Introduction

This appeal arises from a tragic sequence of events set in motion when a two-year-old child, K.M., fatally shot himself with a firearm left unattended in a vehicle by the defendant, Avis Coward. In the aftermath, Coward—already a multi-convicted felon—undertook a scheme to conceal his possession of the weapon and to destroy other incriminating evidence. Federal prosecutors charged Coward with the felon-in-possession offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); separate obstruction-related charges were dismissed when Coward pleaded guilty to the gun count while preserving his constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for Coward’s role in orchestrating a conspiracy to tamper with evidence.

On appeal, Coward mounted a two-pronged challenge:

• A facial and as-applied Second Amendment attack on § 922(g)(1); and
• A challenge to the application of the § 3B1.1(c) leadership enhancement to his sentence.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in full. In doing so, the court reinforced its “dangerousness-based” framework for evaluating Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) and clarified how leadership can be established under the Sentencing Guidelines in obstruction conspiracies—particularly through control of critical information, time-sensitive direction, and the pursuit of intangible benefits such as evading criminal liability.

Summary of the Opinion

Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1): The panel rejected Coward’s facial challenge as foreclosed by United States v. Williams, which held that American historical tradition allows disarming dangerous persons and that § 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional because “most applications” target the dangerous (113 F.4th 637, 657 (6th Cir. 2024)). The as-applied challenge also failed because Coward’s criminal record included multiple offenses that render him “dangerous” under Williams—most notably an armed carjacking, which alone would be sufficient, and additional crimes that inherently threaten public safety (e.g., drug offenses, breaking and entering, and high-speed flight from police). Given that even a single dangerous offense can be dispositive, the court held that Coward falls within the category Congress may permissibly disarm.

Leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c): The court upheld a two-level enhancement based on Coward’s role in recruiting, directing, and supervising accomplices (Kelley and Schieberl) in an evidence-tampering conspiracy. Critical facts included his use of coded language on recorded jail calls, his control of key information (the location of the firearm and vehicle), his insistence on immediate action, his follow-up supervision, and his disproportionate benefit from the scheme (avoiding serious criminal exposure). The court emphasized that:

• Leadership may be established even if accomplices voluntarily join or make independent decisions.
• More than one person can be a leader in a single conspiracy.
• “Fruits” of the offense include intangible benefits; thus, the defendant can “claim a larger share” by securing personal legal protection even if a confederate receives tangible proceeds (like drugs) from selling gun parts.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): Central to the Second Amendment analysis. Williams adopted a history-and-tradition framework and held that Congress may disarm persons deemed dangerous. It defined two broad categories of “dangerous” crimes—(1) crimes against the person (e.g., murder, rape, assault, robbery) and (2) crimes that inherently pose a significant threat of danger (e.g., drug trafficking and burglary). Williams also established that courts may look beyond the predicate felony to a defendant’s entire criminal record and other judicially noticeable facts (including PSR details), and that one dangerous offense can be dispositive.
• United States v. Fordham, No. 24-1491, 2025 WL 318229 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025): Cited for the propriety of considering “judicially noticeable information” like offense conduct contained in a presentence investigation report and statements at sentencing when assessing dangerousness for § 922(g)(1) challenges.
• United States v. Martin, 378 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2004): Recognized the inherent dangers posed by high-speed flight from law enforcement, reinforcing that such conduct endangers officers, passengers, and the public—supporting the dangerousness determination.
• United States v. Loney, 331 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2003): Provided the standard of review: de novo review of the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).
• United States v. Minter, 80 F.4th 753 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1078 (2024): Clarified that the government bears the burden to prove Guidelines enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence.
• United States v. Hills, 27 F.4th 1155 (6th Cir. 2022): Distinguished between clear-error review for factual findings and de novo review for the legal applicability of Guideline enhancements.
• United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975 (6th Cir. 2013), citing Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001): Emphasized deference in fact-bound sentencing determinations and confirmed multiple leaders can exist in a single conspiracy. Washington also repeats the non-exhaustive leadership factors.
• United States v. Gort-Didonato, 109 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 1997): Held that a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement is warranted if the defendant organizes, leads, manages, or supervises at least one other participant.
• United States v. Tanner, 837 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2016): Restated the leadership factors: decision-making authority, nature and scope of participation, recruitment, planning, control over others, and share of the fruits of the crime.
• United States v. Kraig, 99 F.3d 1361 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Taniguchi, 49 F. App’x 506 (6th Cir. 2002): These decisions support the proposition that control over critical information—where co-conspirators “turn to” the defendant for insider knowledge—can itself evidence leadership or supervision.
• United States v. Bandy, 239 F.3d 802 (6th Cir. 2001): Approved leadership enhancement where the defendant offered “like-minded” accomplices the option to participate, underscoring that voluntariness of others does not negate the defendant’s leadership role.
• United States v. Hopson, 134 F. App’x 781 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805 (6th Cir. 2000): Distinguished between mere essential assistance (supplying a van, storage, or contraband) and true leadership (recruitment, planning, monitoring). The present opinion situates Coward in the latter camp.

Legal Reasoning

1) Second Amendment: Facial and As-Applied Challenges to § 922(g)(1)

Facial challenge. The panel’s response is straightforward: Williams forecloses facial attacks by holding that § 922(g)(1) aligns with the historical tradition of disarming dangerous persons and, in “most applications,” targets that category. A statute that constitutionally applies in most cases is “not susceptible” to facial invalidation.

As-applied challenge. The court applied Williams’s holistic “dangerousness” inquiry. Key features of that inquiry include:

• Consideration of the defendant’s entire criminal record, not just the predicate felony for § 922(g)(1).
• Use of judicially noticeable information beyond convictions—such as PSR offense conduct and sentencing statements (Williams; Fordham).
• A single dangerous offense can be dispositive; some offenses are “totally dispositive” of dangerousness.
• Dangerousness includes two broad categories: crimes against the body (e.g., murder, rape, assault, robbery) and inherently dangerous crimes (e.g., drug trafficking, burglary).

Applying these principles, the panel found Coward’s record more than sufficient:

• Armed carjacking: Coward brandished a .45 caliber handgun, demanded the victims exit and leave keys, and later admitted willingness to inflict death or serious harm—an offense the court treats as presumptively dangerous and alone sufficient to sustain disarmament.
• Additional dangerous conduct: The opinion catalogs a series of inherently risky felonies: carrying a concealed weapon, possessing and distributing drugs, breaking and entering, and leading police on a high-speed chase (blowing a red light, crashing, and fleeing on foot)—the latter specifically recognized as endangering the public (Martin).

Given this history, the court concluded that Coward is squarely within the class Congress may disarm, defeating his as-applied challenge.

2) Sentencing: Leadership Enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)

Standards and factors. The government must prove the enhancement by a preponderance (Minter). The district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error; the legal conclusion is reviewed de novo (Hills). The analysis is fact-bound, warranting deference (Washington; Buford). Under § 3B1.1(c), an enhancement applies where a defendant was an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” of criminal activity involving at least one other participant (Gort-Didonato). The commonly referenced (non-exhaustive) factors include decision-making authority, nature of participation, recruitment, planning, control over others, scope of activity, and the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits (Tanner; Washington; Application Note 4 to § 3B1.1).

Application to Coward. The record showed:

• Recruitment and initiation: Coward initiated contact with Kelley and Schieberl from jail and elicited their commitment to conceal incriminating evidence.
• Information control: He alone knew the precise hiding location (e.g., “rain troughs” near a fence) and directed the search, a form of “insider information” long recognized as probative of leadership (Kraig; Dupree; Taniguchi).
• Directives and timing: He issued urgent, time-specific orders (“right now, like right now, right now”) and supervised compliance through follow-up calls (e.g., confirming “two phones” were recovered).
• Use of coded communications: Employing “phone” as a code word for firearms demonstrated planning and operational control and supported the inference of leadership in an obstruction conspiracy.
• Disproportionate benefit: Coward stood to gain the most valuable “fruit” of the conspiracy—minimizing or avoiding significant criminal exposure—an intangible benefit the panel held counts in the profit/benefit factor, even though Kelley received tangible drugs from selling gun parts.

Rebutting Coward’s four principal objections:

• “Kelley volunteered.” Voluntariness of a confederate’s participation does not negate leadership where the defendant recruits and directs (Bandy).
• “Kelley made independent decisions.” Independent decision-making by a subordinate about implementation details does not erase the leader’s role in setting the objective, dictating timing, and supervising progress. Moreover, multiple leaders can coexist (Washington).
• “No larger share of the profits.” The “fruits” of criminal activity include intangible benefits. A defendant who orchestrates obstruction to avoid prosecution claims the lion’s share of value even if a confederate pockets tangible proceeds.
• “Just providing information isn’t leadership.” When the “information asymmetry” is such that conspirators must “turn to” the defendant for critical insider knowledge, courts have treated that as evidence of leadership or supervision (Kraig; Dupree). Here, Coward did far more—he recruited, planned, directed, and monitored.

On this record, the enhancement was comfortably supported.

Impact and Forward-Looking Considerations

A. Second Amendment Litigation in the Sixth Circuit

This decision fortifies Williams’s “dangerousness” framework in two ways:

• Facial challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain non-starters in the Sixth Circuit because the statute’s “most applications” disarm individuals with dangerous criminal histories.
• As-applied challenges face steep headwinds where the record contains any one “totally dispositive” dangerous offense (e.g., armed robbery, carjacking), or a pattern of inherently dangerous conduct. The panel’s reliance on PSR narratives, arrest facts, and sentencing colloquy—consistent with Williams and Fordham—signals that courts will consider a holistic factual picture, not just bare convictions.

Defense implications: Defendants contemplating as-applied challenges must confront the full sweep of their record and should be prepared to contest PSR descriptions and other judicially noticeable materials. Arguments emphasizing aged convictions or post-conviction rehabilitation may need to be robust to overcome a single serious violent felony.

B. Sentencing: Leadership Enhancements in Obstruction/Tampering Conspiracies

The opinion underscores two practical points that will reverberate in obstruction cases:

• Information control and time-sensitive direction can establish leadership. Where a defendant alone knows the evidence’s location, directs immediate retrieval, enforces the use of code, and monitors progress, a leadership finding is likely—even if confederates operate with some independence.
• Intangible benefits count toward the “fruits” factor. Avoidance of criminal liability can outweigh any tangible benefit flowing to confederates. This clarification widens the lens on “profit” and helps justify leadership enhancements where the primary payoff is legal insulation rather than money or goods.

Prosecution and defense strategy:

• Prosecutors will find recorded jail calls especially potent for proving recruitment, planning, and supervision, as well as for demonstrating coded communications indicative of organizational control.
• Defense counsel should scrutinize the scope of alleged “control,” push back on the characterization of information-sharing as supervisory, and develop evidence of equal roles (to argue the case is a partnership rather than a hierarchy) while recognizing that “more than one leader” can exist.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge asserts a law is unconstitutional in most of its applications; an as-applied challenge argues it is unconstitutional as applied to the specific defendant’s facts.
• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): Federal law making it unlawful for a person convicted of a felony to possess a firearm.
• “Dangerousness” in Second Amendment jurisprudence (within the Sixth Circuit): A historically grounded concept used to assess whether Congress may disarm certain categories of individuals. A person’s entire criminal history and related facts are considered; a single serious or inherently dangerous offense can suffice to deem the person disarmable.
• Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): A report prepared for sentencing that details the offense conduct, criminal history, and other relevant information; courts can rely on it (when undisputed) to make findings and, in the Sixth Circuit, to inform dangerousness assessments in Second Amendment challenges.
• U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) “leadership” enhancement: A two-level increase if the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of criminal activity with at least one other participant. Courts examine decision-making authority, recruitment, planning, control over others, scope, and share of the “fruits.”
• “Fruits” of the offense: Benefits derived from the criminal activity; can be tangible (money, drugs) or intangible (evasion of liability, protection from prosecution). The latter can justify a leadership finding when the defendant stands to gain most from the scheme’s success.
• Standards of review: “De novo” means the appellate court decides the legal question anew; “clear error” means factual findings are upheld unless the appellate court has a firm conviction a mistake was made; fact-bound sentencing determinations receive deference.
• Nonprecedential decision: “Not recommended for publication” means the opinion is not binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit, though it may be cited for persuasive value.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Coward consolidates two important strands of federal criminal law.

• On the Second Amendment front, the court applies its Williams framework to hold that § 922(g)(1) withstands both facial and as-applied challenges where the defendant’s record evidences dangerousness—even a single serious violent offense like armed carjacking can be dispositive. The opinion reinforces that courts may look holistically to PSR facts, sentencing statements, and the entire criminal history.
• On sentencing, the court offers a practical blueprint for proving leadership under § 3B1.1(c) in obstruction and evidence-tampering conspiracies: recruitment, control of critical information, urgent directives, monitoring execution, and disproportionate gain (including intangible benefits) collectively demonstrate leadership. The voluntariness or partial independence of accomplices does not negate the organizing role, and leadership can be shared.

Although nonprecedential, Coward is a clear and instructive application of existing Sixth Circuit law. It signals that as-applied Second Amendment challenges will be difficult for defendants with any serious violent or inherently dangerous felony in their past and that leadership enhancements may appropriately be applied in obstruction schemes where a defendant orchestrates the response to a crime, especially through information control and time-sensitive supervision.