Ivey v. Tuggle: State‑Law Attacks on Prison Administrative Reclassification and 85% Credit Eligibility Are Not Cognizable Under § 2241

Introduction

In Ivey v. Tuggle, No. 25-7049 (10th Cir. Sept. 30, 2025), the Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) to an Oklahoma state prisoner who brought a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition attacking the Oklahoma Department of Corrections’ (ODOC) internal reclassification of his offense and the resulting ineligibility for earned credits under Oklahoma’s “85% Rule.” The court’s order, while nonprecedential, provides a clear and practical restatement of several important habeas principles: (1) a state prisoner’s § 2241 challenge to the execution of a sentence must allege a violation of the Constitution or federal law, not merely state law; (2) arguments not raised in the district court are forfeited on appeal; and (3) irregularities and clerical errors in state court judgments do not, without more, convert a claim into a cognizable federal habeas issue.

Petitioner Douglas Edward Ivey was convicted in 2003 in Oklahoma state court of twenty counts of felony possession of child pornography and sentenced to thirty years on each count, concurrent. Oklahoma law requires certain enumerated offenders to serve at least 85% of their sentence before becoming eligible for parole or for credits that reduce time in custody. Ivey argued that ODOC’s internal reclassification of his statute of conviction and the presence of apparent clerical errors in his state judgment meant he was unlawfully denied earned credits and therefore entitled to earlier release. The district court dismissed his petition and denied a COA; the Tenth Circuit affirmed that outcome by denying a COA and dismissing the appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit denied a COA because Ivey did not make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and Montez v. McKinna.
Ivey’s principal contention on appeal—that Oklahoma law prohibits an executive agency from modifying a criminal sentence—was not raised below and was therefore forfeited under circuit precedent.
Even if considered, the claim sounded exclusively in state law and is not cognizable under § 2241, which provides relief only for custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Alleged irregularities in the state judgment—including a reference to a statute that defines no offense and other apparent clerical issues—do not, on the record presented, establish a federal constitutional violation. The panel characterized the mismatch of statutory citations as, at most, a scrivener’s error.
ODOC’s internal administrative reclassification of the statute of conviction for purposes of applying the 85% Rule did not supply a federal basis for habeas relief; the court found no authority that such internal classification, standing alone, offends federal law.
Ivey’s in forma pauperis motion was granted, but the request for a COA was denied and the appeal dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991): The panel reiterated that while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, courts cannot act as a litigant’s advocate. This framed the court’s approach to Ivey’s filings: generous reading but no supplementation of theories or facts not presented.
Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2000): Central to the disposition. Montez established both that state prisoners proceeding under § 2241 require a COA to appeal and articulated a practical formulation of the COA standard: whether the issues are deserving of further proceedings, subject to a different resolution on appeal, or reasonably debatable among jurists of reason. The panel applied Montez to conclude that none of Ivey’s contentions cleared this threshold.
United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007): Cited for the court’s authority to take judicial notice of publicly filed records relevant to the case’s disposition. This allowed the panel to consult the Oklahoma State Court Network docket reflecting multiple iterations of Ivey’s judgment.
Hancock v. Trammell, 798 F.3d 1002 (10th Cir. 2015): Invoked for the forfeiture principle: arguments not raised in the district court are lost on appeal. Ivey advanced a new state-constitutional separation-of-powers theory on appeal; the court refused to entertain it.
Smith v. Scott, 223 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2000): Recognizes that earned credits can implicate a liberty interest, triggering due process in certain contexts. The panel cited Smith to acknowledge the general constitutional dimension of sentence-credit issues but distinguished Ivey’s claims, which turned on state law and internal reclassification rather than the deprivation of already-awarded credits without process.
Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011): Quoted for the “extreme malfunctions” principle: federal habeas is not for routine error correction in state criminal justice systems. The panel used Greene to emphasize that even if the state proceedings bore clerical irregularities, that is not enough for federal habeas relief absent a constitutional violation.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1: Cited to note that the order is nonbinding precedent but may be cited for its persuasive value. This signals the panel’s intent that the analysis guide future litigants despite its nonprecedential status.

Legal Reasoning

Threshold COA requirement under § 2253(c): Because Ivey filed under § 2241, he needed a COA to appeal the district court’s dismissal. Under Montez, a COA issues only if the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right—effectively, whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution or whether the issues deserve encouragement to proceed further.
Cognizability under § 2241: Section 2241 authorizes relief only when the prisoner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Ivey’s core claim was that ODOC, under Oklahoma law, may not administratively reclassify his offense or apply the state’s 85% Rule to him. As framed, this is a question of state law and state constitutional structure. The panel therefore concluded that the claim is categorically noncognizable in federal habeas.
Forfeiture of new appellate theories: Ivey shifted on appeal to a state separation‑of‑powers argument—that ODOC, an executive agency, had impermissibly modified a judicial sentence by administratively redesignating his offense. Because this theory was not presented to the district court, it was forfeited under Hancock v. Trammell.
No federal violation even if the court looked past forfeiture: The panel addressed the argument in the alternative and found it wanting. It identified several irregularities:
- The operative second amended judgment (2009) lists Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1021.1—a provision that “does not prescribe a crime”—rather than § 1021.2, which sets out the child‑pornography possession offense.
- The judgment references vacating a “first amended judgment entered in 2003,” though the docket shows the first amended judgment filed in 2006.
- Inconsistent spelling of “judgment” across orders.
The court characterized the statute-citation mismatch as a scrivener’s error, consistent with other clerical blemishes on the docket, and noted that Oklahoma could correct it via a simple motion for a third amended judgment. Such clerical irregularities do not translate into a federal constitutional defect in custody.
ODOC’s administrative reclassification does not establish a federal claim: The agency had internally labeled Ivey’s offense under a definitions section, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1024.1, to ensure alignment with the 85% Rule. The panel found no authority that a prison system’s internal designation for administrative purposes violates federal law. The controlling legal effect is the state court judgment and the state credit statute; the internal label does not, by itself, alter the sentence as a matter of federal constitutional law.
The 85% Rule’s continued applicability: The panel reaffirmed that possession of child pornography as charged against Ivey is an enumerated offense under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1, subject to the 85% Rule. Thus, under state law, he is not eligible for parole or earned credits reducing his time to serve until he has completed 85% of his thirty‑year term (projected at least until 2028). The judgment’s notation awarding credit for time served and referencing earned credits does not override the statutory 85% threshold; credits may accrue but cannot effect release before that threshold is reached.
Federal habeas is not a forum for routine state‑law error correction: Invoking Greene v. Fisher, the panel underscored that § 2241 is a guard against “extreme malfunctions,” not a general super‑appellate mechanism to correct state‑law mistakes. Without a pleaded and supported federal constitutional violation, there is nothing on which to grant habeas relief.
Disposition: Ivey’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. But because his issues were neither cognizable as a matter of federal law nor preserved, and because reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s resolution, the court denied a COA and dismissed the appeal.

Impact and Practical Consequences

Clarifies the federal/state boundary in sentence‑execution challenges: State prisoners may use § 2241 to challenge the execution of a sentence (e.g., credit calculations, parole eligibility), but they must anchor their claim in federal law. Purely state‑law disputes—such as whether an agency complied with state statutes when labeling an offense or applying a state credit rule—do not support federal habeas relief.
Reinforces preservation requirements for pro se habeas litigants: Even with liberal construction, new theories raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited. Petitioners should present all federal constitutional theories to the district court to preserve them.
Administrative reclassification is not, without more, a sentence modification: The decision will likely be cited by Oklahoma and other Tenth Circuit correctional systems to defend internal coding changes that align older convictions with current classification schemes. Unless such reclassification itself violates a federal right or results in deprivation of an established liberty interest without due process, it will not sustain § 2241 relief.
Scrivener’s errors are remediable in state court, not in federal habeas: Where the state judgment contains clerical mistakes (e.g., wrong statutory citation), the proper course is a corrective order in state court. Absent a substantive constitutional harm, those errors do not translate into federal habeas relief.
The 85% Rule remains a potent barrier to sentence accelerations: For enumerated offenses, Oklahoma inmates cannot use earned credits to drop below the 85% threshold. After crossing 85%, credits may matter, but before then, challenges premised on early credit application face an uphill battle in federal court.
Citation and persuasive value: While nonprecedential, the order is citable for persuasive value under FRAP 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Expect it to be used to oppose § 2241 petitions predicated on state‑law arguments about credit eligibility and prison administrative designations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 2241 vs. Section 2254: Both are habeas statutes for people “in custody,” but § 2254 generally challenges the validity of the conviction or sentence after state conviction, while § 2241 is often used to challenge the “execution” of a sentence (e.g., how credits or parole eligibility are applied). Either way, state prisoners must allege a violation of federal law to obtain relief.
Certificate of Appealability (COA): A gatekeeping requirement for habeas appeals. A COA issues only if the petitioner makes a substantial showing of a constitutional violation—essentially, if reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s decision or if the claim deserves further proceedings.
Oklahoma’s 85% Rule (Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1): For certain serious offenses, an inmate must serve at least 85% of the sentence before becoming eligible for parole or for sentence‑reducing credits. Credits cannot be used to secure release before that mark is reached.
Earned Credits vs. Jail‑Time Credit: Earned credits are administrative time deductions awarded for conduct or program participation; jail‑time credit is credit for time spent in custody before sentencing. The 85% Rule restricts the effect of credits so that an inmate cannot be released before serving 85% of the imposed term.
Administrative Reclassification: Prisons often re‑code or re‑label convictions internally to align with modern statutes or databases. Such coding does not, by itself, change the judicial sentence. A federal habeas issue arises only if the reclassification violates a federal right or results in unconstitutional custody.
Forfeiture of Issues on Appeal: If a party fails to raise an argument in the district court, the argument is generally lost on appeal. This preserves the adversarial process and prevents sandbagging.
Scrivener’s Error: A clerical or typographical mistake in a judgment or order. Courts can correct such errors without altering substantive rights. Clerical mistakes rarely carry federal constitutional significance.
Judicial Notice of Court Records: Appellate courts may take notice of public court records relevant to the case. This avoids re‑litigating indisputable record facts and helps clarify procedural history.

Conclusion

Ivey v. Tuggle underscores the narrow federal habeas lane for state prisoners challenging the execution of their sentences. The Tenth Circuit’s denial of a COA rests on three bedrock principles: federal habeas relief addresses federal—not state—law violations; arguments must be preserved in the district court; and clerical irregularities and administrative labels, without a resulting constitutional injury, do not justify federal intervention. For Oklahoma inmates subject to the 85% Rule and for counsel litigating credit‑eligibility disputes in the Tenth Circuit, the order serves as a practical reminder: to succeed under § 2241, a petitioner must articulate and support a federal constitutional claim, not simply a disagreement with how state authorities interpret or record state law.