Iowa Supreme Court Declares: “No Guns While Criming” – State v. Woods and the Constitutional Limits on Firearm Possession During Criminal Conduct

1. Introduction

State v. Kevin Dwayne Woods, Jr. (No. 24-0261, Iowa Sup. Ct., 27 June 2025) squarely presented the question whether the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution protect an individual who carries a firearm while simultaneously breaking the law—in this instance, by possessing marijuana. During a routine traffic stop, police discovered that Woods had a small quantity of marijuana, a digital scale, and a loaded 9-mm pistol (plus magazines) inside a backpack on the vehicle’s center console. Woods pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and, conditionally, to violating Iowa Code § 724.8B, which forbids “carrying dangerous weapons” by any person who (1) is disqualified from receiving a carry permit, (2) illegally possesses a controlled substance, or (3) is committing an indictable offense. On appeal, Woods launched federal and state constitutional attacks on § 724.8B.

By a fractured court (3-1-3), the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Justice McDonald’s lead opinion, joined by Chief Justice Christensen and Justice Mansfield, holds there is “no federal or state constitutional right to carry a firearm while criming.” Justice Oxley concurred only in the judgment, urging a narrower rationale. Justice McDermott, joined by Justices Waterman and May, dissented, contending that the majority’s rule erodes both constitutions and fails the historical-tradition and strict-scrutiny tests. The decision crystallises a new doctrinal line—“No Guns While Criming”—that other courts will now confront when evaluating firearms possessed contemporaneously with any criminal activity, however minor.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Federal Claim: Applying N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, the plurality stops at Bruen’s first step. Possessing a firearm while illegally possessing drugs or engaging in an indictable offense falls outside the “plain text” protection; the Second Amendment historically protects only law-abiding, responsible citizens engaged in lawful conduct. Thus, no further historical-analogue inquiry is needed. Even arguendo that step one were satisfied, a raft of “danger-based” colonial and nineteenth-century laws shows § 724.8B is consistent with historical tradition.
State Claim: Article I, section 1A is triggered only when a law “infringes” or “restricts” the right to bear arms. Because that right does not extend to carrying during criminal conduct, § 724.8B inflicts no cognisable infringement. Alternatively, the statute passes strict scrutiny: Iowa’s compelling interests in public and officer safety are served by a narrow, conduct-based, temporary disarmament limited to the period of criminality.
Disposition: Conviction affirmed; Woods’s Second- and state-constitutional challenges rejected.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) – the modern starting point; recognises an individual right but notes it is not unlimited.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) – incorporates Second Amendment against the states.
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – establishes the now-dominant two-step test: text first, history second.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) – clarifies the “relevantly similar” historical-analogue inquiry and re-emphasises “dangerousness.”
United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012) & United States v. Risner, 129 F.4th 361 (6th Cir. 2025) – early and post-Bruen examples rejecting a right to be armed while committing crime.
State v. Mehner, 480 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1992) & State v. Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d 365 (Iowa 1997) – pre-Heller Iowa cases the plurality deems still persuasive: “no right to be armed while committing a crime.”
Numerous district- and circuit-court cases post-Bruen (e.g., Page, Johnson, Alaniz, Connelly, Daniels) examining firearms alongside drug offences.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step-One Cut-Off

The plurality treats Bruen’s first step as dispositive: Woods’s conduct—carrying a pistol while simultaneously violating drug law—is not within the “plain text.” They string-cite Supreme Court passages emphasising “law-abiding” citizens and frame “law-abiding” as a definitional qualifier inside the Amendment itself. Because the conduct is “categorically unprotected,” historical analysis is theoretically unnecessary, though the plurality nevertheless offers an alternative history-based justification.

Historical Analogues (Step Two, in the Alternative)

Why: Legislatures have a compelling safety interest in separating firearms from ongoing criminal behaviour; guns plus drugs (or other illegal activity) amplify risks of violence, especially during police encounters.
How: Colonial and nineteenth-century laws enhanced punishment for burglary or robbery “while armed,” or temporarily disarmed smugglers, intoxicated persons, or those who refused loyalty oaths. The plurality characterises § 724.8B as a “conduct-based, temporary, narrow” regulation echoing that lineage.
Distinguishing Status-Based Bans: By contrasting Iowa’s statute with federal dispossession law (§ 922(g)(3)), the court stresses that § 724.8B disables carrying only during the window of criminal conduct; once the indictable offence or drug possession ceases, the right re-vests.

State-Constitution Analysis

Article I, section 1A requires strict scrutiny, but the plurality first finds no “infringement” at all, reasoning the state right never protects carrying while criminally active. Assuming arguendo an infringement, they find the statute survives strict scrutiny: compelling public-safety interest and narrow tailoring (limited in time, place, and manner to the exact criminal act).

3.3 Points of Division

Concurrence (Oxley, J.): Agrees Woods loses, but faults the plurality’s over-broad reasoning. She would limit the holding to firearms carried while illegally possessing drugs, stop short of a blanket “any indictable offence” rule, and emphasise the need for proof the firearm facilitated the crime.
Dissent (McDermott, J.): Argues marijuana possession is a non-violent misdemeanour and historically innocuous; disarming without proof of actual danger fails both Bruen history and state strict scrutiny. Warns that the plurality’s rule renders the right to bear arms “illusory” anytime a person commits even minor infractions.
Dissent (May, J.): Adds that the State bears the burden to show a firearm was carried “for an unlawful purpose.” Close proximity alone is insufficient; the majority impermissibly shifts the burden onto the citizen.

3.4 Likely Impact

State prosecutions: The decision green-lights § 724.8B prosecutions whenever officers locate firearms during drug or other indictable offences. Expect more plea bargains conditioned on constitutional challenges.
Second-Amendment litigation: Other jurisdictions grappling with § 922(g)(3) and similar conduct-based restrictions will cite Woods as supportive authority, especially for the view that any criminal activity removes one from the Second-Amendment people.
Split authority: Woods deepens the divide with Fifth-Circuit cases (Connelly, Daniels) that struck down dispossession of non-violent marijuana users. The inter-court tension raises potential U.S. Supreme Court interest.
State-constitutional doctrine: The court’s “no infringement” threshold may narrow article I, section 1A review; many firearms cases might be disposed of before strict-scrutiny balancing even begins.
Legislative drafting: Woods blesses “temporary, conduct-based” firearm prohibitions. Legislatures might craft new disarmament triggers (e.g., during domestic-abuse order violations, intoxicated boating, street racing) and rely on Woods as precedent.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge

A facial attack says “the statute is never constitutional.” An as-applied attack says “it is unconstitutional in my circumstances.” Woods raised both, but the plurality resolved only the as-applied scenario.

4.2 Bruen’s Two-Step Framework

Step 1: Textual Coverage. Is the person part of “the people” and is the conduct (“keep” or “bear” arms) within the Second Amendment’s plain meaning?
Step 2: Historical Tradition. If yes, the government must show the regulation is rooted in historically accepted analogues.

4.3 Strict Scrutiny (State Standard)

Compelling Interest: Objective of the highest order (e.g., public safety).
Narrow Tailoring: Law must be the least restrictive means; cannot be over-inclusive or under-inclusive.

4.4 Conduct- vs. Status-Based Regulation

Conduct-based rules disarm while the conduct occurs (e.g., armed while intoxicated). Status-based rules impose longer (sometimes lifetime) bans based on a person’s category (e.g., felon-in-possession). Woods frames § 724.8B as the former.

5. Conclusion

State v. Woods inaugurates a bright-line doctrine in Iowa: citizens forfeit constitutional firearm protection at the moment they simultaneously violate drug laws or commit any indictable offence. By anchoring its reasoning in Bruen’s textual threshold—and, alternatively, in a broad reading of historical “dangerousness”—the plurality cements a “No Guns While Criming” rule. The fractured opinions, however, signal ongoing uncertainty about the rule’s breadth: the concurrence would cabin it; the dissents fear it collapses the right entirely for minor misconduct. As other courts wrestle with post-Bruen fallout—especially regarding marijuana users and other non-violent offenders—Woods will serve both as precedent and as cautionary tale, illustrating the judiciary’s pivotal role in defining the outer limits of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms.