Introduction

In Clark County Deputy Marshals Association v. Clark County, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 49 (Oct. 23, 2025), the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment declaring that deputy marshals serving the Eighth Judicial District Court (EJDC) are employees of the judiciary—not of Clark County—and that, although they possess peace officer powers, they are not employed by a “law enforcement agency” under NRS Chapter 289. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stiglich held that the Nevada Constitution’s separation of powers and the judiciary’s inherent authority to administer its own affairs empower courts to employ and direct deputy marshals to perform core court-security and courtroom-management functions. As a result, the Peace Officer Bill of Rights procedures in NRS 289 did not entitle appellant Deputy Raymundo Enriquez to the hearing he sought to challenge a written reprimand.

The case pitted the Clark County Deputy Marshals Association (CCDMA) and Deputy Enriquez against Clark County and the EJDC. The key issues were: (1) whether deputy marshals serving the EJDC are judicial or county employees; (2) whether their peace officer certifications and duties transform them into employees of an executive-branch “law enforcement agency” under NRS 289.010; and (3) whether NRS 289’s hearing protections apply to discipline imposed by the court.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Clark County and the EJDC. It held:

• Deputy marshals at the EJDC serve within the judicial department and are employees of the court, not the county. Their work—preserving order in court, attending the jury, opening and closing court, and performing duties assigned by judges (NRS 3.310)—is integral to adjudication and courtroom security, which fall within the judiciary’s inherent powers.
• Classifying court deputy marshals as judicial employees does not violate separation of powers. The judiciary may hire, direct, and manage personnel necessary to maintain security and administer its proceedings.
• Deputy marshals’ peace officer status does not render the EJDC a “law enforcement agency” under NRS 289.010. A “law enforcement agency” must (a) have a duty to enforce the law and (b) employ persons with peace officer powers. EJDC marshals’ primary duty is not law enforcement but judicial support and security.
• Because EJDC marshals are judicial employees and not employed by a law enforcement agency, NRS Chapter 289’s hearing provisions do not apply to Deputy Enriquez’s reprimand. The court also rejected ancillary arguments (e.g., that county salary setting controls employer status).

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

The court’s analysis draws from Nevada constitutional structure and a line of cases recognizing inherent judicial authority and clarifying the contours of executive law enforcement powers:

• Separation of powers and inherent judicial authority
  • Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1(1): Establishes separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial departments.
  • Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 20, 422 P.2d 237, 242 (1967): Executive power entails carrying out and enforcing laws, capturing the classic law enforcement role of crime prevention and apprehension.
  • Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261, 163 P.3d 428, 439 (2007): Each department possesses inherent power to administer its own affairs—courts can protect themselves and manage their operations.
  • Sun Realty v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 91 Nev. 774, 776, 542 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1975): Recognizes “inherent court power” to protect and administer judicial affairs.
  • City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Ct., 129 Nev. 348, 365, 302 P.3d 1118, 1130 (2013): Selecting and managing court employees is directly tied to the judiciary’s essential functions.
  • Oade v. State, 114 Nev. 619, 621, 960 P.2d 336, 338 (1998): Trial judges are responsible for maintaining order and decorum.
  • State v. Hartzog, 635 P.2d 694, 701 (Wash. 1981): Trial courts have discretion to provide courtroom security.
  • In re Petition of Governor, 846 A.2d 1148, 1153 (N.H. 2004) (quoting In re Mone, 719 A.2d 626, 633 (N.H. 1998)): Judicial administrative powers to control courtrooms do not violate separation of powers; security is integral to adjudication.
  • State v. Graham, 203 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Iowa 1973): Officers carrying out court orders are part of the judicial machinery.
• Court attendants, bailiffs, and statutory structure
  • NRS 3.310(1)-(3): Authorizes courts to appoint deputy marshals to preserve order, attend the jury, open/close court, and perform other judge-directed duties.
  • Board of County Commissioners v. Devine, 72 Nev. 57, 294 P.2d 366 (1956): Recognizes the court’s inherent power to secure necessary attendants and confirms bailiffs are subject to the judge’s instruction and control when statutory mechanisms impede judicial administration.
  • NRS 3.100 (modernized in 2023): Prevents counties from imposing requirements that deprive courts of the resources needed to fulfill constitutional functions; echoes Devine in preserving judicial capacity to administer justice.
  • Merrill v. Phelps, 84 P.2d 74, 78 (Ariz. 1938); Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa. 1949): Statutes concerning court attendants are constitutional so long as they do not hamper performance of the courts’ constitutional duties.
  • Wis. Prof. Police Ass’n v. Dane County, 439 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989): When sheriffs “attend” court, they act as officers of the court with a duty to carry out court orders—underscoring that attendance is a judicial function.
  • Mayenbaum v. Murphy, 5 Nev. 383, 388 (1870): Recognizes sheriffs as officers of the court when serving court process.
• Law enforcement function and NRS 289
  • Hill v. State, 95 Nev. 327, 333, 594 P.2d 699, 703 (1979): Defines the law enforcement function as preventing crime and apprehending criminals.
  • NRS 289.010 (2019 definition; renumbered in 2025): A “law enforcement agency” must both (a) have a duty to enforce the law and (b) employ persons with some or all powers of a peace officer.
  • Nevada examples confirming peace officer powers can exist outside law enforcement agencies: NRS 289.155 (Supreme Court security personnel with peace officer powers), NRS 289.240 (certain DHHS personnel with peace officer powers), NRS 289.260(1) (State Parks rangers/employees with arrest powers). These provisions show that possession of peace officer powers does not itself define the employer as a “law enforcement agency.”
• Standards and procedural posture
  • Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005): Summary judgment standard; de novo review for summary judgment.
  • Lawrence v. Clark County, 127 Nev. 390, 393, 254 P.3d 606, 608 (2011): De novo review of constitutional and statutory interpretation.
  • Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Restaurant, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006): Court declines to address claims lacking cogent argument and pertinent authority.
• Logical clarity
  • Drawing on general logic sources (e.g., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) and case law (In re Stewart Foods, Inc., 64 F.3d 141, 145 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995); City of Green Ridge v. Kreisel, 25 S.W.3d 559, 563–64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)), the court rejected appellants’ “affirming the consequent” fallacy—i.e., that because law enforcement agencies employ persons with peace officer powers, any person with peace officer powers must be employed by a law enforcement agency.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three principal steps.

1. Inherent judicial authority and separation of powers

   The Nevada Constitution separates powers among branches, but also endows each branch with inherent authority to carry out essential functions without subordination to the others. For the judiciary, those functions include hearing cases, maintaining order, ensuring safety, and administering court operations. Deputy marshals’ enumerated duties under NRS 3.310—preserving order, attending juries, opening/closing court, and carrying out judge-directed tasks—are quintessentially judicial. Accordingly, the EJDC’s employment and supervision of deputy marshals follow from the court’s constitutional power to run safe and orderly proceedings and do not offend separation of powers.

2. “Appointment,” “attendance,” and the judicial workforce

   Appellants’ reliance on the statutory language that courts “appoint” marshals, the term “attend,” and the historical reference to “attendants” in prior law (pre-2023 NRS 3.100) does not reclassify marshals as county employees. Courts routinely appoint their own officers (e.g., masters, reporters, clerks’ deputies) who are unmistakably judicial personnel. The court underscored that Devine affirms judges’ authority to secure necessary attendants and control bailiffs—reinforcing that security-related court staff are under judicial direction. Modern NRS 3.100(3)-(4) further guards against county-imposed constraints that would hamper courts’ constitutional duties.

3. Peace officer powers do not make the EJDC a “law enforcement agency” under NRS 289

   The NRS 289.010 definition requires two elements for an employer to qualify as a “law enforcement agency”: a duty to enforce the law and employment of persons with peace officer powers. EJDC deputy marshals do not have as their primary duty the enforcement of laws (i.e., preventing crime and apprehending criminals). Their mission is to enable the court’s adjudicative function by providing security, maintaining order, and executing judge-directed tasks. Possession of peace officer powers does not invert the analysis; the statute’s text conditions agency status on its mission and staffing, not the other way around. Nevada’s statutes provide multiple examples of peace officer powers vested in employees outside law enforcement agencies (e.g., Supreme Court security staff). Appellants’ contrary logic commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent and is therefore unsound.

The court also rejected secondary arguments. County involvement in setting salaries does not determine which branch employs a person; the Legislature often sets salary maximums for state executive employees without changing their branch alignment. Finally, arguments based on the Clark County Code’s classification of competitive versus non-competitive service were inadequately briefed and not addressed.

Impact of the Decision

This opinion crystallizes several important rules for Nevada public employment, judicial administration, and law enforcement statutes:

• Judicial control over court security statewide: Trial courts in Nevada may hire, supervise, and discipline deputy marshals and bailiffs as judicial employees, not county executive personnel, when those roles are dedicated to courtroom security and judicial support. This ensures courts can independently guarantee safety, order, and the effective conduct of proceedings.
• Limits on NRS 289 “Peace Officer Bill of Rights” coverage: Peace officer status alone does not trigger NRS 289 protections. To be covered, the employer must be a “law enforcement agency” within the statute’s definition. Judicially employed marshals—whose primary duties are court security and judicial support—are outside NRS 289’s hearing requirements. Unions representing court marshals should reassess strategies that presuppose NRS 289 procedures apply.
• Local government labor law implications: The opinion aligns with prior determinations that courts are not “local government employers” under NRS 288.060, limiting the Local Government Employee-Management Relations Board’s reach over court-employed marshals. Collective bargaining and grievance mechanisms for these employees will be governed by judicial branch policies and any court-specific administrative procedures rather than county labor frameworks.
• Budgeting and resource allocation: While counties often fund court operations, NRS 3.100(3)-(4) and this decision prevent counties from using budgetary levers to deprive courts of needed personnel or to impose employment structures that compromise judicial independence. Inter-branch budget negotiations must respect this constitutional boundary.
• Clarified interpretation of “law enforcement agency”: The opinion provides a clear methodology: first ask whether the employer has a duty to enforce the law. Only if that is satisfied does the presence of peace officer employees complete the definition. This two-step reading will guide future disputes across contexts involving agencies with mixed public safety functions.
• Operational clarity for courts and sheriffs: The ruling distinguishes the judiciary’s authority to manage courtroom security from the executive branch’s general law enforcement mission. Where sheriffs or other executive officers “attend” court pursuant to judicial direction, they act as officers of the court—confirming that security inside the courtroom is constitutionally a judicial matter.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Separation of powers: Each branch (legislative, executive, judicial) has distinct roles and cannot control essential functions of another. Courts must be able to conduct proceedings safely and fairly without dependence on or subordination to other branches.
• Inherent judicial authority: Powers that are not expressly written in statutes but are necessary for courts to function—such as maintaining order, securing the courtroom, and managing court staff.
• Peace officer powers vs. law enforcement agency: A person may have peace officer powers (e.g., to arrest in specific contexts) without working for a “law enforcement agency.” Under NRS 289.010, a law enforcement agency must both enforce laws and employ peace officers. Courts do not enforce laws as their primary duty; they adjudicate disputes.
• “Appointment” vs. “employment”: Courts “appoint” various officers (e.g., masters, reporters, deputies to the clerk). Appointment is a means of filling positions; it does not imply that the employee is outside the judiciary.
• Affirming the consequent (logical fallacy): The faulty reasoning that if “All law enforcement agencies employ peace officers,” then “All employers of peace officers are law enforcement agencies.” The latter does not follow from the former.
• Summary judgment and de novo review: Summary judgment is granted when no material facts are disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. De novo review means the appellate court decides the legal question anew without deference to the lower court’s conclusions.

Conclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision establishes a clear and consequential principle: courts possess inherent constitutional authority to employ, direct, and discipline deputy marshals who ensure courtroom security and support judicial operations. Peace officer certification does not convert court-employed marshals into executive-branch law enforcement personnel, nor does it bring them within the scope of NRS Chapter 289’s “law enforcement agency” provisions. By affirming the EJDC’s status as the marshals’ employer, the court fortifies judicial independence and clarifies the statutory framework that governs court security personnel.

For litigants, unions, and public employers, the key takeaway is that NRS 289’s hearing protections do not apply to disciplinary actions taken by the judiciary against its marshals, and county labor regimes do not control the employment relationship. Going forward, disputes over court marshal discipline, procedures, and working conditions will be resolved within the judicial branch’s administrative structures, firmly rooted in the judiciary’s constitutional authority to administer justice safely and effectively.

Case and Counsel

• Case: Clark County Deputy Marshals Association and Raymundo Enriquez v. Clark County and Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 49 (Oct. 23, 2025)
• Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
• Opinion by: Justice Stiglich; Chief Justice Herndon and Justice Parraguirre concurred
• Holding: Affirmed summary judgment for respondents