No Private Right of Action for Erroneous BMV Records: Chris A. Kelly v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Ind. 2025)

Introduction

In Chris A. Kelly v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, the Supreme Court of Indiana confronted a recurrent question at the intersection of administrative law and tort liability: Does a driver have the right to sue the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) for money damages when the agency maintains an inaccurate driving record?

Chris Kelly, an Indianapolis resident, claimed that repeated BMV record-keeping errors left his license falsely flagged as suspended, resulting in multiple traffic stops, towing fees, and loss of employment opportunities. When administrative and informal efforts to correct the record failed, Kelly filed a negligence suit seeking damages. The trial court dismissed the action under Trial Rule 12(B)(6); the Court of Appeals reinstated it; and the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rush, ultimately affirmed dismissal.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court held, 5–0 as to result (with a concurrence and a dissent on reasoning), that:

• No statute within Indiana Code article 9-14 (including the Driving Records Statute, Ind. Code § 9-14-12-3) creates an express or implied private right of action for damages arising from erroneous BMV records.
• The General Assembly already supplied independent enforcement mechanisms: the “material error review” process (Ind. Code art. 9-33) and judicial review under the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA).
• The statutory duty to maintain records primarily serves public safety; any benefit to individual drivers is incidental.
• No common-law duty obliges the BMV to keep accurate individual records for the purpose of private tort recovery.
• Accordingly, Kelly failed to allege a legally actionable injury, and his complaint was properly dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Doe #1 v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 81 N.E.3d 199 (Ind. 2017)
  Provided the controlling two-part test for implied private rights of action: (1) whether the statute has its own enforcement mechanism; and (2) whether it primarily protects the public at large. Either element, if present, defeats implication. The Court transplanted this framework wholesale to the BMV context.
• Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991)
  Supplies the three-factor test (relationship, foreseeability, public policy) for recognizing new common-law duties. Kelly’s failure to develop a Webb analysis was fatal.
• F.D. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 1 N.E.3d 131 (Ind. 2013)
  Reiterated that governmental entities are liable in tort only when a duty exists and no immunity applies—used to clarify that dismissal here turned on lack of duty, not on Tort Claims Act immunity.
• Raybestos Products Co. (2008) and Watson (2017)
  Emphasized that AOPA is generally the exclusive avenue for judicial review of administrative actions unless specifically exempted.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two sequential silos—statutory and common-law—each yielding dismissal.

1. Statutory Analysis
   
   • No express cause of action: Unlike numerous Indiana statutes that say a claimant “may bring a civil action,” the Driving Records Statute is silent on remedies.
   • Independent enforcement exists: Material error review gives drivers a streamlined path to correct records, and AOPA supplies back-up judicial oversight. Under Doe #1, courts must not “engraft” an additional damages remedy.
   • Primary beneficiary = public: Accurate records enable law enforcement to police suspended drivers, advancing road safety; individual benefit is “merely incidental.” This satisfies the second Doe #1 prong.
2. Common-Law Analysis
   Kelly argued the BMV owed a general duty of reasonable care. The Court disagreed:
   • Pre-existing authority: No Indiana case imposes on an agency a duty to keep error-free records for private recovery.
   • Failure of advocacy: Kelly offered no Webb factor analysis; the Court refused to craft one for him.
   • Distinguishing Benton: That case recognized duties related to premises liability, not record keeping. Thus, it did not create a universal, trans-substantive duty as Kelly suggested.

Impact of the Decision

The decision erects a bright-line rule: Drivers cannot sue the Indiana BMV for money damages over data errors unless the Legislature expressly authorizes it. Key consequences include:

• Administrative Primacy: Plaintiffs must exhaust material-error review and/or AOPA before seeking judicial relief, and even then relief will be prospective (record correction), not compensatory.
• Legislative Signal: The Court effectively invites the General Assembly to decide—by “plain statement,” as Justice Slaughter’s concurrence urges—whether to create a damages remedy in the future.
• Spill-over to Other Agencies: The opinion reinforces a meta-doctrine: where Indiana agencies possess their own review mechanisms, courts will resist implying tort remedies, discouraging similar suits against entities like the Department of Revenue or the Gaming Commission.
• Tactical Guidance for Practitioners: Lawyers representing aggrieved drivers must pivot toward administrative advocacy, record-correction petitions, or, where appropriate, civil-rights claims (e.g., § 1983) rather than state-law negligence.
• Potential Legislative Reform: Public policy concern about real harms (e.g., lost jobs, wrongful arrests) may spur statutory amendments to add fee-shifting, liquidated damages, or expedited correction timelines.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Private Right of Action: The legal ability of a private person to sue for violation of a statute. If the legislature wants people to sue, it normally says so outright.
• Material Error Review (Ind. Code art. 9-33): A quick, mostly administrative procedure that allows a driver to tell the BMV “you made a mistake” and have it corrected—limited to fixing the record, not paying damages.
• Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA): Indiana’s default statute governing how and when courts can review actions of state agencies. Think of it as an “appeals court” for agency decisions, but it rarely awards monetary relief.
• Common-Law Duty: Obligations created by judges over time, not written statutes. Without a recognized duty, a negligence suit fails at the starting gate.
• Webb Balancing Test: A three-factor method (relationship, foreseeability, public policy) courts use when asked to create a brand-new common-law duty.

Conclusion

Kelly v. BMV cements a clear doctrinal stance: statutory silence plus existing administrative remedies equals no private tort remedy. The Court’s adherence to textualism and separation-of-powers principles leaves the onus squarely on the legislature to address any perceived remedial gap. For now, Indiana drivers harmed by BMV errors must rely on correction procedures and, perhaps, political pressure—not lawsuits for damages.