Inferring Federal “Intended Use” from Historical Plans: Eleventh Circuit Affirms U.S. Title to Wisteria Island under the Submerged Lands Act

Introduction

In United States v. F.E.B. Corp. (No. 24-12383, 11th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a bench-trial judgment quieting title in favor of the United States to Wisteria Island, a spoil island off Key West, Florida. The central legal question—framed by the court’s earlier published opinion in United States v. F.E.B. Corp. (“FEB II”), 52 F.4th 916 (11th Cir. 2022)—was whether, at the time the United States built up the land, the federal government intended to use the island, thus bringing it within the Submerged Lands Act’s exception for lands “filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its own use,” 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a).

After a two-day bench trial on remand, the district court found that the island was intentionally created for several federal purposes: repeated placement (i.e., storage) of dredge spoils, protection of naval operations as a natural barrier, and potential future physical improvements in support of military defenses. On appeal, F.E.B. argued that the record showed nothing more than incidental disposal of dredge spoils with no intended use. Applying deferential clear-error review to the district court’s factual findings of federal intent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the findings were plausible and supported by contemporaneous Navy planning documents, an executive order reserving the area, historical use evidence, and expert testimony on spoil-island practices.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed FEB II’s framework that the Submerged Lands Act’s “filled in ... for its own use” exception turns on federal intent at the time of creation; “use” is broad, and actual use is not required.
Reviewing post-trial findings for clear error, the court held that the district court plausibly inferred the requisite intent from historical documents and expert testimony.
The court accepted three intended federal uses as supported by the record: (1) recurrent storage of dredge spoils; (2) wave and harbor protection; and (3) potential future physical improvements for naval purposes.
The panel clarified that “non-use (or non-development by private parties)” is not itself a qualifying “use” under § 1313(a) and was not supported by the record, but that point did not disturb the overall judgment for the United States.
Arguments premised on the Navy’s later failure to perfect record title or the absence of actual use did not undercut the dispositive question: intended use at the time of filling.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. F.E.B. Corp. (“FEB II”), 52 F.4th 916 (11th Cir. 2022): The controlling, published prior decision established the governing interpretation of the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) exception:
- Intentionality is required—the filling cannot be accidental.
- “Use” is broad, encompassing any conversion to service, such as storage.
- Actual use is not required; what matters is intended use at the time of creation.
FEB II remanded for trial because the summary-judgment record showed a genuine factual dispute about intent—whether Wisteria Island was created for ongoing storage of dredge spoils and other naval purposes, or merely as an incidental dump site.
F.E.B. Corp. v. United States (“FEB I”), 818 F.3d 681 (11th Cir. 2016): Earlier litigation in which F.E.B. sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) was dismissed as time-barred. Although Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152 (2023), later held that the QTA’s 12-year limit is nonjurisdictional, FEB I’s historical account and recognition of a long-standing federal claim contextualized the title dispute. The present case is a federal action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, not a QTA defense case.
Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152 (2023): Cited for the proposition (in a footnote) that the QTA limitations period is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule, abrogating FEB I in part. This had no direct effect on the SLA merits but situates prior procedural history.
Compulife Software Inc. v. Newman, 959 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2020): Reiterated the post-bench-trial standard of review: legal conclusions de novo; factual findings for clear error.
Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007): Emphasized the high deference inherent in clear-error review.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985): Canonical statement of clear error: if two permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder’s choice cannot be clearly erroneous; deference applies even when findings derive from documents or inferences, not credibility alone.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986): Quoted for the definition of a “genuine” factual dispute at summary judgment—relevant to FEB II’s remand posture.
Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369 (2025): Cited for the proposition that even mixed questions warrant deferential review when they turn on case-specific factual assessments; supports applying clear-error review to “intent” in historical land-creation contexts.
Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1435, 1446 n.16 (11th Cir. 1987): Invoked to decline a new argument raised for the first time in a reply brief (a challenge to the government’s expert testimony).

Legal Reasoning and Application

The panel treated the SLA question as resolved in its legal framework by FEB II: the dispositive inquiry is whether the United States intended a federal “use” at the time it filled or built up the land that became Wisteria Island. The court then:

Confirmed that the district court’s determinations were factual “intent” findings reviewed only for clear error.
Accepted three intended uses as supported by the trial record:
- Recurrent storage of dredge spoils (i.e., future spoil deposition at a designated site).
- Harbor and wave protection—enhancing a barrier that protected naval operations.
- Potential future physical improvements (e.g., magazine, wharfage, or other naval-defense infrastructure).
Rejected the district court’s separate suggestion that “non-use (or non-development by private parties)” itself counted as a federal purpose; there was no record support that the island was created for that reason, and “non-use” is not a “use” within the meaning of § 1313(a).

Crucially, the panel emphasized that later events are not dispositive. The absence of actual federal use; the Navy’s failure to perfect record title sooner; and mixed views expressed in 1950s internal memoranda did not override the central question: why the land was filled or built up at the time of its creation in the 1920s and 1940s. Under FEB II, actual use is not required; intended use suffices.

Evidence the Court Found Persuasive

The appellate court concluded that the following evidence supported the district court’s inference of intended federal use:

Pre-creation Navy planning: Early 20th-century documents show the Navy regarded Frankford Bank as part of the Key West naval reservation and contemplated enlarging the shoals by fill for protection and development (e.g., a magazine, wharfage, or breakwater effects).
1924 Executive Reservation: After Florida’s attempted sale, the Navy secured a presidential executive order reserving the shoals and keys (including Frankford Bank) for naval purposes. Navy communications explained that plans contemplated enlarging Frankford Bank with dredged materials to augment harbor protection and anticipated the island’s importance to future Key West naval development.
1928 License and Government Control: The Navy issued a revocable license to a private firm describing Frankford Bank and the spoil bank as government property not then in use—corroborating federal dominion even before WWII dredging.
World War II dredging and expansion: The United States intentionally returned to the same area in the 1940s and significantly expanded the island—consistent with prior federal plans to enlarge the barrier and consider future development.
Engineering “shape” and capacity evidence: Expert testimony (Professor Charlie Hailey) explained that the island’s 1923 crescent shape reflected initial construction along the harbor-facing edge with an eye toward later infill; standard practice was to reuse spoil-deposition sites. Documentary evidence showed an intended island elevation (five feet above mean high water) not yet achieved, suggesting continued future spoil placement was intended.

Against this, F.E.B. argued there was no contemporaneous documentation specifying an intent to create a spoil island for future use, and the dredging records themselves did not state purpose for placement. The court found it permissible to infer intent from the broader historical record and context, not only from the dredging contracts.

Standard of Review and Appellate Deference

The opinion is as much about appellate process as it is about property law. The court repeatedly underscored that:

Intent is a classic question of fact.
Clear error is a “highly deferential” standard; if the district court’s account is plausible in light of the whole record, it must stand.
Deference applies even when findings are drawn from historical documents and inferences rather than live witness credibility—per Anderson v. Bessemer City.
Even if “intent” is cast as a mixed question, Bufkin v. Collins counsels deference where the resolution turns on case-specific factual assessments.

This posture determined the outcome: even acknowledging competing inferences, the appellate court held that the district court’s view was a permissible one supported by the evidence.

Clarification: What Does Not Qualify as “Use”

The panel agreed with F.E.B. on one point: “non-use (or non-development by private parties)” is not the kind of “use” contemplated by § 1313(a), and the record did not show the island was created for that purpose. This clarification prevents the exception from swallowing the rule by treating mere opposition to private development as a qualifying “use,” while leaving intact core intended uses (storage, protection, potential improvements) that satisfy the statute.

Impact and Implications

Submerged Lands Act Litigation

Intent can be inferred: Federal “intended use” at the time of filling may be inferred from historical planning documents, executive reservations, subsequent expansion consistent with prior plans, physical configuration of the filled area, and expert testimony on standard engineering practices.
Broad understanding of “use” reaffirmed: Storage of dredge spoils, wave/harbor protection, and earmarking for future naval improvements are qualifying uses. Actual post-creation use is not required.
Limits on “use”: The court signaled that “non-use” or mere opposition to private development is not itself a qualifying federal “use.” Parties should anchor “use” in positive, functional purposes.

Standard-of-Review Consequences

Once FEB II’s legal framework is set, ownership cases under § 1313(a) will often turn on intent findings after trial, which are hard to overturn on appeal. Parties should build a robust, documentary record of pre-creation intent.
Appellants relying on “undisputed documents” should anticipate deference; inferences drawn from those documents by the trial court typically will not be second-guessed absent a firm conviction of error.

Practical Guidance for Future Disputes

For the United States: Assemble early reservation instruments (e.g., executive orders), pre-project planning documents, and engineering evidence (e.g., target elevations, staged construction patterns) to demonstrate intended use at creation.
For States and Private Owners: Challenge the nexus between historical planning and the specific site; contest expert inferences with contrary engineering or archival evidence; do not rely solely on later non-use or administrative ambivalence.
Preservation matters: Daubert or admissibility challenges to expert testimony must be timely; new objections raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited.

Title Stability and Transactional Implications

Private chains of title originating from state quitclaim deeds to artificial islands may be vulnerable where the federal government can prove intended federal use at creation. Title insurers should evaluate SLA risks for spoil islands and filled lands near historic naval operations.
Agencies should contemporaneously document intended uses of fill to reduce later evidentiary uncertainty; standardized Corps/Navy spoil management plans can be outcome-determinative decades later.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Submerged Lands Act (SLA): A federal statute (43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315) that generally grants coastal states title to lands beneath navigable waters within defined boundaries, but with exceptions—most relevantly for lands “filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its own use” (§ 1313(a)).
“Filled in / built up for its own use”: Land created by the federal government qualifies if, at the time of creation, the government intended a functional federal purpose (e.g., storage, protection, development). Actual later use is not required.
Spoil island: Land mass formed from dredged material (spoils) excavated from waterways to deepen channels. Reusing designated spoil sites is common practice.
Mean high water / mean low water: Tidal benchmarks. Acreage “above mean low-water line” indicates exposed land; intended design elevations (e.g., five feet above mean high water) can reveal planned future filling.
Clear-error review: An appellate standard that requires deference to a trial court’s factual findings. A finding is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Mixed questions and deference: Even if a question blends law and fact (e.g., “intent” in historical contexts), appellate courts often defer when resolution is fact-intensive.
Quitclaim deed: A deed conveying whatever interest a grantor has, without warranties of title; the grantee takes the risk of competing claims.
Executive reservation: An executive order reserving land for federal purposes evidences contemporaneous federal intent and control.

Conclusion

This decision operationalizes FEB II’s interpretation of the Submerged Lands Act by showing how trial courts may infer federal “intended use” at the moment of land creation from a mosaic of historical sources: pre-creation naval planning, executive reservations, engineering practices, and the physical configuration of the filled land itself. The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance underscores two durable points. First, “use” under § 1313(a) is capacious—embracing recurrent spoil storage, harbor protection, and planned improvements—and does not require proof of actual utilization. Second, on appeal, factual determinations about historical intent are entitled to substantial deference; competing plausible readings of the record will not warrant reversal.

The panel’s clarification that “non-use” is not a qualifying purpose prevents the exception from drifting beyond its text. But the heart of the ruling is evidentiary and procedural: federal intent can be proved by inference, and once the trial court accepts that inference, it will be difficult to unsettle on appeal. For federal, state, and private actors litigating coastal title disputes over artificially created lands, the case maps a practical path to (or against) establishing federal title under the SLA’s filled-lands exception.

Case Timeline (for orientation)

Early 1900s: Navy identifies Frankford Bank as a protective feature and contemplates enlarging it by fill for naval uses.
1923: Initial spoil island created by depositing dredge material; crescent shape suggests planned future infill.
1924: Florida attempts sale; Navy obtains executive order reserving nearby shoals and keys for naval purposes.
1928: Navy issues revocable license describing the area as government property.
1940s: WWII dredging expands Wisteria Island substantially; evidence of intended elevation not yet achieved.
1951–52: Florida sells via quitclaim over Navy’s objection; private chain of title begins; F.E.B. acquires in 1967.
2011–2016: Litigation round one (FEB I) ends on QTA limitations grounds (later abrogated in part by Wilkins).
2022: FEB II sets the SLA “intended use” framework and remands for trial.
2025: After bench trial, the Eleventh Circuit affirms judgment quieting title in the United States.