Insanity-Based Challenges to Guideline Cross-References Require Persuasive Proof; Prolonged Non‑Extreme Flight Supports §3C1.2; Minute Entries Can Establish Valid Waiver for Uncounseled Misdemeanors

Introduction

In United States v. Humbles (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2025), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a 92‑month sentence imposed on a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, after a bizarre chain of events culminating in the armed taking of a waste removal truck and a 45‑minute, multi‑agency pursuit across the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway and I‑12. The appeal presented five sentencing issues:

Whether the district court properly cross‑referenced to the robbery Guideline under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c) despite the defendant’s claim he was legally insane during the robbery,
Whether denial of a downward departure or variance based on mental illness and military service was error,
Whether the § 3C1.2 reckless‑endangerment‑during‑flight enhancement applied,
Whether an uncounseled Oklahoma misdemeanor DUI could be counted for one criminal‑history point, and
Whether reassignment to a different judge was warranted on remand.

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Edith Brown Clement rejected each challenge, offering notable guidance on how insanity interacts with Guidelines cross‑references, the threshold for reckless endangerment during flight that does not involve extreme driving, and how courts can rely on state minute entries to establish a valid waiver of counsel for prior misdemeanors used in criminal‑history scoring.

Summary of the Judgment

Cross-reference to robbery upheld. Assuming without deciding that an insanity defense could, in principle, defeat a § 2K2.1(c) cross‑reference, the court held the defendant failed to carry his burden to show he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct during the armed taking of the truck. The objective facts—hesitation and inquiry about consequences, apology, anticipation of pursuit, and requests for forgiveness—undercut the expert’s conclusory opinion of legal insanity.
Downward departure denial unreviewable; variance denial affirmed. The Fifth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of a diminished‑capacity departure under § 5K2.13. It affirmed the denial of a downward variance, holding the within‑Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable and the district court appropriately weighed § 3553(a) factors, including mental health and public safety.
§ 3C1.2 reckless‑endangerment enhancement affirmed. Even without evidence of high speed, the defendant’s prolonged evasion with known hazards (dragging hose, sparks, no headlights, dodging spike strips) created a substantial risk to others and justified the enhancement.
Criminal-history point for uncounseled DUI affirmed. Under Oklahoma law, the defendant bore the burden to show no knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. A court minute entry reflecting that he understood his rights and pled pro se supported a valid waiver; thus, the conviction properly counted for one criminal‑history point.
No reassignment. With no remand, reassignment was unnecessary and denied.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s reasoning rested on a network of precedents across four domains—Guidelines interpretation, insanity standards, reckless endangerment, and collateral attacks on prior convictions—along with established review standards.

Guidelines cross-reference framework: U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c) authorizes cross‑reference to “another offense” (charged or not) when a firearm was used/possessed in connection with that offense and the cross‑referenced offense level is higher. The panel cited United States v. Fannin, 821 F. App’x 358 (5th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Oyervides, 546 F. App’x 362 (5th Cir. 2013), to confirm the pathway through § 2X1.1 to the robbery Guideline, § 2B3.1.
Insanity doctrine: The substantive standard derives from 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) and Fifth Circuit cases like United States v. Eff, 524 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129 (5th Cir. 1996), which focus on whether the defendant could appreciate the nature/quality or wrongfulness of the act; the defendant bears the burden (United States v. Romans, 823 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2016)). The court distinguished “inconsistent verdicts” cases (Dunn, Powell) and double‑jeopardy/issue‑preclusion authorities (Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Langley v. Prince), because Humbles was charged with a single count and there was no adjudication of insanity as to any count. It also referenced United States v. Santiago, 96 F.4th 834 (5th Cir. 2024), to illustrate that self‑defense/justification can defeat cross‑references when a defendant meets his burden—but found no comparable evidentiary showing here.
Departures and variances: Denials of discretionary departures are not reviewable absent a mistaken belief of no authority (United States v. Sam, 467 F.3d 857 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Serrano‑Lopez, Simpson), whereas variance denials are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with within‑Guidelines sentences presumed reasonable (United States v. Scott, 654 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2011)).
Reckless endangerment during flight: The panel relied on United States v. Jimenez, 323 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Gould, 529 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2008), emphasizing that § 3C1.2 is not limited to high‑speed chases or actual harm; “reckless” is defined by reference to § 2A1.4’s commentary. The facts aligned with decisions upholding the enhancement where prolonged flight created risk (United States v. Sykes, 4 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 1993), cited in Jimenez; United States v. Brooks, No. 22‑30390, 2023 WL 3302838 (5th Cir. May 8, 2023); United States v. Villanueva, No. 02‑41107, 2003 WL 21355961 (5th Cir. May 21, 2003)). Cases invoked by the defense (Chandler, Gonzalez, Reyna, Washington) were distinguished as examples of more extreme conduct, not minimum thresholds.
Uncounseled misdemeanor convictions: The governing federal principles (United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94 (5th Cir. 1995); Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004)) and Fifth Circuit burden‑allocation rule (defers to state law per United States v. Rubio, 629 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2010)) led the court to apply Oklahoma’s rule placing the burden on the defendant to show no waiver (Tucker v. State, 473 P.2d 332 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970); Hanson v. State, 716 P.2d 688 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)). A state minute entry reflecting advisement of rights supports inclusion of the conviction (Williams v. State, 637 P.2d 867 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981)). Contextual waiver factors echoed United States v. Pino Gonzalez, 636 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Rea‑Tapia, 134 F. App’x 711 (5th Cir. 2005).
Standards of review: Guideline interpretations de novo; factual findings for clear error (United States v. Aderinoye, 33 F.4th 751 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Torres‑Magana, 938 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2005)). Substantive reasonableness reviewed for abuse of discretion (Scott). The court noted it need not resolve preservation disputes because the claims would fail even under rigorous review (United States v. Martinez, 131 F.4th 294 (5th Cir. 2025)).
Reassignment: Supervisory power coterminous with remand; no remand, no reassignment (United States v. Stanford, 883 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2018)).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Cross‑reference to robbery and the insanity claim. The Guidelines expressly allow a cross‑reference when a firearm was used “in connection with” another offense and that cross‑reference yields a higher offense level. Here, the undisputed facts supported robbery under § 2B3.1: the defendant sat in the truck’s cab, brandished a firearm at the driver who tried to reenter, and drove away. The PSR’s cross‑referenced calculation (base 20 +5 levels for brandishing) yielded a higher offense level than § 2K2.1 alone, making the cross‑reference applicable.

On insanity, the panel took a careful and narrow approach: it assumed without deciding that an insanity defense could, as a matter of law, defeat a cross‑reference premised on “another offense.” But it found the record insufficient to prove insanity under § 17(a). The expert’s ultimate conclusion—“unable to distinguish right from wrong”—was undermined by the defendant’s own contemporaneous conduct and statements, which showed awareness of wrongfulness:

He hesitated and asked God “what could happen” if he took the truck (recognition of potential consequences),
He apologized to the driver when brandishing and departing,
He anticipated a chase, knew multiple officers were following, and said he wanted to stop but chose to continue,
Upon arrest, he asked for forgiveness—demonstrating moral and legal awareness of wrongdoing.

These objective indicators of appreciation of wrongfulness, much like those relied on in Eff, outweighed the expert’s conclusory label, defeating the insanity argument on this record.

b) Departure under § 5K2.13 and variance under § 3553(a). The district court recognized its authority to depart but declined to do so because brandishing a firearm while taking the truck presented a serious threat of violence, which § 5K2.13 identifies as a disqualifying circumstance for a diminished‑capacity departure. That merits‑based denial is unreviewable on appeal. As to the variance, the court considered the defendant’s mental health, the nature of the offense, victim impact, the need to protect the public, and character letters. Because the 92‑month sentence sat at the bottom of a correctly calculated 92–115‑month range, it enjoyed a presumption of reasonableness, which the defendant failed to rebut.

c) § 3C1.2 reckless endangerment during flight. The panel reaffirmed that the enhancement does not require high speeds, nighttime urban chases, or near‑collisions. Recklessness turns on awareness of a substantial risk whose disregard grossly deviates from reasonable care. Here, the defendant knowingly:

Dragged a fence segment and a hose emitting sparks,
Drove without headlights,
Evaded multiple police units for 45 minutes across major roadways, necessitating spike strips,
Only stopped after striking spike strips.

That exceeded “mere flight” and created substantial risk to officers and the public, satisfying § 3C1.2.

d) Uncounseled misdemeanor DUI as a criminal‑history point. A prior uncounseled conviction resulting in incarceration may be used if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel. Oklahoma places the burden on the defendant in collateral attacks to show absence of waiver. The minute entry indicated the court advised the defendant of rights, found he understood and was competent, and accepted a pro se plea. Considering the straightforward nature of the offense, the brief custodial term served (25 days), the defendant’s prior experience with the criminal process, and his educational background, the waiver was valid. Without proof to the contrary, the point counted.

3) Impact and Forward‑Looking Significance

Insanity and cross‑references: The court did not decide whether § 17(a) insanity formally applies to “another offense” used via cross‑reference, leaving the doctrinal door open. But it set a practical evidentiary marker: expert characterizations of psychosis will not suffice if contemporaneous conduct reveals appreciation of wrongfulness. Defense counsel wishing to defeat cross‑references on insanity grounds must marshal concrete, contemporaneous facts demonstrating the inability to appreciate wrongfulness, not simply impaired judgment or religiosity.
Reckless endangerment without extreme driving: The opinion reinforces that prolonged, hazard‑laden flight at or near the speed limit can earn § 3C1.2. Prosecutors need not show near misses or collisions; defense arguments limited to “no speeding” will likely fail where other risk factors are present.
Criminal history and uncounseled misdemeanors: Minute entries and docket notations may carry significant weight in proving waiver of counsel, especially in states that place the burden on the defendant. Practitioners should obtain transcripts or affidavits to rebut waiver, where possible, or consider seeking state‑court relief to vacate prior judgments before federal sentencing.
Departures vs. variances: The decision re‑emphasizes a strategic point: denials of discretionary departures are generally unreviewable, so defense counsel should preserve variance arguments under § 3553(a) and build robust records focused on individualized mitigation, treatment prospects, and public‑safety assurances.
Within‑Guidelines presumption remains robust: The panel’s deferential substantive reasonableness review underscores the importance of accurate Guideline calculations and reinforces that bottom‑of‑range sentences will be difficult to disturb on appeal absent clear misweighing of § 3553(a) factors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Guideline cross‑reference (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)): When a firearm offense is committed “in connection with” another offense (even if uncharged), the court may calculate the sentence using the other offense’s Guideline if it produces a higher offense level. Think of it as sentencing by the more serious, firearm‑related conduct that actually occurred.
Insanity defense (18 U.S.C. § 17(a)): A defendant is legally insane only if, due to severe mental disease, he could not appreciate the nature/quality or the wrongfulness of his acts at the time. It is not enough to show poor judgment, impulsivity, or religious delusions; the question is whether he understood it was wrong.
Diminished capacity departure (§ 5K2.13) vs. insanity: Insanity is a complete defense to guilt (rarely successful). Diminished capacity is a discretionary sentencing reduction for significantly reduced mental capacity that substantially contributed to the offense—unless the offense involved actual or serious threatened violence, in which case the departure is typically unavailable.
Variance: A court can impose a sentence outside the Guideline range based on statutory factors (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Unlike departures, variances are always available in theory and are reviewed for reasonableness.
Reckless endangerment during flight (§ 3C1.2): Adds two offense levels if, during flight from law enforcement, the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious injury. “Recklessly” means aware of a serious risk but disregarding it in a way that grossly deviates from reasonable care.
Standards of review: “De novo” means the appeals court re‑decides the legal question; “clear error” means the factual finding will stand unless the court is firmly convinced a mistake was made; “abuse of discretion” is very deferential and asks whether the decision was reasonable, not whether the appellate court would have chosen differently.
Collateral attack on prior convictions: A defendant can challenge prior state convictions used to enhance a federal sentence if they violated the right to counsel. But where state law puts the burden on the defendant, he must produce evidence—mere assertions are insufficient.

Conclusion

United States v. Humbles is a practical guide to four recurring sentencing battlegrounds. First, it signals that while the Fifth Circuit has not squarely decided whether legal insanity can defeat a cross‑reference, defendants face a demanding evidentiary burden: contemporaneous facts showing appreciation of wrongfulness will undercut expert opinions of insanity. Second, it confirms that § 3C1.2 applies to prolonged, hazardous flight even without high speeds. Third, it underscores that state‑court minute entries can suffice to establish a valid waiver of counsel for uncounseled misdemeanor convictions used in criminal history. Finally, it reiterates that discretionary departure denials are not reviewable and that within‑Guidelines sentences remain strongly presumed reasonable.

For practitioners, the opinion emphasizes record‑building: tie mental‑health evidence to the legal standard for wrongfulness at the time of the conduct; anticipate § 3C1.2 where flight created any substantial risk; secure concrete proof to challenge prior convictions on waiver grounds; and frame mitigation primarily through § 3553(a) variances. In the broader landscape, Humbles reinforces the Guidelines’ fact‑sensitive, conduct‑centric approach and the Fifth Circuit’s deference to district court sentencing judgments when the Guideline range is correctly calculated and the record shows careful consideration of statutory factors.