Interlocutory Orders and NRCP 54(b): Distinguishing Theories of Liability from Claims for Relief

Introduction

The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v. Peters, D.O., 88800 (Apr. 30 2025), addresses a jurisdictional question under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) (NRCP 54(b)): whether a district court may certify an interlocutory summary‐judgment order dismissing only a theory of vicarious liability as a “final judgment” on a separate claim. Vickie Rhea Richardson and Janice Gonzalez, as special co-administrators of the Estate of Homer Dale Richardson (collectively “Appellants”), appealed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Renown Health, Renown Regional Medical Center, Hometown Health Plan, and several individual physicians (collectively “Respondents”). The district court had certified the order as final under NRCP 54(b), despite pending negligence and negligent hiring claims. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the summary judgment did not dispose of a separate “claim for relief” and thus could not be certified under NRCP 54(b). This commentary explores the case background, the court’s reasoning, precedents cited, and the decision’s impact on Nevada practice.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Nevada held:

• The district court’s summary judgment dismissed only the theory of vicarious liability (ostensible agency) as applied to three Renown corporate respondents and two individual physicians (De Jonghe and Buehler).
• That order did not dispose of any separate “claim for relief” because it left intact the underlying professional negligence and negligent-supervision claims against all defendants.
• Under NRCP 54(b), a final judgment must dispose of a “claim” or a party; dismissing a theory or remedy does not suffice.
• Certification was therefore improper, and the Nevada Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal.
• The appeal was dismissed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court relied heavily on both Nevada and federal authority interpreting Rule 54(b) (on which NRCP 54(b) is modeled):

• Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Cherubini, 95 Nev. 293, 593 P.2d 1068 (1979): A district court must determine whether a complaint pleads more than one “claim for relief.”
• Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 2018): Federal interpretation of “claim” under Rule 54(b) shows it hinges on a set of facts giving rise to legal rights, not separate legal theories.
• CMAX, Inc. v. Drewry Photocolor Corp., 295 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1961): “Claim” means a factual grouping that supports legal rights, not the number of recovery theories.
• Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976): A single legal right, even if multiple remedies are sought, yields a single claim for relief.
• Hallicrafters Co. v. Moore, 102 Nev. 526, 728 P.2d 441 (1986): Multiple causes of action may constitute one claim when they arise from a single transaction or related transactions.
• Valley Bank of Nevada v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 874 P.2d 729 (1994): Finality is assessed by what an order actually does, not by its label.
• Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152 (1984): An interlocutory order that does not dispose of a claim or party cannot be certified as final under NRCP 54(b).

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in several stages:

1. Definition of “Claim for Relief”: Under NRCP 54(b), modeled on Rule 54(b), a “claim” is a set of facts giving rise to legal rights, not each separate theory or remedy based on those facts. Multiple legal theories can relate to a single claim for relief. (CMAX; Liberty Mutual.)
2. Complaint Structure: Although Appellants’ complaint pleaded five distinct causes of action (professional negligence, negligent hiring/training, vicarious liability theories), these arose from the same operative facts and primary right—alleged professional negligence. As such, they constitute one claim for relief for NRCP 54(b) purposes. (Mid-Century; Hallicrafters.)
3. Effect of the Summary Judgment: The district court dismissed only one theory (ostensible agency) of vicarious liability against three corporate respondents and two doctors. It did not resolve the substantive negligence claim or the negligent-supervision claims as to the other defendants. No party was completely dismissed.
4. NRCP 54(b) Requirements: For a valid certification, the order must dispose of a claim or a party, and the court must find no just reason for delay. Here, the order neither disposed of a distinct claim nor any party’s liability entirely. (Valley Bank; Taylor Constr.)
5. Jurisdictional Consequence: Absent a proper certification, the order remained interlocutory, depriving the Supreme Court of Nevada of appellate jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed.

3. Impact on Nevada Law

This decision clarifies the narrow scope of NRCP 54(b):

• District courts in Nevada cannot certify for immediate appeal an order that only dismisses a theory of liability (e.g., ostensible agency) while leaving the underlying claim and other related theories pending.
• Plaintiffs and defendants must differentiate between separate claims for relief and multiple legal theories or remedies arising from the same facts when seeking or opposing Rule 54(b) certification.
• Interlocutory appeals under NRCP 54(b) remain limited, reinforcing the policy against piecemeal appeals unless a full claim or party is finally resolved.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• NRCP 54(b): A rule that allows immediate appeal of a final decision on one or more—but fewer than all—claims or parties, only if the court certifies there is no just reason for delay.
• Interlocutory Order: Any order or decision by a trial court that does not dispose of all claims or parties in the case. Generally, such orders are not immediately appealable.
• Theory of Liability vs. Claim for Relief: A “theory” (e.g., ostensible agency) explains how a defendant might be held liable, whereas a “claim” is the underlying cause of action or legal right asserted (e.g., professional negligence). NRCP 54(b) focuses on the latter.
• Ostensible Agency: A form of vicarious liability where a party is held responsible for another’s acts because it held the agent out as authorized, and a third party reasonably relied on that holding out.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Nevada’s ruling in Richardson v. Peters reaffirms that Rule 54(b) certifications are reserved for genuine final judgments—those disposing of a complete claim or party. Dismissing a single theory of liability, without resolving the underlying claim or the remaining parties, is not enough to transform an interlocutory order into an appealable judgment. Practitioners should ensure that any Rule 54(b) certification in Nevada meets the strict requirement of finality as defined by both Nevada and federal precedent to avoid jurisdictional dismissals.