Introduction

In a significant Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) decision, the Eleventh Circuit in Benjamin Watson, Jr. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (No. 24-11310, decided Nov. 10, 2025) affirmed in large part the district court’s dismissal of tort, terrorism, and contract claims brought by victims and families of the December 6, 2019 mass shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola by Royal Saudi Air Force trainee Lt. Mohammed Saeed Al‑Shamrani. But the court revived one critical theory: claims that Saudi Arabia grossly negligently vetted and hired Al‑Shamrani and sent him to the United States for training.

Writing for a unanimous panel (Judges Jill Pryor, Grant, and Marcus), Judge Marcus held that, under JASTA, “mere negligence” excludes only ordinary negligence, not gross negligence; omission-based claims are categorically outside JASTA’s sovereign-immunity exception; and the “caused by” requirement in JASTA is satisfied by proximate cause (not but‑for causation). Applying Florida law, the court found plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to plead grossly negligent acts of commission by Saudi Arabia (e.g., forwarding allegedly false visa materials, nominating, selecting, funding, and sending the trainee) that were a substantial and foreseeable cause of the attack. The court rejected the remaining bundles of claims as barred by discretionary-function immunity, as impermissible omissions, as outside the scope of employment, for failure of proximate cause, or for lack of a clear contractual waiver.

The decision clarifies pleading pathways in JASTA/FSIA cases against foreign states and resets the doctrinal boundaries for negligent‑hiring‑type claims arising from foreign military trainees in U.S. programs.

Summary of the Opinion

• Affirmed in part: Most claims dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under FSIA/JASTA.
• Reversed in part: Plaintiffs’ Florida-law gross-negligent hiring/vetting claims survive a facial jurisdictional attack under JASTA because:
  • “Mere negligence” in 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(d) means ordinary negligence; gross negligence is not excluded.
  • Claims are based on acts of commission (not omissions): forwarding visa materials, nominating/awarding a scholarship, selecting and sending the trainee, funding U.S. studies.
  • “Caused by” in § 1605B(b) requires proximate causation, which plaintiffs plausibly alleged.
• Rejected bundles of claims:
  • Post‑arrival monitoring of social media: barred as omissions under JASTA and discretionary functions under FSIA § 1605(a)(5)(A).
  • Country Liaison Officer (CLO) supervision: optional assignment; even if assigned, supervisory tasks are discretionary; claims also rest on omissions, thus outside JASTA.
  • Vicarious liability for the shooter’s intentional torts: outside scope of employment under Florida law; fails under FSIA’s noncommercial tort exception and JASTA’s scope requirement.
  • ATA support‑for‑terrorism claims: fail on proximate cause; alleged Saudi support for AQAP in Yemen is too attenuated from the U.S. attack.
  • Contract/waiver: LOA indemnity is not a clear, unambiguous waiver of immunity; alleged oral commitments do not waive immunity; jurisdictional discovery properly denied.
• Remand: For the district court to address the Kingdom’s factual jurisdictional challenge to the surviving gross‑negligence bundle.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Lawrence v. Dunbar (11th Cir.): Distinguishes facial vs. factual attacks under Rule 12(b)(1); the panel treats allegations as true at this stage.
• OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs (U.S. Sup. Ct.): Supports grouping overlapping claims by gravamen when assessing FSIA exceptions.
• Saudi Arabia v. Nelson; Calzadilla; Aquamar: FSIA is the exclusive basis for jurisdiction over foreign states; exceptions are construed claim-by-claim; waivers must be clear and unambiguous.
• Cassirer; First Nat’l City Bank; Flohr: FSIA requires applying the same liability rules as for private parties; state law governs scope-of-employment and substantive tort standards.
• Florida negligent hiring line: Malicki v. Doe; Garcia v. Duffy; McCain; Tallahassee Furniture; Williams v. Feather Sound—define employer duties, foreseeability, and the contours of negligent hiring in Florida.
• Florida gross negligence: Carraway v. Revell; Moradiellos; Elec. Boat Corp. v. Fallen—set the three-part test for gross negligence (imminent peril, knowledge, conscious disregard).
• Proximate cause: Grubart (admiralty “caused by” = proximate cause); Rux; Kilburn; Bank of America v. City of Miami; Lexmark; FindWhat; Paroline—anchor the proximate cause standard and reject mere foreseeability or but‑for as sufficient.
• Discretionary function: Varig Airlines; Gaubert; Berkovitz; Swafford; Andrews; Carlyle; Burkhart—frame the two-step test and show supervision/inspection/monitoring decisions are discretionary.
• Scope of employment (Florida): Morrison Motor; Whetzel; Gowan; Spencer—intentional criminal acts not of the kind employed to perform and not in service of the employer’s purpose.
• Contractual waiver: Aquamar; Architectural Ingenieria Siglo XXI; Butler; First City Texas–Houston v. Rafidain Bank—waiver must be clear, complete, and unmistakable; discovery is circumscribed where complaint fails to make a prima facie jurisdictional showing.
• Textual canons/dictionaries: Scalia & Garner, Reading Law (postpositive modifiers; surplusage); Black’s Law Dictionary; Merriam‑Webster—support the interpretations of “mere negligence,” “omission,” and “commission.”

Legal Reasoning

1) JASTA’s “Mere Negligence” and the Commission/Omission Divide

The court reads § 1605B(d)’s phrase—“on the basis of an omission or a tortious act or acts that constitute mere negligence”—using grammar and surplusage canons to conclude:

• “Mere negligence” modifies only “a tortious act or acts.”
• “Omission” stands alone and is categorically excluded from JASTA jurisdiction, regardless of the negligence level.
• Thus, omission‑based claims cannot pierce sovereign immunity under JASTA at all; commission‑based claims can proceed if they allege more than ordinary (i.e., gross) negligence.

This is a careful syntactic holding: the determiner “a” before “tortious act or acts” limits the reach of the modifier “that constitute mere negligence” to the latter phrase. Reading “mere” to include gross negligence would also render the modifier superfluous, violating the surplusage canon. The court also situates “mere negligence” in Eleventh Circuit usage as the opposite of gross negligence.

2) Proximate Cause Is the JASTA Causation Standard

Construing “caused by” in § 1605B(b), the court aligns with common‑law default rules: proximate cause governs, not but‑for cause. The inquiry asks:

• Was the state’s conduct a substantial factor in the sequence leading to injury?
• Was the injury a reasonably foreseeable or natural consequence of that conduct?

On the pleadings, the court answers yes: the alleged acts of commission (visa sponsorship and forwarding, selection and sending, scholarship funding, securing base access) were substantial and foreseeably connected to the attack by a trainee whose violent radicalization was publicly evident.

3) Application of Florida Negligent Hiring and Gross Negligence

Leveraging § 1606 (foreign states liable as private parties), Florida law controls. Plaintiffs adequately pled negligent hiring:

• Duty and breach: Given the nature of the work (training a foreign military officer on U.S. bases), Saudi Arabia had to investigate suitability and failed to do so.
• Discoverability: Public social media from 2015 onward allegedly showed violent, anti‑American, jihadist content traceable to Al‑Shamrani, followed by Saudi officials.
• Unreasonableness: Selecting, certifying, and sending him was unreasonable in light of what the Kingdom knew or should have known.

Elevating to gross negligence, the court finds the complaint plausibly alleges:

• Imminent/clear danger: The nature of the risk (arming and training a radicalized officer on a U.S. base) far exceeded ordinary peril.
• Knowledge: The radical content was public, longstanding, and echoed notorious AQAP ideologue Anwar al‑Awlaki.
• Conscious disregard via acts of commission: Enrolling, nominating, certifying, forwarding visa forms (allegedly with false statements), funding and sending him to U.S. programs—culminating in a foreseeable tragedy.

4) Why Post‑Arrival Monitoring and CLO Supervision Claims Fail

Two independent barriers defeat these claims:

• JASTA’s omission bar: The theories sound in omissions (failure to monitor or to be present or to inspect), which § 1605B(d) excludes categorically.
• FSIA discretionary function: Plaintiffs identified no specific mandatory directive requiring continuous social‑media surveillance or the assignment of a CLO. The Navy TA Manual states a CLO “may be assigned,” and even if assigned, supervisory acts (how to inspect, how often to monitor, what to enforce) are classic policy‑laden discretionary judgments protected by § 1605(a)(5)(A).

5) Vicarious Liability for the Shooter’s Intentional Torts

The noncommercial tort exception and JASTA both require that the state’s official/employee act within the scope of employment. Under Florida law, the shooting was not:

• Of the kind Al‑Shamrani was employed to perform (he was there to learn to fly).
• Activated by a purpose to serve Saudi Arabia (indeed, the attack undermined massive U.S.–Saudi defense interests; the King expressed devastation).

The scope‑of‑employment element thus fails, foreclosing vicarious liability under both FSIA § 1605(a)(5) and JASTA § 1605B(b)(2).

6) ATA “Support for Terrorism” Claims and JASTA’s Causation Gate

Plaintiffs’ ATA claims needed an FSIA exception, and they invoked JASTA. But they did not plausibly plead proximate cause linking alleged Saudi support to AQAP in the Yemeni civil war to the Pensacola attack in the United States. The alleged causal chain is too attenuated: support for a faction in Yemen is not plausibly a substantial factor in, or a natural/foreseeable cause of, a U.S. base shooting by a trainee acting outside his employment.

7) Waiver and Contract Theories; No Jurisdictional Discovery

The LOA indemnity clause is not a clear, unambiguous waiver of FSIA immunity. It says nothing about consenting to suit; it narrowly addresses indemnification related to procurement/furnishing under the LOA. Nor do alleged oral commitments to “take care of families” amount to a waiver. Because the complaint does not make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction via waiver, the district court properly denied jurisdictional discovery limited to that count.

Impact

• Clarified pleading roadmap under JASTA:
  • Omissions are out. Plaintiffs must identify concrete acts of commission by the foreign state.
  • Ordinary negligence is out. Allegations must plausibly rise to gross negligence (or more).
  • Proximate cause controls. Complaints must tie state actions as substantial, foreseeable contributors to the U.S. injury.
• Negligent hiring claims against foreign states can proceed at least past the facial stage where plaintiffs allege specific commission‑based steps (e.g., nominations, visa submissions, funding, deployment decisions) and evident risks.
• Supervision/monitoring theories are largely foreclosed against foreign states by the discretionary‑function carve‑out and JASTA’s omission bar unless a specific, mandatory directive is identified and violated.
• Scope‑of‑employment threshold remains a formidable barrier to vicarious liability for intentional terrorist acts by state employees.
• ATA theories against foreign states must traverse JASTA’s proximate‑cause gate; geopolitical or battlefield‑support allegations untethered to the specific U.S. attack will likely fail.
• LOA indemnity language does not waive FSIA immunity; agencies and counterparties should not assume defense‑trade instruments supply a waiver absent explicit consent‑to‑suit terms.
• Procedural refinement: The Eleventh Circuit endorses claim‑by‑claim FSIA analysis (joining the D.C., Seventh, and Ninth Circuits), aiding clarity in multi‑count complaints.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• FSIA (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act): The default rule is that foreign states are immune from suit in U.S. courts unless a specific statutory exception applies. Exceptions are construed claim‑by‑claim.
• JASTA (Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act): Adds a targeted FSIA exception for U.S. injuries “caused by” an act of international terrorism and a tortious act of the foreign state (or its officials acting within scope). It expressly bars:
  • Claims “on the basis of an omission,” and
  • Claims based on “tortious act[s] that constitute mere negligence.”
• Omission vs. Commission:
  • Omission: Failure to do something legally required (non‑action). Categorically outside JASTA.
  • Commission: An affirmative act—doing something, such as submitting forms, certifying, sending personnel.
• “Mere Negligence” vs. Gross Negligence:
  • Mere/ordinary negligence: Failure to exercise reasonable care—excluded by JASTA.
  • Gross negligence (Florida): Imminent danger, knowledge of that danger, and conscious disregard—eligible under JASTA if based on acts of commission.
• Proximate Cause: The defendant’s conduct must be a substantial factor in the injury and the injury must be a foreseeable, natural consequence of that conduct (more than mere foreseeability alone).
• Discretionary Function (FSIA § 1605(a)(5)(A)): Shields foreign states from tort claims challenging policy‑laden judgments (e.g., how to monitor or supervise), unless a specific, mandatory directive removes discretion.
• Scope of Employment (Florida): Conduct must be of the kind the employee was hired to perform, within time/space limits, and motivated at least in part to serve the employer’s interests.
• Waiver of Immunity: Must be clear, explicit, and unmistakable; indemnity or general cooperation language typically does not suffice.
• Facial vs. Factual Jurisdictional Challenges:
  • Facial: Court assumes well‑pleaded facts are true and tests legal sufficiency.
  • Factual: Court may consider evidence; on remand, the district court will address factual challenges to the surviving claims.

Open Questions and Next Steps on Remand

• The district court must decide whether the gross‑negligent hiring/vetting claims survive a factual jurisdictional challenge. Key factual issues likely include:
  • What Saudi Arabia actually knew or should have known about Al‑Shamrani’s radicalization at the time of nomination and sending.
  • Whether the visa materials were false and knowingly forwarded.
  • The precise chain of causation between Saudi actions and base access/attack.
• Scope and limits of any jurisdictional discovery tied to the surviving claims will be within the district court’s discretion, mindful of comity and FSIA’s purposes.

Conclusion

Watson v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia materially clarifies JASTA and FSIA doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit. The court carefully parses JASTA’s text to hold that “mere negligence” excludes only ordinary negligence and that omission‑based theories are categorically barred. It confirms proximate cause as the causation standard and supplies a concrete template for pleading commission‑based, gross‑negligence claims—here, negligent hiring/vetting that enabled a radicalized trainee to access a U.S. military base. At the same time, the court preserves foreign sovereign immunity for omission‑based supervision/monitoring claims, discretionary‑function decisions, intentional torts outside the scope of employment, attenuated ATA theories, and contract claims lacking a clear waiver.

The opinion sets important procedural and substantive guardrails for future terrorism‑related suits against foreign states. It invites fact development on a narrow but significant negligent‑hiring theory while sharply circumscribing the broader array of claims often asserted in the wake of transnational terrorist incidents. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit both honors Congress’s expansion of civil remedies in JASTA and respects FSIA’s enduring commitment to comity and sovereign prerogatives.