Iowa Code § 562A.12(8) Attorney Fees Are Limited to Rental-Deposit Disputes; Implied Consent Defeats Landlord-Entry Trespass

Introduction

In Alex Butter and Sydney Stodola v. Midwest Property Management IC, LLC, KMB Property Management and Ruby Investments, LLC, the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed a small-claims dispute arising from frequent landlord showings of a rented duplex in Iowa City. Tenants Alex Butter and Sydney Stodola sued their landlord/property managers (Ruby Investments, LLC and Midwest Property Management IC, LLC d/b/a KMB Property Management) for common law trespass based on entries connected to unit showings.

The appeal presented three core issues: (1) how many actionable trespasses occurred (tenants sought eleven additional findings), (2) whether the trial-level damages award for trespass was legally supportable, and (3) whether the tenants could recover attorney fees under Iowa Code § 562A.12(8), a provision within the Iowa Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (IURLTA).

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the district court in full. It held:

No additional trespasses were required beyond the four entries found below, because implied consent turns on how the tenants’ conduct would reasonably be understood, not on the tenants’ subjective belief about whether they could refuse entry.
The $147 damages award (based on daily rent plus an additional half-day’s rent for a second same-day entry) had a reasonable evidentiary basis and would not be disturbed on appeal.
Iowa Code § 562A.12(8) does not authorize attorney fees here because it applies only to rental deposit disputes, and attorney fees under chapter 562A are not available when the plaintiff proceeds solely on a common law theory rather than an IURLTA cause of action.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and appellate limitations

De Stefano v. Apts. Downtown, Inc.: The court applied the rule that small claims actions tried at law are reviewed for correction of errors at law, and factual findings are binding if supported by substantial evidence. This framed the tenants’ “additional trespasses” argument as largely a challenge to fact-finding about consent and entry.
Est. of Ryan v. Heritage Trails Assocs., Inc.: Used to confirm that an appellee seeking greater relief must cross-appeal; KMB could not expand its position on appeal against the “four trespasses” finding without doing so.
Meier v. Senecaut: Emphasized issue preservation—arguments not raised and decided below are generally not considered on appeal. This mattered because the tenants revised their characterization of the landlord’s email “schedule” between trial and appeal.

2) Trespass, implied consent, and objective manifestations

Larson v. Great W. Cas. Co.: Supplied the operative standard for implied consent—consent exists when the plaintiff’s conduct reasonably led the defendant to believe it had authority to act regarding the property. The Supreme Court treated this objective test as dispositive against the tenants’ claim that they “did not know” they could refuse.
Alexander v. Med. Assocs. Clinic: Reinforced the basic definition that a trespasser enters land without legal right and without express or implied consent. The court used this to connect “consent” directly to whether an entry is tortious.
State v. Hauge: Borrowed by analogy from consensual search law: there is no per se requirement that an actor must inform a person of the right to refuse consent. The court used this to reject the tenants’ theory that consent cannot exist unless the tenants knew they could say “no.”
State v. Bauler: Supported reliance on the Restatement of Torts in Iowa trespass doctrine; the court cited it to justify consulting Restatement damages principles.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892 cmt. c: Anchored the “objective manifestation” concept—words, acts, or inaction can manifest consent even if the person did not subjectively agree. This undercut the tenants’ attempt to reframe their compliance as non-consent.

3) Damages and deference to fact-finders

Hawkeye Motors, Inc. v. McDowell: Provided the controlling appellate restraint principle: damage amounts in bench trials lie within the trial court’s discretion and are affirmed if the record provides a reasonable basis. The Supreme Court relied on this to uphold the district court’s rent-based approximation.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 931 cmt. b: Offered a baseline measure for temporary deprivation: at least the rental value during the deprivation period. The court treated this as validating (not limiting) the district court’s approach, noting the tenants’ own “time-based” calculation would yield only $1.80.
Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. of Iowa and In re Est. of Vajgrt: Cited to explain that punitive damages can serve punishment and deterrence and may be available in certain trespass cases, but the opinion used these cases mainly to illustrate that “deterrence” is not automatically built into compensatory damages.

4) Attorney fees, statutory causes of action, and statutory construction

Severson v. Peterson: The key “fee authority” precedent: there is no authority to award attorney fees under Iowa Code chapter 562A when the plaintiff is not pursuing a cause of action under that chapter. This directly supported denial of fees where tenants chose common law trespass over an IURLTA improper-access claim.
State v. Ross (quoting State v. Tague): Confirmed that statutory titles do not control plain meaning but can help determine legislative intent. The court used this to justify reading § 562A.12(8) in context (including its placement under “Rental deposits”).
State v. Jennie Coulter Day Nursery: Provided the anti-superfluity canon: statutes should be construed so no part is rendered superfluous. This became central to limiting § 562A.12(8): reading it broadly would swallow multiple fee provisions elsewhere in IURLTA.
MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Miller (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.): Supplied the expressio unius/intentional-omission inference: when the legislature includes language in one section but omits it in another, the difference is presumed intentional. This supported the conclusion that broad fee-shifting was not intended across all IURLTA disputes.

Legal Reasoning

A. Implied consent defeated the tenants’ “additional trespass” theory

The tenants sought eleven additional trespass findings for entries occurring outside a “schedule” described in the landlord’s November email. The Supreme Court held that the dispositive question was not whether the tenants internally felt compelled to allow entry after notice, but whether their conduct reasonably signaled permission.

Using Larson v. Great W. Cas. Co. and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892, the court applied an objective consent test: implied consent exists if the plaintiff’s conduct reasonably led the defendant to believe the entry was authorized. Here, the evidence showed the tenants did, in practice, refuse entry when there was no 24-hour notice—and KMB would leave and reschedule—demonstrating both (i) the tenants’ capacity to refuse and (ii) that KMB responded to refusals.

The court rejected the tenants’ attempt to negate consent by arguing they did not know they could refuse entry even when 24-hour notice was given. By analogy to State v. Hauge, the law does not require proof that the person knew of a right to refuse to validate consent. The court therefore upheld the four-trespass finding: trespasses were confined to entries with insufficient notice and without consent.

B. Rent-based loss-of-use damages were permissible and supported by the record

The Supreme Court characterized the measure of damages for brief, non-destructive intrusions on a tenant’s possessory interest as an issue of first impression for the court, and it used the Restatement as guidance.

Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 931, a plaintiff deprived of use is entitled to recover at least rental value during the deprivation. The district court used the daily rental value ($42/day) and then accounted for a second same-day trespass by adding half a day ($21), reaching $147 for four trespasses.

The tenants argued that damages should be higher to deter landlords. The court responded with two limiting principles: (1) appellate review asks whether the record offers a reasonable basis (Hawkeye Motors, Inc. v. McDowell), not whether an alternative would deter more; and (2) deterrence is ordinarily the function of punitive damages, which require additional support in the record (Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. of Iowa; In re Est. of Vajgrt).

C. The opinion’s central new rule: § 562A.12(8) fee-shifting is confined to rental deposit disputes

The tenants sought attorney fees under the text: “The court may, in any action on a rental agreement, award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” The Supreme Court nevertheless held that, read in statutory context, § 562A.12(8) authorizes fees only in rental deposit dispute actions.

The court’s reasoning proceeded in two layers:

No chapter 562A claim, no chapter 562A fees: Under Severson v. Peterson, attorney fees under chapter 562A are not available where the plaintiff does not pursue a cause of action under that chapter. The tenants expressly proceeded on common law trespass and abandoned an IURLTA access claim. This alone supported the denial.
Even on its own terms, § 562A.12(8) is not a general fee clause: The tenants’ broad reading (“any action involving a rental agreement”) would render superfluous multiple specific IURLTA fee provisions. Applying anti-superfluity (State v. Jennie Coulter Day Nursery) and the intentional-omission inference (MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Miller quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.), the court concluded the legislature did not intend § 562A.12(8) to swallow the Act’s carefully placed, circumstance-specific fee rules. While the title/placement is not dispositive, it is relevant to intent (State v. Ross quoting State v. Tague).

The resulting construction is the opinion’s most concrete doctrinal clarification: § 562A.12(8) is a rental-deposit fee provision, not a general “rental agreement” fee provision.

Impact

Fee-shifting boundary in landlord–tenant litigation: By limiting § 562A.12(8) to deposit disputes, the decision curtails attempts to obtain attorney fees in ordinary lease-related conflicts unless a specific IURLTA fee provision applies (e.g., improper access under § 562A.35(2), willful noncompliance under § 562A.21(2), holdover under § 562A.34(4)). This incentivizes careful pleading: tenants (and landlords) seeking fees must identify and prove the particular statutory pathway authorizing them.
Strategic choice between common law and IURLTA remedies: Plaintiffs who choose common law trespass may retain flexibility in theories but risk losing statutory minimum damages and fee-shifting available under IURLTA. The opinion underscores the tradeoff: IURLTA provides a tailored “improper access” remedy with minimum damages and attorney fees, but it must be pleaded and pursued.
Consent doctrine in landlord-entry disputes: The opinion reinforces that implied consent is objective and conduct-based. Tenants who routinely allow entry after notice may have difficulty converting those entries into tort trespasses absent clear refusals, revocations, or proof that consent was not reasonably conveyed.
Damages framing for brief intrusions: The court’s approval of rent-based approximations, informed by Restatement § 931, signals that “loss of exclusive possession” damages can be measured pragmatically. Plaintiffs seeking higher awards will likely need to prove additional compensable harms (e.g., quantifiable losses) or pursue punitive damages with supporting evidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Common law trespass: A tort based on unauthorized entry onto property. If the entrant had the owner/possessor’s express or implied consent, there is no trespass.
Implied consent (objective test): Permission inferred from behavior. The question is whether the plaintiff’s conduct would reasonably make the defendant think entry was allowed—not what the plaintiff secretly believed.
Substantial evidence: Enough evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could reach the conclusion. Appellate courts do not re-try the facts if this threshold is met.
Loss-of-use / rental value damages: Compensation for being deprived of the ability to exclusively use property, often approximated by rental value for the deprivation period.
Punitive damages: Additional damages meant to punish and deter, typically requiring proof beyond mere intrusion (e.g., willful or egregious conduct).
Statutory construction: “anti-superfluity”: Courts avoid reading a statute in a way that makes other parts meaningless. If one provision is read too broadly, it can erase the function of more specific provisions.
IURLTA fee provisions: Chapter 562A contains targeted attorney-fee authorizations for specific disputes. This decision clarifies that § 562A.12(8) is not a general catch-all.

Conclusion

The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision delivers two practical clarifications and one major statutory holding. First, in landlord-entry trespass disputes, implied consent is judged objectively by the tenant’s outward conduct, not by the tenant’s subjective understanding of the right to refuse. Second, rent-based approximations for brief loss-of-exclusivity can supply a reasonable basis for compensatory damages. Most significantly, the court held that Iowa Code § 562A.12(8) authorizes attorney fees only in rental deposit disputes, preserving IURLTA’s structure of specific, circumstance-dependent fee-shifting and warning litigants that fee recovery depends on pursuing the correct statutory cause of action.