Invited Error and the Limits of Tapia v. United States: United States v. Allante Ramone Brown

Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Allante Ramone Brown (No. 23-6029/6034, decided May 5, 2025) clarified the interplay between counsel’s advocacy, the Sentencing Reform Act’s prohibition on rehabilitation-based sentencing (as articulated in Tapia v. United States), and the doctrine of invited error. Allante Brown, a felon on supervised release, was stopped for a traffic violation, found in possession of a heroin/fentanyl mixture, and subsequently pled guilty. At his combined sentencing hearing, the district court revoked Brown’s supervised release, imposed a consecutive 24-month revocation term, then imposed a 75-month term for the new conviction (to run consecutively), followed by five years of supervised release. Brown appealed, arguing that the district court impermissibly lengthened his sentences to promote rehabilitation in violation of Tapia. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that any alleged Tapia error was invited by Brown’s own counsel at sentencing and thus unreviewable except in cases of manifest injustice.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion, authored by Judge Larsen, addressed two principal claims on appeal:

Procedural Reasonableness – Brown argued the district court improperly relied on rehabilitative goals to structure both his supervised-release revocation and his new-offense sentences, in violation of Tapia v. United States (564 U.S. 319, 2011).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Brown asserted that his lawyer’s failure to object to the alleged Tapia error at sentencing was constitutionally deficient.

The panel held:

Brown’s counsel affirmatively requested consecutive sentences and urged the court to structure the prison terms so that Brown “can have served out the time” for supervised-release revocation and thereby qualify for Bureau of Prisons (BOP) programs. Those requests directly produced the very sentencing rationale Brown now alleges to be erroneous. Under the invited-error doctrine, Brown cannot now challenge those aspects of the sentence.
Because Brown did not raise an objection in district court, review would ordinarily be for plain error. But invited error—where defense counsel leads the court to commit the error—precludes even plain-error review absent a showing of manifest injustice, which Brown failed to demonstrate.
Brown’s ineffective-assistance claim was denied without prejudice to a collateral § 2255 motion, consistent with Sixth Circuit practice of preserving such claims for post-conviction proceedings.

Result: Affirmance.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011) – Held that the Sentencing Reform Act “precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.”
United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 768 (6th Cir. 2013) – Clarified that a court may discuss rehabilitative opportunities in prison so long as it does not make them the basis for imposing or extending a sentence.
United States v. Krul, 774 F.3d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 2014) – Explained that not every mention of rehabilitation at sentencing requires reversal; only when there is an identifiable basis that the sentence was imposed or lengthened for rehabilitative ends.
United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512, 521–22 (6th Cir. 2017) – Reiterated that a Tapia error is present only if the court manifestly imposed or lengthened a sentence for rehabilitation, not merely by discussing it.
United States v. Carter, 89 F.4th 565, 568 (6th Cir. 2023) – Defined “invited error” as one the defendant encourages or requests, and held that invited errors are reviewed only for manifest injustice.
United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1047–48 (6th Cir. 2019) – Set forth the standards for procedural reasonableness and explained plain-error review when no objection is made at sentencing.
Montgomery, 998 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2021) – Noted that invited-error review for manifest injustice is rare and often depends on whether both sides are equally at fault.

2. Legal Reasoning

Brown’s appeal hinged on Tapia and the Sentencing Reform Act’s directive that sentences must not be imposed or lengthened to furnish rehabilitative treatment. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged Brown’s argument that the district court’s explicit references to “getting help” and “making resources available” suggested a rehabilitative motive. However, the panel focused on the mechanics of the invited-error doctrine:

Defense counsel told the court that consecutive sentences were necessary to allow Brown to “go into the BOP” untainted by a pending revocation term, thereby opening rehabilitative programs and treatment resources.
Counsel repeatedly urged the court to fashion a sentence that would give Brown time for education, vocational training, mental-health treatment, and drug treatment.
The district court’s statements—promising to “fashion a sentence ultimately that will get you some help” and to “make resources available to you”—directly tracked those requests.
Because Brown’s lawyer affirmatively advised and welcomed a sentencing plan grounded in rehabilitative opportunity, Brown “contributed in some way to the district court’s error” and cannot now fault the court for implementing precisely that strategy.

On these facts, the panel concluded that any alleged Tapia violation was invited and therefore unreviewable except for manifest injustice. Brown failed to show manifest injustice because:

The government did not press rehabilitative arguments (it sought consecutiveness on typical public-safety grounds).
No constitutional right was at stake.
Defendant and counsel steered the court toward the very errors alleged on appeal.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision reinforces two key principles:

Limits of Tapia Challenges – A defendant who affirmatively requests or agrees to a rehabilitative justification for sentencing cannot later invoke Tapia to challenge that same justification on appeal.
Doctrine of Invited Error – Counsel’s strategic sentencing arguments, even if later deemed improper under some precedent, will bind the defendant if they “invite” the very rationale.

Practitioners should beware that requesting concessive remedies (e.g., consecutive terms to maximize program eligibility) may foreclose appellate relief under Tapia or similar statutes. Defendants wishing to preserve Tapia objections must ensure their counsel does not endorse or invite rehabilitation-based sentencing language.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Tapia Error – Occurs when a court imposes or lengthens a prison sentence for the purpose of providing rehabilitation (e.g., education or treatment) rather than focusing solely on punishment, deterrence, or public safety.
Invited Error – A party cannot complain on appeal about an error it encouraged or requested at trial. If your lawyer asks the court to do X, you cannot later claim it was wrong to do X.
Plain-Error Review – When a party fails to object at trial, appellate courts review only for “plain error” (a clear or obvious mistake affecting substantial rights), unless invited error applies.
Manifest Injustice – A narrow exception allowing review of invited errors only when the error is so grave that failing to correct it would produce a fundamentally unfair result.
§ 2255 Motion – A post-conviction proceeding where a defendant can raise ineffective-assistance claims that were not developed at trial or on direct appeal.

Conclusion

United States v. Allante Ramone Brown reaffirms that Tapia prohibits courts from structuring sentences primarily to promote rehabilitation, but it also underscores that defendants who actively request or frame their sentencing around rehabilitative goals invite any resulting error and lose the ability to challenge it on appeal. The Sixth Circuit’s application of the invited-error doctrine emphasizes the strategic importance of sentencing advocacy and preserves appellate resources for genuine, uninvited errors. Finally, the court’s refusal to resolve Brown’s ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal aligns with the prevailing practice of preserving such claims for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.