Informational Injury Standing Under the NVRA Requires Concrete Downstream Consequences

Introduction

In Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 3d Cir. Nos. 23-1590, 23-1591, 23-3045 (Apr. 25, 2025), the Third Circuit addressed whether a civic‐engagement organization, the Public Interest Legal Foundation (“PILF”), had Article III standing to sue under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”). PILF, based in Virginia, had requested from the Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth records related to a PennDOT “glitch” that allegedly allowed non-citizens to register to vote. After Pennsylvania denied access, PILF filed suit under Section 8 of the NVRA (52 U.S.C. § 20510(b)). The District Court concluded PILF suffered a “purely informational injury” sufficient for Article III standing and granted in part PILF’s summary judgment motion. On appeal, the Third Circuit revisited the standards for “informational injury” in light of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 668 (2021), and its own precedents.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court’s orders, holding that PILF lacked Article III standing from the outset. Applying TransUnion and this Court’s post‐TransUnion cases (notably Kelly v. RealPage, Inc., 47 F.4th 202 (3d Cir. 2022)), the panel clarified that a statutory “informational injury” requires:

Denial of information to which the plaintiff is entitled under law; and
A concrete, non-speculative downstream consequence or “adverse effect” that bears a close nexus to the interest Congress sought to protect.

Because the NVRA is aimed at increasing voter registration and participation in federal elections—not solely at disseminating government records—the court held that PILF’s generalized desire to “study and analyze” voting records, to produce educational materials, and its litigation expenditures did not constitute a concrete harm tied to the NVRA’s core purpose. No Pennsylvania voter or member organization had suffered an injury, and PILF offered no evidence of actual downstream consequences. Accordingly, the Third Circuit directed dismissal for want of subject‐matter jurisdiction.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Public Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) – Held FOIA‐like suits require only denial of information; served as early guide to informational‐injury standing.
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) – Voters had standing to sue for disclosure of political committee data; emphasized direct link to “most basic” voting rights.
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 668 (2021) – Clarified that informational injuries must cause adverse, concrete harms akin to traditional torts; mere statutory violation without real‐world effect is insufficient.
Kelly v. RealPage, Inc., 47 F.4th 202 (3d Cir. 2022) – Applied TransUnion to require both denial of information and proof of downstream effects; established nexus test.
Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott, 49 F.4th 931 (5th Cir. 2022) – Reached similar conclusion in NVRA context, rejecting pure denial‐only standing absent concrete harms to Texas voters or organizations.

2. Legal Reasoning

Article III standing requires (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. In TransUnion, the Supreme Court imposed a two‐part test for informational injuries: plaintiffs must allege both the denial of information they are statutorily entitled to and concrete, non‐speculative adverse effects resulting from that denial. The Third Circuit, in Kelly, endorsed this rule and emphasized the need for a “nexus” between the downstream harm and the statutory interest.

The NVRA’s central objectives are (a) to expand voter registration and participation in federal elections, (b) to maintain accurate voter rolls, and (c) to protect election integrity. Its public‐inspection provision (52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)) is one element of a broader statutory scheme—not an end in itself. Accordingly, a plaintiff invoking “informational injury” under the NVRA must show more than denial of records: it must demonstrate concrete downstream consequences that hinder its or voters’ ability to participate in or monitor elections, consistent with the NVRA’s goals.

PILF alleged three “downstream consequences”: (1) inability “to study and analyze” Pennsylvania’s voter‐list maintenance, (2) frustration of its production of educational materials, and (3) time and money spent in litigation. The court found none of these met TransUnion’s requirements. PILF provided no evidence that denial of these records hindered its or any voter’s actual participation in elections or any specific enforcement activity. Its mission to produce reports or educational publications is commendable but not tied to a concrete NVRA purpose. Expenditures to correct a purely legal grievance do not create standing.

3. Impact

This decision sharpens the limits on NVRA citizen suits and, by analogy, on FOIA‐style claims in complex statutory contexts. Key takeaways:

Organizations and private litigants may not treat NVRA’s disclosure requirement as a standalone gratulatory right to all voter‐related data without showing concrete harm.
“Informational injury” suits under statutes whose principal aims exceed transparency must identify tangible downstream consequences tied to statutory objectives.
Citizen suits under the NVRA will likely require either individual voter plaintiffs or organizational plaintiffs with members personally affected by record denials.
The decision discourages “manufacturing” standing through litigation expenditures alone.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Informational Injury: A harm arising from being denied access to information required by statute. Under TransUnion, it also demands a real‐world adverse effect caused by that denial.
Article III Standing: The constitutional threshold requiring (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact, (2) traceability to the defendant’s conduct, and (3) likelihood of redress by a court.
Downstream Consequences: Tangible impacts or real‐world harms that flow from the primary statutory violation (e.g., inability to register voters, monitor election integrity, or participate in civic processes).
NVRA’s Core Purpose: To increase voter registration and participation in federal elections while ensuring accurate voter rolls—beyond mere public access to records.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s ruling in Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania reaffirms that under the NVRA, a plaintiff alleging an “informational injury” must show both denial of statutorily‐mandated records and concrete downstream consequences directly linked to the statute’s aim of expanding voter participation and preserving electoral integrity. Mere refusal to hand over data—or the time and expense of litigation—cannot by itself confer Article III standing. This decision narrows the scope of NVRA citizen suits and provides guidance to courts and litigants on the indispensable nexus between denied information and tangible harms that Congress intended to prevent.