Internal Personnel Disputes, Public Concern, and Constructive Discharge:
A Commentary on Friedman v. Town of Pembroke Park (11th Cir. 2025)
I. Introduction
This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam opinion in Babette Friedman v. Town of Pembroke Park, No. 24‑13916 (11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2025). Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore non‑precedential under the Eleventh Circuit’s rules, the decision is significant as an illustration of:
- How narrowly the Eleventh Circuit may define “matters of public concern” when public employees report internal misconduct; and
- How high the bar remains for alleging a “constructive discharge” under the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act.
The plaintiff, Babette Friedman, was the Director of Human Resources for the Town of Pembroke Park. She alleged that a Town commissioner, Geoffrey Jacobs, retaliated against her when she resisted his efforts to learn the identities of staff members who had reported sexual harassment by his friend, and when she publicly criticized his treatment of Town employees at a commission meeting. She brought:
- A First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town and Jacobs; and
- A retaliation claim under Florida’s Whistle-blower’s Act, Fla. Stat. § 112.3187, against the Town.
The district court dismissed her amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding:
- Her commission‑meeting statement did not address a “matter of public concern” and so was not protected by the First Amendment in the public‑employment context; and
- Her resignation did not amount to a constructive discharge and thus she suffered no “adverse employment action” under the Florida Whistle‑blower’s Act.
The opinion thus reinforces two recurring themes in public‑employment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) internal personnel disputes—even those involving alleged harassment or abuse by an elected official—are likely to be characterized as private employee grievances rather than public‑concern speech; and (2) constructive discharge is reserved for truly intolerable and pervasive workplace conditions, not merely difficult or uncomfortable working relationships.
II. Summary of the Opinion
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, accepting all well‑pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences in Friedman’s favor, as required by Huggins v. School District of Manatee County, 151 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2025).
The court divided its analysis into two parts:
- First Amendment claim (§ 1983) – The court assumed, without deciding, that Friedman spoke “as a citizen” at the April 12, 2023 commission meeting. However, it held that her speech did not relate to a “matter of public concern.” Looking to the “content, form, and context” of her statement, and especially its “main thrust” and her motivation, the panel concluded that her remarks were essentially an internal employee grievance about Commissioner Jacobs’s alleged mistreatment and retaliation against staff, rather than a broader contribution to public debate. Because public-employee speech is protected only when made as a citizen on a matter of public concern, her First Amendment retaliation claim failed.
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Florida Whistle-blower’s Act claim – Again assuming, without deciding, that her internal complaints and commission‑meeting statement were statutorily protected expressions, the court held that Friedman had not alleged an “adverse employment action.”
She argued that her resignation amounted to a constructive discharge, but the court applied the Eleventh Circuit’s stringent standard for constructive discharge and held that:
- her working conditions were not alleged to be “so intolerable that a reasonable person in her position would have been compelled to resign”; and
- she continued working for over a month after her last complaint, and for another month after submitting her resignation, facts which undercut any claim of intolerability.
The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of all claims.
III. Factual and Procedural Background
A. The Town’s Civility Code and Workplace Conflict
The case arises against the backdrop of a 2020 civility code adopted by the Town of Pembroke Park. The code required elected and appointed officials to treat each other, staff, and the public “with civility,” and prohibited “personal attacks, disruption of staff, and public criticism of employees.”
In August 2022, Friedman became the Town’s Director of Human Resources. Between August 2022 and September 2023, Geoffrey Jacobs served as both a commissioner and the Town’s mayor.
In March 2023, two Town employees reported to Friedman that an official—described as a friend of Jacobs—had sexually harassed them. Jacobs demanded the identities of the complaining employees and details of their complaints. Friedman refused, citing confidentiality obligations in her HR role.
Jacobs renewed his request during a March 22, 2023 commission meeting. He learned the identity of at least one complaining employee the next day and allegedly began to harass her. Friedman reported Jacobs’s conduct to the Town manager and warned that Jacobs’s continued harassment “might compel her and the complainants to lodge a formal complaint against him for creating a hostile work environment and engaging in retaliation.”
The Town manager warned Jacobs to refrain from threatening or harassing conduct, but Jacobs allegedly dismissed the warning and did not change his behavior. Believing Jacobs undeterred, Friedman resolved to “blow the whistle” on his conduct.
B. The April 12, 2023 Commission Meeting
At an April 12, 2023 commission meeting, in response to an inquiry from the mayor, Friedman read a prepared statement. According to the complaint (as summarized by the court), she:
- spoke on behalf of “current and past employees who d[id] not have a voice [at the meeting]”;
- described Jacobs’s “persistent mistreatment of staff” and characterized his behavior as “toxic and abusive”; and
- implored the commission to protect employees from Jacobs.
She also referred to the need to “raise the level of professionalism” to “retain and keep good employees” and to “change the reputation of [the] town.” The panel later characterized these broader concerns as present but not as the “main thrust” of her remarks.
C. Alleged Retaliation and Resignation
Friedman alleged a series of retaliatory acts by Jacobs following the April meeting:
- On May 1, 2023, he filed a complaint against her.
- On May 6, 2023, at a food drive, he allegedly referred to her as a “Nazi.”
- On May 27, 2023, at another commission meeting, he called for her termination.
- On June 4, 2023, he demeaned her on social media.
- On June 21, 2023, after she again complained to the Town manager about his “bullying and intimidation,” he filed a complaint against her with the Florida Office of the Inspector General.
Friedman resigned on August 2, 2023, with an effective date of September 2, 2023, thus continuing to work for about a month after giving notice.
D. Litigation History
Friedman filed suit in state court; the Town and Jacobs removed the case to federal court. She amended her complaint to assert:
- A § 1983 claim against both the Town and Jacobs for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; and
- A Florida Whistle-blower’s Act claim against the Town, alleging that the Town retaliated for her disclosure of official misconduct.
The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, holding:
- Her First Amendment retaliation claim failed because her speech at the commission meeting was not on a matter of public concern; and
- Her whistleblower claim failed because she had not suffered a constructive discharge, as evidenced by her continued employment for a month after resigning.
Friedman appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
IV. Analysis
A. Precedents and Authorities Cited
The panel anchored its analysis in several key precedents. Understanding these decisions is essential to understanding Friedman.
1. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
Garcetti is the modern starting point for public-employee free-speech claims. The Supreme Court there held that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking “as citizens” for First Amendment purposes, and their speech is not protected from employer discipline. The Court emphasized a two‑step inquiry:
- Did the employee speak as a citizen or as part of her official duties?
- If as a citizen, did she speak on a matter of public concern?
Only if both conditions are satisfied does the court proceed to a balancing of interests under Pickering v. Board of Education.
In Friedman, the Eleventh Circuit quotes Garcetti indirectly through Alves for the rule that public employees’ speech is protected only if they speak as citizens and on matters of public concern. The panel notably assumes without deciding that Friedman spoke as a citizen, allowing it to resolve the case solely on the “public concern” prong.
2. Alves v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 804 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2015)
Alves is the Eleventh Circuit’s leading post‑Garcetti articulation of the public-concern requirement. It emphasizes that:
- Whether speech addresses a matter of public concern is determined by examining the “content, form, and context” of the speech “as revealed by the whole record.”
- Because speech is rarely entirely public or private, the court focuses on the “main thrust” of the speech and the employee’s “motivation in speaking.”
- The First Amendment does not serve to “constitutionalize employee grievances.”
The panel in Friedman expressly invokes Alves to analyze whether Friedman’s April 12 statement was public‑concern speech. Quoting Alves, the court reiterates that employee speech centered on internal personnel disputes or conditions of employment—even if couched in terms that touch on broader issues—is not necessarily public concern.
3. Huggins v. School District of Manatee County, 151 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2025)
Huggins is cited only for the standard of review. It restates the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) principle that:
- the court reviews dismissals de novo;
- must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true; and
- must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
By citing Huggins, the panel signals that it is deciding the case on the pleadings, taking Friedman’s description of events as accurate, but finding them legally insufficient.
4. McAlpin v. Sneads, 61 F.4th 916 (11th Cir. 2023)
McAlpin provides the framework for retaliation claims under Florida’s Whistle-blower’s Act, Fla. Stat. § 112.3187. The Eleventh Circuit in McAlpin held that a public-employee whistleblower must show:
- That she engaged in statutorily protected expression;
- That she suffered an adverse employment action; and
- That there is a causal relation between the protected activity and the adverse action.
In Friedman, the panel again assumes without deciding that Friedman's speech was statutorily protected, and resolves the claim on the second element—adverse employment action—by finding no constructive discharge.
5. Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551 (11th Cir. 1997)
Poole is a key Eleventh Circuit case on constructive discharge. It holds that a constructive discharge occurs only when working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would feel compelled to resign. Mere dissatisfaction, criticism, or difficult working relationships are insufficient.
The Friedman panel quotes Poole for the core definition of constructive discharge and for the “reasonable person” standard.
6. Hipp v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001)
In Hipp, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that constructive discharge requires “pervasive conduct”—that is, conduct so persistent and severe that continued employment becomes objectively intolerable. The court has consistently emphasized that this is a stringent threshold.
The Friedman opinion cites Hipp to underscore that not every instance of harassment or tension in the workplace will suffice; the behavior must reach a level of pervasiveness and severity that effectively forces resignation.
B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning
1. First Amendment Claim: Defining “Matter of Public Concern”
The panel frames the First Amendment question under the familiar test: a public employee’s speech is protected only if she spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. The Town and Jacobs apparently disputed both prongs, but the court resolves the appeal by focusing on public concern.
The court notes that to “fall within the realm of public concern,” speech must relate to a “matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” and the determination is made by examining the “content, form, and context” of the speech, as spelled out in Alves. Because speech is rarely purely public or purely private, the court looks to the “main thrust” and the speaker’s motivation.
Applying this framework, the court characterizes Friedman’s speech as follows:
She responded to an inquiry from the mayor, spoke on behalf of “current and past employees who d[id] not have a voice [at the meeting],” and urged the commission to “put a stop” to Jacobs’s “toxic and abusive behavior,” including his attempt to intimidate and retaliate against her and other employees.
The panel acknowledges that Friedman also alluded to broader themes—improving professionalism, retaining good employees, and changing the Town’s reputation—which “touch upon public concern.” Nevertheless, drawing directly from Alves, it concludes that these broader concerns were not the “main thrust” of her remarks:
Although Friedman mentioned a need to “raise the level of professionalism” to “retain and keep good employees” and “change the reputation of [the] town,”—a matter that touches upon public concern—it was not the main thrust of her speech. Instead, she expressed an employee grievance, as she recounted internal personnel issues and urged the commission to investigate Jacobs for alleged misconduct.
The key move in the court’s reasoning is thus a characterization decision: it treats her statement more as an internal grievance about workplace mistreatment and retaliation than as public‑facing criticism of an elected official’s abuse of office or systemic misconduct.
The court does not engage in a separate analysis of whether speech about:
- sexual harassment by a public official’s friend, or
- retaliatory bullying by an elected commissioner
might independently qualify as matters of public concern. Instead, it aggregates the whole episode under the rubric of “internal personnel issues.”
This is very much in line with Alves, where the Eleventh Circuit has historically been skeptical of attempts to recast workplace-dispute speech as public‑concern speech simply because it touches on public institutions or public funds. In Friedman, the court extends that skepticism to HR-related whistleblowing about harassment and retaliation.
2. Florida Whistle-blower’s Act: No Adverse Employment Action
The court next addresses Friedman’s claim under Florida’s Whistle-blower’s Act. Under McAlpin, she had to plead:
- Protected expression;
- Adverse employment action; and
- A causal connection between the two.
The panel again assumes that her various complaints—including the commission‑meeting statement and reports to the Town manager—were statutorily protected disclosures of wrongdoing. It focuses instead on whether she alleged any adverse employment action.
Friedman argued that she had been “constructively discharged.” The court turns to Poole and Hipp for the standard:
- Working conditions must be “so intolerable that a reasonable person in her position would have been compelled to resign” (Poole); and
- Constructive discharge requires “pervasive conduct” (Hipp).
The panel highlights two temporal facts that undercut her claim of intolerable conditions:
- She complained to the Town manager about Jacobs’s bullying and intimidation on June 21, 2023, yet she continued working until August 2, 2023, when she tendered her resignation.
- Even after resigning, she worked an additional month, until her effective departure date of September 2, 2023.
These facts suggest that, while the workplace may have been unpleasant or tense, it was not so intolerable as to force an immediate departure. The court reasons that a truly compelled resignation is unlikely to be followed by a substantial delay in departure, especially where the employee continues working under the same alleged harasser.
Friedman proposed two alternative inferences:
- She gave extended notice in order to protect her professional reputation, consistent with the Town’s personnel handbook; and
- She reasonably believed that her resignation would end Jacobs’s retaliation.
The panel rejects these arguments, noting first that she did not raise them in the district court, and second that the factual allegations in her complaint do not support a finding of pervasive, intolerable conditions. In other words, the length of time she continued working, combined with the limited factual detail about concrete harm to her job duties, status, or pay, was insufficient as a matter of law to show constructive discharge.
Without a constructive discharge, Friedman could not show an adverse employment action, and therefore could not state a retaliation claim under the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act.
C. Impact and Future Implications
Although this opinion is unpublished and thus not binding precedent, it offers a clear window into how this Eleventh Circuit panel approaches two recurring issues: (1) public‑employee speech claims where the speech concerns internal misconduct, and (2) constructive discharge claims in whistleblower and retaliation cases.
1. Public Employee Speech: Narrowing the “Public Concern” Category for HR‑Related Whistleblowing
Friedman reinforces a narrow construction of “public concern” for speech that grows out of HR functions and internal personnel disputes. Several potential implications follow:
- HR complaints often framed as private grievances: Even when HR professionals speak in a public forum, such as a commission meeting, and even when their speech implicates misconduct by elected officials, if the main thrust focuses on internal staff treatment or employment conditions, courts may categorize the speech as a private grievance rather than public‑concern speech.
- Limited First Amendment shelter for internal ethics disputes: Public employees who report harassment, bullying, or retaliation by officials may find that, under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, these reports are treated as workplace disputes rather than contributions to public debate, limiting the availability of § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims.
- Importance of framing: The “main thrust” and the employee’s “motivation in speaking” are critical. Employees aiming to secure First Amendment protection might, as a matter of litigation strategy, need to emphasize broader institutional concerns—such as misuse of public office, risk of legal liability, or systemic corruption—rather than focusing primarily on the impact on their own job or on individual colleagues.
- Potential chilling effect: Knowing that courts may treat such speech as unprotected employee grievances could deter public employees, especially HR officials, from raising issues publicly, even where the alleged misconduct of elected officials is likely of genuine interest to the community.
2. Constructive Discharge in Whistleblower Litigation
On the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act side, Friedman underlines the already strict Eleventh Circuit standard for constructive discharge:
- Time between complaint and departure matters: Continued employment for weeks or months after the alleged onset of intolerable conditions weighs heavily against a finding that a reasonable person would have been “compelled to resign.” Plaintiffs must be prepared to explain such delays with concrete facts (not merely post‑hoc arguments).
- Pervasiveness and severity must be pled in detail: General allegations of “bullying,” “intimidation,” or “toxic” behavior will likely be insufficient at the pleading stage, especially in the face of contrary inferences from the plaintiff’s continued employment.
- Constructive discharge is a high bar: The opinion reinforces that constructive discharge is reserved for extreme situations—not just unpleasant workplaces, disagreements with management, or reputational harm.
For public employees bringing Florida whistleblower claims, this means:
- They may succeed more easily where they can plead explicit adverse actions (e.g., termination, demotion, pay cuts, significant changes in responsibilities) rather than relying solely on constructive discharge; and
- If alleging constructive discharge, they must present detailed factual allegations showing pervasive and severe mistreatment that would leave a reasonable employee no realistic choice but to resign.
3. Interaction with Local Civility Codes
The case also arises in the shadow of the Town’s civility code, which prohibits “public criticism of employees” and “personal attacks.” While the panel does not squarely address the constitutionality of such a code, the opinion indirectly suggests that the Town’s internal regulation of official behavior and criticism was the context for this dispute.
The decision thus highlights a tension: policies designed to maintain “civility” and protect employees from public criticism can, in practice, intersect with—and arguably chill—public‑employee speech about misconduct. Although the Eleventh Circuit does not analyze the code itself, future litigants may seek to challenge similar provisions where they constrain whistleblowing or public debate about official wrongdoing.
V. Complex Concepts Simplified
Several key legal concepts drive the outcome in Friedman. The following explanations are designed for readers without a specialized legal background.
1. “Matter of Public Concern”
In the public employment context, the First Amendment protects only some kinds of employee speech. Speech addresses a “matter of public concern” if it relates to issues that a reasonable member of the community would care about—such as:
- government corruption or misuse of public funds;
- discrimination by public officials;
- public safety, health, or welfare; or
- systemic policy failures.
If the main point of the speech is personal—e.g., a complaint about a supervisor, a dispute over discipline, or an individual employment grievance—courts often hold that it is not on a matter of public concern, even if it touches tangentially on broader issues.
2. “Employee Grievance” vs. Protected Speech
An “employee grievance” is essentially a workplace complaint: about pay, promotions, working conditions, or treatment by supervisors. The First Amendment does not automatically turn every such complaint into a constitutional claim for retaliation. If the dispute is primarily about the employee’s own job situation or that of close colleagues, courts often treat it as an employee grievance outside the scope of First Amendment protection.
3. Constructive Discharge
“Constructive discharge” is a legal doctrine that treats a resignation as if it were a firing. To claim constructive discharge, an employee must show:
- The working environment was so bad that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt forced to resign; and
- The employer was responsible for creating or allowing those conditions.
Bad treatment, criticism, or even harassment is not enough by itself. The conduct must be severe and pervasive—so much so that staying on the job is no longer a realistic option for an ordinary, reasonable employee.
4. Adverse Employment Action
In retaliation and discrimination cases, an “adverse employment action” is a significant negative change in employment, such as:
- Being fired or laid off;
- Being demoted or having salary or benefits reduced;
- Being reassigned to a significantly worse job or losing important responsibilities; or
- Being constructively discharged (in extreme cases).
In Friedman, because she was not formally fired, she needed to show constructive discharge to satisfy the “adverse employment action” requirement of her whistleblower claim.
5. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion asks the court to decide whether the complaint, assuming all its factual allegations are true, describes a legal claim for which the court can grant relief. The court:
- Accepts the alleged facts as true at this stage;
- Draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor; but
- Assesses whether, even accepting those facts, the law would allow the plaintiff to win.
In Friedman, the Eleventh Circuit assumed the facts as alleged—including Jacobs’s harsh words and alleged harassment—but concluded that, as a matter of law:
- her speech did not qualify as public‑concern speech under the First Amendment; and
- her working conditions did not amount to constructive discharge under the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act.
VI. Conclusion
Friedman v. Town of Pembroke Park does not break new doctrinal ground, but it provides a stark illustration of how the Eleventh Circuit applies existing principles to modern workplace whistleblowing in a public‑sector HR setting.
On the First Amendment side, the case underscores the circuit’s reliance on Alves and the “main thrust” test to classify employee speech. Even speech that touches on serious allegations—sexual harassment complaints and alleged retaliation by an elected official—can be deemed an “employee grievance” rather than speech on a matter of public concern, particularly where the focus is on internal personnel disputes.
On the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act side, Friedman reaffirms that constructive discharge is a high bar. A plaintiff who remains on the job for weeks or months after alleged retaliatory conduct, and continues to work even after submitting a resignation, will face a steep uphill battle to show that conditions were objectively intolerable and pervasive enough to force resignation.
Though unpublished, the opinion signals to public employees and their counsel that:
- Careful framing of speech—as addressing systemic, public‑facing concerns rather than internal grievances—will be crucial in First Amendment retaliation cases; and
- Detailed, fact‑specific allegations of severe, pervasive mistreatment will be necessary to convert a resignation into a constructive discharge in whistleblower litigation.
In the broader legal context, Friedman exemplifies a judiciary wary of transforming internal workplace disputes into constitutional or statutory retaliation claims absent clear, public‑oriented content and demonstrably intolerable conditions. For public employees contemplating whistleblowing, the decision highlights both the importance of parallel statutory remedies and the limitations of constitutional and constructive‑discharge theories within the Eleventh Circuit.
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