Inherent Judicial Authority to Accommodate Vulnerable Adult Witnesses: Commentary on State v. Richter, 2025 S.D. 58

Introduction

The Supreme Court of South Dakota’s decision in State v. Richter, 2025 S.D. 58, addresses several important procedural and evidentiary questions arising out of a prosecution for sexual contact with a developmentally disabled adult. The central and most novel issue is whether a circuit court may, in the absence of an express statutory authorization, permit an adult witness with developmental disabilities to testify while holding a “comfort item” (here, a stuffed animal) to ease the emotional strain of testimony.

The Court affirms the trial court on all four issues raised:

The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the developmentally disabled complainant, D.W., to testify while holding a stuffed animal.
The court did not plainly err in permitting a line of cross-examination of the defendant, Larry Richter, concerning his failure to tell law enforcement that his recorded admissions were supposedly “false confessions.”
The court did not plainly err in admitting expert testimony that individuals with developmental disabilities are particularly vulnerable to abuse.
The evidence was sufficient to sustain Richter’s convictions for three counts of sexual contact with a person incapable of consenting, and thus the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal was proper.

The opinion is doctrinally significant in at least three respects:

It clarifies that statutes granting specific accommodations for child and developmentally disabled witnesses do not limit the trial court’s broader inherent authority to manage witnesses and courtroom procedures.
It reaffirms the permissibility of using a defendant’s pre-arrest silence to impeach trial testimony when the defendant voluntarily takes the stand and offers explanations inconsistent with earlier admissions.
It sharpens the line between permissible expert testimony on the general vulnerabilities of a class of victims and impermissible “vouching” for a specific complainant’s credibility.

Summary of the Opinion

Factual Background

Richter hosted a Fourth of July celebration at his home. His neighbor, D.W., a 19‑year‑old developmentally disabled man functioning intellectually at about a seven‑year‑old level, attended with his family. Over the course of the gathering, D.W. later reported three separate incidents in which Richter touched his genitals:

Four-wheeler incident: While D.W. drove a four-wheeler with Richter seated behind him, Richter allegedly placed one hand around D.W. and the other hand on D.W.’s genitals over his clothing, continuing after D.W. asked him to stop.
Hot tub incident: Sitting on a covered hot tub in the backyard, Richter allegedly again touched D.W.’s “private parts” over clothing and continued despite D.W.’s repeated requests to stop, stopping only when D.W.’s mother, Tracy, approached.
Trailer incident: At Richter’s request, D.W. met him behind a trailer in the yard. There, Richter allegedly reached inside D.W.’s pants and touched his bare genitals for a “long period of time” despite D.W.’s objection.

Tracy subsequently confronted Richter in a recorded phone call. Richter made a series of damaging admissions, acknowledging touching D.W. in the crotch area on the four-wheeler and behind the trailer, and stating, “I admit to those three things.” Tracy then contacted law enforcement and provided the recording.

D.W. was referred to Child’s Voice, a hospital-based advocacy center, where Dr. Nancy Free evaluated him. She described his developmental delays, slowed information processing, and impaired problem-solving, and noted that developmentally disabled individuals are more vulnerable to various forms of abuse.

Procedural Posture

Richter was indicted on three counts of sexual contact with a person incapable of consenting under SDCL 22‑22‑7.2. Prior to trial, he moved in limine to prevent D.W. from testifying while holding a stuffed animal (a monkey named “Ish” that holds a banana). The trial court reserved ruling and questioned D.W. outside the jury’s presence. D.W. stated that the stuffed animal helped calm his nerves. The court, over defense objection, allowed D.W. to hold the stuffed animal while testifying, finding no undue prejudice to Richter.

After the State’s case-in-chief, and again at the close of all the evidence, Richter moved for judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence; both motions were denied. The jury convicted Richter on all three counts, and he appealed, raising four issues.

Issues on Appeal

Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by allowing D.W. to testify while holding a stuffed animal?
Did the circuit court plainly err by allowing the State’s cross-examination of Richter, which allegedly shifted the burden of proof?
Did the circuit court plainly err in allowing Dr. Free’s testimony that individuals with disabilities are more vulnerable to sexual abuse, allegedly bolstering D.W.’s credibility?
Did the circuit court err in denying Richter’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on alleged insufficiency of the evidence?

Holding

Comfort item: The trial court acted within its broad discretionary authority to control the mode and order of witness testimony by allowing D.W. to testify while holding a stuffed animal; the relevant statutes do not limit this inherent power.
Cross-examination: No plain error occurred. The prosecutor’s questioning was proper impeachment of Richter’s credibility, focusing on his inconsistent statements and pre-arrest silence, rather than impermissibly shifting the burden of proof.
Expert testimony: No plain error occurred. Dr. Free’s generalized testimony about the vulnerability of developmentally disabled individuals was relevant and educational, and did not constitute impermissible vouching for D.W.’s truthfulness.
Judgment of acquittal: The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find Richter guilty of all elements of SDCL 22‑22‑7.2 beyond a reasonable doubt.

Detailed Analysis

I. Inherent Authority to Allow a Comfort Item for an Adult Developmentally Disabled Witness

A. Precedents on Trial Management and Witness Examination

The core doctrinal move in Richter is the Court’s explicit reaffirmation of the trial court’s inherent authority to control courtroom proceedings, especially the mode of witness examination, even when statutes provide specific accommodations in related contexts.

The Court grounds this authority in several strands of South Dakota precedent:

Sioux Falls Argus Leader v. Miller, 2000 S.D. 63, ¶ 12, 610 N.W.2d 76, 83 – Recognizes the circuit court’s duty to maintain “order, dignity and decorum in the courtroom.”
Rapid City Journal v. Delaney, 2011 S.D. 55, ¶ 31, 804 N.W.2d 388, 399 (citing State v. Means, 268 N.W.2d 802 (S.D. 1978)) – Affirms that the circuit court has the “inherent power, as well as a duty, to conduct a fair and orderly trial” and to issue necessary orders in criminal cases.
Daudel v. Wolf, 30 S.D. 409, 138 N.W. 814, 815 (1912) – Notes that the manner of conduct and control of trials, with respect to decorum and dignity, lies within the inherent discretion of the trial judge.

This inherent power is codified and reinforced by SDCL 19‑19‑611(a) (analogous to Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a)):

The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:

Make those procedures effective for determining the truth;

Avoid wasting time; and

Protect witnesses from undue harassment or undue embarrassment.

Prior cases such as State v. Richard, 2023 S.D. 71, ¶ 22, 1 N.W.3d 654, and State v. Hankins, 2022 S.D. 67, ¶ 20, 982 N.W.2d 21, define the abuse-of-discretion standard that governs evidentiary rulings: only a “fundamental error of judgment” or a choice “outside the range of permissible choices” will justify reversal.

B. Interaction with Statutory Accommodations (SDCL 26-8A-31.1 & 23A-24-10)

Richter’s central statutory argument is essentially an expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others) claim: because the Legislature has expressly authorized certain accommodations, courts may not create others.

He specifically relies on:

SDCL 26‑8A‑31.1(5) – Allows a child victim of specified crimes to have “an item used to provide psychological comfort” while testifying.
SDCL 23A‑24‑10 – Permits “a child witness or a witness having a developmental disability to be accompanied by a certified therapeutic dog during the witness' testimony.”

From these provisions, Richter argues that because the Legislature identified (1) comfort items for children and (2) therapy dogs for children and developmentally disabled witnesses, courts lack authority to authorize other accommodations, such as a stuffed animal for a developmentally disabled adult.

The Court rejects this reasoning. It holds:

These statutes grant specific accommodations but do not expressly or impliedly limit the trial court’s inherent power to manage its courtroom and protect witnesses.
The statutes are silent on whether other, similar accommodations are forbidden. In the absence of clear legislative intent to restrict judicial authority, the default rule of inherent judicial control applies.

Thus, the question is not whether the Legislature has positively authorized a stuffed animal for an adult with developmental disabilities, but whether the judge’s decision to permit such an item falls within the range of reasonable, non-prejudicial trial-management choices under Rule 611 and inherent powers.

C. Reasoning Applied to D.W.’s Stuffed Animal

The Court emphasizes specific facts about D.W. and the accommodation:

D.W. was chronologically an adult (21 at trial), but had the intellectual functioning of approximately a seven-year-old child.
In a colloquy outside the jury’s presence, D.W. explicitly explained that he was nervous and that the stuffed animal helped him remain calm.
The trial judge found that the stuffed animal helped D.W. “endure the trial process” and that allowing it would facilitate truthful testimony without creating unfair prejudice.

On these facts, the Court concludes that:

Allowing D.W. to hold the stuffed animal was a reasonable method of protecting a vulnerable witness from undue emotional stress.
The accommodation promoted the truth-seeking function of the trial by making it more likely that D.W. would be able to testify coherently and completely.
There was no evidence that the stuffed animal would elicit improper sympathy or bias so as to create “unfair prejudice” against the defendant.

Accordingly, the decision was well within the trial court’s discretion, and no abuse of discretion occurred.

Key doctrinal point: The opinion establishes that courts in South Dakota may tailor accommodations for adult witnesses with developmental disabilities—akin to those legislatively provided for children—under their inherent authority, so long as the measures:

aid truthful testimony,
protect the witness from undue emotional harm, and
do not create unfair prejudice to the defendant.

II. Prosecutorial Questioning, Pre-Arrest Silence, and Plain Error

A. Plain Error Framework

Richter did not object at trial to the challenged line of cross-examination. As a result, appellate review is limited to plain error.

Citing State v. Guziak, 2021 S.D. 68, ¶ 10, 968 N.W.2d 196, 200, and State v. Jones, 2012 S.D. 7, ¶ 14, 810 N.W.2d 202, 206, the Court reiterates the four-part plain error test:

There must be error;
The error must be plain (clear or obvious under current law);
The error must affect the defendant’s substantial rights (usually meaning it must be prejudicial); and
Even then, the court will notice it only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Because the Court finds no error at all, the analysis effectively ends at step (1).

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct and Impeachment Standards

Richter argued on appeal that the prosecutor’s questions implied he had a duty to prove his innocence or to present evidence to law enforcement, thereby undermining the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof.

The Court frames the law on prosecutorial conduct by referencing:

State v. Rudloff, 2024 S.D. 73, ¶ 54, 15 N.W.3d 468, 487 – Defines prosecutorial misconduct as involving dishonest acts or use of “reprehensible methods.”
State v. McMillen, 2019 S.D. 40, ¶ 27, 931 N.W.2d 725, 733 – A conviction should not be reversed lightly based on a prosecutor’s comments alone; the key question is whether the conduct, in context, affected the fairness of the trial.
State v. Krueger, 2020 S.D. 57, ¶ 48, 950 N.W.2d 664, 676 – There are no rigid rules; each case must be assessed on its own facts.
State v. Pursley, 2016 S.D. 41, ¶ 14, 879 N.W.2d 757, 761 – Once a defendant testifies, the prosecutor may challenge credibility and highlight inconsistent statements.
Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 69 (2000) – Reinforces that a testifying defendant “may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness.”

The challenged line of questioning focused on Richter’s failure, after making incriminating admissions to Tracy in the recorded call, to inform law enforcement that he had supposedly made a “false confession” merely to get Tracy to stop bothering him.

The Court interprets this as a credibility attack, not a shift in the burden of proof:

Richter chose to testify and claimed that his recorded admissions were lies.
The prosecutor highlighted that, although he had multiple opportunities to tell law enforcement that he had lied, he had remained silent.
In context, the questioning sought to show that Richter’s trial explanation was implausible—consistent with standard impeachment practice.

C. Use of Pre-Arrest Silence and Prior Inconsistent Statements

The Court explicitly situates this within federal constitutional doctrine on impeachment by silence:

Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) – The Fifth Amendment is not violated when a defendant's pre-arrest silence is used to impeach his credibility, provided the silence preceded any Miranda warnings.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) – A defendant who voluntarily testifies must tell the truth and may be impeached using standard “truth-testing devices of the adversary process.”

The Court notes that there is no indication in the record that Richter was ever given Miranda warnings at the time in question. Therefore, the concern in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)—that post-Miranda silence, induced by assurances in the warnings, cannot later be used against a defendant—was not implicated.

Thus:

By taking the stand, Richter “cast aside his cloak of silence” and subjected himself to impeachment, including by reference to pre-arrest silence.
The prosecutor permissibly asked why he had not told police that his damaging admissions to Tracy were untrue if that were actually the case.
This was legitimate impeachment and not an effort to shift the burden of proof.

Since the cross-examination was proper under both state and federal law, there was no error, and plain error review does not proceed further.

III. Expert Testimony on Vulnerability of Developmentally Disabled Adults

A. Relevance and “Fit” of Generalized Vulnerability Evidence

Richter also failed to object at trial to the portion of Dr. Free’s testimony in which she stated that individuals with disabilities are more vulnerable to abuse. Accordingly, this issue is likewise reviewed for plain error.

The Court begins with the standard rule of relevance (SDCL 19‑19‑401, mirroring Federal Rule of Evidence 401):

Evidence is relevant if:

It has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and

The fact is of consequence in determining the action.

With respect to expert testimony, the Court invokes State v. Huber, 2010 S.D. 63, ¶ 33, 789 N.W.2d 283, 293, emphasizing that the key question is whether the expert testimony is “sufficiently tied to the facts of the case” to assist the jury in resolving factual disputes.

Here:

D.W. is a developmentally disabled adult whose capacity to consent is a central element under SDCL 22‑22‑7.2.
Dr. Free has specialized expertise in evaluating children and developmentally disabled adults for abuse.
Her testimony that such individuals are more vulnerable to abuse helps the jury understand the context of the alleged crimes and the dynamics of exploitation against cognitively impaired persons.

The Court further relies on State v. Johnson, 2015 S.D. 7, ¶ 33, 860 N.W.2d 235, 248, which allows experts to testify about general principles without applying them directly to the specific case, so long as this educational function assists the trier of fact.

Accordingly, Dr. Free’s testimony was:

Relevant to the issues before the jury;
Tied to the case facts (D.W.’s disability and vulnerability); and
Within the scope of permissible generalized expert testimony.

B. Distinguishing Permissible Education from Impermissible Vouching

Richter argued that Dr. Free’s testimony improperly “invaded the province of the jury” and, in effect, vouched for D.W.’s credibility, contrary to:

State v. Buchholtz, 2013 S.D. 96, ¶¶ 24–27, 841 N.W.2d 449, 457–58 – Reversed where a doctor went beyond describing characteristics of abused children and offered a medical diagnosis that the child was a victim of sexual abuse, thereby effectively telling the jury the defendant was guilty.
State v. Patterson, 2017 S.D. 64, ¶ 23, 904 N.W.2d 43, 50 – Expert testimony that simply tells the jury what conclusions to reach is impermissible.
State v. Snodgrass, 2020 S.D. 66, ¶ 48, 951 N.W.2d 792, 807 – “Experts cannot pass judgment on a witness’s truthfulness in the form of a medical opinion.”

The Court distinguishes Buchholtz carefully:

In Buchholtz, the doctor expressly concluded that the child was a victim of sexual abuse, thereby effectively informing the jury that the alleged abuse had occurred.
In Richter, by contrast, Dr. Free did not diagnose D.W. as sexually abused, nor did she state that she believed D.W.’s account or that abuse had in fact occurred.
She merely described a known, general phenomenon: that individuals with developmental disabilities are more susceptible to maltreatment, including sexual abuse.

The Court reiterates that it is the jury’s role to resolve conflicts, weight credibility, and determine whether abuse occurred (State v. Buchholtz, 2013 S.D. 96, ¶ 24). Dr. Free’s testimony did not usurp this function; it gave jurors a framework for understanding why and how individuals like D.W. might be targeted and how their disabilities affect their experiences and reports.

Therefore:

The testimony was educational, not conclusory.
It assisted the jury’s understanding without endorsing D.W.’s truthfulness.
No error occurred, and there is no basis even to reach the remaining steps of plain error analysis.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Denial of Judgment of Acquittal

A. Legal Standard and Elements of SDCL 22-22-7.2

A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a question of law reviewed de novo. (State v. Wolf, 2020 S.D. 15, ¶ 12; State v. Belt, 2024 S.D. 82, ¶ 35).

The standard: whether there is evidence in the record which, if believed by the factfinder, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court:

Views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict (Wolf, 2020 S.D. 15, ¶ 13);
Does not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility; and
Must uphold the verdict if the evidence supports a reasonable theory of guilt, even if another interpretation is possible.

Under SDCL 22‑22‑7.2 (sexual contact with a person incapable of consenting), as summarized in Belt, 2024 S.D. 82, ¶ 37, the State had to prove:

Richter knowingly engaged in sexual contact with D.W.;
Richter was at least fifteen years old;
D.W. was at least sixteen years old; and
D.W. was incapable of consenting due to physical or mental incapacity.

“Sexual contact” is defined by SDCL 22‑22‑7.1 as any touching, not amounting to rape, of the genitals (among other areas), with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either party.

“Mental incapacity” is defined by SDCL 22‑22‑1.5(3) as a “mental or developmental disease or disability that renders a person incapable of appraising the nature of the person’s conduct.”

B. Evidence of D.W.’s Mental Incapacity

The Court points to substantial evidence supporting the incapacity element:

Tracy’s testimony:
- D.W. functions intellectually at the level of a seven-year-old.
- He has difficulty learning, reading, and writing.
- He cannot live independently or maintain employment.
- He does not have a driver’s license.
Guardianship affidavit: The State introduced Tracy’s affidavit from her guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, detailing D.W.’s intellectual disabilities.
Dr. Free’s testimony: She observed that D.W. had clear developmental delays, processed information slowly, and had difficulty solving problems.

From this, a rational jury could find that D.W. had a developmental disability that rendered him “incapable of appraising the nature of [his] conduct,” satisfying the statutory definition of mental incapacity and supporting the conclusion that he could not validly consent to sexual contact.

C. Evidence of Sexual Contact and Intent

The first element—knowing engagement in sexual contact—is supported by:

D.W.’s testimony:
- On the four-wheeler, Richter placed his hand on D.W.’s genitals over clothing and continued after being told to stop.
- On the hot tub cover, Richter again touched D.W.’s “private parts” over clothing, ignoring repeated requests to stop.
- Behind the trailer, Richter reached inside D.W.’s pants and touched his bare genitals for a long period, again ignoring D.W.’s request to stop.
Richter’s recorded statements: The phone call with Tracy, played for the jury, contained multiple admissions:
- He acknowledged touching D.W.’s crotch area on the four-wheeler.
- He admitted to acts behind the trailer and said, “I admit to those three things.”
- Although he tried to minimize the extent of his conduct, he confirmed key aspects of D.W.’s account.

The nature of the touching (repeated and focused on D.W.’s genitals), combined with Richter’s persistence despite D.W.’s objections, allowed the jury to infer the requisite sexual intent (to arouse or gratify sexual desire).

D. Credibility and Appellate Deference

Richter’s sufficiency challenge is essentially a credibility attack on D.W., arguing that:

D.W. had “documented memory problems” and processing issues;
His account of the chronology of incidents varied over time; and
Therefore, his testimony is unreliable, leaving insufficient evidence to convict.

The Court responds by emphasizing:

Credibility determinations belong exclusively to the jury. Appellate courts do not second-guess jurors’ assessments of witness reliability or reweigh conflicting evidence (Wolf, 2020 S.D. 15, ¶ 13).
The jury was aware of D.W.’s cognitive limitations and inconsistencies; defense counsel highlighted them, yet the jury still found D.W. credible enough to convict.
The recorded admissions by Richter provided strong corroboration, further undercutting a sufficiency challenge.

Given the combined weight of D.W.’s testimony, Tracy’s corroborating testimony and actions, Dr. Free’s expert description of D.W.’s disabilities, and Richter’s partial admissions, the Court concludes that a rational jury could find each element of SDCL 22‑22‑7.2 proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal was therefore proper.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Inherent Judicial Authority vs. Statutory Provisions

Courts have a built-in (inherent) power to run trials fairly and efficiently. This includes:

Deciding how witnesses testify (standing, sitting, with an interpreter, etc.),
Maintaining order and decorum, and
Protecting vulnerable witnesses from undue emotional harm while they testify.

Even when the Legislature passes laws spelling out some specific trial procedures (like comfort items or therapy dogs), this does not mean judges lose their general power to manage other aspects of witness testimony. Only if a statute clearly says “you may not do more than this” does it restrict that inherent authority.

2. Plain Error Review

If a lawyer does not object during trial, the issue is usually considered waived. An appellate court can still step in under “plain error” review, but only when:

There really was an error;
The error was clear and obvious;
The error probably changed the outcome; and
Not fixing it would seriously damage the fairness or reputation of the justice system.

This is intentionally a very high bar. It is meant for extraordinary mistakes, not routine ones.

3. Pre-Arrest Silence and Impeachment

People have a right to remain silent in criminal investigations, but how that silence can be used in court depends on timing:

Before police give Miranda warnings (“you have the right to remain silent…”): if the defendant later testifies and gives a story inconsistent with earlier conduct, the prosecutor can usually ask, “Why didn’t you say that earlier?” to challenge credibility.
After Miranda warnings: the Supreme Court has held (in Doyle) that the defendant’s post-warning silence normally can’t be used against them at trial.

In Richter, the silence at issue occurred before any Miranda warnings (and, indeed, before any arrest), so the prosecutor’s questions were a legitimate way to test the sincerity of his trial explanation.

4. Expert “Vouching” vs. Education

An expert witness can:

Explain general patterns (e.g., “developmentally disabled adults are more vulnerable to abuse”),
Describe common behaviors (e.g., delayed reporting, confusion), and
Help the jury understand technical or psychological concepts.

But an expert cannot:

State that a specific witness is telling the truth, or
Diagnose “this person is a victim of sexual abuse” in a way that leaves the jury with no real decision to make.

The line is between educating the jury and deciding the case for them. In Richter, Dr. Free stayed on the educational side of that line.

5. Mental Incapacity and Ability to Consent

“Consent” in sexual offenses is not just about whether a person said “yes” or “no” in a literal sense. If a person:

Has such a severe mental or developmental disability that they cannot understand what the conduct means, or
Cannot grasp its nature, risks, or significance,

then the law may treat them as incapable of consenting, even if they did not verbally object. SDCL 22‑22‑1.5(3) captures this by focusing on whether the disability renders the person “incapable of appraising the nature of [their] conduct.”

Impact and Future Implications

1. Witness Accommodations for Vulnerable Adults

The most important forward-looking aspect of Richter lies in its treatment of accommodations for developmentally disabled adult witnesses:

Trial courts are not restricted to the specific accommodations listed in SDCL 26‑8A‑31.1 and 23A‑24‑10.
They may extend child-like accommodations (e.g., comfort items) to cognitively child-like adults where justified by the witness’s needs.
The guiding touchstones are:
- Assisting truthful testimony,
- Protecting the witness from undue emotional harm, and
- Avoiding unfair prejudice to the defendant.

Practically, this decision will likely:

Encourage judges to be more open to creative, low-impact accommodations (e.g., support items, modified seating arrangements, breaks), especially in cases involving individuals with cognitive impairments.
Require defense counsel to focus objections on demonstrable prejudice (e.g., dramatic displays likely to inflame the jury), rather than on a lack of explicit statutory authorization.

2. Prosecution and Defense Strategy in Sexual Abuse Cases

The decision supports the use of:

Recorded admissions and partial confessions as powerful corroborative evidence;
Expert testimony on vulnerabilities of particular victim populations to help explain otherwise puzzling behavior (e.g., delayed reporting, inconsistent timelines); and
Impeachment by pre-arrest silence where a defendant changes his story at trial.

Defense counsel should:

Be prepared to object contemporaneously to lines of questioning that risk crossing from impeachment into implied burden shifting;
Address the admissibility and scope of expert testimony in pretrial motions where possible, to litigate the vouching/education line in advance; and
Carefully weigh the risks of having a defendant testify when there is a damaging recorded admission that will be used as a baseline for impeachment.

3. Clarification of Expert Boundaries

Richter refines South Dakota’s vouching jurisprudence by confirming:

Experts may speak in generalized terms about the vulnerabilities of defined groups (e.g., developmentally disabled adults) without necessarily vouching for a particular complainant.
The “Buchholtz error” arises not from general explanations, but from case-specific diagnoses that, in substance, tell the jury “this witness was abused.”

This makes it more feasible for the State to present contextual expert evidence in cases involving:

Children,
Individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities, and
Other vulnerable populations (e.g., those with mental illnesses or cognitive disorders).

4. Reinforcement of Appellate Deference on Sufficiency

The sufficiency analysis underscores:

Appellate courts will not replace the jury’s view of witness credibility with their own, even where the witness has cognitive impairments or inconsistencies.
The presence of corroborating evidence (like a recorded admission) dramatically strengthens the State’s position on appeal.

This reinforces that issues such as:

Memory problems,
Processing delays, and
Inconsistent sequencing of events

are generally matters for cross-examination and jury argument, not grounds for appellate reversal when the jury has chosen to believe the complainant despite those issues.

Conclusion

State v. Richter, 2025 S.D. 58, stands out as a significant affirmation of the trial court’s inherent authority to manage the courtroom and accommodate vulnerable witnesses, even in the absence of explicit statutory directives. The Court holds that allowing a developmentally disabled adult to testify while holding a stuffed animal is within the “range of permissible choices” entrusted to trial judges and does not conflict with statutes that enumerate particular accommodations for child and disabled witnesses.

The decision also clarifies:

The appropriate use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a testifying defendant’s trial explanation for prior admissions;
The scope of permissible expert testimony on the vulnerabilities of developmentally disabled individuals without running afoul of the prohibition on vouching; and
The substantial deference owed to jury verdicts where there is direct testimony from the complainant, corroborated by the defendant’s own recorded statements and expert evidence concerning the complainant’s incapacity.

In the broader legal landscape, Richter reinforces a flexible, fact-sensitive approach to courtroom management and evidentiary admissibility in cases involving cognitively impaired victims. It encourages trial courts to craft reasonable accommodations that enable such witnesses to participate meaningfully and truthfully in the justice process, while maintaining the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the jury’s ultimate authority to decide guilt or innocence.