Intervening Misconduct and Temporal Distance: The Seventh Circuit Tightens Causation and Constructive-Discharge Standards in Retaliation Cases

Introduction

In Alex Kedas v. Illinois Department of Transportation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed and sharpened two critical doctrines that often decide Title VII retaliation suits:

The stringent threshold an employee must satisfy to prove constructive discharge, and
The necessity of a direct causal chain between protected activity and adverse action, unbroken by significant temporal lapses or intervening examples of legitimate misconduct.

Plaintiff-appellant Alex Kedas, a 30-year veteran of the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), alleged that IDOT retaliated against him after he complained of gender discrimination. While a jury agreed that one disciplinary counseling memorandum was retaliatory, it awarded no damages. On appeal, Kedas challenged two adverse summary-judgment rulings that (i) barred his constructive-discharge theory and (ii) excluded evidence concerning his 2018 low-value job assignments.

The Seventh Circuit, in a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Pryor and joined by Judges Hamilton and Kirsch, affirmed. The decision creates a persuasive, organized framework that lower courts will likely cite when evaluating (a) whether a work environment is objectively intolerable and (b) whether intervening misconduct severs the causal nexus between protected activity and an employment action.

Summary of the Judgment

Constructive discharge. The panel held that no reasonable jury could find that IDOT’s actions made Kedas’s work conditions “objectively intolerable” or that termination was imminent. Routine discipline for insubordination and a supervisor’s private use of the term “cancer” were insufficient.
Causation. A two-year gap and multiple intervening disciplinary incidents broke any causal chain between Kedas’s April 2016 discrimination complaint and IDOT’s assignment of sub-$2 million projects in February 2018.
Outcome. The district court’s partial summary judgment was correct; the trial verdict stands; and Kedas receives no relief.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court leaned heavily on, and in some respects refined, existing Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court authority:

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) – foundational definition of “materially adverse action” in retaliation cases.
Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 798 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2015) – outlines the objective standard for intolerable working conditions.
Fields v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 928 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2019) – two modes of constructive discharge; applied to dismiss Kedas’s claim.
Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2008) – constructive discharge requires more than poor evaluations.
Johnson v. Accenture LLP, 142 F.4th 536 (7th Cir. 2025) – confirms “but-for” causation in retaliation.
Adebiyi v. South Suburban College, 98 F.4th 886 (7th Cir. 2024) – catalogues circumstantial proof methods (suspicious timing, pretext evidence, etc.).
Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 2000) – suspicious timing must be “fairly soon.”
University of Chicago Hospitals, 276 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2002) – vivid example where constructive discharge existed (belongings boxed and office converted to storage).

By synthesizing these cases, the panel stressed: (a) context and (b) intervening legitimate discipline will usually defeat both constructive-discharge and causation arguments.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Constructive Discharge

Objective Intolerability. The court reiterated that only conditions “more egregious than a hostile work environment” suffice. IDOT’s counseling memoranda, downgraded evaluations, and managerial frustration—though unpleasant—fell well short.
Lack of Imminent Termination. There was no evidence that “the axe was about to fall”; the employee was never told termination was imminent; indeed, IDOT hoped discipline would correct performance.
Contextual Relevance. The “cancer” remark was never uttered to Kedas and thus could not reasonably shape his perception of the workplace.

b. Causation for 2018 Job Assignments

Temporal Gap. Almost two years separated the protected activity (April 2016) from the challenged assignment (February 2018), diluting any inference of retaliation.
Intervening Misconduct. Kedas’s undisputed overspending and insubordination in 2017 provided independent, non-retaliatory reasons for management to curtail his project authority — a textbook intervening event.
No Other Evidence. The supervisor’s “cancer” email and a later job-description change (May 2018) could not retroactively create causation for a February 2018 decision.

3. Potential Impact

The opinion is notable for crystalizing two cautionary lessons for plaintiffs and their counsel:

Heightened Constructive-Discharge Pleading. Plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit must now anticipate citations to Kedas when asserting that a barrage of discipline forced resignation. Concrete evidence of either extreme hostility or imminent termination is indispensable.
Intervening-Event Doctrine. Defendants will invoke Kedas to argue that honest performance-related issues emerging after protected activity break the causal chain even when earlier actions were suspect.

Practically, employers gain greater confidence that consistent documentation of performance problems can defeat retaliation suits, while employees must marshal tighter temporal and factual connections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Title VII Retaliation

Federal law forbids employers from punishing workers for complaining about discrimination. To win, an employee must show (i) a protected complaint, (ii) a harmful employment action, and (iii) a causal link connecting the two.

2. Materially Adverse Action

Any employer act that might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination—e.g., firing, demotion, significant pay cut.

3. Constructive Discharge

A resignation treated as a firing because conditions were so unbearable that any reasonable employee would quit or because quitting was the only alternative to imminent firing.

4. “But-For” Causation

The protected activity must be the decisive cause of the adverse action; in other words, absent the complaint, the employer would not have acted as it did.

5. Suspicious Timing vs. Intervening Events

Close timing between complaint and punishment can suggest retaliation. Yet, new legitimate reasons arising after the complaint (poor performance, policy violations) can erase that suspicion.

6. Summary Judgment

A procedural device letting judges decide cases without trial where no genuine dispute of material fact exists.

Conclusion

Kedas v. IDOT fortifies employer defenses against retaliation allegations by:

Reiterating that constructive discharge requires working conditions “beyond” hostility or credible evidence that termination is unavoidable.
Clarifying that long temporal gaps, coupled with intervening misconduct, sever causal chains in retaliation claims.

Future litigants must heed the Seventh Circuit’s call for precise, contemporaneous evidence: plaintiffs should document egregious conditions and temporal proximity, while employers should diligently record legitimate performance concerns. The decision thus tightens doctrinal screws on both constructive-discharge and causation analyses, shaping the landscape of Title VII retaliation jurisprudence across the circuit and potentially beyond.