Intervening Misconduct as a Superseding Cause Defeats Temporal-Proximity Retaliation Claims (and “Convincing Mosaic” Adds No Lower Rule 56 Bar)

I. Introduction

In Demetric King v. City of Sylvester Georgia (11th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City of Sylvester, Georgia and Police Chief Raymond Drennon on an array of employment claims. Demetric King, a long-tenured African-American police officer and supervisor, alleged race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VII, and retaliation under the FMLA.

The key issues were whether King could (1) establish discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas framework or through a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence (including allegations of racially derogatory language and purportedly disparate discipline), and (2) establish retaliation causation where adverse action followed protected activity closely in time but where the employer pointed to intervening events—particularly a new, independent disciplinary incident—as the basis for termination.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Discrimination (Title VII / §§ 1981 & 1983): King failed to identify a similarly situated comparator “in all material aspects,” and—even assuming a prima facie case—failed to show the City’s stated reasons (disciplinary history and the on-duty incident) were pretext.
Convincing mosaic / mixed-motive theory: The court held King’s circumstantial evidence did not permit a reasonable inference that race was a motivating factor in his demotion or termination.
Retaliation (Title VII and FMLA): Temporal proximity alone was insufficient where a “superseding cause” (the on-duty incident prompting a District Attorney complaint and investigation) intervened between the protected activity and termination.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is principally an application of settled Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court doctrine. The following authorities shaped the court’s approach:

1. Summary judgment standards

Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949 (11th Cir. 1986): Cited for the proposition that, at summary judgment, courts consider record evidence and reasonable inferences, emphasizing the Rule 56 evidentiary posture.
Guevara v. Lafise Corp., 127 F.4th 824 (11th Cir. 2025) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a): Restated the core Rule 56 requirement: no genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1990): The “scintilla of evidence” formulation—there must be enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.
Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010): Used both for de novo review principles and for the substantive point that poor job performance can be a legitimate reason for termination.

2. Discrimination frameworks and comparator doctrine

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): The classic burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination cases. The court used it to evaluate (i) prima facie case, (ii) employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and (iii) pretext.
Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc): Central to the comparator analysis. The court emphasized that a valid comparator is “similarly-situated in all material aspects,” typically including similar disciplinary history and exposure to the same supervisor/decisionmaker.
Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1997) and Jackson v. State of Ala. State Tenure Comm'n, 405 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2005): These cases set the pretext burden: a plaintiff must show “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the employer’s explanation sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to deem it not credible.
Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008): Confirmed that a demotion qualifies as an adverse employment action cognizable under Title VII discrimination principles.

3. “Convincing mosaic” as an evidentiary route (not a different legal standard)

McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024): Treated “convincing mosaic” and McDonnell Douglas as alternative routes to the same Rule 56 question—whether a reasonable jury could infer discrimination.
Ismael v. Round-tree, 161 F.4th 752 (11th Cir. 2025): Critically characterized “convincing mosaic” as “a stand-in for the Rule 56 summary judgment standard,” rejecting any notion that it lowers the summary-judgment bar.
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (per curiam) and Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243 (11th Cir. 2022): Both illustrate when workplace language or racially biased comments can support an inference of discriminatory animus—cases the panel contrasted with King’s evidence, which it found too attenuated (not directed at him, not shown to be pervasive, and allegedly used even in reference to a white person).

4. Retaliation: causation, temporal proximity, and intervening events

Brown v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) and Martin v. Brevard Cnty. Pub. Schs., 543 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam): Confirmed use of McDonnell Douglas in retaliation cases based on circumstantial evidence and restated the prima facie elements.
Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712 (11th Cir. 2002): Causation requires decisionmaker knowledge and that protected activity and adverse action are not wholly unrelated.
Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc): Reaffirmed the “but-for” causation requirement for Title VII retaliation.
Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) and Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam): Temporal proximity may suggest causation only if “very close.”
Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare, 84 F.th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023): The panel relied on this principle most directly—an intervening, superseding cause (e.g., employee misconduct) can sever any inference of causation that temporal proximity might otherwise support.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Comparator failure under Lewis v. City of Union City

King’s proposed comparator, Lieutenant Brooks, was rejected for two independent reasons the panel treated as materially dispositive: (1) the record did not show Brooks had a similar “lengthy disciplinary record” comparable to King’s, and (2) the supervisory chain differed: King reported to Chief Drennon, while Brooks reported to King. Under Lewis v. City of Union City, those distinctions commonly defeat “similarly situated in all material aspects” status.

2. Legitimate reasons and pretext: the court treated the termination rationale as overdetermined

Even crediting King’s denial of any sexual misconduct in the patrol-car incident, the panel held his admitted conduct—being parked for roughly two and a half hours in a low-crime area while “doing nothing” (by King’s own account, reading the Bible and listening to music)— could itself justify termination, particularly given his role as a shift supervisor and his existing disciplinary history.

The pretext analysis followed Combs v. Plantation Patterns and Jackson v. State of Ala. State Tenure Comm'n: King needed evidence undermining the credibility of the stated reasons, not merely disagreement with the employer’s judgment. The court emphasized that King did not meaningfully rebut most of the performance-based concerns Chief Drennon cited during his tenure (e.g., unsubmitted reports, failures to perform assigned duties, and supervision problems).

3. “Convincing mosaic” did not rescue the case because it is not a separate, more lenient standard

Invoking McCreight v. AuburnBank and Ismael v. Round-tree, the panel treated “convincing mosaic” as simply another way of asking the Rule 56 question: can a reasonable jury infer discrimination? It concluded “no,” reasoning that:

Allegations of N-word usage were not shown to be directed at King, not shown to be pervasive, and (as described) not strongly linked to the adverse actions at issue.
Claims of a reorganization targeting minority supervisors were undermined by the record (the opinion notes only one minority supervisor’s demotion during reorganization).
Claims of “set up to fail” responsibilities were offset by evidence that white supervisors also received increased duties.

4. Retaliation causation: intervening events as “superseding cause”

For both Title VII and FMLA retaliation, the opinion’s key move was to treat the District Attorney’s complaint and the internal investigation into King’s on-duty conduct as an intervening, superseding cause that severed any temporal-proximity inference. Citing Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare, the panel held that—even if timing was “very close”—the intervening incident rendered the protected activity and termination “wholly unrelated” for prima facie causation purposes (and also inconsistent with “but-for” causation under Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc.).

C. Impact

Retaliation litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision reinforces a practical evidentiary barrier where employers can point to a post-complaint, post-leave disciplinary incident as an intervening cause. Plaintiffs relying primarily on timing should expect heightened scrutiny if the record includes a documented investigation or complaint occurring between protected activity and the adverse action.
Comparator selection and proof: The opinion illustrates how comparator disputes are often resolved at summary judgment when the comparator lacks a comparable disciplinary history or is subject to a different supervisor/decisionmaker—factors repeatedly treated as “material aspects” under Lewis v. City of Union City.
“Convincing mosaic” framing: By quoting Ismael v. Round-tree and McCreight v. AuburnBank, the panel underscores that “convincing mosaic” is not a doctrinal shortcut; it is simply a label for the same Rule 56 inquiry. Plaintiffs must still connect circumstantial facts to a reasonable inference of discriminatory motivation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

McDonnell Douglas framework: A three-step, evidence-organizing method for circumstantial discrimination cases: the employee first shows a basic inference of discrimination (prima facie case), the employer then provides a lawful explanation, and the employee must finally show that explanation is a cover (pretext).
Comparator (“similarly situated in all material aspects”): A comparable employee used to show unequal treatment. “Material aspects” commonly include similar misconduct, similar disciplinary history, and similar supervision/decisionmakers. Small differences can be “material” enough to defeat the comparison.
Pretext: Not whether the employer was harsh or wrong, but whether the stated reason is not the real reason. The question is credibility: is the employer’s explanation believable, consistent, and supported by the record?
Convincing mosaic: A way of describing circumstantial evidence that, taken together, could allow a jury to infer discrimination—without needing a perfect comparator. As the opinion stresses (via Ismael v. Round-tree), it is not a different summary-judgment standard.
Temporal proximity and “superseding cause” in retaliation: Close timing between a complaint/leave and discipline can suggest retaliation. But if a new, independent event happens in between—like a misconduct complaint followed by an investigation—it can “break the chain,” making timing alone insufficient.

V. Conclusion

King v. City of Sylvester Georgia is a straightforward but instructive application of Eleventh Circuit summary-judgment doctrine in employment cases. The court reaffirmed that (1) comparator proof under Lewis v. City of Union City is demanding, especially where disciplinary histories and supervisory chains differ; (2) “convincing mosaic” is not a lower bar than Rule 56 and requires a concrete link from circumstantial facts to discriminatory motivation; and (3) in retaliation claims, an intervening disciplinary event can operate as a “superseding cause” under Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare, severing any inference drawn from temporal proximity.