Interstate Adoptions and the UCCJEA: Jurisdictional Limits and Post‑Transfer Termination of Parental Rights in In re R.D. and S.D.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s decision in In re R.D. and S.D., No. 24‑386 (Nov. 13, 2025), is a significant opinion at the intersection of interstate child welfare, adoption practice, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).

The case arises from a long-running dependency/neglect matter that began in Tennessee and migrated to West Virginia when the children were placed with relatives there. Acting on the mistaken belief that Tennessee had already terminated both parents’ rights, a West Virginia circuit court granted adoptions in 2022. Only later did the courts realize Tennessee had not terminated parental rights and still held continuing exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Tennessee then transferred jurisdiction to West Virginia, which consolidated the abuse/neglect and adoption proceedings and ultimately terminated the biological father’s parental rights in 2024.

On appeal, the father challenged (1) the validity of the 2022 adoptions and (2) the 2024 termination of his parental rights. The Supreme Court’s opinion does two important things:

• It holds that the 2022 adoption orders are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, because Tennessee retained exclusive continuing jurisdiction over custody when those orders were entered.
• It upholds the later 2024 termination of the father’s parental rights in West Virginia as a proper modification of disposition under West Virginia’s child abuse and neglect regime, after Tennessee affirmatively relinquished jurisdiction.

The decision therefore simultaneously protects the integrity of the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional scheme and preserves permanency for the children by validating the eventual termination of parental rights and directing the circuit court how to proceed with adoption on remand.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

• Petitioner: D.D., biological father of R.D. and S.D. (the “petitioner”).
• Children: R.D. and S.D., initially subject to a Tennessee dependency and neglect proceeding.
• Custodial relatives: T.V. (maternal aunt) and her husband, R.V., residents of McDowell County, West Virginia.
• Agencies/Counsel: Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (DCS) in the originating case; West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) in the transferred matter; guardian ad litem for the children; counsel for the adoptive relatives and for the father.

B. Holdings

1. UCCJEA and the 2022 adoption orders.
   When the McDowell County Circuit Court granted the adoptions in June 2022, Tennessee still held exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over child custody determinations concerning R.D. and S.D. under the UCCJEA. Therefore, West Virginia lacked subject matter jurisdiction to effectively modify Tennessee’s custody determinations by terminating parental rights implicit in the adoptions. The June 2022 adoption orders—and their amended versions—are void and must be vacated.
2. Post-transfer termination of parental rights.
   After Tennessee formally transferred jurisdiction in April 2023, the circuit court had authority to proceed. The later decision (June 2024) to modify the Tennessee disposition and terminate the father’s parental rights under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑606(a) and Rule 46 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings is affirmed. The court held there was:
   • a material change of circumstances since Tennessee’s 2022 disposition, and
   • clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interests.
3. Remand directives.
   The Court orders the circuit court on remand to:
   • Vacate all June 2022 and amended adoption orders in the two adoption cases.
   • Convene an emergency multidisciplinary team (MDT) meeting for the children.
   • Conduct an expeditious permanency review hearing in the abuse and neglect cases.
   • Determine whether to proceed on the pending amended adoption petitions or require new petitions before completing adoption.

III. Background and Procedural History

A. Tennessee: Dependency and Neglect

The case originated in Sumner County, Tennessee in June 2019, when DCS filed a dependency and neglect petition, largely based on the mother’s substance abuse and the father’s incarceration (following an aggravated assault by strangulation against the mother, in the children’s presence).

• July 2019: Children are placed with maternal grandmother B.V. via Immediate Protection Agreement, incorporated into a court order.
• November 2019 adjudication: The father stipulates the children are dependent and neglected. The Tennessee court grants legal and physical custody to B.V., but notes the father can later seek modification.
• Key Tennessee law: Tennessee’s “superior parental rights” doctrine gives biological parents priority over non‑parents in initial custody disputes, but once a valid custody order in favor of a non‑parent is entered, that presumption is lost absent “extraordinary circumstances” (citing Blair v. Badenhope and Sikora v. Mook).

After B.V. suffered a stroke and died in 2021, DCS filed a new dependency petition. The Tennessee court:

• Briefly placed the children with another relative (A.V.) in Tennessee.
• Initiated Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) procedures to evaluate out‑of‑state placement with aunt and uncle, T.V. and R.V., in McDowell County, West Virginia.
• September 2021: Again adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and continued placement with T.V. and R.V., by then in West Virginia.

The father was paroled in January 2022. At a February 1, 2022 hearing (which he did not attend), the Tennessee court entered an “Adjudicatory and Final Dispositional Order” (February 2022 Order) the next day:

• Children placed in the full legal and physical custody of T.V. and R.V.
• Case closed; DCS relieved.
• Crucially, no termination of parental rights occurred; Tennessee explicitly later clarified it had only stripped the parents of “superior parental rights,” not parental rights themselves.

B. West Virginia: 2022 Adoptions

In April and May 2022, T.V. and R.V. filed separate adoption petitions for each child in McDowell County:

• The petitions incorrectly alleged that Tennessee had terminated both parents’ “parental, custodial, and guardianship rights” in the February 2022 Order.
• The Tennessee order was attached, but the West Virginia court accepted the characterization.

On June 21, 2022, the circuit court entered final orders granting the adoptions. Amended and “second amended” orders followed for technical reasons (stylistic changes and new Social Security numbers), but the court later stressed that the adoptions legally took effect on June 21, 2022.

During this period:

• The children continued to speak by phone with the father.
• The aunt testified that the father misrepresented his whereabouts and that the calls upset the children, especially once they realized he was with their abusive mother.
• In July/August 2022, the children told the father about the adoptions. He reacted with anger and profanity toward R.D. and then T.V., allegedly causing distress to the child and leading T.V. and R.V. to cut off contact.
• The father violated parole and was re‑incarcerated in December 2022.

C. Tennessee’s Transfer of Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA

From prison, the father wrote to the Tennessee court in February and March 2023, asking for a hearing and asserting he had done nothing “other than being incarcerated” to warrant loss of his children, and that they should be returned to him upon his release.

T.V. and R.V. then provided the Tennessee court with copies of the June 2022 West Virginia adoption orders. The Tennessee court:

• Recognized that West Virginia’s orders mistakenly treated the February 2022 Tennessee order as a termination of parental rights.
• Held a UCCJEA conference with the McDowell County Circuit Court on March 31, 2023.
• On April 3, 2023, entered an “Order to Transfer Jurisdiction,” explaining:
  • Tennessee had not terminated parental rights and no TPR proceeding had been filed there.
  • Its February 2022 order only eliminated the parents’ “superior parental rights” and granted custody to T.V. and R.V.
  • Although Tennessee could continue to exercise jurisdiction, the children now resided in West Virginia, the mother’s whereabouts were unknown, and West Virginia was a more appropriate forum under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36‑6‑222 (UCCJEA inconvenient forum provision).
  • It therefore relinquished jurisdiction to West Virginia for “all adjudicatory and dispositional purposes.”

The McDowell County Circuit Court received the Tennessee files in April 2023 and opened two abuse and neglect cases parallel to the already‑existing adoption cases.

D. Post‑Transfer Proceedings in West Virginia

Once jurisdiction was formally in West Virginia:

• June 2023: T.V. and R.V. moved in the adoption cases to terminate both parents’ rights, alleging continued incarceration, lack of improvement, and no reasonable likelihood of correction.
• December 2023: At a status hearing, the circuit court expressly recognized that it had entered the 2022 adoption orders “improvidently,” and characterized the adoptions as “contested.” It instructed T.V. and R.V. to file amended adoption petitions, which they did, now alleging abandonment (to obviate consent).
• January 2024: The court consolidated the adoption cases with the abuse/neglect cases, and directed DHS and the children’s guardian ad litem to file motions to terminate parental rights.
• March and May 2024 hearings: The father did not appear at either, despite notice (he claimed car trouble in March, and was unreachable in May). The court treated his filings as an attempt to set aside the adoptions, announced it would give full faith and credit to Tennessee’s abuse/neglect adjudications, and focused the hearing on disposition and possible modification.

At the May 23, 2024 evidentiary hearing, the circuit court heard from:

• T.V. – describing:
  • father’s long-term incarceration and minimal contact with the children,
  • his reaction to the adoptions and verbal abuse of R.D.,
  • threats toward R.V.,
  • children’s adjustment and stability in her home.
• Regina Mullins (CPS worker). – testifying:
  • she had no concerns about T.V. and R.V. as caregivers,
  • it was in the children’s best interests to be adopted by them,
  • the father had never contacted her.

On June 25, 2024, the circuit court entered its “Final Order Refusing to Set Aside Prior Adoption Orders and Involuntarily Terminating the Parental, Custodial, and Guardianship Rights” (June 2024 Order), in which it:

• Refused to vacate the 2022 adoptions, reasoning that the father waited more than six months after learning of them to challenge them, beyond the window in W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑704(b), (c).
• In the alternative, modified the Tennessee disposition under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑606(a) and Rule 46 and terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding:
  • a material change of circumstances, including the father’s conduct during the July 2022 call, his reincarceration, and his failure to attend hearings or demonstrate improvement; and
  • that termination was in the children’s best interests.

The father appealed, challenging both the refusal to vacate the adoptions and the manner in which his parental rights were terminated.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Standards of Review: Chrystal R.M. and Tiffany Marie S.

• Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).
  Cited in Syllabus Point 1 for the rule that purely legal issues, such as statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. This governs review of UCCJEA jurisdiction questions and interpretation of West Virginia’s and Tennessee’s statutes.
• In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).
  Cited (through Syllabus Point 1 of In re Cecil T.) for the standard of review in abuse and neglect cases:
  • Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
  • Findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard and given deference where plausible.

B. UCCJEA Jurisdiction: Rosen, Snider, Thornsbury, Z.H., K.R., K.W., A.T.-1

• Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W. Va. 402, 664 S.E.2d 743 (2008).
  Syllabus Point 6: the UCCJEA is a jurisdictional statute, and its requirements must be satisfied for a court to adjudicate child custody disputes. This is the core principle the Court applies to invalidate the June 2022 adoption orders.
• Snider v. Snider, 209 W. Va. 771, 551 S.E.2d 693 (2001).
  Cited to confirm that whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law.
• State ex rel. Smith v. Thornsbury, 214 W. Va. 228, 588 S.E.2d 217 (2003).
  Distinguished subject matter jurisdiction from personal jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred by consent, and may be raised for the first time on appeal—even sua sponte by the Court. The Court uses this to justify addressing UCCJEA jurisdiction although the parties had not squarely argued it.
• In re Z.H., 245 W. Va. 456, 859 S.E.2d 399 (2021).
  Another case where the Court raised UCCJEA subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion; underscoring the Court’s obligation to ensure jurisdiction exists in child custody matters.
• In re K.R., 229 W. Va. 733, 735 S.E.2d 882 (2012).
  Provides a succinct summary of the four bases of initial UCCJEA jurisdiction (“home state,” “significant connection,” “declination,” and “default”). Used to frame West Virginia’s potential jurisdiction vis‑à‑vis Tennessee.
• In re Guardianship of K.W., 240 W. Va. 501, 813 S.E.2d 154 (2018).
  Reiterates that orders entered without subject matter jurisdiction are void.
• In re A.T.-1, 248 W. Va. 484, 889 S.E.2d 57 (2023).
  Holds that a court cannot “cure” a UCCJEA jurisdictional defect by later acquiring jurisdiction. Applied here to reject the notion that Tennessee’s 2023 transfer could retroactively validate West Virginia’s 2022 adoption orders.

C. Tennessee “Superior Parental Rights” and Custody: Blair and Sikora

• Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137 (Tenn. 2002).
  Recognizes Tennessee’s presumption that a biological parent has “superior parental rights” in initial custody disputes between parent and non‑parent.
• Sikora ex rel. Mook v. Mook, 397 S.W.3d 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
  Clarifies that once a valid custody order places a child with a non‑parent, the biological parent loses that presumption absent extraordinary circumstances. The Tennessee court explained that its earlier placement of the children with grandmother B.V. stripped the father of his “superior parental rights,” but left parental rights intact.

D. Adoption as Custody Determination: In re Adoption of L.U., D.B. v. M.A.

• In re Adoption of L.U., 292 A.3d 1076 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022).
  Cited for the principle that adoption and custody matters are not hermetically sealed silos—adoption proceedings can involve custody determinations, and vice versa. The West Virginia Court uses this to justify treating the 2022 adoptions as including a de facto termination of parental rights (a “child custody proceeding”).
• D.B. v. M.A., 975 So. 2d 927 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte D.B., 975 So. 2d 940 (Ala. 2007).
  Observes that “before a child can be adopted, the biological father’s parental rights must be terminated, and the matter of custody must be resolved.” The Court uses this to support its functional analysis of the 2022 orders.

E. Modification of Disposition: In re Cecil T., In re P.K., In re D.G.

• In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).
  Reiterates the Tiffany Marie S. standard of review, applied here to the circuit court’s modification and termination decision.
• In re P.K., No. 23‑729 (W. Va. Nov. 5, 2025).
  Very recently decided when this opinion issued, it held in Syllabus Point 3:

  Allegations of abuse and neglect for which a respondent has not been previously adjudicated do not constitute a material change of circumstances for purposes of modification of a dispositional order under Rule 46 … and W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑606(a). Such allegations must be pleaded in a verified petition or … a verified amended petition, and adjudicated in accordance with W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601, et seq.

  The Court uses P.K. as an important guardrail: new unadjudicated abuse allegations require a new petition and adjudication; mere changes in circumstances (including exacerbation or continuance of already‑adjudicated conditions) may be handled via modification.
• In re D.G., No. 22‑767, 2023 WL 6144639 (W. Va. Sept. 20, 2023) (memorandum decision).
  Upholds a modification that terminated parental rights where the parent failed to communicate with counsel and the child and failed to participate post‑disposition. Cited to support using modification to reach termination in appropriate circumstances.

V. Legal Reasoning

A. Recharacterizing the 2022 Adoption Proceedings

A central move in the Court’s reasoning is to refuse to accept the label “adoption proceeding” at face value. The statute governing the UCCJEA’s scope, W. Va. Code § 48‑20‑103, states that the chapter “does not govern an adoption proceeding.” The parties leaned on this to argue that the UCCJEA did not apply to the 2022 adoptions.

The Court disagreed for two reasons:

1. Substance over form. To grant an adoption, the circuit court necessarily had to proceed on the premise that parental rights had been terminated. Because Tennessee had not terminated parental rights, the circuit court’s orders effectively:
   • modified Tennessee’s existing custody determination, and
   • terminated the biological parents’ parental rights in fact, even if not expressly labeled as such.
   That is a classic “child custody proceeding” as defined in W. Va. Code § 48‑20‑102(d) (which explicitly includes “neglect, abuse, dependency, [and] termination of parental rights”).
2. UCCJEA commentary and fairness. The Court cites the official comments to the model UCCJEA, which recognize that even though adoption proceedings are generally excluded, there will be “instances where it will be necessary to apply this Act in an adoption proceeding.” This is such a case: ignoring the jurisdictional problem merely because the proceeding was captioned as an adoption would “run counter to the purposes of the UCCJEA” and be fundamentally unfair.

Accordingly, the Court treats the 2022 adoptions as comprising:

• a custody/termination component, to which the UCCJEA squarely applies; followed by
• the adoption itself.

Once framed this way, the jurisdictional analysis proceeds under the UCCJEA as in any interstate custody/TPR modification case.

B. UCCJEA Framework Applied

1. Tennessee’s initial and continuing jurisdiction

Under both Tennessee and West Virginia enactments of the UCCJEA:

• “Child custody proceeding” includes dependency/neglect and TPR actions.
• “Child custody determination” means any order deciding legal or physical custody, including temporary, permanent, initial, and modification orders.
• “Initial determination” is the first such order; “modification” is any subsequent order that changes it.

The Tennessee court made the initial child custody determination in July 2019 when it first placed the children with grandmother B.V. in the pending dependency/neglect case. Tennessee was then clearly the children’s “home state” (the state where they had lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months before commencement).

Once Tennessee made that initial determination, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36‑6‑217(a) (mirroring UCCJEA § 202, W. Va. Code § 48‑20‑202) gave Tennessee exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody of these children until:

1. a Tennessee court determined that neither the children nor a parent (or a person acting as a parent) had a significant connection with Tennessee and substantial evidence was no longer available there; or
2. a Tennessee or another state’s court determined that the children, the parents, and any person acting as a parent no longer resided in Tennessee.

The record contains no such determination until Tennessee’s April 3, 2023 Order to Transfer Jurisdiction. Until that order:

• Tennessee had made multiple subsequent custody determinations (placement with B.V., then A.V., then T.V. and R.V.); and
• the father still resided in Tennessee in June 2022, when West Virginia entered the adoption orders.

Thus, Tennessee retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction up to April 3, 2023.

2. West Virginia’s ability to modify Tennessee’s custody determination

West Virginia’s UCCJEA, at W. Va. Code § 48‑20‑203, strictly limits when a West Virginia court may modify another state’s child custody determination:

• First, the West Virginia court must itself have jurisdiction to make an initial determination under W. Va. Code § 48‑20‑201(a)(1) or (2) (home‑state or significant‑connection jurisdiction).
• Second, either:
  • the original state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction or that West Virginia is a more convenient forum; or
  • a West Virginia or original state court determines that the children, the parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the original state.

By June 2022, West Virginia had likely become the children’s “home state,” because they had lived in T.V. and R.V.’s care in McDowell County for approximately one year. So, the first prong of § 48‑20‑203 was satisfied. But the second prong was not:

• Tennessee had not yet relinquished jurisdiction—its April 2023 order doing so was almost a year away.
• The father was still a Tennessee resident in June 2022, and no court had determined that neither the children nor any parent/person acting as parent resided in Tennessee at that time.

Thus, the statutory gateway conditions in § 48‑20‑203 were not met in June 2022, and West Virginia was prohibited from modifying Tennessee’s custody determinations.

3. “Void” and not curable by later transfer

Because subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA did not exist when the June 2022 adoption orders were entered:

• Those orders are void, not merely voidable, under In re Guardianship of K.W. and long-settled West Virginia law.
• Tennessee’s later April 2023 transfer of jurisdiction cannot “cure” or retroactively validate the prior jurisdictional defect, as emphasized by In re A.T.-1.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court holds that the:

• June 21, 2022 final adoption orders,
• June 30, 2022 amended adoption orders, and
• December 19, 2022 second amended adoption orders

are void and must be vacated.

C. Personal Jurisdiction vs Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The father had argued that the 2022 adoptions were invalid because he had received no notice and therefore was not subject to the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction. The Court briefly addresses this:

• Objections to personal jurisdiction can be waived, and generally must be raised in the trial court.
• By contrast, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the Court itself.

Ultimately, the Court does not resolve the personal jurisdiction argument because the deeper flaw—absence of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA—renders the 2022 orders void regardless of notice issues.

D. Modification of Disposition and Termination of Parental Rights

After Tennessee’s transfer of jurisdiction, the circuit court proceeded under West Virginia’s child abuse and neglect framework to modify the Tennessee disposition and terminate parental rights. The father argued on appeal that this was improper because:

• the court had relied on alleged abandonment and the July 2022 phone‑call incident, and
• those were not the subject of any new verified petition or adjudication.

The Supreme Court rejects this argument.

1. Statutory and rule framework

• W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑606(a).
  Allows modification of a dispositional order “upon motion” by the child, parent, custodian, or DHS if:
  • there is a material change of circumstances, and
  • modification is in the child’s best interests, proven by clear and convincing evidence.
• Rule 46 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings.
  Mirrors the statute and allows modification at any time upon similar findings.
• Termination standard.
  Termination of parental rights is governed by W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6), which focuses on whether there is:
  • no reasonable likelihood that conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future, and
  • termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

2. The guardrail from In re P.K.

In re P.K. tightly cabins when modification is permissible:

• If the State relies on new, unadjudicated allegations of abuse or neglect, it must file a (amended) verified petition and secure an adjudication under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601 before seeking a dispositional change premised on those allegations.
• But changes in circumstances related to previously adjudicated conditions can support a modification without a new adjudication.

The Supreme Court applies this framework and concludes:

• The father had already been adjudicated as an abusing/neglecting parent in Tennessee based on his incarceration and related facts.
• His post‑disposition conduct—reincarceration, failing to appear for multiple hearings, yelling profanities at his child, threatening the custodian, failing to acknowledge underlying issues—did not constitute a wholly new kind of abuse/neglect that required a new adjudication. Rather, they were a material change in circumstances within the scope of his adjudicated pattern.

Thus, the circuit court properly proceeded under § 49‑4‑606(a) and Rule 46 rather than requiring an amended petition and new adjudication.

3. Evidence of material change and best interests

The Court carefully catalogues the changes between Tennessee’s February 2022 disposition and the 2024 West Virginia termination:

• Father’s opportunities and choices.
  • February 2022: The Tennessee court had preserved his parental rights while granting custody to relatives, leaving open the possibility that he could make positive changes and re‑engage.
  • By late 2022 and 2023: He had:
    • lost control during phone contact with R.D., cursing at the child and threatening R.V.;
    • prompted the caregivers to cut off contact for the children’s emotional safety;
    • violated parole and been reincarcerated;
    • after release, failed to attend several duly noticed hearings (January, March, and May 2024) despite explicit direction to stay in touch with counsel.
• Children’s circumstances.
  • February 2022: They had lived with T.V. and R.V. for less than one year.
  • By May 2024: They had been in that relative placement for roughly three years—longer than their earlier placement with grandmother B.V.—defining stability and “home” for them.
  • Evidence showed they were thriving in this placement, and that contact with the father as he conducted himself caused confusion and distress.
• CPS and GAL evidence.
  • Ms. Mullins testified she had no concerns about T.V. and R.V. and recommended adoption as in the children’s best interests.
  • The father never reached out to her to engage in services or planning.

Taken together, the Court agrees with the circuit court that:

• These facts reflect a material change of circumstances affecting both the father and the children.
• Modification of the prior disposition to termination of parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is in the children’s best interests—particularly given their need for permanency, security, and stability.

The Court explicitly notes that:

• The circuit court did not find abandonment, and actually declined to do so.
• The termination was not based on abandonment allegations but on the overall pattern of the father’s conduct and the children’s need for permanency.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the June 2024 termination of the father’s parental rights.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction vs. Personal Jurisdiction

• Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a particular type of case (e.g., child custody, divorce, criminal matters). It comes from statutes and the constitution; parties cannot create it by agreement or waiver.
• Personal jurisdiction is a court’s power over a specific person, typically based on residency, presence, or sufficient contacts with the state. It can be waived if not timely raised.

Here, the fatal defect was lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA when West Virginia purported to modify Tennessee’s custody determination in 2022. Because subject matter jurisdiction was missing, the adoption orders were void, regardless of any notice issues.

B. The UCCJEA’s Core Ideas

• Home state jurisdiction. Normally, the child’s home state (where the child has lived for six months with a parent or person acting as parent) has priority to make initial custody decisions.
• Exclusive continuing jurisdiction. Once a state has made a custody determination, it usually keeps control until (a) the child and parents are gone and no longer connected in a significant way, or (b) that state formally decides another state is now a more convenient forum.
• Limited modification authority. Another state may not change the first state’s custody orders unless specific criteria are met and the first state either relinquishes jurisdiction or all relevant persons have moved out.

The purpose is to prevent “competing” custody orders and forum shopping between states, ensuring one state at a time has control over custody decisions.

C. “Void” vs. “Voidable” Orders

• A void order is one entered without fundamental authority (like subject matter jurisdiction). It is a legal nullity from the start and must be set aside whenever the defect is recognized.
• A voidable order is entered with jurisdiction but may contain errors. It remains effective unless and until reversed on appeal or modified.

The 2022 adoption orders are declared void, not just erroneous, because the court lacked UCCJEA authority to act at all on custody/TPR at that time.

D. Material Change of Circumstances vs. New Abuse/Neglect Allegations

• Material change of circumstances refers to significant changes in the facts underlying a prior disposition (e.g., a parent’s continued failure to correct conditions, worsening behavior, new stability for the child in foster care), which may justify changing an existing order.
• New abuse/neglect allegations (e.g., a new incident of physical abuse not previously litigated) require:
  • a new or amended verified petition, and
  • a new adjudicatory process to determine whether the parent is responsible for that new abuse/neglect.

In re P.K. draws this line sharply; in In re R.D. and S.D., the Court concludes that the father’s post‑disposition conduct falls on the “material change” side, not the “new allegations requiring adjudication” side.

E. Tennessee’s “Superior Parental Rights” vs. Parental Rights Generally

• Under Tennessee law, biological parents start with a presumption of “superior parental rights” over non‑parents in initial custody disputes.
• Once a court validly awards custody to a non‑parent, the parent loses that presumption but not necessarily their parental rights. They remain legal parents but without the automatic “first in line” status for custody.

In this case, when Tennessee placed the children with B.V. and later with T.V. and R.V., the father lost his superior parental rights but still retained parental rights until West Virginia terminated them in 2024.

F. Dependency/Neglect Proceedings vs. Adoption

• Dependency/neglect proceedings determine whether children are abused/neglected and where they should live (custody, placement), and whether parental rights should be restricted or terminated.
• Adoption creates a new, permanent legal parent‑child relationship and (for non‑stepparent adoptions) almost always presupposes:
  • termination of parental rights, or
  • valid consent/voluntary relinquishment by the legal parents.

Because adoption depends on prior resolution of custody and parental rights, adoption proceedings can overlap functionally with “child custody proceedings” under the UCCJEA, especially when they involve de facto termination of out‑of‑state parents’ rights.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. For Interstate Child Welfare and Adoption Practice

The decision is a strong reminder that in interstate child welfare and adoption:

• Courts and practitioners must verify the exact status of parental rights in the originating state. Assumptions or misreadings of out‑of‑state orders (as happened here with the February 2022 Tennessee order) can have serious consequences and create void judgments.
• UCCJEA analysis is mandatory whenever a child has been the subject of prior custody or dependency/neglect proceedings in another state:
  • Has another state made an initial custody determination?
  • Does that state still have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction?
  • Has that state formally relinquished or declined jurisdiction?
• Adoption proceedings that depend on modifying an out‑of‑state custody order are not insulated from the UCCJEA merely by the “adoption” label.

Other states may find this decision persuasive when confronted with out‑of‑state dependency/neglect histories feeding into local adoption efforts.

B. For West Virginia Courts and Agencies

For West Virginia specifically, In re R.D. and S.D.:

• Clarifies that West Virginia courts must apply the UCCJEA even in adoption contexts when those adoptions inherently modify out‑of‑state custody orders.
• Signals that circuit courts should:
  • hold UCCJEA conferences with sister states when prior orders exist,
  • obtain explicit orders of relinquishment or declination before assuming modification jurisdiction, and
  • document these jurisdictional findings in the record.
• Reinforces the proper use of § 49‑4‑606(a) and Rule 46 to reach termination of parental rights by modification where:
  • the parent has already been adjudicated as abusive/neglectful (even in another state),
  • post‑disposition conduct shows material deterioration or non‑engagement, and
  • there is compelling evidence of the child’s need for permanency.

C. For Future Litigation Strategy

Lawyers on all sides (parents, agencies, and custodians) will likely:

• Pay closer attention to time‑of‑order jurisdiction, recognizing that later transfers cannot repair jurisdictional voids.
• Be more deliberate in choosing between:
  • a modification of disposition route when relying on changed circumstances related to prior adjudications; versus
  • a new or amended petition and adjudication when new abuse/neglect allegations arise.
• Anticipate that appellate courts may raise UCCJEA jurisdiction sua sponte, as they did here and in Z.H..

D. For Parents and Children

From a human perspective, the opinion strikes a careful balance:

• It acknowledges the harm of jurisdictional missteps—declaring the 2022 adoptions void—but does so to uphold the rule of law and interstate comity.
• At the same time, it preserves permanency for the children by affirming a valid, post‑transfer termination of parental rights and directing the circuit court to move expeditiously toward a proper adoption.
• It underscores to parents, particularly those with criminal justice involvement, that:
  • mere incarceration is not necessarily fatal to parental rights, but
  • failure to engage with the process, continued law violations, and harmful interactions with children can tip the scales irreversibly.

VIII. Conclusion

In re R.D. and S.D. is a carefully crafted opinion that both corrects a serious jurisdictional error and reinforces mechanisms for achieving permanency in complex interstate child welfare cases.

The Court establishes that:

• West Virginia courts cannot modify out‑of‑state custody determinations—including by de facto termination of parental rights through adoption orders—while another state retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
• Orders entered in violation of the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional requirements are void and must be vacated, even if substantial time has passed and children have settled into new homes.
• Once jurisdiction is properly transferred, West Virginia’s modification of disposition mechanism under § 49‑4‑606(a) and Rule 46 can be used to terminate parental rights where there is a material change of circumstances anchored in prior adjudications and termination is in the child’s best interests.

By vacating the void adoption orders but affirming the later, valid termination of parental rights and directing swift permanency review on remand, the Court offers a roadmap for reconciling the rigid demands of jurisdictional law with the paramount need to secure stability and permanence for children caught in multi‑state dependency and adoption systems.