Independent Termination of Parental Rights Under MCA §41-3-609

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Montana’s decision in Matter of B.J.B., YINC (2025 MT 116), which clarifies that under Montana Code Annotated § 41-3-609, a district court may terminate one parent’s rights without simultaneously terminating the other parent’s rights. The case arises from a petition by the Department of Public Health and Human Services (the Department) to terminate the parental rights of K.B. (Mother) to her five-year-old child, B.J.B., on the basis of Mother’s prolonged substance-use relapse, domestic violence, housing and employment instability. The District Court terminated Mother’s rights but declined, without prejudice, to terminate the father’s rights, prompting Mother’s appeal based on the contention that terminating only her rights undermined Child’s best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

In Matter of B.J.B., the Supreme Court of Montana considered whether the District Court abused its discretion by terminating Mother’s rights while continuing reunification efforts with Father. After more than three years of repeated treatment attempts, Mother had not resolved her substance-use disorder or stabilized her home life. The District Court found by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Child was adjudicated as a Youth in Need of Care (YINC); (2) Mother failed to comply successfully with her court-approved treatment plan; and (3) her unfitness and instability were unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, the Court held each parent’s rights are separately evaluable. Hence, the failure to terminate Father’s rights did not preclude termination of Mother’s rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Mother’s “best-interests” challenge and affirming that permanency for Child did not require simultaneous termination of both parents.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• In re A.S., 2016 MT 156: Standard of review—termination decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• In re L.D., 2018 MT 60: Clarifies that “abuse of discretion” includes arbitrary or unreasonable decisions resulting in substantial injustice.
• In Re M.W., 2001 MT 78: Upheld termination of father’s rights while reversing termination of mother’s rights, demonstrating separate evaluation of each parent’s circumstances.
• In re Adoption of C.W.D., 2005 MT 145: Affirms that parental rights may be terminated by multiple statutory means and need not be uniform across both parents.
• In re A.K., 2015 MT 116: Held that a parent who successfully completes treatment may avoid termination, regardless of the other parent’s status.
• In re D.D., 2021 MT 66: Addressed a similar permanency argument; upheld termination of father’s rights despite mother’s regained custody, emphasizing separate assessments under § 41-3-609.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning focused on three elements of § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA:

1. YINC Adjudication: Child was adjudicated as a Youth in Need of Care on January 4, 2022.
2. Treatment Plan Compliance: Mother repeatedly failed her court-ordered plan aimed at substance-use recovery, domestic violence mitigation, and socioeconomic stability.
3. Likelihood of Change: Under § 41-3-609(2)(a)–(d), the District Court detailed Mother’s history of chemical dependency, relapse cycles, domestic violence, housing instability, missed visitations, and ongoing unsafe behavior, concluding her condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

The Supreme Court stressed that statutory text does not require simultaneous termination of both parents. When clear and convincing evidence supports termination as to one parent, the district court’s discretion must be respected, even if the other parent remains in the reunification track. Relying on In re M.W. and In re D.D., the Court affirmed that separate parental evaluations are both lawful and logical, ensuring that a child’s best interests are assessed individually for each parent.

Impact

This decision establishes a binding precedent clarifying that:

• District courts in Montana may terminate the rights of one parent under § 41-3-609 without terminating the other, provided each decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
• Permanency considerations—while central to best-interests analysis—do not mandate parallel outcomes for both parents.
• Child welfare agencies can pursue termination against an unfit parent even if reasonable reunification efforts continue with the other parent.

Lower courts will apply this ruling to streamline decision-making in split-parentage cases, focusing on individualized assessments rather than ensuring uniform outcomes for both parents.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Youth in Need of Care (YINC): A child adjudicated by the court as lacking proper parental care or control due to neglect or mistreatment.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence: A higher proof standard than preponderance but lower than beyond a reasonable doubt; it requires the fact-finder to be “substantially certain” of the truth of the allegations.
• § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA: The statutory provision allowing termination when a parent fails a court-approved treatment plan and is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
• Abuse of Discretion: Occurs when a court acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without conscientious judgment, resulting in substantial injustice.

Conclusion

Matter of B.J.B. reaffirms Montana’s commitment to individualized parental-fitness assessments under § 41-3-609. By upholding the District Court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights independently of Father’s status, the Supreme Court has provided clarity: termination of one parent’s rights need not hinge on the outcome for the other. This ruling strengthens child-centered decision-making, ensuring that each parent’s fitness and the child’s best interests drive permanency determinations.