Intent, Guns, and Attempted Aggravated Assault: The Mississippi Supreme Court Disavows the “Actual, Unequivocal Intent” Standard in Jones v. State

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Mississippi’s decision in Carlos Jones, Jr. v. State of Mississippi (Oct. 30, 2025) clarifies a recurring and often difficult issue in criminal law: how the State may prove a defendant’s intent in an attempted aggravated assault case and what role circumstantial evidence and jury inference play in that determination.

The case arises from a neighborhood argument in Clarksdale that escalated when Carlos Jones retrieved a gun, pointed it toward neighbor Sandra Russell, and fired two shots as she ran to her porch. A jury convicted Jones of attempted aggravated assault. On appeal, Jones argued:

• the evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to hit Russell (he claimed he fired into the air), and
• the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and, in doing so, made an important doctrinal move: it explicitly rejects the notion that Mississippi law requires proof of “actual, unequivocal intent” to sustain an attempt conviction, disapproving the earlier decision in Murray v. State, 403 So. 2d 149 (Miss. 1981). The Court also robustly reaffirms:

• that intent is a question of fact for the jury,
• that circumstantial evidence can alone support a conviction and carries the same weight as direct evidence, and
• that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or second-guess jury credibility determinations when sufficiency and weight standards are properly applied.

This commentary discusses the facts, the holdings, the Court’s use and rejection of prior precedents, and the broader implications for Mississippi criminal law—especially attempt liability and evidentiary sufficiency.

II. Brief Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

On March 26, 2024, Sandra Russell’s friend, Yolanda Reed, delivered furniture to Russell’s home in Clarksdale and honked the truck horn upon arrival. This irritated Carlos Jones, who lived across the street. Jones came out and argued with Russell about the noise.

As Russell turned to retrieve pictures from Reed’s truck:

• Jones went to a car driven by his girlfriend,
• retrieved a firearm,
• and pointed the gun at Russell, which Russell said she clearly saw, even though she was somewhat turned away.

Russell then:

• heard a gunshot,
• ran toward her house and up the steps to her porch,
• and heard a second shot which she said sounded “so close” that she thought he was “fixing to shoot” her.

Jones then left the scene in the car with his girlfriend. Russell told first responders she was running with her back to Jones when he fired. Officers documented her as “erratic” and “afraid.”

The next day, when questioned by investigators, Jones admitted being awakened and irritated by the horn and confronting Russell, but claimed he fired into the air and then returned the gun to a family member. The weapon was never recovered.

B. Trial and Conviction

The State charged Jones with attempted aggravated assault under Mississippi Code § 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(ii). At trial:

• Russell testified that Jones pointed the gun at her and then fired two shots as she fled.
• An investigator testified (without objection) about Jones’s statement that he fired only into the air.
• Jones moved for a directed verdict after the State’s case, arguing that no one saw him actually pull the trigger and the only “intent” evidence came from his own statement.
• The trial judge denied the motion, reasoning that Russell’s testimony about Jones pointing the gun created a jury question on intent.
• Jones presented no evidence in his own defense.

The jury unanimously found Jones guilty. He received a five-year sentence, with three years to serve and two years of supervised probation. His motion for a new trial—challenging both sufficiency and weight of the evidence—was denied, and he appealed.

C. Holdings

The Supreme Court:

1. Affirms the sufficiency of the evidence:
   • Pointing a gun at Russell followed immediately by firing two shots, in the context of angry confrontation, provides sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational juror could infer an intent to shoot and injure Russell.
2. Affirms the verdict as not against the weight of the evidence:
   • The conflicting accounts (Russell’s testimony versus Jones’s claimed warning shots into the air) presented a classic jury credibility question, and the jury’s resolution of that conflict is entitled to deference.
3. Clarifies and reshapes Mississippi law on criminal intent in attempt cases:
   • Explicitly states that the “actual, unequivocal intent” standard applied in Murray v. State “is not based on Mississippi law,” and that Murray is “contrary to law and has no application here.”
   • Reaffirms that intent is a fact question for the jury, not for appellate courts to second-guess by reweighing evidence.
   • Re-emphasizes that circumstantial evidence and direct evidence carry the same weight in Mississippi criminal law.

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. The Legal Framework: Sufficiency, Weight, and Attempted Aggravated Assault

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Court reiterates the now-standard sufficiency test:

“When testing the sufficiency of evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. We determine if any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The State receives the benefit of all favorable inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence.” (citing Williams, Martin, and Hughes)

Key points:

• The question is not whether the appellate court believes the defendant is guilty, but whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, not rebalanced neutrally.
• The State receives all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the proof presented.

2. Weight of the Evidence

On the weight-of-the-evidence challenge, the Court applies its usual highly deferential standard:

The Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” and will only disturb a verdict:
“when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” (quoting Williams and Little)

This makes clear:

• Even if there is conflicting testimony (as there was here), that conflict is for the jury to resolve, not the appellate court.
• Court intervention is reserved for extreme cases of clear, overwhelming imbalance in the evidence.

3. Elements of Attempted Aggravated Assault

The State charged Jones under Mississippi Code § 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(ii), which defines aggravated assault, relevantly, as:

“[A]ttempts to cause . . . bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm[.]”

“Attempt” itself is defined under Mississippi case law, particularly Brooks v. State, 18 So. 3d 833, 841 (Miss. 2009), and Hughes v. State, 983 So. 2d 270, 278 (Miss. 2008), as requiring:

1. Intent to commit a particular crime,
2. A direct but ineffectual act toward its commission, and
3. Failure to consummate its commission.

In this case:

• Intent element: Whether Jones intended to cause bodily injury to Russell with a deadly weapon.
• Overt act element: Jones’s pointing the gun at Russell and firing two shots.
• Failure to consummate: Russell was not actually struck or injured by the bullets.

The only genuinely disputed element was intent—whether Jones meant to hit Russell when he fired.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence on the Decision

1. Williams v. State, 305 So. 3d 1122 (Miss. 2020) & 285 So. 3d 156 (Miss. 2019)

The Court cites two different Williams decisions:

• 305 So. 3d 1122 (2020): for the sufficiency of the evidence standard (“any rational juror” test, light most favorable to the State, favorable inferences to the State).
• 285 So. 3d 156 (2019): for the weight-of-the-evidence standard, which emphasizes that the verdict is disturbed only for “unconscionable injustice.”

These cases provide the foundational lens through which the appellate court must review the trial record. They anchor the Court’s insistence that its role is limited and deferential in reviewing jury decisions.

2. Martin v. State, 214 So. 3d 217 (Miss. 2017)

Martin is cited as an authority for the sufficiency standard and the “any rational juror” approach. The case continues to underscore that sufficiency review is not a re-try of the case but a test of whether the evidentiary floor for conviction has been met.

3. Hughes v. State, 983 So. 2d 270 (Miss. 2008)

Hughes appears in two doctrinal roles:

• It informs the attempt standard quoted in Brooks, defining the elements of criminal attempt.
• It underscores that determinations of intent are factual questions for the jury, to be made in light of the “totality of the circumstances.”

By invoking Hughes, the Court emphasizes that intent need not be proved by a confession or direct acknowledgment but can be inferred from behavior and context.

4. Thomas v. State, 277 So. 3d 532 (Miss. 2019)

Thomas is cited for the proposition that:

Determining a defendant’s requisite intent is a fact question for the jury to decide, considering the totality of the circumstances.

The citation to Thomas is reinforced later via Hydrick, to show that it is long-standing Mississippi law that intent is for the jury—underscoring the error in Murray’s approach (where the Supreme Court effectively substituted its own assessment of the defendant’s intent for that of the jury).

5. Nevels v. State, 325 So. 3d 627 (Miss. 2021)

Nevels is central to the Court’s evidentiary approach, for this key proposition:

“Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence carry the same weight.”

By invoking Nevels, the Court decisively undercuts Jones’s argument that because no witness actually saw the trigger pulled or observed a bullet striking near Russell, the State failed to prove intent. Under Mississippi law, the State can prove every element—including intent—by circumstantial evidence alone.

6. Wilson v. State, 904 So. 2d 987 (Miss. 2004)

Wilson is the core precedent on attempted aggravated assault involving firearms. In Wilson:

• The defendant argued and fought with the victim,
• put a gun to the victim’s head,
• pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire.

The jury convicted him of attempted aggravated assault. This Court affirmed, holding that the defendant could not show that reasonable jurors must acquit him based on that evidence.

In Jones, the Court analogizes:

• In both cases, the defendant pointed a gun at a victim and attempted to fire.
• In Jones’s case, the gun actually fired twice—if anything, a stronger factual setting for attempt.

Thus, Wilson squarely supports the idea that pointing a gun at a victim and pulling the trigger in a hostile context is sufficient to support an attempted aggravated assault conviction, even if the shot misses or fails to fire.

7. Murray v. State, 403 So. 2d 149 (Miss. 1981)

Murray is the centerpiece of the defendant’s appellate argument and the most consequential precedent addressed in this opinion.

In Murray:

• A prison inmate held a shank to a correctional officer’s throat and demanded keys.
• The inmate repeatedly said the officer would not be harmed if he complied.
• Another inmate urged him to release the officer; he then did so and surrendered the shank.
• A jury convicted him of aggravated assault.
• The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that it could not find “actual, unequivocal intent” to stab or that some extraneous event prevented the stabbing.

In Jones, the Court labels Murray:

• an “outlier,”
• resting on a requirement of “actual, unequivocal intent” that “is not based on Mississippi law,” and
• ultimately “contrary to law and [having] no application here.”

The Court criticizes Murray for:

• reweighing the evidence,
• speculating about the defendant’s intent despite a jury verdict, and
• importing a heightened and unsupported “actual, unequivocal intent” formula from nowhere in Mississippi precedent, misreading Hydrick.

This is a decisive doctrinal move. Though the Court does not use the formal term “overrule,” describing a precedent as “contrary to law” and declaring its gloss on intent unsupported amounts to a strong disavowal of Murray as precedent for intent in attempt cases.

8. Bucklew v. State, 206 So. 2d 200 (Miss. 1981)

Bucklew is cited tangentially in Murray and is referenced here for its treatment of attempt-related concepts. In Bucklew, the Court reversed an attempted embezzlement conviction because there was no “extraneous cause” preventing completion of the crime.

In Jones, the Court notes Murray’s reliance on this sort of “extraneous cause” requirement but implicitly distances itself from such a rigid approach. The modern understanding, as reflected in Brooks and Hughes, is that attempt focuses on:

• a defendant’s intent to commit the crime, and
• whether the defendant took a direct, ineffectual step toward that crime,

without requiring some external interruption to explain why the crime was not completed.

9. Hydrick v. State, 246 Miss. 448, 150 So. 2d 423 (1963)

Murray had cited Hydrick as support for its “actual, unequivocal intent” language, but the Jones Court shows that this was a misreading:

• Hydrick was about jury instructions on presumptions of intent, not definitions of attempt or heightened proof of intent.
• Hydrick actually held that the State cannot use a presumption instruction to “supply the place of a fact” it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
• On directed verdict, Hydrick held that intent to kill was for the jury to decide based on the facts, explicitly treating intent as a jury issue—not something courts should decide as a matter of law.

Thus, far from supporting Murray, Hydrick supports the Jones Court’s position that intent is a jury question and that appellate courts should not override jury findings except under established sufficiency or weight standards.

10. Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288 (Miss. 2017), and Gathright v. State, 380 So. 2d 1276 (Miss. 1980)

These cases are cited to emphasize:

• The weight-of-the-evidence standard (“unconscionable injustice” threshold).
• The jury’s singular role in determining the credibility of witnesses and the “weight and worth” of their testimony.

These authorities reinforce the Court’s refusal to intervene in the jury’s resolution of the conflicting testimonies of Russell and Jones.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Intent as a Jury Question, Inferred from Circumstantial Evidence

The central reasoning is straightforward:

• Intent is nearly always proved by inference from conduct and context, not by direct admissions.
• Jones was:
  • angry about the noise,
  • in a heated argument with Russell,
  • retrieved a gun,
  • pointed the gun at Russell, and
  • fired two shots as she fled to her porch.
• Given those circumstances, it is reasonable (indeed, arguably compelling) to infer that Jones intended to hit Russell.

In the Court’s words:

“From these facts, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones intended to shoot Russell. The jury simply rejected Jones’s claim he fired into the air.”

The Court frames this as the classic function of a jury:

• weighing conflicting testimony,
• deciding who is credible, and
• drawing commonsense inferences from behavior.

2. Disavowal of “Actual, Unequivocal Intent” as a Standard

The opinion’s most doctrinally significant part is its discussion of Murray. The Court declares:

• “Murray is an outlier.”
• “Simply put, the requirement of ‘actual, unequivocal intent’ is not based on Mississippi law.”
• “Thus, Murray is contrary to law and has no application here.”

This does several things at once:

1. Eliminates a heightened intent requirement from Mississippi attempt jurisprudence:
   • Prosecutors are not required to prove some uniquely clear or unusually explicit intent beyond the ordinary beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
   • “Actual, unequivocal intent” is treated as an incorrect gloss on the law.
2. Prevents appellate courts from re-litigating intent:
   • Murray engaged in its own fact-finding, reasoning that because the inmate had the means and opportunity but did not stab, his intent was not sufficiently “actual and unequivocal.”
   • Jones emphasizes that this is contrary to long-standing principles: where there is evidence on intent, the issue belongs to the jury.
3. Re-aligns Mississippi law with general attempt doctrine:
   • Attempt liability turns on:
     1. intent to commit the underlying offense, and
     2. a substantial step (here, pointing the gun and firing).
   • It does not require external proof that the crime was only incomplete due to “extraneous” events.

3. Application of Precedent: Wilson and Beyond

By analogizing to Wilson, the Court emphasizes continuity in its treatment of firearm-based attempts:

• In Wilson, pointing a gun at a victim’s head and pulling the trigger—even though the gun misfired—was enough for attempted aggravated assault.
• In Jones, the same core conduct occurred but with shots actually fired.

Hence, if anything, Jones presents a stronger factual scenario for attempt, and Wilson makes clear that reasonable jurors can infer intent from this kind of violent act.

4. Sufficiency and Weight Applied to the Record

The Court’s application of standards is methodical:

• Sufficiency:
  • Russell testified that she saw Jones point the gun at her and then heard two shots as she ran.
  • The jury was free to disbelieve Jones’s self-serving statement that he fired into the air.
  • This provides enough evidence for a rational juror to find the intent to cause bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Weight:
  • The only real conflict is between:
    • Russell’s account (gun pointed at her, shots as she fled), and
    • Jones’s reported statement to police (shots into the air).
  • Resolving that conflict is a classic jury function.
  • There is no “overwhelming” evidence in favor of Jones such that the conviction constitutes an “unconscionable injustice.”

Thus, both of Jones’s appellate arguments fail under settled review standards.

D. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying the Law of Intent in Attempt Cases

This opinion provides important clarity for:

• Prosecutors:
  • They need not prove some heightened “actual, unequivocal” intent standard.
  • They may rely on circumstantial evidence—including the defendant’s conduct, threats, and surrounding circumstances—to establish intent.
• Defense counsel:
  • They cannot rely on Murray to argue that mere opportunity and means, without consummation and without explicit admissions, preclude a finding of attempt.
  • Argument must instead focus on undermining the inferences the State asks the jury to draw from behavior.
• Trial judges:
  • They should treat intent in attempt prosecutions as a jury question where any evidence supports both inferences.
  • Directed verdicts and JNOV should be rare where there is evidence of threats, weapon use, and hostile context.

2. Practical Consequences for Firearm-Related Offenses

This decision will be especially influential in cases where:

• A defendant points a gun at a victim and fires but misses, or
• Claims to have fired “warning shots” or “into the air.”

Under Jones:

• A jury may reasonably infer an intent to shoot the victim from:
  • the pointing of the gun toward the victim,
  • the firing of shots in the victim’s direction or in close proximity,
  • and the surrounding hostile or threatening circumstances.
• The defendant’s alternative narrative (e.g., warning shot) is solely a credibility issue, not a legally dispositive fact if contradicted or undermined by other testimony.

This is likely to fortify attempted aggravated assault prosecutions in domestic disputes, neighborhood confrontations, and other volatile settings where guns are pointed and fired but no one is physically hit.

3. Erosion of Murray and Realignment with Mainstream Criminal Law

By branding Murray “contrary to law,” the Court aligns Mississippi law more closely with mainstream American criminal law on attempt:

• Most jurisdictions accept that:
  • intent can be inferred from fairly common indicators—threats, weapon use, pursuit behavior;
  • no special “unequivocality” test constrains attempt liability beyond the general requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Appellate courts are not supposed to reweigh the evidence on intent or require juries to find some extraordinary clarity of motive.

While Murray had sometimes been invoked to argue for a higher threshold in attempt cases, its effective disavowal brings Mississippi doctrine back into line with:

• statutory elements of attempt (as articulated in Brooks and Hughes), and
• general principles of jury deference on factual questions.

4. Reinforcement of Deference to the Jury

The opinion consistently reinforces:

• The jury as the sole arbiter of credibility and factual disputes.
• The limited role of appellate courts—to review:
  • whether any reasonable juror could convict (sufficiency), and
  • whether the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to work an unconscionable injustice (weight).

In practice, this:

• narrows the scope for successful appellate challenges to conviction based on factual disputes; and
• encourages litigants to focus their efforts on trial fact-finding, particularly witness examination and evidentiary presentation.

IV. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

A. “Sufficiency of the Evidence” vs. “Weight of the Evidence”

Sufficiency asks:

• Could a rational juror, viewing all the evidence in the State’s favor, find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

If the answer is no, the conviction must be reversed and the defendant is entitled to acquittal.

Weight asks:

• Is the verdict so against the overwhelming evidence that letting it stand would be a miscarriage of justice?

If yes, the remedy is usually a new trial, not an outright acquittal.

In Jones, the Court found:

• Sufficiency: Yes, a rational juror could convict based on Russell’s testimony and the surrounding facts.
• Weight: The verdict was not so against the evidence as to constitute an unconscionable injustice.

B. Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence

• Direct evidence is a straightforward assertion of a fact—e.g., “I saw him pull the trigger,” or a confession.
• Circumstantial evidence is evidence from which a fact must be inferred—e.g., the defendant pointed a gun and a shot was heard; no one saw the trigger pulled, but it is reasonable to infer he pulled it.

Mississippi law, as reaffirmed in Nevels and applied in Jones, treats both kinds of evidence as equally valid. A conviction may rest entirely on circumstantial evidence if it supports the necessary inferences beyond a reasonable doubt.

C. Criminal “Intent” and Attempt

Criminal intent (or “mens rea”) is a mental state—what the defendant meant to do. It is rarely proved by direct admissions from the defendant. Instead:

• Jurors infer intent from:
  • what the defendant did (pointed a gun, fired twice),
  • what was said (anger over noise, hostile argument),
  • and the overall circumstances (timing, distance, threats).

In an attempt case, intent is pivotal because:

• The crime is incomplete—no harm may have actually occurred—so the law focuses on:
  • what the defendant intended, and
  • whether he took a serious step toward causing the harm.

Jones confirms that jurors may infer intent to injure from acts like pointing and firing a gun at a fleeing person, even if no bullet hits the target and even if the defendant later claims he meant no harm.

D. The Rejected “Actual, Unequivocal Intent” Standard

In Murray, the Court had suggested that for attempt, there must be “actual, unequivocal intent” to commit the crime. This suggested a uniquely high bar:

• Intent would have to be nearly indisputable or unmistakable.
• Ambiguous behavior or mixed motives might be insufficient.

Jones rejects that gloss, clarifying that:

• There is no special “unequivocal intent” requirement beyond proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Intent can remain a matter of reasonable inference; it need not be proven by a confession or absolute clarity.

V. Conclusion

The Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Carlos Jones, Jr. v. State of Mississippi does more than affirm a conviction for attempted aggravated assault. It:

• Reinforces core procedural doctrines:
  • the sufficiency and weight-of-the-evidence standards,
  • the equality of circumstantial and direct evidence, and
  • the centrality of the jury in resolving factual disputes and determining intent.
• Clarifies substantive criminal law:
  • Attempt requires intent and a substantial step—not an “actual, unequivocal intent” tested de novo by appellate courts.
  • Pointing a gun at a person and firing in an angry confrontation suffices to permit an inference of intent to cause bodily injury.
• Repositions precedent:
  • Murray is identified as an outlier and deemed contrary to law, effectively disavowing the “actual, unequivocal intent” gloss.
  • Cases like Wilson, Hughes, Brooks, Hydrick, and Nevels are reaffirmed as the backbone of Mississippi’s approach to intent, attempt, and evidentiary sufficiency.

For practitioners, the decision provides clear guidance: in Mississippi, intent in attempt prosecutions will usually be a jury question, and juries may infer intent from conduct like aiming and firing a gun toward a victim amid hostile circumstances. Appellate courts will intervene only where the evidence cannot support such an inference under the deferential sufficiency and weight standards.

In this way, Jones both settles the law and underscores a broader principle of criminal adjudication: that the line between dangerous preparation and criminal attempt is drawn—not by heightened judicial glosses—but by juries applying common sense to concrete acts in the real world.