Intrastate Use of an Automobile Satisfies § 1958’s “Facility of Interstate Commerce” Element (Per Se Instrumentality Approach)

Introduction

In United States v. Kermon Williams (11th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Kermon Williams, James Higgs, Jr., and Jhaphre Higgs for offenses arising from a murder-for-hire plot and the resulting deaths of Tywan Armstrong and Roger Ford. The government’s theory was that Williams, a rival drug dealer, hired the Higgs brothers—paying $20,000 and “several ounces” of cocaine and supplying an AR-15—to kill Armstrong. The killing occurred after the Higgs brothers allegedly pursued and fired into Armstrong’s vehicle while driving a Lexus.

The appeal raised three central issues:

Statutory scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (murder-for-hire): whether using a private automobile solely within Florida can satisfy the statute’s requirement of using a “facility of interstate or foreign commerce.”
Commerce Clause limits: whether Congress may constitutionally reach purely intrastate use of a personal vehicle in this context.
Drug and firearm counts: whether evidence sufficed to prove a cocaine distribution conspiracy (and attempted possession with intent to distribute), which also served as predicates for the § 924(c) counts.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all convictions. Most significantly, it held that the intrastate use of an automobile, by itself, is sufficient evidence of using a “facility of interstate commerce” under 18 U.S.C. § 1958. The panel relied on (1) the text and amendment history of § 1958 (including Eleventh Circuit precedent interpreting the “facility of” phrasing), and (2) the Eleventh Circuit’s recent holding in United States v. Bryan that automobiles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even when used purely intrastate.

The court also rejected (1) a belated Commerce Clause challenge under plain-error review, (2) a claim that § 1958’s commerce element carries a scienter requirement, and (3) sufficiency challenges to the drug conspiracy and attempt counts. Finally, it rejected a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) as foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Interpreting “facility of interstate commerce” and regulating instrumentalities

United States v. Bryan, 159 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2025): The pivotal authority. Bryan held that automobiles “are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce” and thus can satisfy federal jurisdictional hooks even if their use during the offense is purely intrastate. Although Bryan arose under the federal kidnapping statute, the Williams panel treated its instrumentality analysis as strongly supporting the conclusion that a car is likewise a “facility of interstate commerce” for § 1958 purposes.
United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc): Provided the constitutional framework: Congress may regulate channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and may prohibit their use for harmful purposes, even if the harm is purely local. This undergirded the court’s receptiveness to jurisdiction based on the car itself.
United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005): A critical statutory precedent. Drury emphasized the 2004 amendment changing § 1958’s language from “facility in” to “facility of” interstate commerce, reasoning that this “makes absolutely clear” that purely intrastate use of such a facility can satisfy the statute. Drury also rejected a scienter requirement for the interstate-commerce element—an issue Williams revisited and again rejected.
United States v. Mandel, 647 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011): Cited for the proposition that § 1958 “does not require that a facility of interstate commerce actually be used in interstate commerce” and for the Seventh Circuit’s view that automobiles are designed for interstate movement and may qualify even when used intrastate.
United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998): Quoted via Bryan for the notion that automobiles are “inherently mobile and indispensable” to interstate movement, supporting their treatment as commerce-linked instrumentalities.
United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2003) and United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc): Used to support that Congress enacted § 1958 pursuant to its authority to regulate interstate instrumentalities and that there is “no meaningful distinction” between “facilities” and “instrumentalities” in this setting.
United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475 (4th Cir. 2013): Cited for the view that “facility of interstate commerce” and “instrumentality of interstate commerce” are essentially interchangeable in this context.
United States v. Chavarria, 140 F.4th 1257 (10th Cir. 2025): Raised by defendants to show potential limits on treating all vehicle uses as commerce-linked. The Williams panel distinguished it because Chavarria dealt with the broader term “motor vehicle” and did not squarely address “automobile” or “car” as used here, and in any event circuit conflict does not create plain error in the Eleventh Circuit.

2) Standards of review, binding precedent, and “plain error” barriers

United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011): Provided the de novo standard for statutory interpretation and sufficiency and the obligation to view evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2018): Used to enforce the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-precedent rule: a panel must follow prior binding precedent even if arguably wrong or undermined by later reasoning unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. This mattered both for defendants’ attempt to relitigate Bryan and for their effort to leverage Rehaif against Drury.
United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2013): Set the plain-error framework for a constitutional challenge raised for the first time on appeal; an error is “plain” only if contrary to on-point Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent or a federal statute.
United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2000): Cited for the proposition that a split among circuits does not establish plain error in the Eleventh Circuit.

3) Mens rea and jurisdictional elements

Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019): Defendants invoked Rehaif to argue for a knowledge requirement. The panel rejected this analogy because Rehaif turned on statutory text (“knowingly”) that does not appear in § 1958, and because Drury already resolved the scienter question in this circuit.
United States v. Davila, 592 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1979) and Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Davila, adopted as binding through Bonner, supported Drury’s view that even incidental/unintended interstate routing can satisfy jurisdictional commerce requirements in analogous statutes (wire fraud).

4) Drug conspiracy and attempt sufficiency

United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021): Supplied the elements of a § 846 drug conspiracy and reinforced that a reasonable jury standard governs sufficiency challenges.
United States v. Johnson, 889 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1989): Supported using circumstantial evidence and inferences from conduct to establish conspiratorial agreement.
United States v. Achey, 943 F.3d 909 (11th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Dekle, 165 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 1999): Framed the “buyer-seller” limitation: a mere transaction does not automatically establish a distribution conspiracy, but certain circumstances (amount, continuity, distribution inference) can.
United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) and United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016): Supported inferring intent to distribute from drug quantity; White was cited to indicate an ounce-plus quantity may support such an inference.
United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1985): Reinforced that credibility determinations belong to the jury and that a witness’s criminal history and motives do not make testimony “unbelievable on its face.”
United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012): Used to state the baseline § 841(a)(1) principle that knowingly possessing with intent to distribute violates the statute.

5) Felon-in-possession constitutional challenge

United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): Foreclosed defendants’ Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) under binding circuit law.

Legal Reasoning

A) The § 1958 “facility of interstate commerce” element is met by intrastate car use

The opinion’s reasoning proceeds in layered steps:

Text and amendment history (“of” not “in”): Relying on United States v. Drury, the panel treats Congress’s 2004 amendment—from “facility in” to “facility of” interstate commerce—as dispositive evidence that the statute does not require interstate use, only use of a qualifying facility.
Statutory definition includes “means of transportation”: Section 1958(b)(2) states that “facility of interstate or foreign commerce” “includes means of transportation and communication.” The panel holds a car “quite plainly” qualifies as a “means of transportation.”
Equating “facility” with “instrumentality”: Drawing on sister-circuit decisions (United States v. Richeson, United States v. Marek, United States v. Runyon, United States v. Mandel), the panel accepts the practical interchangeability of “facility of interstate commerce” and “instrumentality of interstate commerce” for § 1958 cases.
Binding effect of Bryan’s per se instrumentality rule: The panel treats United States v. Bryan as binding authority that automobiles are per se instrumentalities, making intrastate use sufficient. The defendants’ critique of Bryan is rejected under the prior-precedent rule.

Notably, the panel affirms jurisdiction based on the Lexus alone, making it unnecessary to rely on the roadway’s status (even though the facts mention U.S. Route 19). The holding effectively frames the automobile as the jurisdictional anchor for § 1958 in the Eleventh Circuit post-Bryan.

B) The Commerce Clause challenge fails under plain-error review

Because the defendants raised their Commerce Clause objection for the first time on appeal, the panel applied plain error review (United States v. Wright). That posture is outcome-determinative: to win, defendants needed on-point Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit authority clearly forbidding Congress from reaching their conduct. The panel found none—especially given Bryan’s broad instrumentality analysis and multiple sister-circuit decisions upholding § 1958 even for intrastate vehicle use (e.g., United States v. Mandel). Even if United States v. Chavarria suggests a narrower approach elsewhere, United States v. Aguillard prevents a circuit split from establishing plain error.

C) No scienter requirement applies to § 1958’s commerce element

The defendants argued the jury should have been instructed that they must have knowingly used a facility of interstate commerce. The panel held this is foreclosed by United States v. Drury, which rejected a knowledge/intent requirement as to the commerce nexus. The panel also declined to treat Rehaif v. United States as implicitly overruling Drury, emphasizing (i) Rehaif’s focus on statutory text not present in § 1958 and (ii) the Eleventh Circuit’s strict prior-precedent rule (United States v. Vega-Castillo).

D) Drug conspiracy and attempt: “distribution amount” evidence supports an agreement

On the drug counts, the panel applied established § 846 conspiracy standards (United States v. Reeves; United States v. Colston) and reiterated that a single transaction alone may not prove conspiracy (United States v. Dekle), but quantity and surrounding circumstances may permit an inference of a shared distribution objective (United States v. Achey).

The panel found sufficient evidence because a witness described Williams paying the Higgs brothers “several ounces” of cocaine as part of the murder-for-hire compensation and characterized that amount as a “distribution amount.” Coupled with the cash component and the coordinated criminal conduct, the jury could infer an agreement to possess with intent to distribute. Credibility attacks on the witness failed under United States v. Rivera and United States v. Garcia.

Impact

Expanded practical reach of § 1958 in the Eleventh Circuit: By treating automobiles as sufficient “facilities of interstate commerce” even when used purely intrastate, the opinion lowers the government’s jurisdictional burden in murder-for-hire prosecutions where a car was used in planning or execution.
Forum-defining importance of Bryan: Although the case is unpublished, its reasoning demonstrates how United States v. Bryan can migrate beyond the kidnapping context and reshape other federal statutes with commerce “facility” language. Future defendants will face the additional obstacle that Bryan is treated as controlling, and “vehicle-as-instrumentality” arguments are likely to recur in other statutes.
Instructional stability on commerce scienter: The panel’s reliance on United States v. Drury signals continued resistance to importing Rehaif-style scienter principles into jurisdictional elements that lack explicit “knowingly” language.
Drug conspiracy proof via “payment-in-drugs” theory: The decision underscores that where drugs function as compensation in a joint criminal venture (here, murder-for-hire), quantity and context can bridge the gap from a mere transfer to an inferred agreement to distribute.
Plain-error posture matters: The Commerce Clause issue illustrates that failing to raise constitutional arguments in the district court can be fatal; under plain-error review, even substantial debate across circuits may not help.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Facility of interstate commerce” vs. “facility in interstate commerce”: “In interstate commerce” often implies the thing was actually being used across state lines at the time. “Of interstate commerce” focuses more on the nature of the thing—whether it is a type of channel/instrumentality used in interstate commerce—so intrastate use can still count.
Channels vs. instrumentalities: Channels are the routes (highways, railways, airspace). Instrumentalities are the vehicles/equipment that travel those routes (cars, trains, planes). Under Bryan (as applied here), a car can be regulated as an instrumentality even if it never crosses state lines during the crime.
Jurisdictional element: Many federal crimes require a commerce connection not because it is central to the wrongdoing, but to ensure Congress has constitutional authority to legislate. Here, the commerce “hook” is the use of a qualifying facility (the car).
Scienter (mens rea) for the commerce hook: The defendants wanted the government to prove they knew they were using something tied to interstate commerce. Under Drury (followed here), § 1958 does not require that: the intent goes to the murder-for-hire purpose, not to the commerce character of the facility used.
Plain error review: When an argument is raised for the first time on appeal, the appellant must show a clear, obvious error under existing controlling law. If the law is unsettled (or even split), it is typically not “plain.”
Buyer-seller vs. conspiracy: A one-off purchase/sale does not automatically prove a shared plan to distribute drugs. But large quantities (“distribution amounts”), ongoing relationships, or contextual facts can allow a jury to infer a distribution conspiracy.

Conclusion

United States v. Kermon Williams reinforces a commerce-jurisdiction principle with substantial practical consequences: in the Eleventh Circuit, using a car intrastate can satisfy § 1958’s “facility of interstate commerce” element, supported by the statutory “facility of” language, § 1958’s inclusion of “means of transportation,” and the binding rule from United States v. Bryan that automobiles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The court also reaffirmed that § 1958’s commerce element carries no scienter requirement (per United States v. Drury), and it sustained drug conspiracy/attempt convictions based on testimony that “several ounces” of cocaine served as murder-for-hire payment—an amount permitting a distribution inference.

Even as an unpublished disposition, the opinion functions as a roadmap for how Eleventh Circuit panels will likely apply Bryan’s instrumentality logic across statutes and how they will treat intrastate vehicle use as a sufficient jurisdictional hook in federal violent-crime prosecutions.