Issue Forfeiture and Appeals Council Discretion in Social Security Disability Appeals: Commentary on Patrick J.P. Leach v. Commissioner of Social Security

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in Patrick J.P. Leach v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 24‑11251 (11th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), affirms the denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income to a pro se claimant. Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion is instructive on several recurring issues in Social Security litigation:

The highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard in judicial review of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions.
The stringent criteria for meeting or equaling a “listed impairment” at step three of the sequential evaluation process.
How ALJs must evaluate medical opinion evidence under the post‑2017 regulations, which reject the old “treating physician rule.”
The doctrine of issue forfeiture for arguments not raised in the district court, applied explicitly to a pro se Social Security claimant.
The scope of arbitrary‑and‑capricious review of Appeals Council decisions, especially denials of deadline extensions.

The appellant, Patrick Leach, proceeding without counsel on appeal, raised three main sets of challenges:

The ALJ allegedly erred in finding that his physical and mental impairments did not meet or equal listed impairments under the Social Security regulations.
The ALJ allegedly erred in assessing his residual functional capacity (RFC) and in relying on a vocational expert (VE) to determine that he could perform certain jobs.
The Appeals Council allegedly acted arbitrarily and capriciously and violated due process by denying his request for a second extension of time and by failing to consider additional evidence (a Social Security Administration letter).

The Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirms the district court’s judgment and, by extension, the ALJ’s denial of benefits. The opinion’s significance lies less in any new doctrine and more in its clear consolidation of existing standards: strict evidentiary requirements for “listed” impairments, a robust application of forfeiture principles to unpreserved issues (even for pro se claimants), and a strong deference to the Appeals Council’s management of its own procedural deadlines.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court structures its analysis into four parts:

Part I – Standard of Review and Listings: The court reiterates that its review is limited to whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Applying this framework, the panel concludes that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Leach’s impairments did not meet or equal several relevant listings for musculoskeletal issues, visual acuity, digestive‑related weight loss, and various mental disorders.
Part II – RFC and Vocational Expert Challenges: The court holds that Leach forfeited his challenges to the ALJ’s RFC determination and reliance on a vocational expert because he did not raise these issues in the district court. No “extraordinary circumstances” justify excusing the forfeiture.
Part III – Appeals Council’s Denial of Second Extension and Other Allegations: The court applies arbitrary‑and‑capricious/abuse‑of‑discretion review to the Appeals Council’s denial of a second extension to file exceptions to the ALJ’s decision and upholds the denial. It further holds that Leach forfeited his arguments that the Appeals Council should have considered an SSA letter as evidence and that his due process rights were violated, because those arguments were not raised below.
Part IV – Disposition: The court affirms the district court’s judgment.

Functionally, the panel closes the door on Leach’s claim at three levels:

On the merits of whether he met or equaled a listing (resolved against him).
On the procedural preservation of his RFC/VE and Appeals Council evidence/due‑process arguments (found forfeited).
On the agency’s discretion in managing its deadlines and extensions (upheld under arbitrary‑and‑capricious review).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Posture and Framework

Leach challenged the Commissioner’s denial of benefits in the Southern District of Florida. The district court affirmed. On appeal, because the Appeals Council denied review, the Eleventh Circuit reviews the ALJ’s decision as the final agency decision. The panel cites:

Viverette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021) – confirming that where the Appeals Council denies review, the ALJ’s decision is the relevant decision for judicial review.

Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), judicial review is limited. The court restates the traditional two‑pronged inquiry:

Is there substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s findings?
Did the ALJ apply the correct legal standards?

The panel cites:

Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002)
Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018) – legal standards are reviewed de novo.

This framework anchors the entire opinion: if the ALJ’s fact‑finding is supported by substantial evidence and the legal standards are correct, the court must affirm even if the evidence could also support a contrary conclusion.

B. The First Issue: Listed Impairments and Substantial Evidence

1. Legal standard for disability and listed impairments

To be eligible for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a claimant must be “disabled” as defined in the Social Security Act. The court restates:

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1) – entitlement to benefits requires disability.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) – disability means inability to engage in “substantial gainful activity” due to a medically determinable impairment expected to result in death or lasting at least 12 months.

Under the five‑step sequential evaluation (referenced via 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v) and Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005)), step three asks whether the claimant’s impairments meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in the regulations (the “Listings”). Meeting a listing is effectively a presumption of disability.

The panel emphasizes the substantial evidence standard:

Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001): Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983): More than a scintilla, less than a preponderance.
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004): If supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ’s findings are conclusive.

The court concludes that, under this deferential standard, the ALJ’s determination that Leach did not meet or equal a listing is adequately supported.

2. Musculoskeletal disorders – Listings 1.00, 1.02, 1.04 (and 1.14/1.15)

Leach’s primary physical complaints were musculoskeletal: back issues, shoulder pain with bullet fragments around the scapula, and alleged neuropathy. The court describes the relevant musculoskeletal framework in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, pt. A § 1.00 et seq.

A musculoskeletal disorder satisfies the functional criteria of a listing when the medical records show at least one of the following (under § 1.00(E)(3)(a)–(c)):

A documented medical need to use a mobility device (e.g., a walker).
Inability to use one upper extremity for work‑related fine and gross movements and a documented medical need for a one‑handed assistive device.
Inability to use both upper extremities to independently initiate, sustain, and complete work‑related fine and gross movements.

For conditions compromising a nerve root (e.g., degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine), the applicable listing (identified here as § 1.15(A)–(D), though the text also references § 1.14) requires all of the following:

Radicular distribution of pain, paresthesia, or muscle fatigue.
Radicular distribution of neurological signs on examination (e.g., muscle weakness, signs of root irritation, decreased sensation, sensory nerve deficits).
Imaging consistent with a compromised nerve root.
Impairment‑related physical limitations lasting or expected to last 12 months, with documentation of at least one of the functional criteria in § 1.00(E)(3)(a)–(c).

The Eleventh Circuit upholds the ALJ’s finding that Leach did not meet these criteria. Key factual points supporting this conclusion:

No evidence that Leach required a walker, cane, or similar mobility device during the relevant period.
No documented inability to perform fine and gross movements with either upper extremity; he scored well on strength testing in both arms.
Imaging showed bullet fragments around his scapula but no significant degenerative changes in his shoulder.
Spinal imaging revealed bulging discs but “no degeneration in his spine.”
Neuropathy testing in the lower extremities did not show deficits in fine motor skills.
Functionally, Leach drove regularly, was capable of exercise and normal ambulation, and reported doing pushups, chin‑ups, and frequent walking.

The court thus accepts that the ALJ reasonably found that neither functional criteria nor required neurological findings were present in the record at a level and duration consistent with the Listings.

3. Visual impairment – Listing 2.02 (Loss of central visual acuity)

Leach also alleged severe visual impairment. Listing 2.02 requires that the claimant’s remaining vision in the better eye be 20/200 or less after best correction. The court notes:

Leach’s medical records repeatedly showed visual acuity of 20/60 during the relevant period.
20/60, while imperfect, is far better than 20/200, and therefore does not meet Listing 2.02.

Because listings are stringent, falling short of the numeric requirement—even by a modest margin—defeats a listing claim.

4. Digestive‑related weight loss – Listing 5.08

Listing 5.08 addresses weight loss due to digestive disorders, evaluated primarily via body mass index (BMI) thresholds and duration, under 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, pt. A § 5.00(F).

The court finds substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that Leach did not meet this listing:

The record did not support an inability to eat or maintain weight because of a digestive disorder.

5. Mental impairments – Listings 12.04, 12.07, 12.08, 12.15 and Paragraph B

Leach alleged multiple mental health conditions, including:

Post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
Antisocial personality disorder
Schizoaffective disorder
Depression
Bipolar disorder
Pain disorder

The applicable listings are:

12.04 – Depressive, bipolar, and related disorders
12.07 – Somatic symptom and related disorders
12.08 – Personality and impulse‑control disorders
12.15 – Trauma‑ and stressor‑related disorders

Each listing requires, among other things, satisfaction of the Paragraph B criteria, which focus on four broad areas of mental functioning (20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, pt. A § 12.00(A)(2)(b)):

Understanding, remembering, or applying information
Interacting with others
Concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace
Adapting or managing oneself

To meet Paragraph B, a claimant must show either:

An extreme limitation in one area, or
Marked limitations in two areas.

The regulations define these terms:

Extreme limitation: The person cannot function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis in that area. § 12.00(F)(2)(c).
Marked limitation: The person’s ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is “seriously limited.” § 12.00(F)(2)(d).

Although Leach had several serious diagnoses, the ALJ—and the Eleventh Circuit—focus on his actual functioning as documented in the record:

He was often noted to be alert, oriented, cooperative, and easy to work with.
He attended school during part of the relevant period, indicating some ability to concentrate, persist, and manage himself in a structured environment.

The panel accepts the ALJ’s conclusion that these facts are inconsistent with an “extreme” limitation in any one domain or “marked” limitations in two domains. Consequently, Leach did not satisfy the Paragraph B criteria for any of the cited mental health listings.

6. Evaluation of medical opinions – Rejection of the “treating physician rule”

Leach argued that the ALJ improperly discounted his treating physicians’ opinions in favor of non‑treating physicians, presumably invoking the former “treating physician rule” that gave special deference to treating sources. The opinion responds by emphasizing the governing regulation:

20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a): The Social Security Administration “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) . . . including those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.”

Since March 2017, the SSA has abandoned the treating‑physician rule. Instead, all medical opinions are evaluated under “supportability” and “consistency” factors, and ALJs must explain how these factors apply, but no source gets automatic controlling weight.

The Eleventh Circuit finds that:

The ALJ treated all opinions under the regulation, without granting automatic deference to treating providers.
The ALJ permissibly discounted medical opinions to the extent they were unsupported or inconsistent with other evidence.
The ALJ adequately articulated reasons regarding “supportability” and “consistency,” satisfying § 416.920c(b)(2), (c).

Thus, Leach’s challenge to the weighing of medical opinion evidence fails as a matter of law given the current regulatory framework and as a matter of substantial evidence based on the record.

Having addressed the listings and medical evidence, the Eleventh Circuit holds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Leach’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. That resolves his primary merits issue at step three.

C. The Second Issue: Forfeiture of RFC and Vocational Expert Challenges

Leach also attempted on appeal to challenge:

The ALJ’s assessment of his residual functional capacity (RFC), and
The ALJ’s reliance on a vocational expert (VE) to find that jobs exist in the national economy that he can perform.

However, he had not presented these challenges to the district court. The Eleventh Circuit holds these arguments are forfeited.

1. Forfeiture doctrine for issues not raised below

The panel relies on:

Flowers v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 97 F.4th 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2024): Arguments not raised before the district court are forfeited; appellate courts typically will not consider them absent extraordinary circumstances.
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008): Even for pro se litigants, issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned. By extension, a pro se status does not exempt a litigant from preservation rules.

To identify when an appellate court may excuse forfeiture, the panel quotes Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2006), which lists “extraordinary circumstances,” including:

A question of pure law and a risk of grave miscarriage of justice.
No opportunity to raise the argument earlier.
Interests of substantial justice.
The correct resolution is beyond any doubt.
Issues of great public concern.

The court finds none of these circumstances present. Leach had ample opportunity in the district court to challenge his RFC assessment and the VE testimony but failed to do so.

2. Application to pro se claimants

Significantly, the panel applies this forfeiture doctrine without relaxation for Leach’s pro se status on appeal:

It notes that the forfeiture rule applies to pro se appellants (citing Timson).

This reinforces a critical procedural principle: even in Social Security disability cases, and even for pro se claimants, arguments not raised in the district court will typically not be heard for the first time on appeal. The court thereby:

Refuses to reach the substantive merits of Leach’s RFC and VE challenges.
Signals that litigants (and counsel) must develop all relevant theories in the district court record.

D. The Third Issue: Appeals Council’s Denial of Second Extension and Related Claims

Leach next argued that the Appeals Council acted:

Arbitrarily and capriciously in denying his second request for an extension of time to file exceptions to the ALJ’s decision.
In violation of his due process rights by failing to grant that extension and failing to consider a letter from the Social Security Administration as new evidence.

The panel addresses only the first argument on the merits; it holds that Leach forfeited the SSA‑letter and due‑process arguments by not raising them in the district court.

1. Legal standard – Arbitrary and capricious / abuse of discretion

The standard derives from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as incorporated into the Social Security Act. The court quotes:

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994): Courts must set aside agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).

The opinion stresses that an arbitrary‑and‑capricious action is akin to an abuse of discretion and cites:

Ferreira v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 2013) – applying arbitrary‑and‑capricious review to an exercise of discretion.
Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 149 F.4th 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2025) – arbitrary‑and‑capricious review applies to agency decisions exercising discretion.

The panel then adopts the abuse‑of‑discretion formulation from:

Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, 846 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2017): An abuse of discretion occurs when a court (or agency) “commits a clear error of judgment, fails to follow the proper legal standard or process for making a determination, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.”

In short, the question becomes: did the Appeals Council’s refusal to grant a second extension fall outside the bounds of reasonable judgment under the applicable rules?

2. Facts: Prior extension and timing

The key facts, as found by the panel:

The Appeals Council had already granted Leach one extension of time to file exceptions.
When granting that first extension, the Appeals Council had warned that it would not grant additional extensions.
Leach nonetheless filed a request for a second extension one week after the extended deadline had already passed.
He justified the request on the ground that his attorney had withdrawn from representation.
But his attorney had withdrawn nearly five months earlier—long before the extended deadline—meaning Leach had time to adjust or request accommodation much earlier.

3. Application of the standard

Given these facts, the court concludes:

The Appeals Council’s denial of a second extension did not reflect a clear error of judgment.
The agency followed its own rules and its prior warning about not granting further extensions.
No clearly erroneous factual premise underlay the denial; indeed, the timing was straightforward.

Accordingly, the denial was not arbitrary or capricious under the APA standard, nor an abuse of discretion under Yellow Pages Photos.

4. Forfeiture of SSA letter and due process claims

Finally, the panel notes that Leach argued on appeal that:

The Appeals Council should have considered a letter from the SSA as additional evidence.
The Appeals Council’s refusal to consider that letter, combined with its extension denial, violated his due process rights.

But he had not raised these contentions before the district court, where he argued only that the Council arbitrarily denied the second extension. Thus, under the same Flowers / Access Now forfeiture framework:

These arguments are deemed forfeited on appeal.
No extraordinary circumstances justify an exception.

The court therefore does not address the substance of Leach’s due process theory or evidentiary complaint; they are rejected on purely procedural grounds.

IV. Precedents and Regulations: How They Shape the Decision

1. Substantial‑evidence review and the scope of appellate scrutiny

Viverette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 1309 (11th Cir. 2021): Establishes that the ALJ’s decision is the focus where the Appeals Council denies review.
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2002): Confirms limited review under §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3), focusing on substantial evidence and correct legal standards.
Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2018): Legal standards are reviewed de novo, while factual findings get deference.
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) & Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233 (11th Cir. 1983): Define “substantial evidence” as more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance.
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2004): Emphasizes that courts may not reweigh evidence or substitute their judgment for that of the Commissioner.

These cases collectively shield the ALJ’s fact‑finding from being second‑guessed so long as there is some reasonable evidentiary basis for the conclusions. The Leach panel leans heavily on this deferential framework, repeatedly invoking “substantial evidence” to uphold the ALJ’s step‑three analysis.

2. Issue forfeiture and appellate scope – Flowers, Timson, Access Now

Flowers v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 97 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2024): Articulates that issues not raised in district court are forfeited on appeal in Social Security cases.
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008): Applies forfeiture and abandonment rules to pro se litigants; pro se status does not excuse compliance with procedural rules.
Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2006): Identifies narrow “extraordinary circumstances” where an appellate court may consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.

These precedents directly control the panel’s refusal to entertain Leach’s RFC, VE, SSA-letter, and due process arguments. Leach thus reinforces the consistent application of preservation rules in Social Security appeals.

3. Arbitrary‑and‑capricious review – Thomas Jefferson Univ., Ferreira, Lopez-Martinez, Yellow Pages Photos

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994): Applies APA arbitrary‑and‑capricious review to agency action and reiterates the § 706(2)(A) standard.
Ferreira v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2013) & Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 149 F.4th 1202 (11th Cir. 2025): Confirm that arbitrary‑and‑capricious review applies to discretionary agency actions, including immigration contexts, which the panel analogizes here.
Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, 846 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2017): Defines abuse of discretion in terms of clear error of judgment, failure to follow proper legal standards or process, or reliance on clearly erroneous facts.

Leach uses these authorities to frame the review of the Appeals Council’s decision to deny a second extension. Because the Council had previously extended the deadline and warned no further extensions would be granted—and because counsel’s withdrawal occurred months earlier—the exercise of discretion was upheld as reasonable.

4. Social Security regulations and listings – Post‑2017 medical‑opinion rules

The decision depends heavily on the regulatory framework:

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) – the five‑step sequential evaluation process (steps referenced rather than fully discussed).
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 – the Listings (musculoskeletal, vision, digestive, and mental‑disorder sections).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c – evaluation of medical opinions, expressly abolishing the treating‑physician rule and replacing it with a supportability/consistency framework.

The panel’s reliance on § 416.920c is particularly important: it undercuts any argument that a treating physician’s opinion must be given controlling weight, aligning the case with the post‑2017 regulatory regime.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Substantial evidence”

“Substantial evidence” is a middle‑ground evidentiary standard:

It is more than a scintilla – more than a mere trace or guess.
It is less than a preponderance – the court need not be convinced that the agency’s view is more likely than not correct.

In practice, this means:

If the record could support two different conclusions, and the ALJ chose one of them rationally, the court must uphold that choice.
The court cannot re‑weigh evidence or resolve conflicts in the record; that is the ALJ’s function.

2. Listed impairments

The Listings are a catalogue of medical conditions so severe that, if a claimant meets all of the criteria, disability is presumed. But key points are:

The criteria are strict and specific – especially numerical or functional criteria (e.g., vision 20/200 or worse, particular BMI thresholds, documented neurological deficits).
It is not enough to have a diagnosis that appears in a listing; one must satisfy the exact criteria, including the duration requirement (typically 12 months).
The ALJ compares objective medical findings and documented functional limitations to those criteria.

3. Residual functional capacity (RFC)

RFC is the most a claimant can still do despite physical and mental limitations. It is assessed:

Between steps three and four of the sequential process.
Using all relevant medical and non‑medical evidence.

The RFC determines:

Whether the claimant can perform past relevant work (step four).
If not, whether the claimant can perform other work in the national economy (step five), often based on VE testimony.

Leach’s challenges to RFC and VE testimony were not reached because of forfeiture, but conceptually, these are central to most disability cases.

4. Vocational experts (VEs)

A vocational expert is a specialist in the labor market and vocational implications of limitations. At hearings, VEs:

Testify about what jobs a hypothetical person with certain limitations could perform.
Estimate how many such jobs exist in the regional or national economy.

ALJs often rely on VE testimony at step five. Challenges typically focus on the accuracy of hypothetical questions, job numbers, or consistency with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In Leach, such challenges were deemed procedurally barred.

5. Paragraph B for mental‑disorder listings

Paragraph B criteria measure functional impact, not just diagnoses:

The focus is on what a person can actually do in day‑to‑day situations.
Marked or extreme limitations indicate serious, pervasive difficulty functioning independently, appropriately, and on a sustained basis.

Thus, a claimant with multiple psychiatric diagnoses may still fail to meet a listing if they can attend school, interact appropriately with providers, manage basic activities, and otherwise function at a level inconsistent with marked or extreme impairment.

6. Forfeiture vs. waiver

While the opinion uses “forfeiture,” it is helpful to distinguish:

Forfeiture: A party fails to raise an argument or objection at the proper time, often unintentionally. Courts generally will not consider forfeited issues on appeal.
Waiver: A party intentionally relinquishes a known right or argument. Waived issues are typically off‑limits entirely.

The Eleventh Circuit here treats Leach’s unraised arguments as forfeited, applying its usual rule that arguments not presented to the district court will not be heard on appeal absent extraordinary circumstances.

7. Arbitrary‑and‑capricious review / abuse of discretion

Under APA‑style review:

A decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency has no rational basis, ignores important aspects of the problem, or acts contrary to its own rules or the evidence.
Abuse of discretion overlaps closely: it involves a clear error of judgment or failure to follow lawful procedures, or reliance on clearly erroneous facts.

In Leach, the Appeals Council had:

Already granted one extension.
Clearly notified Leach that no further extensions would be granted.
Received a second extension request after the deadline, based on a fact (attorney withdrawal) known months earlier.

Given this, the denial of a second extension fits comfortably within the range of reasonable agency discretion.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

1. Reinforcement of a high bar for “listing‑level” impairments

The opinion illustrates the difficulty of prevailing at step three:

Claimants must demonstrate that all components of a listing are met, including specific functional and objective criteria.
Partial or marginal evidence—e.g., back pain but no documented neurological deficits, vision worse than 20/20 but better than 20/200—will not suffice.
Mental‑health listings require documented, sustained functional deficits at a “marked” or “extreme” level, not just diagnoses or episodic symptoms.

Future claimants and practitioners must ensure that records contain the kind of detailed functional documentation envisioned by the listings, particularly for musculoskeletal and mental conditions.

2. Practical consequences for pro se Social Security litigants

Leach sends a clear message:

Pro se litigants are held to the same preservation standards as represented parties regarding issues to be raised in the district court and on appeal.
Failure to contest RFC findings or VE testimony at the district‑court level virtually guarantees that such arguments cannot be raised later in the court of appeals.

This underscores the importance, even in an ostensibly remedial system, of:

Timely and comprehensive briefing in district court.
Clear articulation of all challenges to each step of the sequential evaluation, including RFC and VE issues.

3. Clarification of Appeals Council discretion and timeliness rules

The opinion provides practical guidance on how the Eleventh Circuit views Appeals Council management of deadlines:

Granting one extension and expressly declining to grant more creates a strong presumption that a second extension denial is within discretion.
Excuses based on facts known well before the deadline (e.g., counsel withdrawal months earlier) are weak grounds for second extensions.

For future litigants:

Requests for additional time should be made before deadlines expire, and based on genuinely new or unforeseen circumstances.
Documentation supporting good cause for delay will be critical if an extension denial is challenged.

4. Continued entrenchment of the post‑2017 medical‑opinion framework

By emphasizing § 416.920c(a), the panel reinforces:

The demise of the treating‑physician rule in Social Security disability cases.
The primacy of “supportability” and “consistency” as the key evaluation factors for medical opinions.

Claimants can no longer rely on the fact that an opinion comes from a treating physician; they must instead show that it is well‑supported by objective evidence and consistent with the overall record.

5. Procedural rigor in Social Security appeals

Taken together, Leach illustrates that Social Security appeals—despite involving vulnerable claimants—are governed by rigorous procedural norms:

Strict issue preservation rules at the district‑court level.
Strong deference to agency fact‑finding and discretionary decisions.
Limited scope for appellate courts to revisit unpreserved or weakly supported claims.

This may encourage greater emphasis on:

Early, comprehensive legal representation where possible.
Meticulous record development and timely objections at the ALJ and Appeals Council levels.

VII. Conclusion

Patrick J.P. Leach v. Commissioner of Social Security affirms the denial of disability benefits in a non‑precedential opinion, but its reasoning reflects and reinforces core themes of Eleventh Circuit Social Security jurisprudence:

Deferential review: The court upholds the ALJ’s findings under the substantial‑evidence standard, particularly the conclusion that Leach’s impairments did not meet or equal any relevant listing.
Strict listing criteria: Diagnostic labels alone are insufficient; objective findings and functional limitations must align precisely with regulatory requirements, including Paragraph B for mental disorders.
Modern medical‑opinion rules: The panel underscores that no medical opinion, even from a treating physician, receives automatic deference under § 416.920c.
Issue forfeiture: Arguments regarding RFC, VE testimony, new evidence, and due process raised for the first time on appeal are not considered. Pro se status does not alter this rule.
Appeals Council discretion: The denial of a second extension of time is upheld under arbitrary‑and‑capricious/abuse‑of‑discretion review, illustrating the wide latitude agencies have in enforcing their own deadlines.

In sum, while the opinion does not announce a new doctrine, it crystallizes several important principles for future Social Security litigants and practitioners: the need for precise, well‑documented medical and functional evidence; the importance of raising all arguments at the earliest judicial stage; and the reality that courts will defer both to ALJ fact‑finding and to the Appeals Council’s reasonable procedural decisions.