Intrinsic Drug-Trafficking Evidence, Structuring Inferences, and Harmless Guideline Error: Commentary on United States v. Frazier

Intrinsic Drug-Trafficking Evidence, Structuring Inferences, and Harmless Guideline Error: Commentary on United States v. Frazier

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Anthony Lamon Frazier, No. 24‑12897 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), affirms a sweeping set of convictions and a 120‑month sentence arising out of a multi-faceted financial and narcotics prosecution. Though marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore non‑precedential, the opinion is a detailed application of several important doctrines:

  • Severance of counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 and “spillover prejudice”
  • The scope of “intrinsic” evidence versus Rule 404(b) in admitting prior drug activity
  • Rule 403 balancing when admitting a prior conviction and K‑9 drug alerts
  • Use of circumstantial evidence to prove:
    • Drug‑proceeds money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956
    • Structuring under 31 U.S.C. § 5324
    • Wire fraud conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349
    • Willfully false tax returns under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)
  • The Keene harmless‑error framework for Guideline calculation challenges

Frazier was convicted after trial of:

  • 23 counts of laundering proceeds of drug distribution (Counts 1–23)
  • 4 counts of structuring financial transactions to evade reporting (Counts 24–27)
  • 1 count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud (Count 28)
  • 1 count of laundering wire‑fraud proceeds (Count 29)
  • 3 counts of filing false tax returns (Counts 35–37)

On appeal, he raised four principal issues:

  1. The denial of his motion to sever the wire-fraud-related Counts 28–29 from the rest
  2. The admission of evidence of his prior drug conviction and K‑9 alerts to his truck
  3. The denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts (sufficiency of the evidence)
  4. The reasonableness of his 120‑month sentence in light of alleged Guideline errors

The Eleventh Circuit rejected each argument and affirmed in full. The opinion is particularly instructive on how the court:

  • Uses limiting instructions and the concept of “intrinsic” evidence to uphold admission of highly damaging prior‑drug‑crime proof
  • Relies heavily on circumstantial financial evidence to sustain money laundering and structuring convictions
  • Applies the Keene harmless‑error approach to dispose of sentencing challenges that are not fully developed

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s core holdings can be summarized as follows:

  1. Severance (Rule 14): The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance of Counts 28–29 (wire fraud conspiracy and fraud‑proceeds laundering) from the drug‑money‑laundering, structuring, and tax counts. Any risk of “spillover prejudice” was mitigated by strong limiting instructions, and there was strong independent evidence of guilt on Counts 28–29.
  2. Admission of Prior Conviction and K‑9 Evidence:
    • Evidence of Frazier’s prior methamphetamine conviction and the underlying October 2019 controlled buy was admissible as intrinsic to the drug‑proceeds laundering counts, not subject to Rule 404(b).
    • Even if not intrinsic, admission was proper under Rule 403; the probative value was high and any unfair prejudice was reduced by limiting instructions. The K‑9 alerts to Frazier’s truck were likewise admissible.
  3. Sufficiency of the Evidence:
    • Money laundering and structuring (Counts 1–27): A rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Frazier was distributing drugs, that the financial transactions involved drug proceeds, and that those transactions were designed to conceal the proceeds or evade federal reporting requirements.
    • Wire fraud and fraud‑proceeds laundering (Counts 28–29): Circumstantial evidence was ample to infer that Frazier knowingly joined a scheme with Frederick Spencer to defraud investor Q.W. of $500,000 and then laundered that money.
    • False tax returns (Counts 35–37): The evidence showed large amounts of unreported income and that Frazier did not fully disclose financial information to his accountant, allowing the jury to reject his “good‑faith reliance” defense and find willful falsity.
  4. Sentence Reasonableness and Keene: Frazier failed to identify any actual Guideline calculation error. His argument—that without two enhancements his 120‑month sentence would be an unreasonable upward variance—did not suffice. Given the district court’s explicit Keene statement that it would impose the same sentence even if it miscalculated the Guidelines, and absent any developed argument that the sentence was substantively unreasonable with the enhancements, there was no basis to disturb the sentence.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Doctrinal Role

1. Joinder, Severance, and Spillover

  • United States v. Mosquera, 886 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2011):
    • Establish the “heavy burden” on defendants seeking severance under Rule 14.
    • Articulate the “compelling prejudice” standard: the defendant must show actual prejudice that cannot be cured by instructions or other measures short of severance.
  • United States v. Prosperi, 201 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2000):
    • Supplies a four‑factor framework for assessing prejudicial spillover:
      1. Whether the jury meticulously sifted the evidence for each count
      2. Whether the other‑acts evidence was inflammatory
      3. Whether admission altered the defendant’s trial strategy
      4. The strength of the evidence on the challenged counts
  • United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2002):
    • Confirms abuse‑of‑discretion review for Rule 14 severance decisions.
  • United States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851 (11th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Almanzar, 634 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2011):
    • Emphasize that properly given limiting instructions ordinarily dispel spillover prejudice, and that courts presume juries follow such instructions absent contrary evidence.
  • United States v. Hernandez, 921 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir. 1991):
    • Holds that a short deliberation combined with a unanimous verdict, by itself, does not demonstrate prejudice; it may instead reflect strong evidence.
  • Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014):
    • Important for appellate practice: issues are abandoned if mentioned only in passing without argument or supporting authority—relevant here because any Rule 8 misjoinder claim was deemed abandoned.

2. Evidence Law: Intrinsic Evidence and Rule 403

  • United States v. Harding, 104 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2024):
    • Defines “intrinsic” evidence of the charged offense as evidence that:
      • Arises from the same transaction or series of transactions, or
      • Is necessary to complete the story of the crime by providing context, motive, set‑up, or key details of the scheme, or
      • Is “inextricably intertwined” with the charged conduct.
    • Frames the doctrinal basis for treating Frazier’s prior drug conviction as intrinsic to the money laundering charges.
  • United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2015):
    • Approves admission of older drug‑dealing evidence as necessary to complete the story of a later drug conspiracy, despite a substantial temporal gap.
    • Used here to rebut Frazier’s temporal‑remoteness argument; the court notes Holt involved a larger time gap than the months at issue in Frazier.
  • United States v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 2003):
    • Provides the standard of review: evidentiary rulings are reviewed for clear abuse of discretion.
    • States that, under Rule 403, evidence is to be viewed “in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.”
  • United States v. Kent, 93 F.4th 1213 (11th Cir. 2024):
    • Defines “unfair prejudice” as an “undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.”
    • Recognizes that while limiting instructions often mitigate prejudice, in rare cases no instruction can cure extreme prejudice.
  • Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b):
    • Rule 403: allows exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers such as unfair prejudice or confusion.
    • Rule 404(b): governs admission of other‑act evidence to show things like motive or intent; but it does not apply to intrinsic evidence in the Eleventh Circuit’s framework.

3. Money Laundering, Structuring, and Related Statutes

  • United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001):
    • Sets out the four elements of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i): conducting a financial transaction, knowing it involved illegal proceeds, that the funds are in fact proceeds of specified unlawful activity, and knowledge that the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the nature or source of those proceeds.
  • United States v. Calderon, 169 F.3d 718 (11th Cir. 1999):
    • Recognizes the alternate concealment element in § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii): structuring to avoid transaction reporting requirements as a form of money laundering.
  • United States v. Zayas, 141 F.4th 1217 (11th Cir. 2025) (as described in the opinion):
    • Reiterates that under the Bank Secrecy Act and regulations, financial institutions must file Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) for transactions in currency over $10,000.
  • United States v. Bird, 79 F.4th 1344 (11th Cir. 2023):
    • Defines “structuring” under 31 U.S.C. § 5324 as breaking up a single transaction above the reporting threshold into multiple smaller transactions for the purpose of evading reporting.
    • Confirms that the requisite intent may be proven circumstantially.

4. Wire Fraud and Conspiracy

  • United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019):
    • Articulates the elements of conspiracy to commit wire fraud: existence of a conspiracy, defendant’s knowledge of it, and knowing and voluntary participation.
  • United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2013):
    • Stresses that conspiracies are usually proven through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from participants’ conduct.
  • United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2015):
    • Clarifies that a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy even if he:
      • Plays only a minor role
      • Does not know all details
      • Does not meet all co‑conspirators
      • Does not participate in every stage of the scheme

5. False Tax Returns and Good-Faith Defenses

  • United States v. Margarita Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2018):
    • Sets out the elements for 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1): making and subscribing a return under penalty of perjury, knowing that it was not true and correct as to every material matter, and acting willfully.
  • United States v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111 (11th Cir. 1994):
    • Recognizes that a good‑faith mistake or belief is a complete defense to filing a false return. That includes genuine, reasonable reliance on a tax professional—but only if the taxpayer makes full disclosure.

6. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Appellate Standards

  • Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979):
    • Provides the constitutional benchmark for sufficiency: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational juror could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838 (11th Cir. 1998):
    • Applies Jackson in the Eleventh Circuit, requiring that all credibility choices and reasonable inferences be drawn in favor of the jury’s verdict on appellate review.

7. Sentencing Errors and Harmlessness

  • Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992):
    • Holds that a Guideline miscalculation requires remand only if it affected the sentence imposed; harmless errors do not warrant resentencing.
  • United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006):
    • Establishes that when a district court says on the record it would impose the same sentence regardless of a Guideline issue, the appellate court can assume arguendo that the Guideline calculation was wrong and simply review whether the sentence is reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) on that assumption.
  • United States v. Martikainen, 640 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2011):
    • Reiterates that to vacate a sentence there must be an error and that error must not be harmless. If the appellant shows no error, harmlessness analysis is unnecessary.

B. Legal Reasoning in Frazier

1. Severance and Alleged Spillover Prejudice

Frazier asked to try the wire‑fraud conspiracy and wire‑fraud‑proceeds laundering counts (Counts 28–29) separately from the drug‑proceeds laundering, structuring, and tax‑fraud counts. He argued that evidence of drug trafficking, structuring, and false tax returns would taint the jury’s view of the wire‑fraud allegations involving victim Q.W.

Key points in the court’s reasoning:

  • Abandonment of Rule 8(a) claim: The court held that any misjoinder argument under Rule 8(a) was abandoned because it was referenced only in passing and without analysis, invoking Sapuppo. Thus, the panel addressed only Rule 14 prejudice.
  • High standard and curative instructions: Applying Mosquera and Lopez, the court stressed that severance is reserved for “compelling prejudice” not addressable by other means. Here, the district court instructed the jury that:
    • Each count had to be considered “separately and individually.”
    • A guilty finding on one count could not affect the verdict on others.
    • Frazier was “on trial only” for the specific charged crimes.
    • Evidence of other acts could not be used to infer he committed the acts charged simply because he did similar acts at other times.
    The panel presumed, under Almanzar and Kennard, that the jury followed these instructions.
  • Application of the Prosperi factors:
    • Meticulous sifting: Different types of evidence supported different counts (e.g., narcotics‑related financial movements vs. Q.W.’s investment). The relative distinctness of this evidence made spillover less likely.
    • Inflammatory nature: The drug evidence was certainly damaging, but much of it consisted of financial records, which are not inherently inflammatory. Even evidence of drug trafficking, while prejudicial, was not so inflammatory that limiting instructions could not mitigate its effect.
    • Trial strategy: Frazier claimed he had to change strategy to contest the prior drug conviction, but the panel noted he did not show how this “significantly” altered his overall defense—particularly since the government did not rely on the prior conviction to prove the Q.W. fraud.
    • Strength of evidence on Counts 28–29: The court found “strong evidence” that Frazier conspired with Spencer to defraud Q.W. and launder the proceeds (large transfer to Spencer’s mother’s newly opened account, personal uses of investor funds, and Frazier’s use of those funds to pay credit‑card debt and flip houses). Strong evidence reduces the plausibility of a spillover theory.
  • Short deliberation time: Frazier argued that 82 minutes of deliberation for a multi‑count case showed the jury could not have carefully separated the counts. The panel, citing Hernandez, rejected that inference: short deliberations and a uniform verdict can signal a strong government case rather than prejudice.

Taken together, the panel concluded that Frazier had not shown “compelling prejudice” and that severance was not “the only proper remedy.” The heavy reliance on curative instructions and the strength of the evidence is typical of Eleventh Circuit severance jurisprudence and signals the difficulty of succeeding on spillover arguments on appeal.

2. Admission of Prior Drug Conviction and K‑9 Alerts

a. Intrinsic Evidence Analysis

The government introduced evidence that:

  • In October 2019, Frazier sold 666 grams of methamphetamine to a confidential informant and was later convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute 50+ grams.
  • Postal inspectors and agents observed Frazier’s pattern of visiting known drug dealers, then post offices and banks, between May and September 2020.
  • A K‑9 alerted twice to Frazier’s truck in August 2020, suggesting the presence of narcotics.

The question was whether the prior conviction and the underlying transaction should be treated as:

  • Intrinsic evidence of the charged laundering and structuring counts (and thus outside Rule 404(b)), or
  • Extrinsic “other acts” evidence subject to Rule 404(b) and more stringent admission standards.

Using Harding, the panel held the evidence was intrinsic to Counts 1–23 (laundering drug‑distribution proceeds between July 2017 and September 2020). The rationale:

  • Same series of transactions / inextricably intertwined: The prior drug conviction fell squarely inside the timeframe of the charged laundering scheme and directly concerned Frazier’s distribution of narcotics for cash. This “formed an integral and natural part” of the story of how he acquired the cash that was later laundered.
  • Completing the story / providing context: Even though the government did not trace the specific October 2019 controlled‑buy money into the laundered funds, the controlled buy showed Frazier was conducting significant cash drug transactions during the period when he was using money orders and structured deposits. That helped explain:
    • Why he had large amounts of currency
    • Why he might choose opaque instruments like postal money orders
    • The context, motive, and “set‑up” of the laundering scheme
  • Temporal remoteness: The court rejected Frazier’s claim that the October 2019 transaction was too remote from February 2019 and March 2020 laundering acts. Citing Holt, which allowed 1995 conduct to illuminate a conspiracy beginning in 2000, the court deemed the months‑long gaps here well within acceptable bounds.

Once classified as intrinsic, the evidence was outside Rule 404(b), and the only remaining question was Rule 403 balancing.

b. Rule 403 Balancing

Under Rule 403 (as understood through Lopez, Dodds, and Kent), the trial judge must determine whether the evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or other listed harms.

For the prior drug conviction:

  • High probative value: It directly showed that Frazier was engaged in significant drug distribution during the laundering period—a key link for proving both the existence of “proceeds of unlawful activity” and Frazier’s knowledge.
  • Prejudice mitigated by instructions: The judge issued cautions about using the prior act only for limited purposes, and not to infer bad character or propensity. Under Kent, such instructions are generally sufficient unless the prejudice is extreme, which the panel found it was not.

For the August 2020 K‑9 alerts:

  • Relevance and probative value: Two separate alerts by a well‑trained K‑9 during the same month as several alleged laundering acts supported an inference that Frazier’s truck carried narcotics or drug residue, reinforcing the link between his movements, cash, and drug trafficking.
  • Defense counterpoint: Frazier argued the dog could detect other (potentially legal) odors, but the panel held this did not erase probative value, especially given testimony that the dog was “very good” and did not alert on other vehicles.
  • Non‑inflammatory nature: The court considered that video of a K‑9 alerting in a parking lot is not the sort of emotionally incendiary evidence (e.g., graphic violence) that typically triggers extreme Rule 403 concerns.

Ultimately, the panel concluded that in light of the substantial probative value and the limiting instructions, any unfair prejudice did not “substantially outweigh” probative value. This reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s tendency to:

  • Apply Rule 403 “sparingly”
  • View evidence “in a light most favorable to admission”
  • Rely on juries to follow clear limiting instructions

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

a. Drug-Proceeds Money Laundering and Structuring (Counts 1–27)

The key sufficiency questions were:

  1. Was there enough evidence that Frazier was engaged in drug distribution during the relevant period?
  2. Did the government prove the funds he moved were drug proceeds and that he knew it?
  3. Did the evidence show the financial transactions were designed to conceal or to evade reporting requirements?

On drug activity, the panel, applying Jackson and Trujillo, held a rational juror could find drug dealing based on:

  • The October 2019 controlled buy of 666 grams of meth
  • The conviction for possessing with intent to distribute 50+ grams
  • Surveillance of Frazier visiting known drug dealers before going to post offices and PNC branches
  • Two K‑9 alerts to his truck in August 2020

The courts have long allowed drug activity to be proven circumstantially; here, even the absence of on‑the‑spot narcotics seizures after the August stops did not undermine the overall picture.

On the laundering elements, the government introduced:

  • Postal money orders: Inspector Verhine testified that:
    • The names and addresses on money orders deposited into the Frazier Investment and Head of Game accounts (Counts 1–12, 14, 16–19) were fictitious combinations.
    • The handwriting on multiple money orders appeared similar, suggesting a common author.
  • Cash flows and deposits:
    • Large cash deposits into the same business accounts on the same days as fake‑name money‑order deposits (Counts 13 and 20).
    • Additional large cash deposits (Counts 15, 21–23) into the same accounts, within days or weeks of other suspicious deposits.
    • Frazier’s possession of substantial cash (approximately $4,000–$5,000 on his person; over $45,000 in a safe at a property he owned).
    • Observation of Frazier producing a large amount of cash from his pocket at a post office counter.
    • Investigators rarely, if ever, saw a vehicle at “FF Autos,” the supposed car business whose accounts were receiving these funds.

From these facts, the panel reasoned that a jury could infer:

  • The funds represented unreported income from drug distribution, not legitimate business revenue.
  • The use of fictitious names and dispersed postal money orders was designed to obscure the source, ownership, and control of the money—satisfying the concealment element of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

On structuring (Counts 24–27), the prosecution had to show Frazier intentionally broke up large currency transactions to stay below reporting thresholds:

  • CTR threshold ($10,000): For Count 24, Frazier converted $21,100 in cash into numerous money orders purchased at different post offices, then deposited them into the Frazier Investment account—none triggering a CTR, even though the aggregate exceeded $10,000.
  • Postal money order threshold ($3,000): For Counts 25 and 26, he bought $4,000 in money orders from different post offices on the same day, avoiding the requirement to present identification and have purchase information recorded.
  • Mixing deposits: For Count 27, he divided $14,500 between money‑order and cash deposits in a way that avoided CTR filing.

Inspector Verhine testified that no CTRs or equivalent reports were filed for these transactions. Although Frazier pointed out at least one instance where overall account deposits exceeded $10,000, the panel noted that deposit was itself split into cash and check so that the cash portion fell below the threshold. More broadly, occasional non‑structured deposits did not negate the jury’s ability to infer an intent to structure in the specific charged instances.

Using Bird as the doctrinal foundation, the court held that the repeated pattern of:

  • Large cash holdings
  • Fragmented money‑order purchases at different locations
  • Deposit patterns just below statutory thresholds

permitted a reasonable inference that Frazier understood the reporting rules and intentionally circumvented them.

b. Wire Fraud Conspiracy and Fraud-Proceeds Laundering (Counts 28–29)

The scheme involving victim Q.W. centered on a purported investment in “Head of Game.” Key facts:

  • Q.W. agreed to invest $500,000, wired to a Head of Game account, based on representations that the funds would be used to grow the business.
  • The day after receiving the funds, Frazier transferred $214,825 to a “Mom & Son’s Towing” account that Spencer’s mother had opened the prior day.
  • Funds in Mom & Son’s Towing were used for personal purposes (e.g., dental and water bills), not Head of Game promotions or operations.
  • Frazier used additional portions of the $500,000 to:
    • Pay off personal credit card debt
    • Flip houses, with sales proceeds deposited into his own “Frazier Investment” account
  • Spencer lied to investigators, falsely claiming that Frazier had sent the funds for him and another individual to start a nightclub.

Frazier argued that the government produced no evidence of him personally misrepresenting anything to Q.W. and no explicit “meeting of the minds” with Spencer. The panel, invoking Vernon and Sosa, emphasized that:

  • Conspiracy is almost always proven circumstantially.
  • A conspirator need not personally communicate with the victim or formulate the misrepresentations.
  • Awareness of the “essential nature” of the scheme and voluntary participation, even in a limited role, suffices.

From the pattern of financial transfers, the timing (immediate post‑wire diversion), the opening of the Mom & Son’s Towing account just in time to receive funds, and the personal uses of the money, the court held the jury could infer that Frazier:

  • Knew that Q.W.’s wire was supposed to fund Head of Game’s growth
  • Joined with Spencer in diverting the money for personal expenditures and real‑estate ventures
  • Participated in designing subsequent transactions (transfers, house flips, deposits into Frazier Investment) to conceal the diversion and use, satisfying § 1349 and § 1956’s elements for conspiracy and fraud‑proceeds laundering
c. False Tax Returns (Counts 35–37)

For the 2017–2019 tax years, IRS Agent Rolanda Rooney calculated:

  • Unreported income of approximately $176,000 (2017)
  • Unreported income of $100,413 (2018)
  • Unreported income of $527,887 (2019)

These figures already accounted for giving Frazier the “benefit of the doubt” on certain items and additional deductions. Thus, even under a generous assumption, his reported income was far below his actual income.

On the critical element of willfulness, Special Agent Lisa Fontanette testified that Frazier:

  • Did not provide his accountant with documentation of:
    • The postal money orders
    • The $500,000 transfer from Q.W. to the Head of Game account
  • Thereby made it difficult or impossible for the accountant to prepare accurate returns.

Under Margarita Garcia and Morris, a “good‑faith” reliance on a professional is a potential complete defense, but it requires:

  • Full disclosure of all relevant facts to the professional, and
  • A reasonable belief that the resulting return is accurate.

The panel held that the jury could reasonably reject Frazier’s good‑faith defense because:

  • He withheld documentation of major income streams (the money orders and the $500,000 wire).
  • The sheer magnitude of unreported income—especially in 2019—strongly suggested willfulness, not mistake.

4. Sentencing and the Keene Harmless-Error Framework

On appeal, Frazier did not directly argue that any particular Guideline enhancement was wrongly applied. Instead, he asserted that if:

  • The six‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1), and
  • The two‑level “sophisticated laundering” enhancement under § 2S1.1(b)(3)

were removed, then his 120‑month sentence would represent an unreasonable upward variance from the (hypothetical) lower range.

The district court, however, had delivered a standard Keene statement: it would have imposed the same 120‑month sentence regardless of how those enhancements were resolved. Under Williams and Keene, that triggers a two‑step inquiry:

  1. Was there a Guideline calculation error?
  2. If so, was that error harmless because the same sentence would have been reasonable under § 3553(a) anyway?

Critically, the panel never reached step two. Citing Martikainen, it noted that an appellant must establish both an error and that it was not harmless. Frazier:

  • Did not argue the enhancements were legally or factually incorrect.
  • Did not argue that the 120‑month sentence was substantively unreasonable even if the enhancements were proper.

Instead, he argued only that the sentence would be unreasonable if the enhancements were removed. The panel held that without a properly developed claim of error in the application of the enhancements—and without a stand‑alone substantively unreasonable‑sentence argument—the appeal presented no reversible sentencing issue.

This outcome underscores a key appellate practice point: when a district court issues a Keene statement, defendants must either:

  • Substantively challenge the reasonableness of the sentence under the assumed lower Guideline range, and/or
  • Specifically challenge the enhancements themselves

Merely positing a hypothetical lower range without identifying any concrete error is insufficient.

C. Impact of the Decision

1. Evidentiary Doctrine: Broad Intrinsic Evidence and Limited Rule 403 Relief

Although unpublished, Frazier reflects and reinforces several trends in Eleventh Circuit evidence law:

  • Expansive “intrinsic” evidence doctrine:
    • Priors that fall within the timeframe of the charged scheme and relate to how the defendant obtained the illicit funds are likely to be deemed “inextricably intertwined” and “necessary to complete the story.”
    • This allows prosecutors to avoid Rule 404(b) in many drug‑proceeds–laundering cases, provided they tether the prior conviction to the narrative of the charged crime.
  • Rule 403’s high barrier:
    • Even highly damaging drug and K‑9 evidence survives 403 scrutiny where:
      • It is probative of contested issues (source of funds, knowledge, intent), and
      • Limiting instructions are given.
    • The court’s description of the K‑9 videos as not particularly inflammatory may encourage their continued use in similar prosecutions.

2. Substantive Criminal Law: Money Laundering and Structuring

On the substantive front, Frazier illustrates how:

  • Circumstantial financial evidence can sustain laundering counts:
    • There was no direct tracing of drug sales proceeds into specific money orders.
    • Yet, patterns of:
      • Large unexplained cash holdings,
      • Use of phony names and addresses,
      • Deposits into accounts associated with thin or non‑existent businesses, and
      • Temporal proximity to drug‑related observations
    • were enough for a rational jury to infer drug‑proceeds laundering under § 1956.
  • Structuring intent inferred from patterns:
    • Acquisition of multiple smaller money orders at different post offices—rather than a single large purchase—supports the mens rea required by § 5324(a)(3).
    • Defendants cannot defeat structuring inferences by pointing to occasional unstructured deposits, especially where specific charged transactions show careful avoidance of thresholds.

3. Wire Fraud Conspiracy: Limited Role Yet Full Liability

The wire fraud conspiracy discussion serves as a reminder that:

  • A defendant’s liability does not depend on personally lying to the victim.
  • Participation in moving, diverting, and personalizing funds—especially in close coordination with a co‑conspirator who handles the victim communications—can be enough, even if the defendant never speaks to the investor.

The facts involving Q.W.’s $500,000 show how financial flows alone can demonstrate agreement and participation in fraud.

4. Tax Cases: Limits of the “Reliance on Accountant” Defense

The decision reinforces the narrowness of the good‑faith reliance defense in tax prosecutions:

  • Taxpayers must fully inform their preparers of all material income streams and documentation; withholding large sources of income effectively defeats good‑faith reliance.
  • Very large discrepancies between actual and reported income strongly support inferences of willfulness.

5. Sentencing Appeals: The Power of Keene Statements

Finally, Frazier signals the continuing robustness of the Keene harmless‑error framework in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • When district judges state on the record that they would impose the same sentence irrespective of contested enhancements, appellants must either:
    • Show the sentence is substantively unreasonable even under a lower range, or
    • Demonstrate non‑harmless error in the application of the enhancements.
  • Abstract arguments about hypothetical lower ranges—without any actual allegation of Guideline error—will not suffice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 8(a) Joinder vs. Rule 14 Severance:
    • Rule 8(a) allows charging multiple offenses in one indictment if they are of the same or similar character, arise from the same transaction, or are part of a common scheme.
    • Rule 14 allows a judge to sever counts for separate trials if joinder (even if proper) would unfairly prejudice a defendant.
  • Spillover Prejudice:
    • The risk that evidence admissible on one count will “spill over” and cause the jury to convict on another count based on bad character or cumulative impression rather than proper proof for that count.
  • Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Evidence:
    • Intrinsic evidence is part of the story of the charged crime (same series of transactions, necessary context) and is admitted without resort to Rule 404(b).
    • Extrinsic evidence (governed by Rule 404(b)) concerns other acts and is admissible for limited purposes like proving intent or knowledge, but not propensity.
  • Unfair Prejudice (Rule 403):
    • Evidence is “unfairly” prejudicial when it has an undue tendency to cause the jury to decide on an improper basis (e.g., emotion, anger, or moral outrage), not merely because it is damaging.
  • Bank Secrecy Act, CTRs, and Structuring:
    • Banks must file Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) for cash transactions above $10,000; the Postal Service has similar obligations for money orders $3,000 or above (with ID and recordkeeping).
    • Structuring occurs when someone deliberately splits what is essentially a single large cash transaction into multiple smaller ones to avoid triggering those reports—this is a standalone crime under 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
  • Money Laundering “Concealment” Element:
    • Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the government must show that the financial transaction was designed, at least in part, to hide the nature or source of criminal proceeds—e.g., by using fake names, shell accounts, or complicated transfers.
  • Wire Fraud Conspiracy:
    • To prove conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the government must show a plan to defraud using interstate wires, that the defendant knew of the scheme, and that he knowingly joined it.
    • The conspirator need not personally speak to the victim or mastermind the scheme; knowingly helping execute or benefit from the fraud suffices.
  • Good-Faith Reliance on Accountant (Tax Cases):
    • A taxpayer can sometimes defend by saying, “I relied in good faith on my accountant,” but only if:
      • He provided complete and accurate information to the accountant, and
      • He reasonably believed the returns were correct.
    • Concealing major income streams from the accountant undermines this defense.
  • Keene Statements and Harmless Error:
    • When a sentencing judge says, “I would impose the same sentence even if my Guideline calculation is wrong,” an appellate court can:
      • Assume the Guideline error was real, but
      • Affirm if the same sentence would still be reasonable under the § 3553(a) factors.
    • This doctrine puts a premium on defendants raising clear, specific challenges both to the Guideline calculation and to the substantive reasonableness of the ultimate sentence.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Frazier is an unpublished but analytically rich decision that:

  • Reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit’s stringent standard for severance and its faith in limiting instructions to cure potential spillover.
  • Illustrates the court’s broad conception of “intrinsic” evidence in complex drug‑money‑laundering prosecutions, allowing admission of prior drug crimes closely tied to the charged scheme’s timeframe and context.
  • Demonstrates that careful, circumstantial financial analysis—fictitious money orders, structured deposits, under‑utilized shell businesses—can sustain both money‑laundering and structuring counts even without direct drug seizures or confessions.
  • Clarifies that conspiracy liability for wire fraud does not require personal communication with the victim, and that misuse of investment funds in clear coordination with a co‑conspirator supports conviction.
  • Underscores the narrowness of good‑faith reliance defenses in tax cases when a defendant withholds key financial data from his preparer.
  • Shows the practical force of Keene: sentencing appeals that neither identify specific Guideline errors nor argue substantive unreasonableness are unlikely to succeed once a district court has declared it would impose the same sentence regardless.

While not binding precedent, Frazier provides a detailed snapshot of how the Eleventh Circuit currently applies core evidentiary, substantive, and sentencing doctrines in a complex, multi‑count white‑collar and narcotics case. For practitioners, it offers a roadmap of what arguments are likely to fail—and how carefully the government can build a case on circumstantial financial proof and prior‑act evidence that is cast as “intrinsic” to the charged offenses.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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