Ineffective Assistance: Failure to Object to Unauthorized Parole Testimony in People v. Franklin

Introduction

In People v. Franklin (2025 NYSlipOp 01975), the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed a Clinton County conviction for robbery in the second degree, criminal use of a firearm, and petit larceny, holding that trial counsel’s failure to object to highly prejudicial testimony about the defendant’s status as a sex offender deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. The defendant, Rudolph Franklin, robbed a convenience store in Plattsburgh in 2017 and was convicted after a jury trial in September 2021. On appeal, Franklin argued, among other things, that his trial lawyer performed deficiently by allowing parole officers to testify that he was supervised “primarily” as a sex offender, in direct conflict with a prior Sandoval ruling. The court found this error egregious, requiring reversal and a new trial.

Summary of the Judgment

Defendant was charged with second-degree robbery (Penal Law § 160.10[2][b]), second-degree criminal use of a firearm (§ 265.08[2]), and fourth-degree grand larceny (§ 155.30[1]). The grand larceny count was reduced to petit larceny (§ 155.25).
At trial, the People obtained limited Sandoval permission to impeach Franklin with certain prior convictions; the court precluded a 2007 rape conviction as too prejudicial and remote.
Despite an on-the-record stipulation that parole witnesses would not volunteer the basis of Franklin’s parole, his parole officer testified he supervised “primarily sex offenders” and that Franklin was on “sex offender restrictions.”
Trial counsel did not object or request a curative instruction. The Appellate Division held that this failure was an “egregious” deprivation of a fair trial under New York’s more protective ineffective-assistance standard.
The judgment was reversed and the case remitted for a new trial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court relied on a well-developed line of Sandoval jurisprudence, beginning with People v. Sandoval (34 NY2d 371 [1974]), which governs when and how a defendant’s prior convictions may be used to impeach credibility. The decision also cited:

People v. Carnevale (101 AD3d 1375 [3d Dept 2012]) and People v. Rivera (71 NY2d 705 [1988]) to frame the effective assistance inquiry.
People v. Kent (235 AD3d 1094 [3d Dept 2025]) and People v. Taylor (163 AD3d 1275 [3d Dept 2018]), emphasizing that a single “particularly egregious” error can warrant reversal.
People v. Osman (228 AD3d 1007 [3d Dept 2024]) and People v. Currier (83 AD3d 1421 [4th Dept 2011]), illustrating that parole-status testimony cannot be used to circumvent Sandoval limits.
People v. Stevens (136 AD3d 1375 [4th Dept 2016]) on the prejudice from improperly admitted character evidence.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied New York’s two-prong test for ineffective assistance: (1) deficient performance by counsel, and (2) prejudice resulting in denial of a fair trial (People v. Shuler, 231 AD3d 1285 [3d Dept 2024]). Under CPL 470.05(2), most objections unpreserved at trial are forfeited, but ineffective assistance may excuse that default. Here:

Counsel had no strategic reason to remain silent when the parole officer introduced the sex-offender label in direct breach of the court’s Sandoval order and the People’s express stipulation.
The testimony was highly prejudicial, suggesting Franklin’s “criminal bent” and undermining his credibility on charges unrelated to sexual misconduct.
Because counsel did not request a prompt limiting instruction or lodge an objection, the harm was not dissipated and Franklin did not receive a fair trial.

The Third Department noted that New York’s standard is more protective than the federal Strickland rule: even absent reasonable doubt about a different outcome, deprivation of a fair trial suffices for reversal (People v. Kellum, 233 AD3d 1374 [3d Dept 2024]).

Impact

This decision reinforces the strict enforcement of Sandoval rulings and limits on impeachment evidence. It signals to defense counsel:

Vigilance is required when opposing prosecutors’ efforts to introduce collateral or highly prejudicial character evidence.
Failure to object to unauthorized testimony, especially in breach of stipulation, can constitute an “egregious” error mandating reversal.

For prosecutors and trial courts, Franklin underscores the importance of adhering to on-the-record agreements and carefully policing witness testimony to avoid introducing barred details.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sandoval Hearing: A pretrial proceeding where the court decides which of a defendant’s past convictions may be mentioned to a jury if the defendant testifies. It balances probative value against potential prejudice.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A constitutional claim that defense representation was so poor it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. New York’s standard allows reversal if counsel’s mistakes cause unfairness, even if the outcome likely would not have changed.
Limiting Instruction: A direction from the judge telling jurors how they may—and may not—use certain evidence, aimed at reducing unfair prejudice.

Conclusion

People v. Franklin establishes that defense counsel’s failure to object to clearly unauthorized, prejudicial testimony about a defendant’s status as a sex offender—at odds with both a court order and prosecutorial stipulation—constitutes ineffective assistance warranting reversal. This ruling clarifies that once a Sandoval limit is imposed, any closure of that door must be met with immediate and forceful objection and, if necessary, a request for a curative instruction. The decision will shape trial practices concerning impeachment, counsel vigilance, and the cross-examination of parole witnesses.