Intent, Specificity, and Executive Sessions: The Washington Supreme Court Tightens Recall Standards for Alleged OPMA Violations in In re Recall of Olsen

I. Introduction

The Washington Supreme Court’s en banc decision in In re Petition for Recall of Commissioner Lisa Olsen, No. 104087-3 (Dec. 4, 2025), sits at the intersection of two significant strands of Washington public law:

the constitutional and statutory framework governing recall of elected officials, and
the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), particularly the executive-session exception for attorney–client communications in RCW 42.30.110(1)(i).

The case arises from intense local controversy in Pacific County over the management of the county jail after two in-custody deaths (in 2022 and 2024) and the county commissioners’ later decision to remove the jail from the sheriff’s control by creating a new “jail services department.” In that charged environment, voter Irving Edersheim filed a recall petition against County Commissioner Lisa Olsen, asserting:

Charge 1: “Explicit” violations of the OPMA by holding executive sessions under RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) to discuss “litigation or potential litigation” without legal counsel present on several specified dates in 2024.
Charge 2: “Implicit” violations of the OPMA by allegedly pre-deciding the jail issue outside public view, disregarding public input, and misrepresenting at a December 26, 2024 public meeting that the decision had not been made in advance—supposedly evidenced by prewritten statements and document metadata.

The superior court found both charges factually and legally sufficient and allowed the recall process to proceed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that both charges are factually and legally insufficient and thereby terminating the recall effort at the gatekeeping stage.

At its core, the opinion reinforces a strict, two-layered filter for recall petitions:

Factual sufficiency: detailed, non-speculative facts, supported by some demonstrable knowledge, that would make out a prima facie case of misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of oath; and
Legal sufficiency: a clear articulation of how those facts violate a specific law, standard, or rule and rise to the statutory recall threshold—particularly requiring an intentional violation where illegality is alleged.

The decision is especially important for recall efforts premised on alleged OPMA violations: it clarifies that technical or debatable open-meetings irregularities do not automatically translate into recallable misconduct, and that petitioners must show more than procedural missteps—they must show intent and specify the precise legal norms allegedly breached.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court, per Justice Whitener, framed its task within Washington’s longstanding doctrine that courts act as gatekeepers in recall proceedings, ensuring the process is not weaponized to harass officials with “frivolous or unsubstantiated charges.” The Court:

Reiterated that it does not assess whether recall allegations are true—that is for the voters—but assumes the factual allegations are true for purposes of the sufficiency analysis.
Reviewed the legal and factual sufficiency of the petition de novo.

After laying out the recall framework in RCW 29A.56.110 and related case law, the Court addressed each charge:

A. Charge 1 – Alleged explicit OPMA violations (RCW 42.30.110(1)(i))

Charge 1 alleged that Commissioner Olsen violated the OPMA by participating in executive sessions held “to discuss litigation or potential litigation” under RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) on:

June 11, 2024
June 25, 2024
October 8, 2024
October 22, 2024
October 31, 2024

The theory was that legal counsel was not present for these closed sessions, making the use of the attorney–client privilege exception improper and thus violating the OPMA. The petition relied largely on the county’s meeting minutes to infer who attended and which statutory exception was invoked, supplemented by:

Olsen’s OPMA training certificate and training materials, and
her prewritten statements for the December 26, 2024 meeting.

The Court parsed Charge 1 date-by-date:

October 8, 2024: The minutes expressly listed legal counsel, Michael Rothman, as present. Because this directly contradicted the allegation that counsel was absent, the minutes could not support the petitioner’s claimed knowledge of an OPMA violation. Factual and legal insufficiency resulted.
October 22, 2024: The minutes again showed counsel present. The petitioner asserted that an audio recording revealed counsel left the meeting (“going to have to step out”), but he did not submit that recording with the petition. Without that evidence, there was no adequate factual basis. Again, factual and legal insufficiency.
June 11, June 25, October 31, 2024: The minutes identified these sessions as addressing “litigation or potential litigation” and did not list counsel as attending, while listing Olsen as present. The Court accepted that the minutes gave adequate detail on date, location, and nature of the sessions, but held that mere attendance at such meetings, even if they were improperly closed, does not by itself establish misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of oath. Crucially, the petitioner failed to allege facts showing that Olsen intended to violate the OPMA, as required for recall when an illegality is alleged. Training materials alone did not bridge that gap.

Thus, Charge 1 failed both factual and legal sufficiency tests as to all dates.

B. Charge 2 – Alleged “implicit” OPMA violations and misrepresentation

Charge 2 asserted that Olsen and the Board:

held private (non-public) meetings about removing the jail from the sheriff’s control,
limited or disregarded public input, and
falsely claimed at the December 26, 2024 public meeting that the decision had not been made in advance, despite using prewritten statements whose metadata showed they were created or modified before the meeting.

The petitioner characterized these as “implicit violations of the OPMA” that undermined “public deliberation and transparency.” The petition attached:

prewritten statements by Commissioner Olsen and Commissioner Tobin, and
a memo from Olsen to “Pacific County Jail Employees,”

together with screenshots of Microsoft Word metadata.

The Court held:

Factual insufficiency: The petition did not identify any specific private meetings—no approximate dates, locations, or descriptions of what occurred. Inferring secret meetings purely from (a) metadata showing documents were drafted before a public meeting and (b) the lack of prior agenda items was too speculative.
Legal insufficiency: The petitioner did not identify any particular OPMA provision or other law, rule, or standard allegedly violated. The broad reference to “implicit violations of the OPMA” failed to meet the requirement that recall charges specify how the challenged conduct amounts to misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of oath as defined by statute.

Because both charges failed, the Court reversed the superior court and blocked the recall from proceeding.

III. Legal Framework: Recall and the OPMA

A. Constitutional and statutory basis for recall

Under article I, section 33 of the Washington Constitution and RCW 29A.56.110, all elected officials except judges are subject to recall for:

Misfeasance in office;
Malfeasance in office; or
Violation of the oath of office.

RCW 29A.56.110 defines these terms:

Misfeasance / Malfeasance (general definition): “any wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts, or interferes with the performance of official duty.”
Misfeasance (specific): “the performance of a duty in an improper manner.”
Malfeasance (specific): “the commission of an unlawful act.”
Violation of the oath of office: a neglect or knowing failure to perform faithfully a duty imposed by law.

A recall petition must:

state the acts complained of in concise language,
give a detailed description, including approximate date, location, and nature of each act, and
be supported by the petitioner’s knowledge of the facts underlying the stated grounds, based on more than mere belief.

B. Factual and legal sufficiency

The Court reiterated the now-canonical two-pronged sufficiency test:

Factual sufficiency (from Chandler v. Otto, Wasson, Boldt, Durkan):
Alleged facts, taken as a whole and accepted as true, must:
- identify acts or failures to act that, without justification, would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of oath, and
- be described with sufficient detail (date, place, nature) to give both the official and the electorate meaningful notice of what is being alleged.
Legal sufficiency (from Chandler, Pearsall-Stipek, Boldt, Ackerson):
The petition must:
- identify the specific law, rule, or standard allegedly violated, and
- show that the challenged conduct, if true, clearly amounts to misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of oath.
- Where the alleged misconduct stems from the exercise of official discretion, show that the discretion was exercised in a manifestly unreasonable manner.

When the charge asserts the official violated the law, the Court again emphasized (citing Inslee and Wade) that the facts must show the official intended to do so.

C. The OPMA and executive sessions under RCW 42.30.110(1)(i)

The OPMA generally requires that the meetings of governing bodies be open to the public. RCW 42.30.110 creates specific exceptions allowing “executive sessions” (closed meetings) for certain topics. RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) allows a governing body to hold a closed session:

“[t]o discuss with legal counsel … litigation or potential litigation”

when public disclosure of the discussion is likely to result in adverse legal or financial consequences to the agency. Drawing on In re Recall of Lakewood City Council Members, 144 Wn.2d 583, 30 P.3d 474 (2001), the Court reiterated the three conditions for this particular OPMA exception:

the body must be discussing with legal counsel,
the topic must be actual or potential litigation, and
public knowledge of the discussion is likely to cause adverse legal or financial consequences to the agency.

Critically, the opinion reaffirms that the presence of legal counsel is necessary for this exception to apply—no lawyer, no attorney–client privilege executive session.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Charge 1: Alleged explicit OPMA violations in executive sessions

1. The evidentiary basis: meeting minutes, training materials, and statements

For all five 2024 dates, the petitioner relied heavily on the official meeting minutes to establish:

that an executive session occurred,
that it was purportedly held under RCW 42.30.110(1)(i), and
who attended (including whether legal counsel was listed).

The Court accepted that the minutes can be a proper basis for the petitioner’s knowledge even if the petitioner did not personally attend the executive sessions, consistent with Lee and Reed, which allow reliance on secondhand sources so long as knowledge rises above mere belief.

To bolster the claim of an intentional violation, the petitioner submitted:

Olsen’s OPMA training certificate and Attorney General’s OPMA PowerPoint, and
Olsen’s prewritten statements given at the December 26, 2024 meeting.

The theory was that these materials showed Olsen knew the legal requirements for executive sessions, yet allegedly disregarded them by attending .110(1)(i) sessions without counsel present.

2. October 8, 2024 – contradiction between minutes and allegations

For October 8, the minutes explicitly recorded that legal counsel, Michael Rothman, attended the executive session. The recall petition, by contrast, described the session as held without legal counsel.

This direct contradiction was fatal. Because the petitioner’s claimed knowledge of an OPMA violation rested entirely on minutes that actually refuted his allegation, the Court found no prima facie factual basis to support the charge for that date.

In essence, the Court held that:

While a petitioner may rely on minutes as evidence of what happened,
he cannot claim “knowledge” of a fact (counsel’s absence) when his only evidence affirmatively says the opposite.

Accordingly, the allegation for October 8 was both factually and legally insufficient.

3. October 22, 2024 – missing audio recording

For October 22, the minutes also listed counsel Rothman as present. The petitioner attempted to get around this by alleging that an audio recording showed Rothman publicly stating he had to “step out” due to a scheduling conflict.

But the petitioner did not provide that recording as part of the recall petition. The Court emphasized that in DeBruyn it had found factual insufficiency where no minutes, recording, or statements were provided to support allegations about an executive session. Similarly here, the absence of the recording meant:

there was no competent material in the record to support the petitioner’s assertions about what actually occurred, and
the minutes themselves continued to show counsel as an attendee.

With the only submitted evidence again contradicting rather than supporting the allegation, the petition failed to establish a prima facie case or legally cognizable misconduct for October 22.

4. June 11, June 25, and October 31, 2024 – adequacy of detail but failure of intent

For these three dates, the minutes:

identified the sessions as being held to discuss “litigation or potential litigation,”
listed Olsen as present,
did not list legal counsel in the attendees, and
recorded the start and end times and whether subsequent action was anticipated.

The Court held that these minutes did indeed provide a detailed description of each alleged incident (date, location, nature)—satisfying that aspect of factual sufficiency under Wasson and Chandler.

However, the petition still failed on a more fundamental factual element: intent to violate the law. Relying on Anderson, Inslee, and Estey, the Court reaffirmed:

“[I]n a recall case, recall petitioners should at least have knowledge of facts which indicate an intent to commit an unlawful act.”

The record showed only that:

Olsen attended OPMA training and thus knew the general requirements of RCW 42.30.110(1)(i); and
on three dates, the minutes do not list counsel as present at sessions identified as addressing litigation or potential litigation.

From this, the petitioner asked the Court to infer that Olsen knowingly and intentionally violated the OPMA. The Court refused, reasoning that:

Attendance at meetings does not, by itself, show the official directed or knowingly condoned a violation.
Errors or omissions in minutes or misunderstanding of the procedural requirements for invoking RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) might support an OPMA enforcement action, but not necessarily a recall-level accusation of misfeasance/malfeasance.
Training materials prove knowledge of law in the abstract, not intent to violate it in specific instances.

Key language underscores this distinction:

“The mere fact that Commissioner Olsen attended meetings under subsection .110(1)(i) privileges without legal counsel does not constitute malfeasance, misfeasance, or violation of her oath of office.”

And, on Lakewood:

“Lakewood held only that certain requirements must be met in order for the attorney-client privilege exception to apply. Lakewood did not address whether a governing body member’s mere attendance in a meeting under the attorney-client privilege exception without legal counsel present amounts to malfeasance, misfeasance, or violation of oath of office.”

Thus, even assuming the sessions did not validly fall under RCW 42.30.110(1)(i), that would establish at most a technical OPMA problem, not the kind of intentional misconduct necessary for recall.

For these reasons, Charge 1 was held factually and legally insufficient as to all five meetings.

B. Charge 2: Alleged “implicit” OPMA violations and misrepresentation concerning jail control

1. The petitioner’s theory

Charge 2 alleged that Olsen:

intentionally disregarded public input regarding the removal of the jail from sheriff control, and
misrepresented the decision-making process by claiming no pre-decision had been made, while in fact prewriting statements and a resolution beforehand.

To support this, the petitioner cited:

Olsen’s statement at the December 26 meeting that some matters are “not, nor should not be for public consumption.”
Commissioner Tobin’s statement that “we have been talking about this for months” despite the public’s sense the decision was “fast-tracked.”
Metadata showing that Olsen’s and Tobin’s statements, as well as the resolution creating the jail services department, were created or last modified before the public meeting date.
The absence of prior meeting minutes listing “Pacific County Jail Services” as an agenda item, which he argued implied undisclosed discussions had taken place.

He characterized this conduct as a series of “implicit violations of the OPMA” undermining openness and public deliberation.

2. Factual insufficiency – lack of date, place, and nature

RCW 29A.56.110 and cases like Wasson and Pepper require that each recall charge “give a detailed description including the approximate date, location, and nature of each act complained of.”

Charge 2 failed this threshold in several ways:

It alleged that “private meetings” occurred, but did not identify a single specific meeting—no date, no time, no location.
The inference that “there must have been” at least one non-public meeting about the jail issue, based solely on lack of public agenda items and prewritten remarks, is speculative rather than based on concrete knowledge.
The metadata, even if accurate, shows only that documents existed or were drafted before December 26; it does not reveal what discussions occurred, who participated, or whether any illegal meeting under OPMA occurred.

The Court concluded that Charge 2 lacked the “requisite detail and precision necessary to determine the nature of the act complained of,” and thus was factually insufficient.

3. Legal insufficiency – no identified law, rule, or standard

Legally, the Court invoked Teaford v. Howard and Ackerson to emphasize that a recall charge must:

explain why the alleged acts, if true, amount to misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of oath, and
identify the specific “standard, law, or rule that would make the officer’s conduct wrongful, improper, or unlawful.”

Charge 2 simply labeled the conduct “implicit violations of the OPMA” without:

citing any specific statutory provision of the OPMA (e.g., RCW 42.30.030, 42.30.060, etc.),
pointing to any binding case law defining such “implicit” violations, or
articulating how drafting statements in advance or discussing policy options outside of a noticed public meeting, in and of itself, violated the Act.

The Court explicitly noted that the OPMA does not recognize “implicit violations” in the manner alleged. Without a well-pleaded legal theory—and without tying the alleged conduct to specific OPMA provisions or recall standards—Charge 2 was legally insufficient.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is deeply rooted in, and largely consistent with, Washington’s preexisting recall jurisprudence and open-meetings case law. Key precedents include:

A. Gatekeeping and the purpose of recall

In re Recall of Riddle, 189 Wn.2d 565 (2017); In re Recall of West, 155 Wn.2d 659 (2005)
These cases articulate the recall process as a mechanism to remove officials for serious misconduct, not to referee political disagreements. They stress the courts’ “gatekeeper” role in filtering out frivolous or harassing recall efforts. Olsen uses these principles to justify a strict sufficiency review.
In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787 (2003); Cole v. Webster, 103 Wn.2d 280 (1984)
The Court reaffirms that in recall proceedings, courts do not decide whether the charges are true; they assume the facts as alleged, focusing solely on sufficiency. Olsen follows that template, scrutinizing the adequacy of the petition’s factual detail and legal theory while not weighing credibility.
In re Recall of Durkan, 196 Wn.2d 652 (2020); In re Recall of Boldt, 187 Wn.2d 542 (2017)
These cases confirm that sufficiency is reviewed de novo and that factual allegations are taken as true for that inquiry. Olsen applies the same approach.

B. Factual sufficiency, knowledge, and the need for detail

Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wn.2d 268 (1984)
Chandler provides the foundational test: recall charges must be detailed and supported by petitioner’s knowledge of underlying facts. Olsen explicitly invokes Chandler’s requirement of detailed “approximate date, location, and nature of each act.”
In re Recall of Reed, 156 Wn.2d 53 (2005); In re Recall of Lee, 122 Wn.2d 613 (1993)
These cases clarify that a petitioner’s knowledge need not be firsthand, but must be more than a bare belief. Olsen uses this to accept that meeting minutes can supply sufficient knowledge—yet also to reject knowledge claims where minutes and allegations conflict.
In re Recall of DeBruyn, 112 Wn.2d 924 (1989)
DeBruyn found factual insufficiency where no minutes or recordings were provided to show what occurred in a five-minute executive session. Olsen analogizes: the failure to provide an audio recording allegedly showing counsel’s early departure on October 22 is similarly fatal.
In re Recall of Pepper, 189 Wn.2d 546 (2017)
Pepper stresses that a charge must give meaningful notice of “the particular conduct challenged and why it is grounds for recall.” Olsen applies Pepper in holding that Charge 2’s vague allusions to private meetings are inadequate.

C. Legal sufficiency: intent, discretionary acts, and justifications

In re Recall of Inslee, 194 Wn.2d 563 (2019); In re Recall of Wade, 115 Wn.2d 544 (1990)
Inslee and Wade hold that where a recall charge alleges unlawful conduct, the facts must show an intent to violate the law. Olsen heavily relies on this principle to reject Charge 1, concluding that training materials showing knowledge of OPMA are not enough to show intent to violate it.
In re Recall of Bolt, 177 Wn.2d 168 (2013); Pearsall-Stipek decisions, 136 Wn.2d 255 (1998) & 141 Wn.2d 756 (2000)
These cases define the “manifestly unreasonable” standard for discretionary acts and clarify that a legally cognizable justification for an official’s conduct defeats recall. Olsen does not involve an explicit “discretionary act” defense but implicitly follows the same logic: even if there were procedural OPMA issues, they do not automatically translate into recallable misconduct absent clear wrongful intent.
Teaford v. Howard, 104 Wn.2d 580 (1985); In re Recall of Ackerson, 143 Wn.2d 366 (2001)
Teaford and Ackerson require that recall charges specify which law or standard is violated and explain why the alleged acts meet the statutory recall definitions. Olsen deploys these cases to hold that the nebulous assertion of “implicit OPMA violations” in Charge 2 is legally insufficient.
In re Recall of Anderson, 131 Wn.2d 92 (1997); Estey v. Dempsey, 104 Wn.2d 597 (1985); In re Recall of Telford, 166 Wn.2d 148 (2009); In re Recall of Carkeek, 156 Wn.2d 469 (2006)
These cases collectively stress the necessity of factual allegations indicating an intent to commit an unlawful act, and caution against basing recall purely on inference without sufficient specificity. Olsen explicitly cites Estey and Anderson to reject the inference that training certifications alone show intent to violate the OPMA.

D. OPMA-specific precedent: Lakewood

In re Recall of Lakewood City Council Members, 144 Wn.2d 583 (2001)
Lakewood is the central OPMA precedent cited. It:
- interprets the attorney–client executive-session exception in RCW 42.30.110(1)(i),
- establishes the three-part test for its proper use, and
- underscores that counsel must be present for the exception to apply.
Olsen accepts Lakewood’s interpretation but carefully limits its implications: Lakewood governs when an executive session is valid under OPMA; it does not say that any deviation automatically satisfies the high bar for recall. That gap—between OPMA enforceability and recallability—is central to the decision.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For recall practice in Washington

In re Recall of Olsen strengthens existing doctrine in several ways that will matter in future recall efforts:

High bar for OPMA-based recall: Petitioners must do more than show a plausible OPMA violation; they must allege:
- specific dates, locations, and actions,
- a clearly identified statutory provision or case-based standard, and
- facts indicating that the official intended to violate that law.
No shortcut from technical irregularity to recall: An executive session that may exceed the scope of RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) is not automatically recallable misconduct. It might support a civil OPMA action (e.g., to void decisions, seek penalties, or obtain injunctive relief), but recall requires wrongful intent and impact on official duties.
Evidence quality matters: Petitioners must attach key evidentiary materials they rely on—especially recordings or documents that contradict official minutes. Omissions, as with the missing October 22 audio, will be held against sufficiency.
Limits on inferential accusations: The Court is wary of allegations that rest on inferences from circumstantial facts (like metadata) without concrete evidence of unlawful meetings. This will likely discourage speculative recall efforts built on generalized suspicion of backroom dealings.

B. For OPMA compliance and executive sessions

Although this is a recall case, it contains important messages for public agencies:

Counsel’s presence is mandatory to invoke RCW 42.30.110(1)(i): The Court reaffirms that the attorney–client executive-session exception requires counsel’s presence. Executive sessions about “litigation or potential litigation” without counsel risk being outside the exception and, thus, illegal under the OPMA.
Accuracy of minutes: While minutes may be prepared in advance and amended later, inaccuracies (particularly about attendance) can create a record that petitioners will use. Agencies should:
- ensure that minutes accurately reflect who attended executive sessions, and
- promptly correct any discrepancies.
Separation of remedies: The opinion implicitly channels OPMA enforcement into its proper legal avenues—civil suits, attorney general actions, or other compliance mechanisms—rather than recall.

C. For local governance, public participation, and activism

The decision has both constraining and clarifying effects for citizen-led oversight:

Recall is not a general-purpose accountability tool: Even controversial policy decisions—such as removing a jail from sheriff control after inmate deaths—are not recallable merely because the process feels rushed or opaque to constituents.
Activists must build robust factual records: Before filing a recall, petitioners should:
- gather documents, recordings, and other verifiable evidence,
- tie allegations to specific statutes or case law, and
- demonstrate intent where illegality is claimed.
Metadata and prewritten statements are not enough: Drafting remarks or resolutions in advance—even on controversial topics—does not, without more, establish illegal private decision-making under the OPMA. Activists should recognize that strategy and preparation are not synonymous with unlawful secret meetings.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Misfeasance, malfeasance, and violation of oath

Misfeasance: Doing your official job, but doing it in the wrong way. Example: properly holding a vote, but deliberately ignoring a legal requirement about notice.
Malfeasance: Doing something you have no legal right to do at all. Example: signing a contract you are legally barred from signing.
Violation of oath: Knowingly failing to follow the law or your legal duties after swearing to uphold them.

B. Factual vs. legal sufficiency in recall petitions

Factual sufficiency asks: “If we assume these facts are true, are they detailed and concrete enough to describe real events that could amount to misconduct?” It focuses on:
- specific dates and places,
- who did what, and
- whether the petitioner has some evidentiary basis for those claims.
Legal sufficiency asks: “If these detailed facts are true, do they violate a particular legal standard in a way that meets the definition of misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of oath?” It focuses on:
- what laws or rules apply, and
- whether the described conduct clearly breaks them in a serious way.

C. Prima facie case

A prima facie case means that, based solely on the allegations and supporting materials, there is enough evidence that—if unchallenged—would justify a finding of misconduct. It does not mean the allegations are proven beyond dispute; it means they are sufficiently plausible and supported to warrant moving ahead to the voters.

D. Executive sessions and RCW 42.30.110(1)(i)

An “executive session” is a portion of a meeting that the public is not allowed to attend, authorized only in narrow circumstances under the OPMA. Under RCW 42.30.110(1)(i), a body can meet privately:

to discuss with their lawyer,
about lawsuits or likely lawsuits,
when public disclosure is likely to harm the government’s legal or financial position.

If those conditions are not met—especially if no lawyer is present—the session may be illegal under the OPMA.

E. Metadata

“Metadata” is data about data. In a Microsoft Word document, metadata can show:

when the file was created,
when it was last edited, and by whom.

In this case, the petitioner used metadata to argue that speeches and resolutions must have been drafted before the public meeting, suggesting pre-deciding the issue outside public view. The Court found that while metadata showed timing of drafting, it did not, by itself, prove that any illegal meeting occurred.

VIII. Conclusion

In re Recall of Olsen is a significant reaffirmation and refinement of Washington’s recall jurisprudence, particularly in the context of alleged OPMA violations.

The decision underscores that:

Recall is reserved for clear, intentional misconduct—not for disagreements over policy speed, tone, or perceived lack of transparency.
Petitions must meet stringent factual and legal standards: specific dates, places, and acts; a concrete evidentiary basis; and a clearly articulated legal theory linked to statutory recall definitions.
Allegations of unlawfulness—especially under complex statutes like the OPMA—require allegations of intent, not mere technical noncompliance.
The OPMA’s attorney–client executive-session exception remains narrow and counsel-dependent, but not every possible OPMA misstep is recallable misconduct.

By reversing the superior court and dismissing the recall effort against Commissioner Olsen, the Washington Supreme Court both protects elected officials from politically motivated or speculative recall attempts and clarifies the proper, disciplined way in which legal challenges to government transparency and process should be framed. In doing so, the Court preserves recall as a serious and exceptional remedy, rooted firmly in demonstrable and intentional violations of law rather than in the ebb and flow of contentious local politics.