Intimate Association and Qualified Immunity: No Clearly Established Right Against Public-Employment Retaliation for a Spouse’s Political Activity in the Eleventh Circuit

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in Ramona Thurman Bivins v. Gail Hambrick, No. 23-13029 (11th Cir. Dec. 9, 2025), an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity in a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation case. The decision addresses an important and underdeveloped corner of constitutional law: the scope of a public employee’s First Amendment right to intimate association when the alleged retaliation is based on the political activities of the employee’s spouse.

At its core, the court holds that, as of June 2022, it was not “clearly established” in the Eleventh Circuit that a public employer violates the First Amendment by taking adverse employment action against an employee in retaliation for the political campaign activities of the employee’s spouse, framed as a violation of the employee’s right to intimate association (marriage). On that basis alone, the court reverses the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Commissioner Gail Hambrick.

The case thus sits at the intersection of three doctrinal areas:

• The First Amendment right to intimate association (including the right to marry).
• Public-employee First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence (speech and political association).
• The law of qualified immunity and what counts as “clearly established” law.

The opinion also includes a concise concurrence by Judge Jordan, who would find that the complaint plausibly alleges a constitutional violation under persuasive authority from other circuits, but agrees that the right was not clearly established because case law is divided.

II. Background and Procedural Posture

A. Factual Background

Ramona Thurman Bivins served as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Clayton County, Georgia, from 2013 to 2022. As CFO, she:

• Oversaw the internal-audit and finance departments of Clayton County; and
• Provided guidance to the five-member Clayton County Board of Commissioners.

At the relevant time, the Board comprised:

• Commissioner Gail Hambrick (Defendant–Appellant).
• Commissioner Jeffrey Turner.
• Commissioner DeMont Davis.
• Commissioner Felisha Franklin.
• Commissioner Alieka Anderson.

In 2022, two events coincided:

1. Bivins’s employment contract as CFO was up for renewal.
2. Commissioner Davis was seeking reelection.

According to the complaint:

• Bivins’s husband openly campaigned for Davis.
• Commissioners Franklin and Anderson openly campaigned for Davis’s opponent.
• Mr. Bivins’s support for Davis received local media attention just before the Board voted on renewal of Ms. Bivins’s contract.

During the key Board meeting, Commissioners Hambrick, Franklin, and Anderson allegedly voted:

1. Not to renew Bivins’s contract.
2. To immediately terminate the contract.
3. To declare the contract ultra vires (beyond the County’s legal authority).

Subsequently, these same commissioners voted to claw back tuition payments the County had made for Bivins to attend management courses. Bivins claims these actions were retaliatory and motivated by her husband’s political activities, and therefore violated her First Amendment right to intimate association (her marriage).

B. Claims in the District Court

In the Northern District of Georgia, Bivins sued:

• Clayton County, Georgia (including in its official capacity role).
• Commissioners Franklin, Anderson, and Hambrick (in both their individual and official capacities).

Relevantly, she asserted First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against each individual commissioner, arguing:

• The commissioners took adverse employment actions against her (non-renewal, termination, contract invalidation, and tuition clawback).
• Those actions were taken because of her husband’s political campaigning.
• This retaliation burdened her right to intimate association with her husband (specifically, the right to maintain her marriage free of government penalty for the spouse’s political activity).

Commissioner Hambrick filed a motion to dismiss; Commissioners Anderson and Franklin filed motions for judgment on the pleadings. They argued:

1. The complaint failed to state a plausible First Amendment claim.
2. In any event, they were entitled to qualified immunity because any such right was not clearly established.

C. The District Court’s Ruling

The district court:

• Denied the motions.
• Held that Bivins had plausibly pleaded First Amendment retaliation based on intimate association:
  • She alleged adverse employment actions.
  • She alleged those actions were motivated by her husband’s political activities.
• Declined at the pleading stage to conduct a detailed Pickering/Elrod-type balancing test, but noted some form of balancing would govern the merits.
• Concluded that the law was clearly established by Eleventh Circuit precedent, relying primarily on:
  • McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1994).
  • Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

Only Commissioner Hambrick appealed the denial of qualified immunity via an interlocutory appeal; the other commissioners did not. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion therefore addresses qualified immunity only as to Hambrick.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit:

• Vacated the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Hambrick.
• Remanded with instructions to dismiss the First Amendment claim against Hambrick on qualified immunity grounds.

Key points from the majority’s analysis:

1. Qualified immunity applies if:
   • (a) the official performed a discretionary function, and
   • (b) the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established federal right.
2. It was undisputed that Hambrick’s votes on employment and contract matters were within her discretionary authority as a county commissioner.
3. The court chose to address only the second prong—whether the right was clearly established—without deciding whether there was an underlying constitutional violation.
4. The court held that Bivins failed to show that, as of June 2022, it was clearly established that:

   a public employer violates the First Amendment right of intimate association by taking adverse employment action against an employee because of that employee’s spouse’s political activities.

5. Neither:
   • (a) Supreme Court precedent;
   • (b) Eleventh Circuit precedent (including McCabe and Shahar); nor
   • (c) Georgia Supreme Court precedent
   had addressed materially similar facts or articulated sufficient broad principles to put every reasonable official on notice.
6. Therefore, Hambrick is entitled to qualified immunity, regardless of whether her conduct might ultimately be held unconstitutional under some First Amendment theory.

Judge Jordan concurred, stating that (taking the allegations as true) he would find that the complaint plausibly alleges an actual constitutional violation, in line with decisions from other circuits (e.g., Adler v. Pataki and Adkins v. Board of Education). However, because the case law is not uniform and includes contrary authority in the Eighth Circuit (Singleton v. Cecil), he agrees that the right was not clearly established and that qualified immunity applies.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Issues on Appeal

The appeal presented a narrow but critical question:

Does a public official have “fair warning” that she violates the First Amendment by voting to terminate and penalize a public employee because of the political activities of the employee’s spouse, where the plaintiff frames the claim as a violation of the right to intimate association (marriage)?

More precisely, because the case came on interlocutory appeal from a motion to dismiss, the question is whether the complaint alleges violation of a clearly established right, assuming the facts as pleaded are true.

B. The Qualified Immunity Framework

The court applies the familiar two-step qualified immunity analysis:

1. Discretionary Authority: The defendant must show that she was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority when the alleged misconduct occurred. Here, all parties agreed that Commissioner Hambrick’s votes regarding renewal, termination, and financial recoupment were discretionary functions of an elected commissioner. This prong was satisfied.
2. Violation of a Clearly Established Right (burden on plaintiff):
   • (1) Did the official’s conduct violate a federal statutory or constitutional right?
   • (2) Was that right clearly established at the time of the conduct?

Citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018), the court notes both prongs must be met to defeat qualified immunity. The court has discretion to address either prong first. Here, it proceeds directly to the “clearly established” question, bypassing the underlying constitutional merits.

C. “Clearly Established” Law: The Three Routes

The Eleventh Circuit reiterates three doctrinal methods by which a plaintiff can show a right was clearly established (citing Jarrard v. Sheriff of Polk County, 115 F.4th 1306 (11th Cir. 2024)):

1. Materially similar precedent:
   • A prior decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Georgia Supreme Court with facts sufficiently similar to put the official on notice that the conduct is unlawful.
   • The case need not be “directly on point,” but the constitutional question must be placed “beyond debate” (Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
2. Broad statement of principle:
   • A general constitutional or statutory principle that is so clear and specific that it gives fair notice even though it has not been applied to the exact facts at issue.
3. Egregious conduct / obviousness:
   • Conduct so outrageous that any reasonable official would know it is unconstitutional, even absent factually similar precedent.
   • The opinion references Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002), where an officer slammed the head of a handcuffed, secured arrestee against a car; such brutality was “obviously” unconstitutional.

The court finds that Bivins fails under all three avenues.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Supreme Court Precedents

The majority surveys key Supreme Court authorities:

• Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
  • Recognized the First Amendment protects certain forms of intimate association, particularly close familial relationships such as marriage.
  • Drew a distinction between “intimate association” (close, small, deeply personal) and “expressive association” (groups formed to engage in protected expression).
  • Confirmed that individuals have a protected right to “enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships,” including marriage.
• Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)
  • Political-patronage cases involving political association rights of public employees.
  • Held that non-policymaking, non-confidential public employees may not be dismissed or threatened with dismissal solely because of their political affiliation.
  • Recognized that in certain “policymaking” or “confidential” positions, political loyalty may be a constitutionally permissible job requirement.
  • Imposed strict or heightened scrutiny when the government penalizes employees for political affiliation.
• Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
  • Established the Pickering balancing test for public-employee speech:
    • The employee’s interest, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern; versus
    • The government employer’s interest in promoting the efficiency of public services.
  • Requires a fact-specific balancing; not a bright-line rule.

The Eleventh Circuit notes that the Supreme Court has:

• Not decided a case directly about intimate-association-based retaliation in the employment context.
• Instead provided:
  • General statements that intimate relationships (including marriage) are protected; and
  • Fact-bound tests (Pickering/Elrod/Branti) in other First Amendment retaliation contexts.

Therefore, Supreme Court precedent does not “clearly establish” that a public employer may not penalize an employee for a spouse’s political activity, especially where the implications for workplace functioning have not been litigated in those cases.

2. Eleventh Circuit Precedents: McCabe and Shahar

Two cases anchor the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of intimate association:

• McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1994)
  • A police chief’s secretary married a subordinate police officer.
  • The police chief demoted her from the confidential secretary position because he believed the marital relationship undermined the confidentiality and loyalty needed in that role.
  • The plaintiff sued, alleging violation of her First Amendment right to marry (intimate association).
  • The Eleventh Circuit:
    • Set out a three-part framework for intimate-association retaliation in employment:
      1. The asserted right is constitutionally protected.
      2. The plaintiff suffered adverse employment action for exercising that right.
      3. The adverse action infringes the constitutional right, as determined by appropriate scrutiny (Pickering/Elrod/strict scrutiny).
    • Ultimately held that the employer’s action did not violate the First Amendment right to intimate association under any of the applicable balancing tests.
  • Important for this case: McCabe recognizes the existence of an intimate-association right but shows it is not absolute, and in that case the government prevailed.
• Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
  • The Georgia Attorney General rescinded a job offer to a law-school graduate after learning that she had entered into a same-sex marriage ceremony.
  • The plaintiff alleged that the rescission violated her First Amendment right to intimate association and other rights.
  • The Eleventh Circuit:
    • Assumed without deciding that the plaintiff had a constitutionally protected right of same-sex intimate association.
    • Applied a Pickering-type balancing test between the plaintiff’s associational rights and the state’s asserted interests (e.g., internal morale, external perception, potential conflict with state’s litigation positions).
    • Concluded that the balance favored the government; no First Amendment violation was found.
  • Again, the court recognized a potentially protected intimate association, but upheld the adverse government action in that particular context.

The majority in Bivins uses these cases to emphasize:

• The right to intimate association is qualified, not absolute, in the public-employment context.
• Adverse actions related to marriage or intimate relationships do not automatically amount to constitutional violations (both McCabe and Shahar concluded in favor of the government).
• Neither decision squarely addresses the specific scenario here:

  a public employee claims retaliation based on the political activities of her spouse, alleged as a violation of her own right to intimate association.

Thus, these precedents recognize the general right to intimate association but do not clearly delineate what factual circumstances will cross the constitutional line.

3. Other Eleventh Circuit Precedent on “Clearly Established” Law

Several additional Eleventh Circuit decisions shape the court’s approach:

• Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000) (spelled “Maio” in the opinion)
  • Noted that First Amendment retaliation claims—particularly those involving Pickering balancing—are highly fact-specific and “do not lend themselves to clear, bright-line rules.”
  • As a result, “a defendant in a First Amendment suit will only rarely be on notice that his actions are unlawful.”
• Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2017)
  • Reinforced that, in First Amendment public-employee cases, qualified immunity often applies because of the fact-intensive balancing and lack of bright-line rules.
  • Held that a superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity where there was no controlling precedent addressing retaliation based on a parent–child relationship, analogous to the intimate-association setting.
• Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019)
  • Emphasized that precedent must establish the law with a “high degree of specificity.”
  • Warned that if case law has not staked out a “bright line,” qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant.

This doctrinal background supports the court’s conclusion that the intimate-association retaliation claim here—highly specific and fact-bound—falls well within the zone where qualified immunity is usually granted.

4. Other Circuits: The Concurrence’s References

Judge Jordan’s concurrence cites:

• Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1999).
• Adkins v. Board of Education, 982 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation slightly mis-typed in the opinion).

Those decisions are examples where other circuits have recognized First Amendment protections in analogous “spouse retaliation” scenarios, typically framed either as:

• Retaliation for the employee’s intimate association with the spouse; or
• Retaliation for the spouse’s exercise of First Amendment rights (speech, petition, political participation), with the employee as the injured party.

The concurrence contrasts them with Singleton v. Cecil (8th Cir. 1998/1999), where the Eighth Circuit took a more restrictive view, illustrating that the national landscape is not uniform. This non-uniformity undercuts any claim that Bivins’s right was clearly established in the Eleventh Circuit.

E. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Focusing Only on the “Clearly Established” Prong

Consistent with Supreme Court guidance (e.g., Pearson v. Callahan), the court chooses to bypass the question whether a First Amendment violation actually occurred. Instead, it assumes the facts as true and asks whether any such violation would have been clearly established at the time.

This decision has an important practical effect:

• It does not resolve whether the alleged retaliation is unconstitutional.
• It resolves only whether the law was clear enough in June 2022 to deny qualified immunity to Hambrick.

2. Failure Under the “Materially Similar Case” Method

Under the first method (materially similar precedent), the court looks for cases from:

• The U.S. Supreme Court,
• The Eleventh Circuit, or
• The Georgia Supreme Court

that would “place the constitutional question beyond debate” on facts similar to Bivins’s case.

The key question: Is there binding authority holding that an elected official violates the First Amendment by terminating a public employee because of the employee’s spouse’s political activities, framed as a violation of the employee’s right to intimate association?

The court answers: No.

• Supreme Court: Has not addressed intimate-association retaliation in employment, let alone in the specific “spouse political activity” context.
• Eleventh Circuit:
  • McCabe and Shahar recognize that marriage and intimate association are protected interests, but both cases:
    • Involve different factual settings (inter-office marriage; same-sex marriage and Attorney General’s office).
    • Ultimately hold in favor of the government after balancing.
    • Do not articulate a clear rule that any retaliation based on marriage is unconstitutional.
  • Gaines v. Wardynski already recognized the lack of controlling precedent in parent–child retaliation scenarios, reinforcing the notion that “family-based retaliation” law remains unsettled.
• Georgia Supreme Court: The panel notes it found no relevant precedent defining contours of the First Amendment intimate-association right in this way.

Because no binding case has “staked out a bright line” governing retaliation for a spouse’s political activity, qualified immunity “almost always protects the defendant” in such circumstances (Corbitt).

3. Failure Under the “Broad Principle” Method

Could broad principles from existing cases clearly establish the right, even without an on-point fact pattern?

Bivins argued, in essence, that:

• Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent clearly recognize the fundamental status of marriage and intimate association as First Amendment interests.
• Therefore, any adverse action “because of marriage” (or because of a spouse’s protected activity) should obviously violate the right to intimate association.

The court rejects this argument as too broad and abstract:

• Yes, there is a broad principle that marriage is constitutionally protected, but:
  • In public employment, that right must be balanced against the government’s interests (e.g. workplace efficiency, confidentiality, public perception) via fact-intensive tests (Pickering/Elrod/strict scrutiny).
  • Consequently, the existence of a protected right of intimate association does not answer whether retaliatory action in any particular factual context is unconstitutional.
• McCabe and Shahar themselves show that:
  • Government employers sometimes may take adverse actions connected to an employee’s marriage or intimate relationships.
  • Thus, a public official could reasonably believe that some marriage-related decisions are constitutionally permissible.

Accordingly, although marriage and intimate association are deeply protected interests, the Eleventh Circuit concludes they are not protected in an absolute, unqualified way in the public-employment setting, and that no “broad statement of principle” clearly forecloses the conduct alleged here.

4. Failure Under the “Egregious Conduct / Obviousness” Method

The third method allows for denial of qualified immunity where the conduct is so egregious that any reasonable official would recognize its illegality, even without case law.

The court cites Lee v. Ferraro, where an officer slammed a handcuffed woman’s head against a car after she was already subdued—an obvious use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The court contrasts that with the allegations here:

• Retaliatory employment actions (non-renewal, termination, contract invalidation, tuition clawback) based on a spouse’s political activity.
• Such actions, while potentially unconstitutional, are not of the same “obviousness” category as gratuitous physical violence against a restrained person.

The opinion therefore holds that this is not one of the rare cases where the unconstitutionality is so inherently apparent that prior case law is unnecessary.

5. The Court’s Response to Bivins’s “Marriage-Based Retaliation” Theory

Bivins contended that because the retaliation was “based on marriage,” and because cases like Roberts, McCabe, and Shahar recognize marriage as a protected intimate relationship, any such retaliation should be clearly established as unconstitutional.

The court answers this directly:

• Not every act of retaliation “based on marriage” is necessarily a constitutional violation.
• McCabe and Shahar are clear examples where adverse action connected to marriage or intimate relationships was upheld.
• Thus, a complaint must allege a type of marriage-based retaliation that has been clearly established as unconstitutional to survive a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.

Because Bivins’s complaint did not identify any such precedent—and, indeed, precedent is sparse and inconsistent nationwide—the court holds that qualified immunity protects Commissioner Hambrick.

F. The Concurring Opinion (Jordan, J.)

Judge Jordan’s brief concurrence is doctrinally significant even though it agrees with the result.

• He states that, accepting the allegations as true, he would find that the complaint does state a plausible constitutional violation, consistent with:
  • Adler v. Pataki (2d Cir.): Recognizing a First Amendment claim where a public employee was penalized because of a spouse’s protected litigation or petitioning activity.
  • Adkins v. Board of Education (6th Cir.): Recognizing protection against retaliation where adverse employment action stemmed from the spouse’s exercise of First Amendment rights.
• However, he acknowledges that the national case law is not uniform, citing:
  • Singleton v. Cecil (8th Cir.): An example where the Eighth Circuit read such claims more narrowly or rejected similar theories.
• Because of this lack of consensus, he concludes that the law was not clearly established in the Eleventh Circuit at the time, and he therefore concurs in granting qualified immunity.

The concurrence underscores a key nuance:

In Judge Jordan’s view, this case probably does involve unconstitutional retaliation under a strong reading of the First Amendment, but the inconsistency in national case law means Eleventh Circuit officials lacked clear notice.

G. Impact and Future Implications

1. Practical Impact on Public Employees in the Eleventh Circuit

The decision sends a clear message: As of June 2022 (and until binding precedent says otherwise), a public employee in the Eleventh Circuit does not have a clearly established First Amendment right to:

be free from employment retaliation taken against her because of her spouse’s political activities, when the claim is styled as a violation of intimate association (marriage).

This has several consequences:

• Qualified Immunity Shield: Individual officials (like county commissioners) are likely protected from personal damages in similar suits.
• Chilling Effect on Claims:
  • Even if future courts ultimately recognize such retaliation as unconstitutional, plaintiffs may struggle to obtain damages from individual officials for past conduct because of the “clearly established” requirement.
• Possibility of Municipal Liability:
  • Qualified immunity does not protect municipal entities (e.g., Clayton County).
  • However, municipal liability under Monell requires proof that the violation was caused by an official policy or custom or by a final policymaker decision.
  • The court’s choice to avoid deciding whether any constitutional violation occurred leaves that underlying question open for the district court as to the County.

2. Doctrinal Impact on Intimate Association Jurisprudence

The decision highlights that:

• In the Eleventh Circuit, the contours of the intimate-association right in employment remain murky:
  • Recognized in principle.
  • But rarely found to be actually violated.
  • And almost never “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes.
• The court openly acknowledges that neither it nor the Supreme Court has articulated clear, bright-line rules for intimate-association retaliation in the workplace.

As a result, public officials have substantial legal “breathing room” when making personnel decisions that may incidentally or directly affect employees’ marriages or close family relationships, at least absent more definitive precedential development.

3. Reinforcement of a Restrictive Approach to “Clearly Established” Law

The opinion fits squarely within a broader trend, particularly after al-Kidd and Wesby, under which:

• Courts demand high factual specificity for clearly established law.
• General statements of rights (e.g., “marriage is protected,” “speech on matters of public concern is protected”) rarely suffice to defeat qualified immunity.
• Fact-bound balancing tests (like Pickering) make it more difficult to declare any set of facts clearly unconstitutional before a court actually finds a violation in a factually similar case.

For First Amendment retaliation claims in the Eleventh Circuit, this decision strengthens the already robust presumption in favor of qualified immunity. Unless and until a case directly holds that a specific type of retaliation is unconstitutional, individual officials may be insulated from damages.

4. Guidance (and Warnings) for Future Litigants

For plaintiffs:

• Merely invoking “marriage” or “family” is not enough; plaintiffs should:
  • Identify the specific First Amendment interest (speech, political association, petition, intimate association), and
  • Locate binding, factually similar precedent whenever possible.
• Consider framing claims not only as intimate-association violations but also as:
  • Retaliation for protected speech or political association (if the employee herself engaged in such activities), or
  • Derivative or third-party retaliation theories, if supported by existing precedent.

For government defendants:

• The opinion provides a detailed template for qualified immunity arguments in family-based First Amendment retaliation suits.
• Officials should:
  • Emphasize the absence of factually on-point Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court authority.
  • Invoke the fact-specific balancing nature of public-employee First Amendment law.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is the First Amendment Right to Intimate Association?

“Intimate association” refers to the First Amendment protection for close, personal relationships that are central to individual liberty and identity—especially:

• Marriage.
• Parent–child relationships.
• Other close familial or quasi-familial relationships.

This doctrine derives from cases like Roberts v. United States Jaycees and related family-privacy jurisprudence. The idea is that the government generally may not punish you for maintaining such relationships.

B. How Does Intimate Association Work in Public Employment?

In public employment, the right to intimate association is not absolute. Courts typically:

• Recognize the employee’s right to maintain intimate relationships (like marriage), but
• Allow the government, as an employer, to justify adverse action if:
  • The relationship creates legitimate concerns about loyalty, confidentiality, efficiency, workplace harmony, or public trust; and
  • Those concerns outweigh the employee’s associational rights under tests like Pickering or Elrod/Branti.

Thus, a marriage is protected in principle, but:

a public employer may sometimes permissibly rearrange job duties or even end certain employment relationships when the marital relationship creates serious and demonstrable conflicts with the government’s operational needs.

C. What Is Qualified Immunity?

Qualified immunity is a doctrine that shields government officials from personal liability for damages under § 1983, so long as:

1. They were acting within their discretionary authority; and
2. Their conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable official would have known.

“Clearly established” does not mean merely that the right exists in the abstract. It means:

• The law had previously been applied in a similar context or articulated in a way that would put a reasonable official on notice that their specific conduct was unlawful.

This doctrine aims to:

• Protect all but the “plainly incompetent” or those who “knowingly violate the law” (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Lee v. Ferraro).
• Avoid chilling legitimate decision-making by government officials fearful of personal liability.

D. Why Is It So Hard to Overcome Qualified Immunity in First Amendment Employment Cases?

Public-employee First Amendment cases (speech, association, intimate association) often require:

• Balancing complex and context-sensitive factors (employee’s rights vs. government’s interests).
• Case-by-case determinations without bright-line rules.

Because of this:

• Courts rarely announce categorical rules that any reasonable official would understand in advance.
• Therefore, unless a factually similar case has already found a violation, officials often receive qualified immunity even if a court later rules their conduct unconstitutional.

VI. Conclusion

Ramona Thurman Bivins v. Gail Hambrick reinforces two interlocking propositions in Eleventh Circuit law:

1. The First Amendment right to intimate association in public employment—though recognized, particularly in the context of marriage—is not well-defined in terms of what kinds of employment decisions are forbidden.
2. Given that lack of definition, and the fact-specific nature of First Amendment retaliation doctrine, qualified immunity will almost always protect individual officials from damages in novel or borderline scenarios, absent controlling precedent on materially similar facts.

In practical terms, the court holds that as of June 2022:

No clearly established law in the Eleventh Circuit prohibited a commissioner from voting to terminate or otherwise penalize a public employee based on the political activities of the employee’s spouse, when that claim is characterized as an intimate-association violation.

The opinion does not decide whether such conduct is ultimately constitutional or not; it decides only that Commissioner Hambrick cannot be held personally liable for damages because she lacked fair notice. Judge Jordan’s concurrence highlights that, on the merits, such retaliation may well violate the First Amendment under persuasive authority from other circuits, but the split in authority and absence of Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court precedent render the right insufficiently clear.

This decision thus leaves the underlying substantive question open for future cases, while simultaneously signaling that public officials in the Eleventh Circuit remain broadly protected by qualified immunity in cases at the frontier of intimate-association and First Amendment retaliation law.