Interlocutory Appeals from Preliminary Injunctions Do Not Trigger Missouri Supreme Court Exclusive Jurisdiction Absent a Preserved Statute-Validity Ruling
1. Introduction
In Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. State (Mo. banc Aug. 12, 2025), the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed a jurisdictional question created by two developments: (1) Missouri voters’ November 2024 adoption of a new constitutional amendment protecting decisions “relating to reproductive healthcare” (Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 36.2), and (2) the legislature’s 2025 amendment to section 526.010.2 authorizing the attorney general to appeal certain preliminary injunctions that restrain enforcement of Missouri law.
After the amendment passed, Planned Parenthood sued the State and multiple state officials and agencies, seeking declaratory relief that numerous abortion-related statutes and regulations were unconstitutional and seeking to preliminarily enjoin enforcement pending final judgment. The circuit court entered a preliminary injunction (later expanded), this Court issued a peremptory writ requiring reevaluation under a stricter preliminary-injunction framework, and the circuit court then reissued substantially the same injunction. The State appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Missouri under section 526.010.2.
The threshold issue became: Does an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction “involve the validity of … a statute” such that the Supreme Court of Missouri has exclusive appellate jurisdiction under Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3?
2. Summary of the Opinion
The Court held that it lacked exclusive appellate jurisdiction because the appeal challenged only the circuit court’s issuance of preliminary injunctive relief, not a circuit-court adjudication that any statute was unconstitutional. Although Planned Parenthood’s underlying case squarely challenges statutory validity, the circuit court had not yet ruled on constitutional validity at the merits stage; therefore, no statute-validity claim had been “properly preserved” for purposes of triggering the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Because a statute cannot expand the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, and because this appeal did not present a preserved statute-validity issue, the Court transferred the appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 11.
3. Analysis
3.1. Precedents Cited
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Goodman v. Saline Cnty. Comm'n, 699 S.W.3d 437 (Mo. banc 2024)
Role in this opinion: This was the Court’s principal jurisdictional anchor. The opinion applies Goodman’s rule that exclusive jurisdiction under Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3 is not triggered merely because a case contains constitutional issues. Rather, a party must have: (i) properly raised a claim that a statute is unconstitutional, (ii) properly preserved it in circuit court (presented to and ruled on), and (iii) properly presented it on appeal. The Court used this framework to separate the underlying constitutional challenges (pending below) from the narrower interlocutory question (whether the preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion). -
Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 2 S.W.3d 798 (Mo. banc 1999)
Role in this opinion: Cited to reject the State’s implicit theory that section 526.010.2 can route appeals to the Supreme Court by virtue of the subject matter. Greenbriar is invoked for the constitutional principle that a statute cannot expand the Court’s constitutionally defined exclusive appellate jurisdiction. -
Bridegan v. Turntine, 689 S.W.3d 481 (Mo. banc 2023)
Role in this opinion: Reinforced the preservation requirement: once a constitutional validity claim is properly raised and preserved, then the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over that appeal. The key implication drawn here is temporal—exclusive jurisdiction attaches when there is an appeal presenting a preserved validity ruling, not when constitutional claims merely exist in the pleadings. -
Kan. City v. Graybar Elec. Co., 454 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 197 0)
Role in this opinion: Supports the proposition that jurisdiction does not shift to the Supreme Court unless the circuit court considered and ruled on the constitutional issue—i.e., preservation requires a ruling, not just an allegation. -
Sharp v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 138 S.W.3d 735 (Mo. App. 2003)
Role in this opinion: Cited consistently with Graybar to illustrate that preservation for exclusive-jurisdiction purposes requires presentation and a circuit-court ruling. -
Nat'l Historic Soul Jazz Blues Walker Found. v. AltCap, 681 S.W.3d 202 (Mo. App. 2023) (quoting Cook v. McElwain, 432 S.W.3d 286 (Mo. App. 2014))
Role in this opinion: Used to define the limited nature of preliminary injunctions: they preserve party positions pending trial; they are based on less formal procedures and incomplete evidence; and findings/conclusions at this stage are not binding at trial. This directly supports the Court’s conclusion that an interlocutory injunction appeal does not inherently “involve the validity” of statutes. -
Lackey v. Stinnie, 145 S. Ct. 659 (2025)
Role in this opinion: Supplies a modern caution against equating “likelihood of success” with actual success. The Court relied on Lackey to underscore that preliminary injunction determinations are not “tantamount” to merits decisions—reinforcing why statute validity is not being decided on this appeal. -
State ex rel. Director of Revenue v. Gabbert, 925 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. banc 1996) and
Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. CL Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981)
Role in this opinion (procedural background): These cases appear as context for the earlier extraordinary-writ phase, when the Supreme Court noted Gabbert’s reliance on Dataphase for preliminary-injunction standards. -
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D., v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008)
Role in this opinion (procedural background with doctrinal relevance): Rounds is the source of the more rigorous framework applied when a plaintiff seeks to preliminarily enjoin a duly enacted statute; it also is quoted for the proposition that the circuit court must make a threshold finding that the movant is likely to prevail on the merits. Importantly, the Court used Rounds both to frame what the circuit court did and to show why that exercise still falls short of an adjudication of statutory invalidity.
3.2. Legal Reasoning
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The Constitution fixes exclusive jurisdiction; statutes cannot enlarge it.
The Court began with the baseline that Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3 grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction only in “cases involving the validity” of Missouri statutes. Section 526.010.2 authorizes certain appeals by the attorney general but is silent on which appellate court hears them. The Court treated that silence as constitutionally significant: even if the legislature wanted to channel these appeals to the Supreme Court, it could not do so by ordinary legislation (Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue).
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“Involving validity” requires more than pending constitutional claims—it requires a preserved ruling and an appeal presenting it.
Applying Goodman v. Saline Cnty. Comm'n, the Court focused not on the underlying pleadings but on the claim at issue on appeal. Planned Parenthood’s petition challenges statutes as unconstitutional under the new reproductive-healthcare amendment, but the appeal before the Court challenged only the interlocutory decision to grant a preliminary injunction. Because the circuit court had not yet ruled on the merits of constitutionality, no statute-validity issue had been preserved (also citing Kan. City v. Graybar Elec. Co. and Sharp v. Curators of Univ. of Mo.).
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A preliminary injunction is not a decision on constitutionality.
The Court emphasized that preliminary injunctions serve to preserve positions pending trial and are made on an incomplete record. Even though the “likelihood of success on the merits” factor necessarily requires some preview of constitutional arguments, that preview is not an adjudication that statutes are invalid. The Court relied on Nat'l Historic Soul Jazz Blues Walker Found. v. AltCap (quoting Cook v. McElwain) and Lackey v. Stinnie to show why it would be doctrinally incorrect to treat preliminary relief as a decision resolving the underlying constitutional dispute.
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Transfer—not dismissal—is the remedy when exclusive jurisdiction is absent.
Because Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 11 instructs transfer to the proper appellate court when a case is filed in the wrong appellate forum, the Court transferred the appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, which has general jurisdiction over appeals outside Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.
3.3. Impact
- Clarifies routing of section 526.010.2 appeals. Even though section 526.010.2 authorizes the attorney general to appeal certain preliminary injunctions against enforcement of Missouri law, those appeals will not automatically land in the Supreme Court. Unless the appeal presents a preserved ruling on a statute’s constitutional validity, such appeals should proceed in the appropriate district of the Missouri Court of Appeals.
- Separates “statute enjoined” from “statute invalidated.” The opinion draws a firm doctrinal line: enjoining enforcement pending trial is not the same as adjudicating invalidity. This constrains strategic efforts to invoke the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction by pointing to the practical effect of an injunction rather than the legal content of the appealed ruling.
- Encourages disciplined preservation practice. Parties seeking Supreme Court review on validity grounds must ensure the circuit court actually rules on the constitutional challenge (and that it is properly presented on appeal). Without that procedural posture, the Supreme Court will treat the matter as outside its exclusive jurisdiction even if the litigation is constitution-heavy.
- Maintains constitutional separation of powers. By reiterating that jurisdiction is constitutionally fixed and not expandable by statute, the opinion reinforces structural limits on legislative attempts to reallocate appellate authority.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Preliminary injunction
- A temporary court order entered early in a case to maintain the status quo until the court can hold a full trial. It is based on an abbreviated record, and the court’s “likelihood of success” assessment is a forecast—not a final ruling.
- Exclusive appellate jurisdiction (Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3)
- Categories of appeals that only the Supreme Court of Missouri may decide. One category is cases “involving the validity” of Missouri statutes—but that requires an appeal presenting a preserved constitutional validity issue, not merely allegations that statutes are unconstitutional.
- Preservation
- A procedural requirement that an issue must be presented to the circuit court and actually ruled on to be reviewable in the posture that triggers certain jurisdictional rules. Here, constitutional validity was pleaded but not yet ruled on.
- Interlocutory appeal
- An appeal taken before the final judgment (here, from a preliminary injunction). Interlocutory review usually addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion, not whether the plaintiff ultimately wins on the merits.
- Writ of mandamus / prohibition (procedural backdrop)
- Extraordinary appellate tools used to correct certain trial-court errors before final judgment. The earlier writ phase required the circuit court to apply the correct preliminary-injunction framework, but it did not decide the merits of constitutionality.
5. Conclusion
This decision establishes a practical jurisdictional rule for Missouri appellate practice: an appeal from a preliminary injunction—even one that restrains enforcement of duly enacted statutes—does not “involve the validity” of those statutes for purposes of Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3 unless the circuit court has actually ruled on constitutional validity and that preserved validity ruling is what the appeal presents. Section 526.010.2 creates a right to appeal, but it does not (and cannot) expand the Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The result is procedural but consequential: many high-stakes preliminary-injunction appeals against the State will be decided first in the Missouri Court of Appeals unless and until a merits ruling on constitutional validity is entered and properly appealed.
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