Intentional Tortfeasors Excluded from Contribution under Illinois Contribution Act: Gerill Corporation v. Hargrove Builders

Intentional Tortfeasors Excluded from Contribution under Illinois Contribution Act: Gerill Corporation v. Hargrove Builders

Introduction

The case of Gerill Corporation et al. v. Jack L. Hargrove Builders, Inc. et al. (128 Ill. 2d 179, Supreme Court of Illinois, 1989) addresses critical aspects of liability and contribution among joint tortfeasors under Illinois law. This comprehensive commentary explores the background, key legal issues, parties involved, and the court's ultimate decision, shedding light on the exclusion of intentional tortfeasors from seeking contribution under the Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Illinois delivered a pivotal judgment affirming that intentional tortfeasors are not entitled to contribution under the Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (Contribution Act). The case originated from a fraudulent misrepresentation by Jack L. Hargrove Builders, Inc. (Hargrove) to John F. Rosch, resulting in significant damages. Hargrove sought contribution from Gerill Corporation and its president, Gerald A. Heinz, invoking the Contribution Act. While the appellate court had previously reversed the lower court's dismissal of Hargrove's third-party complaint, holding that intentional tortfeasors could seek contribution, the Supreme Court overturned this aspect, reinstating the lower court's original stance that only non-intentional tortfeasors are eligible for contribution.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references several precedents to substantiate its ruling:

  • Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977): This case was instrumental in shaping the Contribution Act, particularly concerning the right of contribution among tortfeasors.
  • BRESLAND v. IDEAL ROLLER GRAPHICS CO. (1st Dist. 1986): Held that intentional tortfeasors are not entitled to contribution.
  • DOVIN v. WINFIELD TOWNSHIP (2d Dist. 1987): Contrary to Bresland, this case concluded that intentional tortfeasors do have a right to contribution.
  • PEOPLE v. BOYKIN (1983): Emphasized the importance of legislative intent in statutory interpretation.

The Supreme Court of Illinois leveraged these precedents to navigate the conflicting appellate decisions and to interpret the statutory nuances of the Contribution Act.

Legal Reasoning

The core legal issue revolved around interpreting the term "tort" within the Contribution Act. The statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 301 et seq., does not explicitly distinguish between intentional and non-intentional torts. The Supreme Court acknowledged the inherent ambiguity in the term "tort," citing authoritative sources like Prosser and Wigmore, which highlight the challenges in defining "tort" comprehensively.

To elucidate legislative intent, the Court delved into the legislative history, notably the discussions surrounding the Skinner case. While Skinner abolished the blanket no-contribution rule among tortfeasors, the Court noted that the General Assembly did not intend to extend this abolition to intentional torts. Statements from legislative debates emphasized addressing negligence-related contributions, aligning with the majority opinion in Skinner, and not supporting contributions from intentional tortfeasors.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the Contribution Act was designed to facilitate contributions among non-intentional tortfeasors, thereby excluding intentional tortfeasors from this right.

Impact

This judgment has profound implications for future litigation involving joint tortfeasors in Illinois:

  • Clarification of Contribution Rights: Establishes a clear boundary that intentional tortfeasors cannot seek contribution under the Contribution Act, thereby resolving previous appellate inconsistencies.
  • Litigation Strategy: Parties involved in tortious litigation can now better strategize regarding their potential claims for contribution, focusing on non-intentional torts.
  • Statutory Interpretation: Serves as a benchmark for how courts interpret ambiguous statutory terms by closely examining legislative intent and history.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (Contribution Act)

The Contribution Act allows multiple parties who are liable for the same injury or wrongful death to share the financial burden proportionally. This ensures that no single tortfeasor is unfairly overburdened with the entire liability.

Intentional vs. Non-Intentional Torts

Intentional Torts: Actions taken with the intent to cause harm or with knowledge that harm is likely to result. Examples include fraud, assault, and defamation.

Non-Intentional (Negligent) Torts: Actions resulting from carelessness or failure to act with reasonable care, leading to inadvertent harm. Examples include accidental injuries or property damage due to negligence.

Benefit-of-the-Bargain Rule

This legal principle determines damages in fraudulent misrepresentation cases by assessing the difference between the actual value of the property sold and its value had the representations been true. It essentially places the injured party in the position they would have been in had the misrepresentation not occurred.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Illinois' decision in Gerill Corporation et al. v. Jack L. Hargrove Builders, Inc. et al. serves as a definitive guide on the application of the Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act concerning intentional tortfeasors. By excluding intentional tortfeasors from the right of contribution, the court not only resolves previous appellate discrepancies but also reinforces the importance of legislative intent in statutory interpretation. This judgment fortifies the legal framework governing joint tortfeasor liabilities in Illinois, ensuring clarity and fairness in the distribution of financial responsibilities among parties with varying degrees of culpability.

Case Details

Year: 1989
Court: Supreme Court of Illinois.

Attorney(S)

Michael A. Braun and Ira N. Helfgot, of Chicago (Braun Rivkin, Ltd., of counsel), for appellants and cross-appellees. John T. McGarry, of Chicago, for appellee John F. Rosch, and John F. Rosch, of Glen Ellyn, pro se. Ross Hardies, of Chicago (Michael H. King, Alexander R. Domanskis and Joshua M. Levin, of counsel), for appellees and cross-appellants.

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