Interdependency Requirement for Aggregating Noncontiguous Parcels Under Section 705 of the Eminent Domain Code

Introduction

In Pignetti, G. & J. h/w, Aplts. v. PennDOT, No. 26 & 27 EAP 2023 (Pa. Apr. 25, 2025), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether two noncontiguous parcels owned by appellants Gianni and Jennifer Pignetti could be valued as a single parcel under Section 705 of the Eminent Domain Code (26 Pa. C.S. § 705). The Commonwealth Court had reversed a trial-court order that treated the parcels jointly. The key issue was the meaning of the statutory phrase “used together for a unified purpose.” Justice Brobson, joined by Justices Donohue and McCaffery, dissented, arguing that aggregation requires actual interdependency between the parcels so that the taking of one adversely affects the value of the other.

Summary of the Judgment

The majority held that noncontiguous parcels need only be “used in furtherance of a shared enterprise” to qualify as a single parcel under § 705. It declined to import dictionary definitions or common-law principles beyond the plain words of the statute, reasoning that two tracts are “used together” whenever they are employed for the same end. Accordingly, it reversed the Commonwealth Court and remanded for valuation treating the two lots as one.

In dissent, Justice Brobson concluded that the phrase “used together for a unified purpose” is ambiguous. He invoked dictionary definitions and the 1964 Joint State Government Committee Comment to § 705, as well as pre-Code common-law cases, to show that “used together” must mean “used as an integrated whole”—i.e., there must be interdependency such that losing one parcel diminishes the value of the other. Finding no evidence of such interdependency in the Pignetti parcels, the dissent would have affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s reversal of the trial court.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Potts v. Pennsylvania & S. V. R. Co., 13 A. 291 (Pa. 1888): Earliest articulation that noncontiguous properties must be “so inseparably connected in the use to which they are applied” to be regarded as one in condemnation.
Kossler v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 57 A. 66 (Pa. 1904): Reinforced Potts by holding that noncontiguous tracts must be “inseparably connected” in use so that injury to one injures the other.
Morris v. Commonwealth, 80 A.2d 762 (Pa. 1951): Confirmed the common-law rule codified in § 705—that aggregation requires interconnectedness or mutual dependency.
H. C. Frick Coke Co. v. Painter, 48 A. 302 (Pa. 1901): Addressed contiguous tracts, but cited in the Joint State Government Committee Comment as part of the statutory history.
Truck Terminal Realty Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 403 A.2d 986 (Pa. 1979): Emphasized that statutes should be construed in light of antecedent case law unless the legislature clearly states otherwise.
Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2022): Authorizes consulting dictionary definitions to resolve statutory ambiguity.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Brobson’s dissent unfolded in three steps:

Identifying Ambiguity: The dissent noted that neither § 705 nor the Statutory Construction Act defines “used,” “together,” or “unified purpose.” While “used” plainly means “employed,” “together” admits at least two reasonable senses—(a) merely “in a group or simultaneously,” or (b) “as an integrated whole.” This makes the phrase ambiguous under A.S. v. Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2016).
Statutory Construction and Legislative History: Under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1939, the dissent consulted the 1964 Joint State Government Committee Comment to § 705, which expressly linked the statute to Morris and Frick Coke. Those cases required inseparability of use. Brobson invoked Truck Terminal and Everhart v. PMA Ins. Group, 938 A.2d 301 (Pa. 2007), to show that courts should not depart from established common law without clear legislative command.
Application to the Facts: The Pignettis offered testimony only that they used both lots for storage in support of their electrical business. They did not demonstrate that losing one lot would impair the value or utility of the other. Under the interdependency test, they failed to satisfy § 705.

Impact

If the Brobson dissent’s approach were adopted—either by a future majority or by other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutes—it would:

Elevate the evidentiary burden on condemnees seeking to aggregate noncontiguous parcels, requiring proof of economic or functional interdependence.
Limit broad “shared enterprise” theories of aggregation, especially in cases where parcels serve the same general purpose but operate independently (e.g., multiple parking lots, separate rental properties).
Encourage practitioners to develop detailed expert testimony demonstrating how each parcel enhances the value of the other, rather than relying on generalized statements of use.
Preserve pre-Code common-law principles in eminent-domain valuation unless the legislature clearly articulates a different rule in subsequent amendments to § 705.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Eminent Domain: The power of the government to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation.
Valuation under § 705: Allows a landowner to have multiple noncontiguous parcels treated as one for valuation if they are “used together for a unified purpose.”
Noncontiguous Parcels: Separate tracts of land not physically adjoining but owned by the same person or entity.
Interdependency: A relationship in which the existence or value of one parcel depends on the continued use or existence of the other.
Statutory Construction Act: A body of rules and canons that guide courts in interpreting ambiguous statutory language, including consulting legislative history and commentary.

Conclusion

The dissent in Pignetti v. PennDOT sharpens the standard for aggregating noncontiguous parcels under § 705 of the Eminent Domain Code. Rather than allowing any two parcels that serve a common enterprise to qualify, it insists on proof that the parcels function as an integrated whole—so that the deprivation of one necessarily diminishes the value of the other. This interpretation hews closer to pre-Code common law and promotes fairness in compensation by ensuring that aggregation is reserved for genuinely inseparable property interests. Future condemnations will turn on the depth of evidentiary showing of interdependency, shaping both expert testimony and litigation strategy in eminent-domain proceedings.