Iowa § 670.4A Does Not Apply to Common-Law Negligence or Nuisance—Even When Duties Are Drawn from Statutes: Immediate Appeals Under § 670.4A(4) Unavailable

Introduction

The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in In re Davenport Hotel Building Collapse addresses the scope of the 2021 qualified-immunity amendments to the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), codified at Iowa Code § 670.4A. Following the tragic partial collapse of the Davenport Hotel apartment building in May 2023, multiple plaintiffs—ranging from injured residents and estates to subrogating insurers—sued a variety of defendants, including the City of Davenport and two city employees (collectively, the “City defendants”). Before answering, the City defendants moved to dismiss based on qualified immunity under § 670.4A and, alternatively, on the public-duty doctrine. The district court denied the motion in full. The City took an immediate appeal under § 670.4A(4)’s “denial of qualified immunity” appeal right and also sought interlocutory review of the public-duty doctrine ruling (which a single-justice order denied).

The core legal question on appeal was whether § 670.4A’s qualified-immunity protections—and its associated heightened pleading standard—apply to common-law negligence and nuisance claims. The Court held they do not. Because the plaintiffs’ petition asserted only common-law claims, § 670.4A did not apply, and thus the City’s immediate appeal authorized by § 670.4A(4) failed as a matter of jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the appeal and declined to address the public-duty doctrine because it is distinct from qualified immunity and was not properly before the Court.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reaffirmed that Iowa Code § 670.4A’s qualified immunity—tracking the federal § 1983 “deprivation of rights” formulation—applies only to claims alleging a deprivation of a “right, privilege, or immunity secured by law,” i.e., state constitutional torts or statutory rights, not to common-law torts like negligence or nuisance.
Because the plaintiffs alleged only common-law negligence and nuisance, § 670.4A’s substantive immunity and its heightened pleading requirements did not apply.
The mere fact that a negligence claim relies on a statutory or municipal code duty does not convert that claim into a “deprivation” claim triggering § 670.4A.
Without § 670.4A’s applicability, the statute’s immediate-appeal provision (§ 670.4A(4)) does not confer appellate jurisdiction; the appeal was therefore dismissed.
The public-duty doctrine issue was not considered because it is separate from qualified immunity and interlocutory review had previously been denied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Doe v. Western Dubuque Community School District, 20 N.W.3d 798 (Iowa 2025): The controlling authority. Doe held that § 670.4A “applies only where the plaintiff has asserted a state constitutional tort claim or statutory claim and not where the plaintiff has asserted only a state common law claim.” The Court in Davenport applied Doe directly, rejecting the City’s argument that § 670.4A sweeps in negligence and nuisance simply because those torts can involve statutory or code-derived duties. Doe also emphasized the incompatibility of the federal “clearly established” qualified-immunity standard with negligence concepts, undercutting attempts to graft that standard onto ordinary tort claims.
1000 Friends of Iowa v. Polk County Board of Supervisors, 19 N.W.3d 290 (Iowa 2025): This case linked § 670.4A(1)(a) (the substantive immunity for “deprivation” claims) and § 670.4A(3) (the heightened “clearly established” pleading standard) as “inextricably intertwined.” The Court reiterated that where the substantive immunity does not apply, neither does the heightened pleading requirement. In Davenport, because the claims were common-law torts, neither component applied.
Nahas v. Polk County, 991 N.W.2d 770 (Iowa 2023), overruled on other grounds by Doe: Quoted for the “inextricably intertwined” concept later adopted in 1000 Friends; demonstrates the Court’s ongoing refinement of § 670.4A’s procedural and substantive contours.
Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), overruled in part on other grounds by Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023): Godfrey recognized state constitutional tort claims in Iowa. The legislature’s 2021 § 670.4A amendments borrowed the federal § 1983 “deprivation” language, which Doe and now Davenport read as targeted at constitutional/statutory claims (like those recognized in Godfrey), not common-law negligence.
Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 145 S. Ct. 2219 (2025), quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002): Cited for the “rights-creating terms” doctrine: statutory private rights of action require clear, unambiguous rights-creating language with an unmistakable focus on the plaintiff class. The Court used this to explain why relying on a statute to define a negligence duty does not equal suing to enforce a statutory “right … secured by law.”
Fulps v. City of Urbandale, 956 N.W.2d 469 (Iowa 2021): Quoted for the public-duty doctrine’s baseline rule: governments generally are not liable for breaches of duties owed to the public at large rather than to individuals. The Court in Davenport did not decide this issue; it deemed it separate from § 670.4A and outside the scope of this appeal.

Legal Reasoning

The Court framed the dispute around the meaning and reach of § 670.4A, enacted in 2021 to add a qualified-immunity defense and a heightened pleading regime to the IMTCA. The City argued for a broad “plain language” application to any “claim brought under this chapter,” contending that because “tort” in § 670.1(4) includes negligence, § 670.4A must naturally extend to negligence claims. Plaintiffs countered that § 670.4A(1)(a)’s “deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by law” is a term of art borrowed from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and applies only to constitutional/statutory-rights claims.

The Court adopted the plaintiffs’ position, grounded in Doe. It emphasized:

Textual alignment with § 1983 confirms the legislature targeted “deprivation” claims premised on constitutional or statutory rights, not common-law torts.
The “clearly established” standard, imported from federal qualified-immunity doctrine, does not fit negligence claims conceptually or functionally.
1000 Friends requires reading the immunity provision and the pleading standard together; the heightened pleading standard cannot apply when the substantive immunity does not.

Addressing the City’s fallback point—that plaintiffs’ negligence claims rely on municipal codes or statutes to define duty—the Court drew a critical distinction: using statutes or ordinances to inform the duty element of a negligence claim does not transform the claim into one to vindicate a personal “right … secured by law.” Under Medina/Gonzaga, only statutes with clear “rights-creating terms” confer a private right actionable as a “deprivation” claim. Absent such language, negligence remains negligence, outside § 670.4A.

Finally, because § 670.4A did not apply, the immediate-appeal provision in § 670.4A(4) was unavailable; without jurisdiction under that provision, the Court dismissed the appeal. The Court also declined to address the public-duty doctrine because it is distinct from qualified immunity, and the City’s separate application for interlocutory review of that issue had been denied.

Impact and Practical Implications

Municipal litigation posture: Cities and their employees cannot use § 670.4A to secure early dismissal or an immediate appeal in cases alleging only common-law torts (e.g., negligence, nuisance), even if the asserted duty is grounded in statutes or municipal codes. The usual Iowa notice-pleading standards apply, not § 670.4A(3)’s heightened “clearly established” pleading.
Strategic pleading by plaintiffs: Plaintiffs can avoid § 670.4A’s qualified-immunity defense and its heightened pleading standards by limiting claims to common-law torts unless they truly seek to vindicate a constitutional or statutory “right.” However, where plaintiffs do assert state constitutional or statutory-right claims (with rights-creating terms), § 670.4A will come into play in full.
Immediate appeal rights narrowed: The decision reinforces that § 670.4A(4)’s immediate appeal is available only when a district court actually “den[ies] qualified immunity” on a claim to which § 670.4A applies. A motion to dismiss negligence claims cannot be repackaged as a § 670.4A denial to obtain an immediate appeal.
Public-duty doctrine remains live but separate: Municipal defendants must litigate public-duty doctrine defenses in the normal course or seek interlocutory review under standard procedures—§ 670.4A does not carry the public-duty doctrine along for immediate appeal. Davenport clarifies that the public-duty doctrine is analytically distinct from qualified immunity.
Other municipal defenses unaffected: The decision does not alter other IMTCA defenses or exceptions (e.g., specific immunities in § 670.4), nor does it resolve the merits of the negligence and nuisance claims. It simply clarifies the lane in which § 670.4A operates.
Regulatory enforcement and inspections: In suits arising from code enforcement, permitting, or inspections, municipalities cannot rely on § 670.4A to defeat common-law claims at the pleading stage merely because their duties are defined by ordinance or statute. That said, defenses like the public-duty doctrine or other statutory immunities may still be dispositive later in the case.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity under § 670.4A: A statutory defense modeled on federal § 1983 immunity. It protects municipalities and employees against claims alleging deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right unless the right was “clearly established.” It does not apply to ordinary negligence or nuisance claims.
Heightened Pleading Standard (§ 670.4A(3)): When plaintiffs assert a deprivation-of-rights claim, they must plead the specific right and show a plausible violation of a clearly established right. Davenport confirms that this higher bar is inapplicable to common-law claims.
“Deprivation of rights” as a term of art: Borrowed from § 1983, this phrase targets violations of constitutional or statutory rights, not failures to meet common-law standards of reasonable care.
Rights-creating terms: A statute creates an individual, enforceable right only if it uses clear, rights-creating language focused on a specific class of beneficiaries. Statutes that merely set standards or duties (e.g., safety codes) often do not create private rights of action—though they may inform negligence duties.
Public-Duty Doctrine: A government’s duty to enforce laws and protect the public is generally owed to the public at large, not to individual persons. If the doctrine applies, individual plaintiffs may be barred unless an exception applies. Davenport does not decide the doctrine’s applicability to these claims.
Immediate appeals under § 670.4A(4): This fast-track appeal is limited to true denials of qualified immunity under § 670.4A. It cannot be used to obtain early review of unrelated defenses, like the public-duty doctrine.

Conclusion

In re Davenport Hotel Building Collapse solidifies a clear boundary around Iowa Code § 670.4A: its qualified immunity and heightened pleading rules govern only constitutional and statutory “deprivation” claims, not common-law negligence or nuisance—even when those torts look to statutes or ordinances to define duties. Practically, municipalities cannot invoke § 670.4A to defeat or immediately appeal common-law tort suits at the pleading stage. The Court’s insistence on keeping the public-duty doctrine separate from § 670.4A’s immediate-appeal mechanism further clarifies appellate procedure in municipal tort cases.

Together with Doe and 1000 Friends, Davenport completes a doctrinal trio: (1) § 670.4A is limited to constitutional/statutory deprivations; (2) its heightened pleading standard rises and falls with that limitation; and (3) the immediate appeal right is correspondingly narrow. For litigants and courts alike, the decision streamlines early motion practice in municipal tort litigation and preserves the traditional path for resolving common-law claims while reserving § 670.4A’s special protections for the constitutional and statutory-rights context that the legislature targeted in 2021.