Introduction

In Norberto Torres v. Kent Brookman and Jason Hart, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed and extended a streamlined procedural due process standard for prison disciplinary proceedings that result in disciplinary segregation but do not affect sentence length. Writing for the court, Judge Kolar—joined by Chief Judge Brennan—held that, under Adams v. Reagle, an inmate facing disciplinary segregation (without the loss of good-time credits or any sanction that could lengthen the sentence) is entitled only to “informal, non-adversarial” process: advance notice of the reasons, an opportunity to present his views, and an impartial decisionmaker. Judge Rovner dissented, warning that the majority conflates administrative placement jurisprudence with punitive disciplinary proceedings and erodes protections recognized in Wolff v. McDonnell.

This commentary explains the factual background, the court’s holdings, the precedents that drove the outcome, and the significance of the decision for prison due process claims in the Seventh Circuit.

Background and Procedural Posture

In March 2017, Menard Correctional Center officials issued Torres two disciplinary tickets alleging gang affiliation based on a “Latin Folk questionnaire” found among another prisoner’s belongings. The first ticket was dismissed by the adjustment committee (defendants Hart and Brookman). Roughly ninety minutes later, IDOC issued a second, nearly identical ticket; Torres was immediately placed in segregation and formally served two days later.

The second ticket included additional allegations: a handwriting comparison purportedly matched Torres’s master file, and IDOC asserted he was a “self-admitted” member of the Maniac Latin Disciples (within the “Latin Folk” umbrella). After about a week in segregation, Torres was heard on the second ticket. No witnesses testified; IDOC presented no evidence beyond the ticket itself; and Torres was not shown the handwriting materials. He denied completing the questionnaire and emphasized the similarity to the previously dismissed ticket. Hart and Brookman recommended three months of segregation, and the warden approved.

Torres’s grievance argued IDOC violated its own rules by denying an investigator, adequate preparation time, witnesses, the opportunity to be heard, and access to the questionnaire/handwriting samples. The grievance officer recommended expungement due to regulatory noncompliance; the warden agreed—after Torres had served the three-month segregation term. Torres then sued, pro se, alleging due process violations stemming from the hearing and describing “inhumane” segregation conditions: a leaking toilet with “backflush,” mold and mildew, insects and rust, lack of a bed and property for days, minimal out-of-cell time, and no phone privileges.

The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Torres failed to show an “atypical and significant hardship” to establish a protected liberty interest. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit assumed—without deciding—that Torres had a liberty interest but affirmed, holding the minimal procedural safeguards owed under Adams were satisfied.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on a different ground than the district court:

• The court assumed Torres’s three months in allegedly filthy and unsanitary segregation conditions could constitute an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin v. Conner, thereby implicating a liberty interest.
• However, relying on Adams v. Reagle and Westefer v. Neal (Westefer II), the court held that when disciplinary segregation—not good-time loss or any sanction extending sentence length—is at stake, the Constitution requires only “informal, non-adversarial” process: (1) notice of the reasons for segregation; (2) a chance to present one’s views (orally or in writing); and (3) an impartial decisionmaker.
• Applying that standard, Torres received notice (he was served with the second ticket about a week before the hearing), an opportunity to respond (he denied the charge and challenged the second ticket), and impartial decisionmakers (not contested). That sufficed under the Constitution, even though IDOC later expunged the ticket for violating state regulations and even if witnesses or documentary evidence were not provided.

Judge Rovner dissented, arguing that the majority improperly imported the administrative placement standard from Wilkinson v. Austin and Westefer into punitive disciplinary proceedings. She would hold that once an inmate shows a liberty interest (via atypically harsh segregation under Sandin), the full suite of Wolff minimal protections applies—including a qualified right to call witnesses or have them interviewed, access to exculpatory evidence compatible with safety, and a written rationale—regardless of whether good-time credits are revoked.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Recognizes prisoners’ due process rights in disciplinary proceedings resulting in loss of good-time credits, requiring: advance written notice, an opportunity to present witnesses/documents consistent with safety, an impartial decisionmaker, and a written statement of evidence/reasons. The majority acknowledges Wolff but narrows its application to cases involving sentence-impacting sanctions.
• Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). Requires that disciplinary findings be supported by “some evidence.” The panel reaffirms this baseline but does not separately analyze sufficiency on appeal because Torres’s claim rises or falls on process.
• Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Establishes the “atypical and significant hardship” test for liberty interests tied to conditions of confinement. The majority assumes the standard is satisfied here without deciding, because the second due-process prong is dispositive under Adams.
• Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). Holds that placement in a supermax can create a liberty interest but requires only informal, non-adversarial procedures: notice of the factual basis and a rebuttal opportunity, given dominant institutional security interests. This informs the Seventh Circuit’s shift toward streamlined procedures in certain placement decisions.
• Westefer v. Snyder (Westefer I), 422 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005) and Westefer v. Neal (Westefer II), 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012). Westefer I recognized possible liberty interests in transfers to Tamms supermax and remanded for fact-finding; Westefer II vacated broad injunctive procedures, clarifying that Wilkinson’s “informal, non-adversarial” standard governs transfer/placement decisions and cautioning under the PLRA to limit injunctive relief. The majority here uses Westefer II to anchor the informality of process in segregation contexts.
• Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880 (7th Cir. 2024), cert. denied (2025). The key precedent. Adams restored good-time credits via habeas, leaving the question whether more process was owed for restrictive housing/segregation. The Seventh Circuit held that an inmate facing transfer to disciplinary segregation is entitled only to informal, non-adversarial due process: notice, opportunity to present views, and an impartial decisionmaker. The majority treats Adams as establishing a bright-line rule applicable to disciplinary segregation when sentence length is unaffected.
• Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2013); Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009); Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019); Felton v. Brown, 129 F.4th 999 (7th Cir. 2025). These cases calibrate the “atypical and significant hardship” analysis by considering duration and conditions, not the overall sentence length. The majority reiterates that comparative analysis to total sentence length is not generally used.
• Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2003); Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 1998); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491 (1985); Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1992). Cited to show that more robust procedures (e.g., explanation for denying witnesses) have historically been tied to proceedings that threaten good-time credits. The majority distinguishes those holdings as inapplicable when only segregation is at stake.

Legal Reasoning

The court frames the due process inquiry under two prongs: (1) whether a protected liberty interest is at stake; and (2) whether the process provided was constitutionally adequate. The panel assumes prong one in Torres’s favor and resolves the appeal on prong two:

• Process calibrates to the interest and context. Citing Wolff, Wilkinson, and Hewitt, the majority emphasizes that prison due process arises from a “mutual accommodation” between inmate interests and institutional needs. Where sanctions can extend sentence length (e.g., loss of good-time), Wolff’s fuller suite of protections applies. Where they do not, Wilkinson and Westefer II teach that “informal, non-adversarial” process suffices.
• Adams as a bright-line rule. The opinion reads Adams to establish that inmates “facing transfer to disciplinary segregation” are entitled only to informal process: notice of the reasons, an opportunity to present views, and an impartial decisionmaker. The panel expressly adopts that rule for punitive disciplinary segregation when the sanction does not affect sentence length.
• Application to Torres. Torres received (a) notice of the charges via the second ticket served about a week before the hearing; (b) an opportunity to be heard—he pleaded not guilty, denied completing the questionnaire, and challenged the repeat ticket; and (c) impartial decisionmakers (uncontested). Although he said he requested a witness and access to handwriting materials, the court holds that neither a right to call witnesses nor a right to review exculpatory evidence is constitutionally required under Adams in the disciplinary-segregation-only context. Similarly, an explanation for denying a witness request is not required here, because the cases mandating such explanations involved the loss of good-time credits.
• Constitutional floor vs. state procedural ceiling. The court underscores that IDOC’s own regulations can be—and here were—more protective than the Constitution. The ticket’s expungement for failure to comply with state procedures does not establish a federal due process violation.

The Dissent’s Countervailing View

Judge Rovner would distinguish between administrative placement decisions (governed by Wilkinson/Westefer) and punitive disciplinary adjudications (governed by Wolff/Sandin). Once an inmate shows a liberty interest by proving atypically harsh segregation (per Sandin), she would apply the Wolff minima—limited right to call witnesses, to present documentary evidence, to receive a written statement of reasons, and to access exculpatory evidence consistent with safety—even if no good-time is at stake. She views the majority’s reading of Adams as overbroad and inconsistent with circuit precedent recognizing Wolff protections in harsh segregation cases.

The dissent highlights practical concerns:

• Restricting due process to notice and a chance to respond, without any right to witnesses or exculpatory materials, risks arbitrary punishment in cases with severe segregation conditions.
• Channeling such claims into the Eighth Amendment is inadequate, because that doctrine often does not remedy the wrongful disciplinary finding or procedural unfairness that produced the segregation.
• She suggests forward-looking ways to resolve timing asymmetries (e.g., considering authorized penalties ex ante), and she would remand here because Torres created a fact issue on witness requests and arguably endured atypically harsh segregation.

Impact and Implications

• Clearer but narrower federal process in the Seventh Circuit. Torres cements a bright-line rule: when the disciplinary sanction is segregation alone (no loss of good-time or other sentence-lengthening consequence), the Constitution requires only informal, non-adversarial procedures—notice, an opportunity to present views, and an impartial decisionmaker. There is no federal constitutional right to call witnesses, obtain exculpatory evidence, or receive a written statement of reasons in that context.
• Litigation strategy shifts. Prisoners alleging unfair disciplinary hearings that resulted only in segregation will face a high bar on procedural due process claims. They may:
  • Pivot to Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims to challenge the harshness of segregation conditions; and/or
  • Invoke state-law or regulatory violations for administrative relief, recognizing those do not, by themselves, create federal due process claims.
• Institutional practice. Prisons can continue to provide more robust procedures by policy (investigators, witnesses, disclosure) but need not do so constitutionally when only segregation is at issue. Administrators should still document notice, hearing opportunity, and impartiality to guard against due process challenges.
• Unresolved boundaries. The decision reiterates that the “some evidence” standard applies to disciplinary findings regardless of the sanction, but does not delineate what counts as “some evidence” in the segregation-only setting. Future appeals may test whether a ticket alone suffices when contested, and how safety concerns limit access to exculpatory materials after Adams.
• Doctrinal tension. The dissent flags a friction line: other circuits apply Wolff to pretrial detainee discipline and some Seventh Circuit decisions have contemplated Wolff in harsh segregation cases. Torres’s adoption of the Adams rule in the disciplinary context could spur en banc consideration or Supreme Court review in a case presenting a direct conflict.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Liberty interest in prison: Not every change in prison life triggers due process. Under Sandin, only conditions that impose an “atypical and significant hardship” relative to ordinary prison life create a liberty interest in the conditions-of-confinement context. Loss of good-time credits almost always creates a liberty interest because it affects sentence length.
• Disciplinary segregation vs. administrative segregation: Disciplinary segregation punishes proven misconduct; administrative segregation is a management or safety measure. Torres applies the same “informal” due process to disciplinary segregation where sentence length is unaffected, borrowing the logic of Wilkinson/Westefer.
• Informal, non-adversarial process: A streamlined procedure consisting of (1) notice of reasons for segregation; (2) an opportunity to present one’s views (written or oral); and (3) an impartial decisionmaker. No categorical right to call witnesses or to access exculpatory evidence attaches in segregation-only cases under this rule.
• “Some evidence” standard: Even in informal procedures, disciplinary findings must be supported by at least “some evidence” in the record—a minimal evidentiary floor to avoid arbitrary decisions.
• Constitutional floor vs. state procedural ceiling: State prison regulations can create more generous hearing rights. Violations of those rules may warrant state administrative relief (as here, expungement) but do not automatically equal federal due process violations.

Key Precedent Takeaways

• When good-time credits or sentence length are at risk: Wolff applies (notice, witness/document opportunity consistent with safety, impartial decisionmaker, written reasons) and the decision must be supported by “some evidence” (Hill).
• When only disciplinary segregation is at stake: Per Adams and now Torres, only informal, non-adversarial process is required (notice, opportunity to respond, impartial decisionmaker). No categorical right to witnesses or to an explanation for denying them.
• Liberty interest threshold for segregation: The “atypical and significant hardship” test depends on duration and the specific conditions (e.g., extreme filth, lack of bedding, insect infestation). The court again rejects measuring segregation against the overall sentence length.

Conclusion

Torres v. Brookman consolidates the Seventh Circuit’s move toward a bright-line, minimalist procedural rule for disciplinary segregation cases that do not extend an inmate’s sentence: notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an impartial decisionmaker suffice. While the panel assumed (without deciding) that Torres’s segregation conditions could implicate a liberty interest, it nevertheless held that more robust Wolff-style protections—witnesses, exculpatory disclosures, written reasons—are not constitutionally required unless the sanction jeopardizes sentence length.

The dissent offers a forceful counterpoint, urging that punitive disciplinary findings that consign inmates to atypically harsh segregation should trigger Wolff’s safeguards, not merely administrative-style review. For now, in the Seventh Circuit, Torres confirms that inmates who do not face the loss of good-time credits cannot predicate a federal due process claim on the denial of witnesses or access to evidence in segregation-only cases, although they may still pursue relief under state procedures or raise Eighth Amendment challenges to the conditions themselves.