Intervening Misconduct Severs Retaliation Causation and Threadbare § 1981 Pleadings Fail: Eleventh Circuit in Goolsby v. City of Monroe

Introduction

In Alicia Goolsby v. City of Monroe, the Eleventh Circuit (per curiam; non-argument calendar; unpublished) affirmed two rulings from the Middle District of Georgia: (1) dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of § 1981 intentional race discrimination and retaliation claims against two individual municipal officials; and (2) summary judgment in favor of the City of Monroe on Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims. The decision reiterates core pleading and proof standards that frequently control outcomes in workplace discrimination litigation in the Eleventh Circuit.

The case presents two principal issues. First, what level of factual specificity must a plaintiff plead to state § 1981 claims for discrimination and retaliation against individual supervisors? Second, at the summary judgment stage, what evidentiary showing must a Title VII plaintiff make to overcome an employer’s documented, facially legitimate reasons for termination, and how do timing and intervening misconduct affect causation for retaliation?

The appellant, Alicia Goolsby, an African-American cashier with the City of Monroe, alleged she was improperly removed from a higher-paying customer service position, not selected for that job when it was reposted, and later terminated in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge. The appellees were the City of Monroe and two officials: Beth Thompson (Finance Director) and Les Russell (Human Resources Director).

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. On the § 1981 claims against Thompson and Russell, the court held the complaint did not pass the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility threshold because it offered only conclusory assertions of discrimination and retaliation without concrete factual allegations identifying specific discriminatory or retaliatory acts by either individual or linking adverse actions to protected activity.

On the Title VII claims against the City, the court assumed without deciding that Goolsby could establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, but held that the City articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for her termination—namely, performance problems and documented coworker complaints about morale—and that Goolsby failed to create a genuine dispute that these reasons were pretextual. The court also rejected an alternative “convincing mosaic” theory, concluding the circumstantial record, even when viewed holistically, would not permit a reasonable jury to infer intentional discrimination or retaliation.

Two doctrinal points are emphasized: (1) threadbare § 1981 pleadings that merely recite elements of discrimination or retaliation are insufficient; and (2) for Title VII retaliation, temporal proximity of roughly six months is too attenuated to establish causation, and intervening misconduct can sever any inference created by timing.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and McCarthy v. City of Cordele, 111 F.4th 1141 (11th Cir. 2024): Reaffirm the plausibility standard; courts disregard “threadbare recitals” and conclusory statements unsupported by well-pled facts.
• Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Foundation, 789 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2015): A complaint must allege facts suggesting intentional race discrimination; bare assertions are insufficient.
• Moore v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corp., 834 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016): Title VII retaliation prima facie elements—protected activity, materially adverse action, and causal connection.
• Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003): § 1981 provides for individual liability, unlike Title VII.
• CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) and Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Georgia, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc): § 1981 encompasses retaliation claims.
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Burden-shifting framework for proof of discrimination using circumstantial evidence.
• Tynes v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 88 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 154 (2024): § 1981 and Title VII claims generally share the same analytical framework; also endorses “convincing mosaic” as an alternative evidentiary route to show discrimination.
• Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023): Summarizes pretext standards; emphasizes that intervening employee misconduct can sever any causal inference from temporal proximity in retaliation claims; recognizes “convincing mosaic” for both discrimination and retaliation.
• Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2007): Temporal proximity of three to four months is generally insufficient to show causation; six months is likewise too attenuated.
• Hamilton v. Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012); Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP, 997 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2021); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001): Standards for summary judgment and the McDonnell Douglas framework.

2) Legal Reasoning

a) Pleading standards sink the § 1981 claims against the individuals

The court applied Iqbal and Eleventh Circuit precedent (McCarthy; Surtain) to measure the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations against Beth Thompson and Les Russell. Although § 1981 authorizes individual liability and covers retaliation, a plaintiff still must plausibly allege facts that, if true, create a reasonable inference that each defendant took specific adverse actions because of race or in retaliation for protected activity.

The complaint alleged only that Thompson and Russell “intentionally discriminated,” treated plaintiff “disparately,” and “retaliated” because she “complained” about discrimination—precisely the type of formulaic recitation the Supreme Court has said does not suffice. Critically, the pleading did not link particular adverse acts to either Thompson or Russell, nor did it allege facts showing a causal relationship between protected activity and identified adverse actions by them. Without the who/what/when/why connecting facts, dismissal was required.

b) Title VII claims fail at the pretext stage under McDonnell Douglas

On the City’s summary judgment motion, the court bypassed disputes over the prima facie case and proceeded to the second and third stages of McDonnell Douglas, assuming arguendo that Goolsby met her initial burden. The City articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for the termination:

• Repeated performance issues, including cash-drawer discrepancies documented starting as early as April 2018, and again in January 2020, as well as notices in spring 2020;
• A December 2019 write-up for falsifying time records and going outside the chain of command by contacting the mayor directly; and
• Workplace morale problems corroborated by an investigation (reports of a tense environment and poor attitude, risking employee attrition).

The court emphasized that such reasons “might motivate a reasonable employer to act,” shifting the burden to Goolsby to address them “head on” and show pretext by exposing “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions.”

Goolsby failed to create a triable dispute of pretext. The record contained contemporaneous documentation of the City’s stated reasons; there was no evidence that the cash discrepancies, timekeeping issues, or morale complaints were fabricated or otherwise unworthy of credence. Her “open door” policy argument failed because she received only a warning—not a suspension or dock in pay—for contacting the mayor, and, in any event, she did not undermine the City’s broader performance-based rationale for termination.

c) Retaliation causation: timing alone was insufficient and intervening misconduct severed any inference

The court held that roughly six months between the protected activity (the first EEOC charge) and termination was too attenuated to establish causation by temporal proximity alone, citing Thomas v. Cooper Lighting. Furthermore, Berry’s intervening-misconduct principle applied: the documented performance issues, falsified time records, and workplace conduct occurring after the protected activity broke any causal chain the timing might have suggested.

d) No “convincing mosaic” of discrimination or retaliation

Although the Eleventh Circuit recognizes that a plaintiff may prove discrimination or retaliation without strict adherence to McDonnell Douglas via a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that the totality of Goolsby’s evidence did not permit a reasonable inference of unlawful intent. The record, even viewed favorably to Goolsby, reflected routine personnel management responses to documented performance and workplace conduct issues rather than discriminatory or retaliatory animus.

3) Impact and Practical Implications

While unpublished and not binding precedent, the decision is a clear reiteration of several controlling Eleventh Circuit principles that recur in workplace cases:

• Pleading rigor for § 1981 individual-capacity claims: Plaintiffs must specify which individual did what, when, and how those actions plausibly connect to race or protected activity. Global assertions that “defendants discriminated and retaliated” do not suffice.
• Pretext must be confronted “head on”: Once an employer articulates facially legitimate reasons, the plaintiff must produce evidence from which a jury could reasonably disbelieve those reasons. Disagreement with managerial judgment or isolated quibbles, without undermining the factual basis of the employer’s explanation, is insufficient.
• Retaliation causation is demanding: A six-month temporal gap does not support causation; intervening misconduct breaks any inference from timing. Plaintiffs should marshal additional indicia of retaliatory animus (e.g., contemporaneous statements, comparators, deviation from policy) when timing alone is weak.
• “Convincing mosaic” is available but not a shortcut: The mosaic must cohere into a reasonable inference of discriminatory or retaliatory motive. Ordinary performance documentation and workplace-friction evidence without discriminatory linkage will not carry the day.
• Documented performance issues matter: Early and consistent documentation (e.g., 2018 cash discrepancies continuing into 2020) can be decisive in defeating pretext and retaliation causation. Employers should maintain contemporaneous records; employees must be prepared to show those records are false or inconsistently applied.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• § 1981 vs. Title VII: Both prohibit race discrimination and retaliation in employment. Title VII applies to employers and requires administrative exhaustion with the EEOC. § 1981 does not require EEOC exhaustion and allows suits against individual wrongdoers, but plaintiffs still must plead and prove facts showing intentional discrimination or retaliation.
• Motion to dismiss (Rule 12(b)(6)) and Iqbal/Twombly: A complaint must provide enough factual detail to make the claim plausible, not merely possible. Conclusory statements and bare recitations of legal elements are disregarded.
• McDonnell Douglas framework: A three-step, burden-shifting method for cases based on circumstantial evidence. After the plaintiff’s prima facie showing, the employer offers a legitimate reason; the plaintiff must then show that reason is a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.
• Pretext: Evidence that the employer’s stated reason is not the true reason. Plaintiffs must show inconsistencies or contradictions that would allow a jury to disbelieve the employer.
• Temporal proximity and intervening misconduct: Close timing between protected activity and adverse action can suggest causation, but the Eleventh Circuit requires very close timing (weeks, not months). Misconduct occurring after the protected activity can break any inference created by timing.
• Convincing mosaic: An alternative way to prove intent by piecing together non-comparator circumstantial evidence (e.g., suspicious timing, procedural irregularities, shifting explanations, biased remarks). The pieces must collectively point to discriminatory or retaliatory intent.
• Adverse employment action: A material change in the terms and conditions of employment (e.g., termination, demotion, significant pay cut). In retaliation, any action that might dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge can qualify.

Conclusion

Goolsby v. City of Monroe underscores two themes that dominate employment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit. First, at the pleading stage, § 1981 claims against individual actors must contain specific, non-conclusory facts linking identifiable adverse acts to discriminatory or retaliatory intent; generic allegations will be dismissed. Second, at summary judgment, plaintiffs must directly undermine the credibility of an employer’s documented rationale with evidence of inconsistency or fabrication. Temporal proximity of several months is inadequate to establish retaliation causation, and intervening performance or conduct problems can sever any inference from timing.

Though unpublished, the opinion is a practical roadmap: for plaintiffs, to craft detailed pleadings and assemble concrete pretext evidence; for employers, to maintain contemporaneous documentation and apply policies consistently. The court’s reinforcement of the “intervening misconduct” principle and the requirement to meet pretext “head on” will shape how future discrimination and retaliation claims are pleaded, investigated, and litigated in the Eleventh Circuit.