Invited Error Bars Challenge to Mislabeling a Georgia First Offender Disposition; Prior Methamphetamine Possession Admissible Under Rule 404(b) to Prove Intent

Case: United States v. Jorge Rodriguez Martinez (11th Cir. No. 24-12802, Sept. 8, 2025) — Non-Argument Calendar, Per Curiam (Judges Jordan, Branch, Luck). Not for publication.

Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision affirms the conviction of Jorge Rodriguez Martinez for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The appeal presented two issues: first, whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Rodriguez’s 2015 Georgia methamphetamine possession under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove his intent in the charged 2020 methamphetamine conspiracy and possession; and second, whether the district court plainly erred by referring to the prior offense as a “conviction” during a limiting instruction when Rodriguez’s plea had been entered under Georgia’s First Offender Act (FOA), which under Georgia law is not treated as a conviction upon successful completion.

The panel held that admission of the prior offense was proper under Rule 404(b) because Rodriguez’s not-guilty plea made intent a material issue, the prior act involved the same drug, and any unfair prejudice was mitigated by a limiting instruction. As to the “conviction” label, the court did not reach the underlying state-law question because Rodriguez invited any error by repeatedly describing the prior matter as a “conviction” and by expressly agreeing to a stipulation that used that term; the invited-error doctrine foreclosed plain-error review.

The opinion is unpublished and thus non-precedential, but it provides instructive guidance on two recurring trial issues: the breadth of admissible drug-history evidence under Rule 404(b) when intent is contested, and the consequences of stipulation language that inaccurately labels a Georgia First Offender disposition as a “conviction.”

Summary of the Opinion

Rule 404(b) admission: No abuse of discretion. By pleading not guilty to a drug conspiracy and possession-with-intent charges, Rodriguez put intent at issue. Prior drug offenses are highly probative of intent in such cases, especially when involving the same controlled substance. The court rejected arguments that the evidence was unnecessary given other strong proof and that remoteness diminished probative value. A limiting instruction mitigated any unfair prejudice (relying on United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211; United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296; United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324).
“Conviction” mislabeling: Review barred by invited error. Rodriguez characterized the prior as a “conviction” in his filings and signed a joint stipulation using that term; the court therefore declined plain-error review (citing United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311). The panel expressly noted that it has not resolved in a published opinion whether an FOA disposition constitutes a “conviction” for federal purposes.
Disposition: Convictions affirmed; 120-month sentence stands.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2021, a grand jury charged Rodriguez with (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846) and (2) possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)). Investigators surveilled Rodriguez in September–October 2020, including cell phone and vehicle tracking. On October 7, 2020:

A confidential informant attempted a controlled buy through phone calls that did not culminate in a transaction.
Surveillance observed Rodriguez meet the occupant of a Jeep at a Mexican restaurant in Hapeville; after communications and vehicle repositioning, officers stopped Rodriguez’s truck (with consent search yielding no contraband).
Separately, a Mazda arrived; a woman entered the Jeep, exited with a Home Depot box, placed it in the Mazda trunk, and drove away. After a vehicular pursuit, police recovered two kilograms of methamphetamine from the box.
Later that day, after the confidential informant reported that a truck left outside his house contained drugs, officers initiated another stop of Rodriguez’s truck (following a call asking Rodriguez to retrieve it). Rodriguez attempted to flee; officers recovered three kilograms of methamphetamine and two cell phones.

Forensic review yielded texts and voice messages in coded language consistent, per law enforcement training and experience, with drug trafficking. The parties stipulated to a prior offense: Rodriguez’s 2014 arrest and 2015 plea under Georgia’s First Offender Act for felony possession involving 21 grams of methamphetamine and $13,540.

Over defense objection, the district court admitted the prior offense under Rule 404(b) and instructed the jury not to use it for propensity but only for intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident. The instruction, however, referred to the prior as a “conviction.” The jury found Rodriguez guilty on both counts and specifically found the drug quantity to be 50 grams or more for each. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2013): Establishes the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings and emphasizes that Rule 403 exclusion is an “extraordinary remedy” applied sparingly, with balancing tilted toward admissibility. The panel invoked Troya to frame its deference to the district court’s Rule 403 analysis.
United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007): Articulates the three-part test for Rule 404(b) admissibility—(1) relevance to a non-character purpose, (2) sufficient proof the defendant committed the other act, and (3) Rule 403 balancing—and recognizes the mitigating force of a limiting instruction. The opinion tracked Edouard’s framework, noting the second prong was undisputed.
United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2013): Holds that when a defendant pleads not guilty in a drug conspiracy case, intent becomes a material issue, opening the door to admission of prior drug offenses as highly probative of intent. The court relied on Smith to conclude that Rodriguez’s prior meth possession was especially probative once intent was contested.
United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2005): Endorses the broad probative value of “virtually any prior drug offense” to show intent in a drug conspiracy prosecution. Matthews underscored the Eleventh Circuit’s permissive approach to admitting prior drug conduct for intent.
United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2005): Describes the invited-error doctrine, which forecloses plain-error review when a party induces the error. The panel applied Silvestri to hold that Rodriguez invited any mislabeling error by his own usage and stipulation and thus could not obtain review.
Georgia First Offender Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60: Allows eligible defendants to plead and be sentenced without entry of judgment of guilt, and upon successful completion, to be exonerated and “not be considered to have a criminal conviction” under Georgia law. The panel noted, without deciding, that in a published opinion the Eleventh Circuit has not resolved whether FOA dispositions count as “convictions” for federal purposes.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s legal analysis proceeded in two parts: Rule 404(b) admissibility and invited error.

1) Rule 404(b) Admissibility and Rule 403 Balancing

The panel affirmed the admission of the 2015 meth possession as “other act” evidence to prove intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident:

Non-character purpose: Intent was a central, contested issue. By pleading not guilty, Rodriguez put the government to its proof on all elements, including intent. In drug conspiracy and possession-with-intent prosecutions, prior drug offenses are “highly probative” of intent (Smith; Matthews).
Sufficiency of proof: The prior act was established via a joint stipulation that described the arrest, the amount of methamphetamine, the cash seized, and the plea under FOA. Rodriguez did not challenge the sufficiency prong on appeal (Edouard second prong).
Rule 403 balance: The court credited the government’s argument that the prior offense, which involved methamphetamine like the charged crimes, was not too remote (roughly five years) and that any prejudicial effect could be managed with a limiting instruction. Importantly, the panel rejected the argument that 404(b) evidence becomes unnecessary merely because the government has other strong evidence (surveillance, intercepted communications, seizures). Those items did not “necessarily demonstrate intent,” whereas the prior meth possession directly illuminated Rodriguez’s state of mind. Following Troya, the court emphasized that Rule 403 exclusion is extraordinary and that limiting instructions reduce the danger of unfair prejudice (Edouard).

The upshot was an orthodox application of Eleventh Circuit law: in drug cases, the nexus between prior drug activity and present intent remains robust, and trial courts receive substantial deference in balancing probative value against prejudice, particularly where the prior and charged conduct involve the same drug and the time gap is not extreme.

2) Invited Error and the “Conviction” Label

Rodriguez argued for the first time on appeal that the court plainly erred by calling his 2015 FOA case a “conviction” in its limiting instruction because, as a matter of Georgia law, a successfully completed FOA sentence is not treated as a conviction. The court declined to entertain the argument, invoking the invited-error doctrine:

In the district court, Rodriguez himself repeatedly described the prior FOA matter as a “conviction” and signed a joint stipulation that used the term “prior conviction.” The trial court’s instruction tracked the parties’ own language.
Under Silvestri, a party cannot induce or invite a district court into making an error and then obtain reversal via plain-error review.
The panel therefore did not reach whether an FOA disposition is a “conviction” in federal proceedings. It noted explicitly that the Eleventh Circuit has not resolved that issue in a published opinion.

In short, even if it was incorrect to call the FOA case a “conviction” as a matter of Georgia law, Rodriguez’s strategic choices at trial prevented appellate review of that claim.

Impact and Practical Implications

A) Rule 404(b) in Drug Cases: Intent Remains the Gateway

Expect continued broad admissibility of prior drug conduct to prove intent where a defendant pleads not guilty and contests mental state. Similarity in drug type (methamphetamine here) enhances probative value.
Remoteness arguments face headwinds: a five-year gap, especially with the same drug, is unlikely to tip the Rule 403 balance against admissibility on its own.
“Necessity” is not dispositive: The existence of other strong evidence does not make 404(b) evidence superfluous; juries must still be shown intent, and 404(b) evidence is often the most direct way to do so.
Limiting instructions are critical: They both protect against unfair prejudice and help insulate the record on appeal.

B) Georgia First Offender Act: Terminology Matters

Invited error serves as a cautionary tale: Defense counsel who want to preserve challenges to how an FOA disposition is characterized should avoid stipulation language calling it a “conviction,” and should object to any such language in jury instructions.
Open federal question: The Eleventh Circuit flagged, but did not resolve, whether FOA dispositions (including those “exonerated” and “discharged”) count as “convictions” for federal purposes. That question can have significant collateral consequences (e.g., for evidentiary labels, impeachment, enhancements, firearms disabilities), and remains ripe for a case in which the issue is preserved and squarely presented.
Drafting guidance: Parties can accurately describe FOA matters as “a prior offense” or “a prior act for which the defendant pleaded under the Georgia First Offender Act,” avoiding the term “conviction” unless the record supports that status under applicable law.

C) Appellate Preservation and Trial Practice

Preserve, don’t invite: If a party objects to particular phrasing (e.g., “conviction”), it must object on the record and propose alternative language. Consenting to a stipulation using contested terminology can foreclose appellate review.
Tailor limiting instructions: When admitting 404(b) evidence arising from FOA matters, courts can instruct juries in terms of “other acts” or “prior offense conduct,” thereby avoiding state-law characterization disputes.
Strategic calculus: Given the Eleventh Circuit’s permissive stance toward 404(b) in drug cases, defense counsel should consider focusing 404(b) challenges on demonstrable unfair prejudice (e.g., dissimilar acts, inflammatory details) rather than on “necessity,” which carries less weight in the 403 balance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 404(b): A rule that generally bars using prior bad acts to prove a person’s character, but allows such acts to show things like intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake. In drug cases, a prior drug offense often tends to show the defendant knew the nature of the substance and intended to distribute it.
Rule 403: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if its unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Courts favor admissibility, and jury instructions can reduce prejudice.
Limiting instruction: A directive from the judge telling the jury the specific, lawful purpose for which certain evidence may be considered (e.g., intent) and the improper purposes for which it may not be considered (e.g., propensity).
Invited error: A party cannot complain on appeal about an error it caused or agreed to in the trial court. If you call an FOA case a “conviction” in a stipulation, you likely cannot later argue that it was error for the court to use the same term.
Plain error: A narrow appellate doctrine allowing correction of unpreserved errors that are clear, affect substantial rights, and seriously affect the fairness of proceedings. Invited error blocks plain-error review.
Georgia First Offender Act (O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60): Permits eligible defendants to plead and be sentenced without entry of judgment of guilt; upon successful completion, they are exonerated and “not… considered to have a criminal conviction” under Georgia law. Whether and when that state-law status counts as a “conviction” in federal law contexts remains unsettled in published Eleventh Circuit authority.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Rodriguez Martinez reaffirms two practical points of federal criminal practice in the circuit. First, the court continues to treat prior drug offenses as strongly probative of intent in drug trafficking cases, especially when the prior and charged conduct involve the same drug, and it gives substantial deference to the district court’s Rule 403 balancing, trusting limiting instructions to curb prejudice. Second, a party that adopts or proposes specific language—here, labeling a Georgia First Offender disposition a “conviction”—invites the court’s use of that terminology and forecloses plain-error review on appeal.

Although non-precedential, the opinion signals that counsel should draft 404(b) stipulations and limiting instructions with precision, particularly when navigating the distinctive features of Georgia’s First Offender Act. It also highlights an unresolved question for a future published case: the federal significance of FOA dispositions. Until that question is squarely addressed, the safest course in federal proceedings is to describe FOA matters as “prior offenses” or “other acts,” reserving the legally freighted term “conviction” for those dispositions that clearly qualify as such under the governing federal framework.

Key Takeaways

Prior methamphetamine possession was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) to prove intent in a methamphetamine conspiracy/possession case; limiting instructions remain effective safeguards.
Invited error blocked a plain-error challenge to the trial court’s reference to a Georgia First Offender disposition as a “conviction” where the defendant used that very term and jointly stipulated to it.
The Eleventh Circuit has not, in a published opinion, resolved whether FOA dispositions count as “convictions” for federal purposes—an issue with potential ramifications across evidentiary and sentencing contexts.