Intentional Tort Apportionment Limited under Civil Code section 1431.2: B.B. v. County of Los Angeles

Intentional Tort Apportionment Limited under Civil Code section 1431.2: B.B. v. County of Los Angeles

Introduction

In the landmark case B.B., a Minor, etc., Plaintiffs and Appellants v. County of Los Angeles et al., the Supreme Court of California deliberated on the applicability of Civil Code section 1431.2 to intentional tortfeasors. This case arose when Darren Burley, while restrained by deputies from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, was subjected to excessive force, leading to his untimely death. The central issue revolved around whether section 1431.2, which deals with the apportionment of non-economic damages based on comparative fault, could limit the liability of an officer who committed an intentional tort, namely battery.

Summary of the Judgment

The California Supreme Court held that Civil Code section 1431.2 does not permit intentional tortfeasors to reduce their liability for non-economic damages based on the negligence of others. In this case, Deputy David Aviles was found by a jury to have committed battery against Darren Burley, contributing 20% to the circumstances leading to Burley's death. Contrary to the trial court's judgment, which allocated 100% of the non-economic damages to Aviles, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, affirming that section 1431.2 mandates proportional liability based on the percentage of fault. Consequently, intentional tortfeasors like Aviles cannot escape partial liability through the negligence of other parties.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court extensively analyzed prior case law to elucidate the boundaries of section 1431.2. Key precedents include:

These cases collectively establish that while section 1431.2 facilitates the apportionment of liability among negligent parties, it does not extend this flexibility to those committing intentional wrongs.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's analysis hinged on the interpretation of the statutory language within section 1431.2. The pivotal phrase, "based upon principles of comparative fault," was scrutinized to determine its applicability to intentional torts. The Court concluded that intentional torts, such as battery, fall outside the purview of comparative fault apportionment as envisaged by section 1431.2. This interpretation aligns with established legal doctrine that differentiates between negligent and intentional misconduct, maintaining that last exempts intentional tortfeasors from the comparative fault reductions that apply to negligence-based claims.

Furthermore, the Court dismissed arguments asserting that the absence of explicit exclusion for intentional torts in the statute implied their inclusion. By referencing legislative history and the consistent treatment of intentional torts in prior jurisprudence, the Court reinforced the principle that intentional misconduct remains fully liable for non-economic damages without recourse to comparative fault apportionment.

Impact

This judgment sets a clear precedent in California law by affirming that Civil Code section 1431.2 does not allow intentional tortfeasors to offset liability based on others' negligence. This has significant implications for future cases involving police misconduct and other intentional wrongs, ensuring that individuals committing such acts remain fully accountable for non-economic damages without being able to dilute their responsibility through comparative fault.

Additionally, this decision upholds the integrity of the comparative fault system by delineating its limits, thereby preventing the erosion of accountability in cases of intentional misconduct. It also serves as a deterrent against excessive use of force by law enforcement, reinforcing legal standards that protect individuals from state-sanctioned violence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Civil Code section 1431.2

This section deals with the allocation of non-economic damages (like pain and suffering) in personal injury or wrongful death cases. It mandates that each defendant's liability is determined based on their percentage of fault, preventing joint liability where each party is only responsible for their specific contribution to the harm.

Comparative Fault

A legal doctrine that assigns a percentage of fault to each party involved in causing an injury. Damages are then apportioned according to each party's degree of responsibility.

Intentional Tort

A wrongful act done deliberately, with intent to cause harm to another person. Examples include battery, assault, and defamation.

Battery

An intentional tort that involves harmful or offensive physical contact with another person without their consent.

Conclusion

The California Supreme Court's ruling in B.B. v. County of Los Angeles firmly establishes that Civil Code section 1431.2 does not extend to intentional tortfeasors. This decision reinforces the principle that individuals who commit deliberate wrongdoing cannot evade full responsibility for non-economic damages through the comparative fault doctrine. By maintaining this boundary, the Court ensures that accountability remains intact, particularly in cases involving law enforcement and other scenarios where state actors may engage in intentional misconduct.

This judgment not only provides clarity on the limitations of section 1431.2 but also fortifies the legal framework protecting individuals from excessive use of force and other intentional harms. It serves as a crucial reference point for future litigation, ensuring that victims of intentional torts receive just compensation without the complicating factor of fault apportionment diluting the accountability of the wrongdoer.

Case Details

Year: 2020
Court: SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

Judge(s)

Ming W. Chin

Attorney(S)

Pine Tillet Pine, Norman Pine, Sherman Oaks, Stacy Freeman, Scott Tillett,Sherman Oaks, Chaya M. Citrin; The Sweeney Firm and John E. Sweeney, Simi Valley, for Plaintiffs and Appellants B.B. and B.B. Schonbrun Seplow Harris & Hoffman, Michael D. Seplow, Paul L. Hoffman, Aidan C. McGlaze, John Washington, Los Angeles; Orange Law Offices, Olu Orange, Los Angeles; Antablin & Bruce, Drew Antablin ; Douglas / Hicks Law, Carl E. Douglas, Beverly Hills, and Jamon Hicks for Plaintiff and Appellant T.E. and for Plaintiffs and Respondents. O'Melveny & Myers, Sabrina Heron Strong, Dimitri D. Portnoi, Jefferson J. Harwell, Los Angeles; Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Eugene P. Ramirez, Louis W. Pappas, Steven J. Renick, Julie M. Fleming and Angela M. Powell, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Appellants. Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for The Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Cole Huber and Derek P. Cole, Roseville, for League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Polsinelli, David K. Schultz, J. Alan Warfield, Los Angeles; Mansukhani, Don Willenburg and Gordon Rees Scully for the Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and Association of Defense Counsel of Northern California and Nevada as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Mark A. Behrens, Cary Silverman, and Patrick Gregory, San Francisco, for Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Cole Pedroza, Curtis A. Cole, Fresno, Cassidy C. Davenport, San Marino, and Bethany J. Peak for California Medical Association, California Dental Association and California Hospital Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. Kazan, McClain, Satterly & Greenwood and Ted W. Pelletier, Oakland, for Michael and Cindy Burch as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

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