Interstate Nexus for Email Wire Fraud and Concealment via Altered Titles: The Tenth Circuit clarifies aiding-and-abetting and money-laundering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343, and 1956 in United States v. Cunningham

Introduction

In United States v. Cunningham (10th Cir. Nov. 12, 2025), the Tenth Circuit reviewed a multi-vehicle fraud scheme in which Montressa Cunningham and his wife obtained bank-financed used cars using falsified loan applications, then altered title paperwork to remove lenders’ liens, enabling sales or title loans against falsely “clear” paper titles. A jury found Cunningham guilty on sixteen counts, including conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering.

On appeal, Cunningham challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for seven counts: one bank fraud count (Count 2), one wire fraud count (Count 9), and five money laundering counts (Counts 12–16). The panel (Judge Ebel writing, joined by Judges Matheson and Moritz) reversed the bank fraud conviction on Count 2 and the wire fraud conviction on Count 9, but affirmed all five money laundering convictions, and remanded for resentencing and any necessary restitution recalculation.

The opinion establishes and clarifies three practical rules:

Aiding-and-abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 requires proof of an affirmative act by the defendant in furtherance of the principal’s offense; similar acts committed later cannot substitute for the missing act (Count 2).
Wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires proof that the charged transmissions actually traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; alleging an out-of-state email server is not enough without trial evidence (Count 9).
Using altered vehicle-title paperwork to erase a lender’s lien and then selling the vehicle or obtaining a title loan can satisfy the “design to conceal” element of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), because those transactions conceal the source and control of proceeds derived from bank fraud (Counts 12–16).

Summary of the Opinion

Count 2 (bank fraud/aiding and abetting): Reversed. The government failed to present evidence that Cunningham took any affirmative act to facilitate his wife’s December 2018 bank-fraud loan for a 2013 Mercedes Benz. Later similar misconduct by Cunningham could not fill this evidentiary gap.
Count 9 (wire fraud): Reversed. The government offered no trial evidence that emails between Cunningham and a car salesman traveled through interstate commerce, despite an indictment allegation that the messages routed through a Yahoo server in California.
Counts 12–16 (money laundering): Affirmed. The court held there was sufficient evidence that Cunningham’s subsequent sales and title-loan transactions—enabled by altered titles that deleted lenders’ liens—were designed at least in part to conceal the source, ownership, and control of proceeds derived from bank fraud.
Disposition: Case remanded for resentencing and to recalculate restitution if necessary.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014): Establishes that aiding-and-abetting liability requires (1) an affirmative act in furtherance of the offense, and (2) intent to facilitate its commission. The Tenth Circuit applied Rosemond to hold that no aiding-and-abetting liability lies where the defendant took no affirmative action connected to the principal’s offense (Count 2).
United States v. Joseph, 108 F.4th 1273 (10th Cir. 2024): Later and earlier acts may be relevant to a defendant’s intent when the defendant’s culpable act is otherwise proven. Distinguishing Joseph, the court here explained that when there is no affirmative act by the defendant at all, later similar conduct cannot cure the absence of proof of the act element for aiding and abetting.
United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1992): Confirm that bank fraud is complete when a defendant knowingly provides materially false information to induce a loan from a federally insured institution. These cases underpinned the undisputed bank-fraud convictions tied to Cunningham’s own applications and provided the “specified unlawful activity” for money-laundering analysis.
United States v. Gregory, 54 F.4th 1183 (10th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Little, 119 F.4th 750 (10th Cir. 2024): State the elements of § 1344 and the highly deferential standard of review for sufficiency challenges. The court hewed to that standard but still found counts lacking where elements had no evidentiary support.
United States v. Holloway, 826 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2016): Identifies the interstate transmission element of wire fraud under § 1343. Relying on Holloway, the court reversed Count 9 for failure of proof on the interstate nexus.
United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994): A foundational Tenth Circuit case on § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), articulating the four elements of money laundering and emphasizing that concealment must be a purpose of the transaction. The court applied its framework to the altered-title sales and title-loan transactions.
Regalado Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008): Defines “design” in the money-laundering statute to mean “purpose or plan.” The Tenth Circuit invoked Cuellar to assess whether the transactions were designed, at least in part, to conceal.
United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Dermen, 143 F.4th 1148 (10th Cir. 2025): Provide a non-exhaustive list of indicia of concealment (unusual secrecy, structuring to avoid attention, highly irregular features, use of third parties, etc.), used to evaluate the “design to conceal” element.
United States v. Gonzales, 918 F.3d 808 (10th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1992): Clarify that concealing the defendant’s identity is not required to prove concealment money laundering; it suffices to conceal the source, location, ownership, or control of the proceeds.
United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2010): Confirms that “in whole or in part” means concealment need be only one purpose of the transaction.
United States v. Myers, 854 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2017): Illustrates that tangible property (e.g., stolen motor homes) can be “proceeds” and laundering can occur through sale of such property; the court cited Myers alongside § 1956(c)(9).
United States v. Simpkins, 90 F.4th 1312 (10th Cir. 2024): Courts assess sufficiency against the legal elements, not necessarily the phrasing in jury instructions. The panel noted this principle when evaluating Count 2.

2) Legal Reasoning

A. Aiding and Abetting Bank Fraud (Count 2) — Affirmative Act Required

Felicia Cunningham alone visited the dealership, applied for, and received a $28,000 bank loan from Intrust Bank for a 2013 Mercedes Benz, using a fictitious employer (Global Life Insurance). The government prosecuted Montressa Cunningham as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2. Applying Rosemond, the court held that aiding-and-abetting requires an affirmative act by the defendant in furtherance of the principal’s fraud and an intent to facilitate it. The record contained no evidence that Montressa took any action connected to Felicia’s Intrust loan. The government’s reliance on Montressa’s later, similar fraudulent acts could be relevant to intent only if there were some contemporaneous act to evaluate; but where there was none, later acts could not substitute for the element of an affirmative act. Result: reversal of Count 2.

B. Wire Fraud (Count 9) — Proof of Interstate Transmission for Email Traffic

Count 9 charged wire fraud arising from email communications with a KC Motors salesman during the run-up to the May 2019 purchase of a 2014 Land Rover. The indictment alleged the emails traveled “from [Cunningham’s] Yahoo.com email account” through a server in California to Kansas. At trial, however, the government offered no evidence that the emails actually crossed state lines or routed through California. The government conceded this failure at oral argument. Because interstate transmission is an element of § 1343 (Holloway), and the trial record was silent on that point, the conviction could not stand. Result: reversal of Count 9.

C. Money Laundering (Counts 12–16) — Altered Title Transactions as Concealment

Counts 12–16 charged money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) based on two types of downstream transactions that followed bank-fraud-funded purchases of vehicles:

Selling a car (the Maserati) using a fraudulently obtained “clear” title after removing lien information and registering in a different state.
Obtaining title loans against multiple vehicles using falsely “clear” paper titles after deleting the recorded liens of the financing banks/credit unions.

The government’s theory tracked the statutory definitions:

Specified unlawful activity: Bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 qualifies as “specified unlawful activity” under § 1956(c)(7) by incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
Proceeds: “Any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity” (§ 1956(c)(9)). The cars themselves—acquired through bank fraud—were proceeds.
Financial transaction: Includes “the transfer of title to any … vehicle” (§ 1956(c)(4)(A)(iii)), encompassing both the sale of a car and the transfer of a vehicle’s paper title as collateral for a title loan.
Design to conceal: The fourth element requires that the defendant knew the transaction was designed, at least in part, to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds. “Design” means purpose or plan (Cuellar), and identity concealment is not required (Gonzales; Lovett). Concealment need be only one of the purposes (Faulkenberry).

Applying Garcia-Emanuel and the Shepard/Dermen indicia, the panel identified multiple concealment features:

Altering title paperwork to eliminate the recorded lien concealed the source and the secured lender’s control over the vehicle obtained by the bank-fraud loan.
Registering the car in Georgia (for the Maserati) avoided Kansas lien-notice mechanisms and impeded repossession, constituting unusual and strategically structured steps to avoid attention and enforcement.
Selling the Maserati through a Georgia dealership and surrendering the false “clear” title layered the transaction and distanced the asset from the origin (the bank-fraud-financed purchase), replacing the lender’s security interest with a new chain of title.
For the title-loan transactions, delivering the falsely “clear” paper title to title lenders and allowing those lenders to record their own liens further masked the prior bank’s security interest and complicated enforcement.

Cunningham argued that his purpose was simply to obtain cash. The court agreed that this might have been one purpose, but the statute criminalizes transactions designed “in whole or in part” to conceal. Given the highly irregular steps—erasing liens, exploiting differences between paper and electronic title regimes, and creating a new, recorded lien that displaced the visibility of the original lender’s rights—the jury could reasonably find the requisite concealment purpose and knowledge. Result: affirmance of Counts 12–16.

3) Impact and Practical Implications

A. Aiding and Abetting: Evidence Must Show an Affirmative Act

Prosecutors cannot secure aiding-and-abetting convictions based solely on a defendant’s later or similar misconduct; there must be some affirmative assistance or participation tied to the principal’s charged offense.
In spousal or partner fraud schemes, the absence of proof that the non-applicant assisted with the specific loan application will defeat an aiding-and-abetting theory, even if the partner later engages in comparable frauds.
Practice pointer: To sustain § 2 liability, develop evidence of contemporaneous acts—communications, coordination, provision of documents, appearances at the dealership, or other actions in furtherance of the principal’s fraud.

B. Wire Fraud: Interstate Commerce in the Age of Email

The interstate element of § 1343 is not self-proving for email. Evidence is needed—such as service-provider records, network-routing testimony, or technical stipulations—to show interstate routing.
Indictment allegations (e.g., that a message transited a California server) will not substitute for trial proof. Concessions on appeal, as here, will compel reversal.
Practice pointer: Consider expert or custodian-of-records testimony from email providers; obtain logs or certifications that establish the interstate path of the communications.

C. Money Laundering: Altered Titles as Concealment

The opinion robustly applies § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) to title-based schemes. Removing lienholder information and exploiting electronic vs. paper title systems can constitute concealment transactions.
“Proceeds” includes the very asset acquired by bank fraud, not merely cash flows or profits. This aligns with § 1956(c)(9)’s broad definition post-FERA.
Concealment does not require identity masking. It is enough to disguise the asset’s origin and the lender’s control, including by adding new liens (title loans) that obscure original security interests.
Practice pointer: Investigators should secure county registration records and title paperwork; as the opinion notes, some counties (e.g., Geary County, Kansas) keep paper records revealing chemical or physical alterations to titles.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2): You are liable for someone else’s crime only if you do something affirmative to help it happen and intend to help it. Mere association or similarity of later acts is not enough.
Bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344): It is bank fraud to knowingly make materially false statements to a federally insured bank to obtain a loan. The crime is complete when the false statements are used to induce the loan.
Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343): Requires a fraudulent scheme and a wire communication used to execute the scheme that crosses state or national lines. For emails, the government must show the messages actually traveled interstate.
Money laundering—concealment (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)): It is money laundering to conduct a financial transaction with criminal proceeds, knowing the transaction is designed, at least in part, to hide the source, location, ownership, or control of those proceeds. Selling property acquired by fraud or using it as collateral can qualify if done to conceal those attributes.
Proceeds (§ 1956(c)(9)): Includes any property obtained or retained through unlawful activity—here, the cars themselves acquired through bank fraud—not just the profits from resale.
Financial transaction (§ 1956(c)(4)): Broadly defined to include transferring a vehicle’s title, selling the vehicle, or pledging title as loan collateral.
Design to conceal: Means the transaction’s purpose or plan includes hiding something about the criminal proceeds. The concealment need not be the only purpose.
Lien and title basics: A lienholder is a creditor with a legal interest in the vehicle until the loan is paid. Removing lienholder information from title paperwork can falsely make a vehicle appear free and clear, enabling illicit sales or loans and impeding repossession.

Conclusion

United States v. Cunningham refines three core aspects of federal fraud and money-laundering prosecutions in the Tenth Circuit. First, aiding-and-abetting demands an affirmative act tied to the principal’s offense; later similar acts and bad intent cannot replace that missing element. Second, the interstate aspect of wire fraud remains an evidentiary hurdle even for emails—trial proof of interstate routing is essential. Third, the court underscores a pragmatic, evidence-driven approach to concealment money laundering: altering vehicle titles to erase liens, registering in different states to evade lien-notice systems, and layering transactions through sales or title loans are classic markers that a transaction is designed to conceal the source and control of proceeds derived from bank fraud.

By reversing two counts (bank fraud Count 2 and wire fraud Count 9) and affirming five money laundering counts (Counts 12–16), the opinion both tightens the government’s proof obligations for § 2 and § 1343 and affirms a broad, practical understanding of concealment under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The remand for resentencing and potential restitution recalculation follows naturally from these holdings. Going forward, prosecutors should build records that clearly establish interstate transmissions for email-based wire fraud and contemporaneous assistance for aiding-and-abetting theories, while defense counsel should scrutinize those elements closely. For money-laundering disputes, Cunningham provides a detailed roadmap of how title manipulation and lien-erasure schemes can satisfy the concealment prong.