Jenco v. Valderra Land Holdings (2025 UT 20): Utah Supreme Court Limits Rule 62(b) Stays to Money Judgments

Introduction

Jenco v. Valderra Land Holdings presented the Utah Supreme Court with a procedural question carrying significant practical consequences for every civil litigator who wishes to halt enforcement of an adverse judgment while an appeal is pending. The dispute arose from a performance trust deed securing Valderra Land Holdings’ obligations to its seller—Jenco, LC and two associated entities (collectively, “Jenco”). When Valderra fell behind on property-tax payments, Jenco sought judicial foreclosure. Valderra counter-claimed, admitted the principal owing, and asked the district court to set the exact payoff amount so it could cure the default and obtain reconveyance of the deed of trust.

The district court obliged. It ordered that upon Valderra’s tender of $1,270,061.54 (plus interest, costs, and fees) Jenco “shall instruct the trustee to reconvey the property.” Valderra paid. Jenco, instead of giving reconveyance instructions, appealed and simultaneously moved ex parte for a stay under Utah R. Civ. P. 62(b)—the provision that, upon posting security, automatically stays “a judgment or order to pay money.” The district court granted the stay. Valderra then filed this separate appeal, arguing that the reconveyance directive was injunctive, not monetary, and therefore could be stayed only discretionarily under Rule 62(c). The Supreme Court unanimously agreed, reversed the stay, and in doing so crystallized an important boundary line between Rule 62(b) and Rule 62(c).

Summary of the Judgment

• Issue: Whether Rule 62(b) applies to an order compelling reconveyance of a trust deed, thereby granting a stay as of right, or whether Rule 62(c) governs because the order is injunctive.
• Holding: Rule 62(b) applies only to “a judgment or order to pay money.” An order that commands affirmative conduct—here, instructing a trustee to reconvey real property—is injunctive and falls under Rule 62(c). Therefore, Jenco was not entitled to a stay as of right; the district court erred by granting the Rule 62(b) stay and by ignoring the discretionary, equitable analysis mandated by Rule 62(c).
• Disposition: The Supreme Court reversed the stay, vacated the related orders, denied Valderra’s separate request for appellate attorney fees (because it had not been awarded fees below), and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Simler v. Chilel, 2016 UT 23
   Cited for the standard of review: application of procedural rules is reviewed for correctness.
2. Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
   Earlier case noting that a money judgment can be stayed “as a matter of right” upon posting a supersedeas bond. The Court distinguished today’s facts because injunctive orders are different.
3. Utah Resources International, Inc. v. Mark Technologies Corp., 2014 UT 60
   Recognized that stay determinations may involve discretion, but today’s opinion clarifies that the source of discretion is Rule 62(c), not Rule 62(b).
4. Federal Rule 62 Jurisprudence
   The district court had relied on several older federal opinions construing a differently worded federal Rule 62(b). The Supreme Court underscored that because Utah’s 2011 restyling inserted the limiting phrase “to pay money,” those federal cases are no longer persuasive.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Analysis of Rule 62
   • Rule 62(b) expressly covers “a judgment or order to pay money.”
   • Rule 62(c) addresses suspending “an injunction” and vests the court with discretion to fashion “conditions … as are just.”
2. Characterisation of the District Court’s Order
   The order Jenco wanted to freeze did not require it to pay money; rather, it compelled Jenco to act—instruct the trustee to reconvey. By Black’s Law Dictionary and common-law tradition, such a command is injunctive.
3. Misplaced Reliance on Federal Authority
   Utah’s rule, post-2011, diverges materially from Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b). Because Utah retained the money-judgment qualifier, federal cases allowing broader stays under an older federal rule could not supersede the Utah rule’s plain language.
4. Prejudice Analysis
   Valderra had shown concrete harm: the cloud of a still-recorded trust deed threatened its development plans and financing. The Court found a “reasonable likelihood” that, had the district court applied Rule 62(c), it might have denied a stay or imposed different conditions (e.g., larger security, expedited notice, or partial reconveyance).

C. Practical Impact of the Decision

• Clarifies Procedure for Stays: Litigants must now classify the underlying judgment accurately. If it compels or restrains conduct (transfer of title, specific performance, cease-and-desist orders, etc.) they must proceed under Rule 62(c), not 62(b).
• End of “Automatic” Stays for Injunctions: Parties cannot obtain an injunction stay merely by posting a bond; courts retain discretion and must weigh equitable factors and the adequacy of security.
• Heightened Protections for Non-Moving Parties: Rule 62(c)’s “just conditions” requirement obliges courts to consider business disruption, project delay, opportunity costs, and other harms—particularly important in real-estate and commercial contexts.
• Guidance for District Courts: The opinion warns against ex parte stay motions absent explicit rule authorization and reminds courts that Utah R. Civ. P. 7(l) limits immediate, no-response rulings to narrow “housekeeping” motions.
• Federal vs. State Rule Divergence: Practitioners who litigate in both federal and state courts must adjust their instincts; Utah retained a narrower money-judgment stay, so “just file a Rule 62(b) bond” is no longer a safe assumption.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Judgment vs. Injunction: A judgment for money orders a sum certain be paid. An injunction orders someone to do—or to refrain from—an act. Reconveying property is an act; hence it’s an injunction.
• Supersedeas Bond / Security: Money or other collateral posted with the court to shield the prevailing party from loss caused by a stay. Under Rule 62(b) it’s largely formulaic (cover the judgment, interest, costs). Under Rule 62(c) it must be tailored to protect against non-monetary harms.
• Stay vs. Suspension: “Stay” under Rule 62(b) freezes enforcement of a money judgment. “Suspension” under Rule 62(c) temporarily halts an injunction’s operation, conditioned on equitable factors.
• Prejudice / Harmless-Error Rule: Under Rule 61, appellate courts disregard procedural errors unless they affect “substantial rights.” Here, the wrong stay mechanism materially harmed Valderra, so reversal was required.

Conclusion

Jenco v. Valderra Land Holdings cements a critical procedural principle: Utah Rule 62(b) grants an automatic stay only for judgments requiring payment of money and does not extend to orders mandating affirmative conduct. Injunctive orders—however labelled—fall under Rule 62(c), where stays are discretionary and conditioned on fairness to the non-moving party. The decision re-balances the equities between judgment debtors and prevailing parties, assures that business-disrupting injunctions are not halted without proper safeguards, and underscores the importance of precise rule application in post-judgment practice. Lawyers and courts alike must heed the opinion’s textualist approach: when Utah’s procedural rule diverges from its federal counterpart, the Utah text governs.