Inordinate Delay as a Trigger for § 2254 Exhaustion Exception: Lindsey v. Neal

Introduction

In Steven Lindsey v. Ron Neal, 7th Cir. No. 23-2789 (May 30, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted a protracted six-year stagnation of state postconviction proceedings in Indiana. Petitioner Steven Lindsey, convicted of murdering his wife after three trials, filed a state postconviction petition in February 2019. By mid-2025, the Indiana trial court had neither held a hearing nor ruled on any of his motions, despite multiple prosecutor appointments and procedural filings. Lindsey then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), acknowledging unexhausted claims but invoking the inordinate-delay exception in § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii). The Seventh Circuit granted that exception, vacated the district court’s dismissal, and remanded for merits review.

Key issues:

• Whether a six-year delay by the state court and prosecution renders Indiana’s postconviction remedy “ineffective” under § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii).
• What standards govern “inordinate delay” and “attributability to the state” in the exhaustion context.
• The scope of federal habeas review when state remedies have stalled.

Parties:

• Petitioner-Appellant: Steven Lindsey, serving a 55-year sentence for murder in Indiana.
• Respondent-Appellee: Ron Neal, Warden of the federal facility housing Lindsey.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit held, by a unanimous panel (Maldonado, Hamilton, Lee, JJ.), that Lindsey’s six-year wait for any substantive state-court action constituted an “inordinate delay” attributable to the state. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii), such delay renders state remedies “ineffective” and excuses the exhaustion requirement. The panel identified repeated lapses by the trial court—no hearings, no rulings on pro se motions—and by multiple state-side prosecutors—missed deadlines, repeated withdrawals, and multi-year periods of silence. In contrast, Lindsey diligently filed motions, pursued discovery, and complied with every procedural step. The district court’s contrary finding—that delay was caused by Lindsey’s inexperience and that appointment of counsel mooted earlier motions—was reversed. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the merits of Lindsey’s constitutional claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The panel’s ruling builds on a line of Seventh Circuit cases that recognize inordinate delay as an exhaustion exception:

• O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999): Established the “one complete round” exhaustion rule and the principle of federal-state comity.
• Lane v. Richards, 957 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1992): Found a 3½-year state delay in appointing counsel and briefing intolerable.
• Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1970): Held a 17-month failure by court-appointed counsel to file a brief sufficient to excuse exhaustion.
• Carter v. Buesgen, 10 F.4th 715 (7th Cir. 2021): Deemed a four-year delay “extreme and tragic” and excused exhaustion.
• Evans v. Wills, 66 F.4th 681 (7th Cir. 2023): Clarified that the inquiry focuses on whether the state’s process proved ineffective, not on tallying days attributable to each party.

These cases informed the court’s two-step test: (1) whether the delay is “inordinate,” and (2) whether it is “attributable to the state.”

Legal Reasoning

1. Inordinate Delay: More than six years elapsed from Lindsey’s state filing to the Seventh Circuit’s decision. The court cited Carter (4 years), Lane (3½ years), and Dozie (17 months) to show that much shorter lapses have been deemed inordinate.

2. Attributability to the State: The panel examined:

• Judicial Inaction: No hearings, no status updates, no rulings on pro se motions; selective rulings only on state’s motions within two weeks.
• Prosecutorial Failures: One-month late answer without leave; three successive special prosecutors, two of whom withdrew or delayed; years-long silence even after diligent discovery requests.
• Petitioner’s Diligence: Repeated motions to set hearings; timely discovery responses; clear intent to litigate pro se; no dilatory tactics.

Under § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii), the remedy is “ineffective” when state process fails to “protect the rights of the applicant.” The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana’s judicial machinery and prosecutorial offices abdicated that duty here.

Impact

This decision reinforces and clarifies the inordinate-delay exception:

• Prisoner Rights: Pro se inmates may invoke federal habeas review when state postconviction proceedings stall for years.
• State Accountability: Trial courts and prosecutors must timely move state petitions forward or risk federal intervention.
• Federal-State Comity: The opinion balances respect for state courts with a safeguard against indefinite delay.
• Future Litigation: Litigants will point to Lindsey when state remedies remain inert; courts will scrutinize both the length of delay and its source.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Exhaustion Requirement: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), a habeas petitioner must normally use all available state remedies before seeking federal relief.
• Inordinate-Delay Exception: § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) allows bypassing exhaustion if “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective,” including unreasonable delays by state courts.
• Habeas Corpus under § 2254: A statutory vehicle for state prisoners to challenge constitutional violations in their conviction or sentence.
• Comity Principle: The idea that federal courts should defer to state courts on state prisoners’ constitutional claims, unless state remedies prove ineffective or unavailable.

Conclusion

Steven Lindsey v. Ron Neal establishes that a prolonged, unexplained six-year lull by a state trial court and its prosecutors can excuse the federal exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii). The Seventh Circuit’s clear affirmation of the two-step test—inordinate delay and state attribution—signals to both state judicial officers and attorneys that indefinite inertia is unacceptable. For federal habeas petitioners, Lindsey provides a roadmap to federal courts when their path through state postconviction remedies dead-ends in procedural limbo. Ultimately, the decision underscores the core habeas ethos: no prisoner should be denied meaningful judicial review because of state-court paralysis.