Issue Preclusion, Privity, and Juvenile Abuse Petitions in North Carolina: A Commentary on In re A.D.H.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in In re A.D.H., No. 265PA24 (Dec. 12, 2025), addresses a recurring and conceptually difficult question: when, if ever, may findings in a private child custody action or in related proceedings collaterally estop a county Department of Social Services (DSS) from pursuing a juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency petition?

The case arises out of a protracted, highly contentious dispute involving repeated allegations that a father sexually abused his minor daughter (“Alice”), multiple DSS investigations that found the allegations unsubstantiated, a private custody battle between the parents, and later state-initiated juvenile proceedings. Against that backdrop, the father invoked the doctrine of collateral estoppel to block Carteret County DSS’s juvenile petition, arguing that prior court orders had already determined he did not abuse Alice.

The Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and the trial court, holding that the juvenile petition was not barred by collateral estoppel. In doing so, the Court:

Brings North Carolina’s collateral estoppel doctrine into sharper focus by articulating a clear, five-part test for defensive use of issue preclusion.
Reaffirms that privity remains a distinct, constitutionally rooted requirement, separate from the “full and fair opportunity to litigate” requirement.
Clarifies that DSS is not in privity with parents who litigate a private custody case simply because DSS workers testify there.
Holds that a trial court’s recitation of counsel’s arguments is not an “actual determination” of facts for collateral estoppel purposes.
Strongly condemns Carteret County DSS’s conflict of interest and deems its continued participation in this matter “wholly inappropriate.”

Justice Barringer writes for the Court; Justice Riggs concurs, agreeing with the result but warning that the extreme and unusual facts make the decision a poor vehicle for broad doctrinal pronouncements on privity.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Family Background and Initial Allegations (2021)

Alice was born in 2013 to respondent-mother and respondent-father, who lived together but were never married. They separated in 2018. In February 2021, Mother filed a custody complaint seeking primary custody with Father having secondary placement. A temporary order granted joint legal custody with Mother having primary physical custody and Father visitation.

In March 2021, Alice made statements on the school playground that she and Father had engaged in inappropriate sexual misconduct. The classmate’s parent reported these statements, leading to interviews by the school counselor during which Alice elaborated on the allegations. A report was made to Carteret County DSS.

Because Mother’s aunt was a former Carteret DSS employee with ongoing relationships at the agency, Carteret DSS referred the report to Craven County DSS to avoid a conflict of interest. Craven DSS conducted a months-long investigation (March–July 2021), including:

A trauma screening at a Child Advocacy Center—no disclosures of abuse.
A Child Medical Evaluation—no physical signs of sexual abuse and no disclosures.
A Child and Family Evaluation—raising concerns that Alice was being coached.

Craven DSS social worker Rondy Johnson came to believe Mother was coaching Alice to make false accusations to obtain higher child support. Craven DSS deemed the allegations unsubstantiated and closed the case on July 30, 2021.

B. Continued Allegations and Second DSS Investigation

Despite these findings, Mother continued to deny Father contact with Alice and enrolled Alice with a substance abuse counselor whom the later trial court would find unqualified to counsel children and “quite possibly endorsing a false narrative.” Father filed multiple show cause motions seeking visitation.

After these motions, a second report of the same alleged sexual abuse was made to DSS—this time by the unqualified therapist. Craven DSS again investigated and again concluded:

Mother was coaching Alice.
Father had not abused Alice.
The therapist was unqualified to counsel Alice.

C. The Private Custody Hearing and the Child Custody Order (CCO)

A permanent custody hearing occurred in November 2021 and March 2022. Both parents were represented by counsel. The court heard from:

Craven DSS social workers,
An expert in child abuse and trauma,
Both parents, and others.

The resulting Child Custody Order (CCO) included key findings:

Father did not abuse Alice: “[F]ather did not abuse [Alice] in any way.”
Mother’s willful denial of visitation: She intentionally and knowingly violated the court’s prior order by denying Father contact.
Mother’s lack of credibility: “[M]other’s testimony at the hearing in this matter was untruthful.”

The CCO:

Granted Father primary legal and physical custody.
Found Mother in contempt for denying visitation and for untruthful testimony.
Included a directive that no one other than Alice’s “current, qualified therapist” should discuss the allegations or past allegations against Father with Alice, including school counselors.

D. New Allegations, Interference Petition, and Interference Petition Order (IPO)

On March 28, 2022, Alice’s school counselor again reported alleged sexual misconduct by Father to Carteret DSS, allegedly occurring the previous weekend. Carteret DSS interviewed Alice at the Child Advocacy Center and recommended another Child Medical Examination. Father refused, relying on the CCO’s restriction on discussing past allegations with Alice.

Craven DSS filed an “interference petition” seeking, among other relief, an order compelling the medical examination. Father moved to dismiss. At the June 17, 2022 hearing, Craven DSS’s attorney stated DSS could complete its investigation without a medical evaluation. The trial court granted Father’s motion and dismissed the interference petition with prejudice. In the resulting Interference Petition Order (IPO), the trial court recited, as arguments by Father’s counsel, that prior allegations had been unsubstantiated.

E. The July and August 2022 Allegations and the Juvenile Petition

Shortly after, Alice attended a sleepover. She allegedly disclosed further sexual misconduct by Father. On July 11, 2022, the friend’s mother reported these disclosures to Carteret DSS. Although timing of the alleged conduct was unclear, Carteret DSS attempted another investigation. Father again refused to cooperate, citing the CCO. The trial court then issued a temporary emergency custody order on July 15, 2022, granting Father emergency custody and restraining Mother from removing Alice.

On August 29, 2022 (Alice’s first day of school), Carteret DSS social worker Kelly Dorman removed Alice from class and questioned her about all prior abuse allegations. Based on Alice’s statements, Carteret DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that Alice was an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile.

Before filing, Carteret DSS attempted once more to refer the matter to Craven DSS because of its conflict of interest stemming from Mother’s aunt’s relationship with Carteret DSS staff. Craven DSS refused to re-engage, citing lack of evidence of abuse. Carteret DSS thus proceeded with the petition.

The juvenile petition alleged:

The original March 2021 playground allegations (the subject of Craven DSS’s investigations and the CCO).
The therapist-based allegations from late 2021 (also considered in the CCO).
The March 28, 2022 allegation (subject of the interference petition and IPO).
The July 2022 sleepover disclosure (new to the court).
Additional statements Alice made during the August 29, 2022 interview by Dorman (new to the court, though timing of alleged abuse was unclear).

The trial court later found severe conflict-of-interest facts regarding Carteret DSS, including:

Social worker Dorman previously worked with Mother’s aunt (a former Carteret DSS employee).
Dorman and the aunt were social media “friends.”
Dorman and other Carteret DSS staff were tagged by the aunt in fundraising posts specifically seeking money for Mother’s custody litigation against Father.

The Supreme Court later described Carteret DSS’s continued involvement as “wholly inappropriate” in light of this conflict.

F. Dismissal of the Juvenile Petition and Appellate Decisions

Father responded to the juvenile petition, moving to dismiss on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds, arguing Carteret DSS was trying to relitigate issues already adjudicated in the CCO and IPO, and pointing to the temporary emergency custody order as well.

On September 19, 2022, the district court entered a Juvenile Petition Order (JPO) dismissing the juvenile petition with prejudice “pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”

On appeal, the Court of Appeals:

Held that the dispute was “most squarely governed by collateral estoppel, rather than res judicata.”
Concluded, in a relatively summary fashion, that as to the CCO and IPO, the elements of collateral estoppel were met and that earlier findings that Father had not abused Alice precluded relitigation of those same abuse allegations in the juvenile petition.
But held the trial court went too far in dismissing the entire petition, because the July and August 2022 allegations had not yet been litigated and therefore could not be estopped.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings limited to the new allegations.

Carteret DSS sought discretionary review, challenging the applicability of collateral estoppel based on the CCO and IPO. The Supreme Court granted review.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reverses the Court of Appeals and holds that the district court erred in dismissing the juvenile petition on collateral estoppel grounds.

The Court:

Clarifies the governing test for defensive collateral estoppel in North Carolina as requiring:
1. A valid final judgment on the merits in a previous suit.
2. Identity of issues between the earlier and later suits.
3. Issues that were actually litigated and necessary to the prior judgment.
4. Issues actually determined in the earlier proceeding.
5. The party to be estopped was a party or in privity with a party to the prior suit and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
Rejects the Court of Appeals’ view that DSS was a party or in privity with the parents in the custody case. DSS’s social workers merely testified; DSS did not intervene. The parents’ interests in private custody are not the same as DSS’s statutory mandate to protect juveniles and investigate abuse under N.C.G.S. § 7B-302.
Holds that the Interference Petition Order (IPO) did not actually determine the factual issue of abuse. The order simply recited Father’s counsel’s arguments; such recitations are not findings of fact and cannot support issue preclusion.
Therefore concludes that neither the CCO nor the IPO can collaterally estop the juvenile court from hearing and adjudicating the allegations in the juvenile petition.
Reverses and remands for further proceedings on the juvenile petition.
Expressly notes a serious conflict of interest at Carteret DSS and states that the agency’s continued participation in the matter is “wholly inappropriate,” signaling that on remand another DSS should handle the case.

Justice Riggs concurs in the result and particularly in the conflict-of-interest admonition but emphasizes that the case’s fact pattern is so unusual that it should not be treated as a broad clarifying precedent on privity in collateral estoppel. He urges that the decision be read narrowly and that future, more typical cases should provide more definitive guidance in this area.

IV. Doctrinal Analysis

A. Collateral Estoppel in North Carolina: From King and Summers to McInnis and Whitacre

The Court begins by reciting the traditional North Carolina formulation of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) as articulated in State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620 (2000) (quoting King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348 (1973)) and State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C. 411 (1996):

“[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel ‘precludes relitigation of a fact, question or right in issue’ when the following requirements are met: there has been a final judgment or decree, necessarily determining [the] fact, question or right in issue, rendered by a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, and there is a later suit involving an issue as to the identical fact, question or right theretofore determined, and involving identical parties or parties in privity with a party or parties to the prior suit.”

From this formulation, later cases distilled four “issue” elements: identity of issues, actual litigation, materiality to the prior disposition, and necessity to the judgment. The less-clear element has always been privity.

The Court reaffirms its definition of privity from Whitacre Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 36 (2004): a person “so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.” Privity is expressly linked to due process, citing Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464 (1918): the state cannot, consistent with due process, give conclusive effect to a judgment against someone who was neither a party nor in privity with a party.

The Court then contrasts privity with the earlier doctrine of mutuality. Historically, mutuality required that only those who would themselves have been bound by a judgment could invoke it defensively against others. This symmetry proved excessively rigid. Following the “modern trend,” North Carolina abandoned mutuality for defensive use of collateral estoppel in Thomas M. McInnis & Associates v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421 (1986), adopting the approach pioneered by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942) and later by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).

McInnis removed mutuality but added a due process limitation: the party to be estopped must have had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” the issue in the earlier action.

In re A.D.H. synthesizes these strands and states the current law expressly: for defensive collateral estoppel to apply in North Carolina, five requirements must be met:

A valid final judgment on the merits.
A later suit involving identical issues.
The issue was actually litigated in the prior suit and was necessary to the judgment.
The issue was actually determined in the prior proceeding.
The party to be estopped was a party or in privity with a party to the earlier suit, and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

This is important doctrinally for two reasons:

It explicitly retains privity as a necessary element even after McInnis; privity is not “subsumed” into the full-and-fair-opportunity concept.
It confirms that the “full and fair opportunity” requirement is an additional due process safeguard, not a substitute for privity.

Thus, collateral estoppel may bind non-parties only where a privity relationship that satisfies due process is present, and even then only if those parties (or their privies) had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.

B. Application to the Child Custody Order (CCO): No Privity Between DSS and Parents

The key question with respect to the CCO was whether Carteret County DSS, the party against whom collateral estoppel was asserted in the juvenile case, was:

A party to the custody case (it was not), or
In privity with Mother or Father, the actual parties to that case.

The Court of Appeals believed that both Carteret and Craven DSS had “intervened” in the custody action and thus were in privity with the parents. The Supreme Court finds “no basis in the record” for that statement:

The only parties to the custody action were Mother and Father.
Craven DSS workers testified, but serving as a witness does not make DSS a party.
There is no indication either DSS formally intervened or controlled the litigation.

Nor, the Court holds, can it be said that Mother or Father “represented the legal rights” of DSS:

DSS’s statutory interest under N.C.G.S. § 7B-302 is in investigating reports of abuse, neglect, and dependency and taking action to protect juvenile safety (through removal, protective services, etc.).
That institutional interest is distinct from the parents’ interests in a custody dispute, which focus on allocation of parental rights and visitation under a “best interests of the child” standard.
Indeed, DSS frequently takes positions adverse to parents and does so on behalf of the State and the child, as exemplified in cases like In re Z.O.M., 373 N.C. 87 (2019) and In re D.I.L., 380 N.C. 723 (2022).

Because Carteret DSS was neither a party to the custody action nor in privity with either parent, the CCO could not be used to collaterally estop DSS in later juvenile litigation. The fact that the CCO contained a finding that Father “did not abuse [Alice] in any way” does not matter for collateral estoppel purposes unless the other elements—particularly privity—are met.

This is a critical holding: it prevents parents from using their successes in private custody litigation to bind DSS (and, indirectly, the State) in separate juvenile protection proceedings when DSS did not control or participate as a party in those earlier cases.

C. Application to the Interference Petition Order (IPO): No “Actually Determined” Findings

The Interference Petition Order is even weaker as a basis for collateral estoppel. While the Court of Appeals assumed overlapping issues had been litigated and determined, the Supreme Court closely examines the text of the IPO and finds that it:

Recorded what “Counsel for [Father] argued to the court,”
But did not contain any independent findings of fact on whether Father abused Alice.

North Carolina law is clear that:

Trial courts may describe testimony or arguments in an order, but they must still make their own findings of fact resolving material disputes. See In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 446 (2005); In re L.C., 387 N.C. 475, 482 (2025).
Findings are those determinations the court itself makes, not merely what it says “counsel argued” or what a witness “testified.”

The Supreme Court emphasizes that the IPO simply recounts Father’s contentions about prior unsubstantiated allegations; it does not adopt them as findings, does not weigh credibility, and does not adjudicate whether abuse occurred.

Therefore, the IPO fails the “actually determined” requirement of collateral estoppel: no factual issue regarding abuse was actually decided by the trial court. Without such a determination, there is nothing to preclude relitigation.

Even beyond what the Court expressly says, it is noteworthy that the dispositive ruling in the IPO—granting Father’s motion to dismiss the interference petition with prejudice—rested on Craven DSS’s statement that it could complete its investigation without a medical examination. Whether Father did or did not abuse Alice was not logically necessary to that decision. Even if the order had contained “no abuse” language, it might well have been dicta and hence not “necessary to the judgment,” a separate bar to issue preclusion.

D. The Standard-of-Review / Standard-of-Proof Question: What the Court Does Not Decide

The Court of Appeals had framed “the more meaningful dispute” as whether collateral estoppel could apply “given the discrepancy in the standard of review between the CCO and the present litigation.” In other words, it focused on differences between:

Private custody determinations (best interests standard, typically preponderance of the evidence), and
Juvenile abuse adjudications (statutorily requiring clear and convincing evidence and implicating different statutory purposes under Chapter 7B).

The Supreme Court does not adopt or develop this line of analysis. Instead, it resolves the case by concluding that basic elements of collateral estoppel—particularly privity and “actually determined” findings—are absent. The Court thus leaves for another day the more delicate question of whether and to what extent differences in evidentiary standards and statutory frameworks might independently bar issue preclusion between custody and juvenile proceedings.

This restraint is important: while the Court acknowledges the Court of Appeals' concern, it chooses to decide narrowly, based on clear failures to satisfy core doctrinal requirements.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. King v. Grindstaff and State v. Summers

King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348 (1973), and State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620 (2000), provide the classic North Carolina framing of collateral estoppel, tying it to a final judgment, identical issues, and parties or privies. Summers also stresses that privity is fact-dependent and lacks a single universal definition. In re A.D.H. quotes these cases and uses their language to structure its restatement of the doctrine.

B. State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi and Whitacre Partnership

In Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C. 411 (1996), and Whitacre Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1 (2004), the Court explored privity and its due process foundations. Whitacre in particular defined privity as identification in legal interest and clarified that due process is not violated when a privy is bound by litigation where the primary party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

In re A.D.H. relies on Whitacre to:

Affirm that privity is a due-process device that determines who can be bound by a prior judgment.
Separate privity from the concept of full and fair opportunity to litigate, which concerns whether it is fair to bind that person on constitutional grounds.

C. McInnis, Bernhard, and Blonder-Tongue: Mutuality and Defensive Use

Thomas M. McInnis & Associates v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421 (1986), is North Carolina’s watershed case abandoning the mutuality requirement for defensive collateral estoppel. Relying on Bernhard v. Bank of America (Cal. 1942) and Blonder-Tongue Labs. (U.S. 1971), McInnis held that:

A defendant may invoke a prior judgment against a plaintiff even if that defendant was not a party to the first action,
So long as the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue earlier.

In re A.D.H. adopts McInnis’s pragmatic abandonment of mutuality, but insists that privity survives as a constitutionally grounded limitation on who may be bound. In other words:

There is no limitation on who may invoke collateral estoppel defensively (mutuality is gone).
But there remains a limitation on whom it may be invoked against: only parties and their privies who had a full and fair chance to litigate.

D. In re C.L.C. and In re L.C.: Recitations vs. Findings

In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438 (2005), and In re L.C., 387 N.C. 475 (2025), address the content of trial court “findings of fact.” They accept that a trial court may recite evidence or testimony, but reiterate that real findings must:

Resolve material disputes and state what the court actually finds to be true, not merely what a party asserted.

In re A.D.H. applies this principle to conclude that the IPO’s narrative of “Counsel for [Father] argued…” is not a set of findings and cannot satisfy the “actually determined” element of collateral estoppel.

E. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport

The Court cites Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464 (1918), for the foundational due process principle that a person who was neither a party nor in privity with a party to a prior proceeding cannot be conclusively bound by that judgment. This reinforces privity’s constitutional role: absent privity, binding a nonparty violates due process.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Collateral Estoppel vs. Res Judicata

Res judicata (claim preclusion) bars a party from relitigating a claim or cause of action that has already been resolved in a prior final judgment between the same parties or their privies.
Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bars relitigation of a specific issue of fact or law that:
- Was actually litigated,
- Actually determined, and
- Necessary to the prior judgment.
Here, the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court treated the case as primarily a collateral estoppel problem, not res judicata, because the juvenile abuse petition is a different type of proceeding from the parents’ custody dispute.

B. Privity

Privity exists where two persons or entities are so closely aligned in legal interest that one effectively represents the same legal right as the other in litigation. Examples can include:

Successors in interest (e.g., purchasers of property after a boundary dispute).
Agents or principals where one controls the litigation.
Parties who are legally obligated to defend another’s interests.

In In re A.D.H., the Court holds:

DSS’s institutional interest in protecting children and enforcing Chapter 7B is distinct from parents’ personal custody interests.
Mere testimony by DSS workers in a custody trial does not create privity.

C. Mutuality

Mutuality once meant that only someone who would have been bound by a judgment if it went the other way could use it against someone else. North Carolina, following modern practice, has abandoned mutuality for defensive collateral estoppel:

A defendant can rely on a favorable judgment from a case it was not part of, as long as the plaintiff had a full and fair chance to litigate the issue in that previous case.

Privity and mutuality serve different functions: privity defines who can be bound; mutuality (now largely discarded for defensive use) limited who can invoke preclusion.

D. “Actually Litigated” and “Actually Determined”

Actually litigated means the parties genuinely disputed the issue, presented evidence, and the court had to resolve it to decide the prior case.
Actually determined means the court made a clear decision on the issue, reflected in its findings or necessary reasoning—not in passing comments or counsel’s arguments.
In the IPO, no such determination of abuse occurred; the order only recited what Father’s counsel argued.

E. Defensive vs. Offensive Collateral Estoppel

Defensive use: a defendant prevents a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff previously lost (as Father attempted here against DSS).
Offensive use: a plaintiff seeks to prevent a defendant from contesting an issue the defendant previously lost against someone else.
McInnis and In re A.D.H. deal with the defensive use; mutuality is abolished in that context, subject to privity and due process safeguards.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. Implications for DSS and Juvenile Proceedings

The ruling has significant consequences for how DSS interacts with prior private litigation:

DSS is generally not bound by private custody judgments on abuse findings unless it was a party or in privity with a party in that case.
The State, acting through DSS, retains the ability—and, under N.C.G.S. § 7B-302, the obligation—to investigate new allegations and pursue juvenile petitions, even when parents have previously litigated similar issues in domestic actions.
Parents cannot use favorable custody findings as a blanket shield against state-initiated juvenile proceedings, particularly where DSS had no direct control over the prior litigation.

This protects the independent role of child protective services and ensures that the State’s interest in child safety is not subordinated to the outcome of private litigation to which the State was not a party.

B. Clarification of Collateral Estoppel Doctrine

Doctrinally, In re A.D.H.:

Provides a clear five-element test for defensive collateral estoppel in North Carolina.
Confirms that:
- Privity remains a live, independent requirement grounded in due process; and
- The “full and fair opportunity to litigate” test is in addition to, not a substitute for, privity.
Reinforces that mere recitations of arguments or testimony in an order do not satisfy the “actually determined” requirement for issue preclusion.

At the same time, Justice Riggs’s concurrence cautions against treating this case as fully clarifying privity doctrine because:

The factual pattern—conflicts of interest, cross-county referrals, multiple overlapping proceedings—is “extreme and unusual.”
Some privity questions (especially as between referring and receiving county DSS agencies) are closer than the majority opinion suggests and deserve more thorough exploration in a different, more typical case.

C. Guidance for Trial Courts on Findings and Order Drafting

The decision sends a strong signal to trial courts:

Orders must distinguish between:
- What parties “argued” or “contended,” and
- What the court actually finds as fact after weighing evidence.
Findings of fact must resolve material disputes; recitations of arguments do not suffice.
When orders use language like “counsel argued,” courts should not later treat those recitations as adjudicated facts supporting collateral estoppel.

This has broader significance beyond the juvenile context, reinforcing best practices for order drafting in civil and criminal matters where issue preclusion may later arise.

D. Conflicts of Interest in DSS Practice

Although not the main doctrinal holding, the Court’s commentary on conflicts of interest is unusually blunt:

The Court is “seriously troubled” by evidence that:
- A Carteret DSS worker (Dorman) had a prior working relationship and ongoing social media relationship with Mother’s aunt, a former DSS employee.
- Dorman and other Carteret DSS staff were tagged in fundraising posts raising money for Mother’s custody battle against Father.
The Court declares Carteret DSS’s continued participation in the juvenile matter “wholly inappropriate.”

Overlaying this with N.C.G.S. § 7B-302.1 (as amended by S.L. 2025-16), which requires a county DSS with a conflict to request another county to conduct the assessment, the opinion strongly underscores:

The need for DSS agencies to vigilantly identify and avoid conflicts, including personal or social-media-based entanglements.
The importance of honoring conflict referrals: once a conflict is identified, the referring county should not later reinsert itself into the case in a partisan fashion.

Justice Riggs’s concurrence goes further conceptually, suggesting:

If a former DSS agent effectively funds or directs a parent’s litigation strategy, that could alter the privity analysis (although, in his view, the line was not definitively crossed here).
Under § 7B-302.1, when a conflicted county refers a case and another county “assumes the management of the case,” complex agency and privity issues could arise between the two DSS offices in future litigation.

E. Limits of the Decision: “Bad Facts Make Bad Law”

Justice Riggs invokes the maxim that “bad cases make bad law,” urging that In re A.D.H. be:

Understood as applying settled collateral estoppel principles to an abnormal set of facts, not as a comprehensive redefinition of privity.
Treated as narrowly cabined to its “unique facts,” particularly those involving alleged coaching of a child, repeated unsubstantiated abuse allegations, and serious conflicts within DSS.

He notes that:

The same district judge (Judge McFadyen) heard both the custody and interference matters, providing unusual judicial continuity.
The interference petition replayed many facts already litigated in the custody case.
This context makes it tempting—but potentially dangerous—to stretch collateral estoppel to prevent what appears to be abusive relitigation of false allegations.

Ultimately, the concurrence signals that future, cleaner cases—particularly those involving more standard privity questions among government entities and between government and private actors—will be better vehicles for doctrinal refinement.

VIII. Conclusion

In re A.D.H. stands at the intersection of child protection, domestic relations, and civil procedure. It does not decide whether the father abused his child; rather, it determines that earlier private litigation cannot, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, foreclose the State’s statutory duty to investigate and litigate a juvenile abuse petition where:

DSS was not a party to the prior proceedings,
DSS was not in privity with those parties, and
The prior orders did not actually determine the relevant factual issues in a way that satisfies issue-preclusion requirements.

The decision clarifies and restates North Carolina’s defensive collateral estoppel doctrine, emphasizing:

A five-part test that includes both privity and full and fair opportunity to litigate.
The constitutional function of privity as a due process safeguard that limits who may be bound by judgments.
The requirement that issues be actually litigated and actually determined, not merely argued or assumed.

Equally important is the Court’s insistence on ethical clarity within DSS, denouncing the conflict of interest in Carteret County as “wholly inappropriate” and underscoring the structural safeguards in Chapter 7B for conflict referrals between counties.

In the broader legal landscape, In re A.D.H.:

Affirms the independence of juvenile abuse proceedings from private custody disputes.
Provides practical guidance to courts and practitioners on drafting orders and evaluating collateral estoppel claims.
Signals that privity and due process will continue to cabin the reach of issue preclusion in North Carolina, especially in sensitive child welfare contexts.

At the same time, as the concurrence underscores, the case should be read with awareness of its atypical and troubling facts. Future decisions will likely build on this foundation to address privity and collateral estoppel in more typical and systemic settings. For now, In re A.D.H. offers a carefully limited, but important, reinforcement of due process protections in the use of issue preclusion against government agencies charged with protecting children.