Independent State-Law Tort Claims and Mass Assignment Standing under the Railway Labor Act: Commentary on The Boeing Company v. SWAPA

Independent State-Law Tort Claims and Mass Assignment Standing under the Railway Labor Act: Commentary on The Boeing Company v. Southwest Airlines Pilots Association

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in The Boeing Company v. Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA), No. 22-0631 (Tex. June 20, 2025), sits at the intersection of federal labor preemption, state tort law, and procedural rules governing who may sue and how.

The case arises from the fallout of the Boeing 737 MAX crashes and the subsequent grounding of the aircraft. Southwest Airlines’ pilots—represented by SWAPA—claimed they were induced, by Boeing’s misrepresentations, to agree in a 2016 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to fly the MAX without additional training. When the MAX was grounded, pilots lost flying opportunities and income. SWAPA sued Boeing in Texas state court, both in its own right and (initially) on behalf of its members.

The case presents two central legal issues:

  1. Whether the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA) preempts SWAPA’s Texas-law tort and tortious-interference claims against Boeing, a non-carrier third party.
  2. Whether thousands of pilots’ assignments of their individual claims to SWAPA are void as against Texas public policy—particularly given statutory limits on “associational standing” and the availability of class actions.

The Court holds that the RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s claims because their resolution does not “substantially depend” on interpreting the CBAs, and that the pilots’ assignments of claims to SWAPA are valid and do not violate Texas public policy. The decision simultaneously preserves space for state tort remedies in the shadow of federal labor law and clarifies that mass assignment of claims to an association is a legitimate alternative to associational or class-action mechanisms—subject to strict proof of each individual’s claim.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Parties and posture. SWAPA, the labor organization representing roughly 11,000 Southwest Airlines pilots, sued Boeing in Texas state court for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, fraud by nondisclosure, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious interference with SWAPA’s business relationship with Southwest. SWAPA sought:

  • Damages in its own right (lost membership dues, legal fees), and
  • Lost-wage damages on behalf of individual pilots.

Boeing removed to federal court, arguing that the RLA “completely preempts” SWAPA’s claims. The federal district court disagreed and remanded, holding that the RLA does not support “complete preemption” for removal purposes. Back in state court, Boeing filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing:

  1. The RLA preempts (in the ordinary preemption sense) SWAPA’s state-law claims; and
  2. SWAPA lacks “associational standing” to assert its members’ damages claims.

In response to the standing challenge, 8,794 pilots executed written assignments of their claims against Boeing to SWAPA, and SWAPA filed those assignments. Boeing then argued the assignments were void as against Texas public policy because they allegedly attempted to circumvent associational-standing and class-action requirements. The trial court granted Boeing’s plea, dismissing SWAPA’s claims with prejudice.

The Dallas Court of Appeals held:

  • The RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s claims.
  • SWAPA lacks associational standing to litigate pilots’ damages claims.
  • SWAPA does have standing to pursue its own claims (dues, fees).
  • The pilot assignments are not void, but they do not retroactively cure standing defects in this original suit.

It therefore:

  • Affirmed dismissal of SWAPA’s representative claims on behalf of pilots, but modified that dismissal to be without prejudice, and
  • Reversed dismissal of SWAPA’s own claims and remanded for further proceedings on those.

Boeing sought review in the Texas Supreme Court, challenging:

  1. The conclusion that the RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s claims; and
  2. The modification of the judgment to dismiss the representative claims without prejudice, on the ground that the assignments are void as against public policy.

The Supreme Court of Texas:

  • Affirms the court of appeals on both issues, though with somewhat different RLA-preemption reasoning.
  • Holds that:
    • The RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s fraud and tortious-interference claims against Boeing because they can be resolved without interpreting any CBA.
    • The pilot assignments are valid and do not violate Texas public policy.
    • Those assignments give SWAPA standing (in a different, subsequently filed suit) to pursue the assigning pilots’ individual claims as an assignee, not as a representative association.
  • Leaves open how the trial court should manage the thousands of individual assigned claims—via joinder, consolidation, severance, or separate trials.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The 737 MAX, SWAPA, and the CBAs

Boeing’s 737 series is a long-running, widely used aircraft model. In 2011, Boeing launched the 737 MAX, marketing it as more fuel-efficient but sufficiently similar to prior 737 variants that pilots could fly it without new type ratings or extensive training. SWAPA and Southwest were then operating under a 2006 CBA that listed the aircraft types SWAPA pilots would fly. Unsurprisingly, that list did not mention the yet-unintroduced MAX.

Southwest, after Boeing’s launch of the MAX, purchased 150 of the aircraft. Southwest took the position that the 2006 CBA’s aircraft list was broad enough to include the MAX. SWAPA disagreed. Its pilots refused to fly the MAX, initiating a public dispute about the parties’ “status quo” obligations under the 2006 CBA.

Under the Railway Labor Act, a CBA does not truly “expire” but instead becomes “amendable” on a specified date; at that point the parties must bargain for a new agreement while maintaining the status quo until they reach a new agreement. The 2006 CBA became amendable in 2012. Negotiations dragged on for years. In 2016, SWAPA sued Southwest in federal court, asserting that the status quo under the 2006 CBA did not require SWAPA pilots to fly the MAX.

SWAPA alleges that Boeing then injected itself into the settlement negotiations between SWAPA and Southwest and made key misrepresentations: that the MAX was essentially just a more fuel-efficient version of the 737 the pilots already flew, and that pilots could fly it without further training. SWAPA claims it relied on Boeing’s representations in agreeing to a 2016 CBA that explicitly required pilots to fly the MAX. After the 2016 CBA, SWAPA dismissed its federal suit against Southwest, and Southwest began MAX operations in August 2017.

Following the fatal MAX crashes in Indonesia (2018) and Ethiopia (2019)—crashes allegedly linked in part to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), of which pilots were not adequately informed—the Federal Aviation Administration grounded the MAX. Southwest canceled hundreds of flights. SWAPA pilots were left without aircraft to fly, and thus without corresponding income.

B. SWAPA’s State-Court Suit and Boeing’s Removal Attempt

SWAPA sued Boeing in Texas state court. Its claims sounded in state tort law:

  • Fraudulent misrepresentation,
  • Negligent misrepresentation,
  • Fraud by nondisclosure,
  • Negligence, and
  • Tortious interference with SWAPA’s business relationship with Southwest.

SWAPA sought:

  • Its own damages (lost membership dues and legal costs), and
  • Its members’ lost wages (initially framed as representative/associational claims).

Boeing removed the case to federal court, arguing “complete preemption” under the RLA—that is, that the RLA converted SWAPA’s state-law claims into federal claims for jurisdictional purposes. The federal district court disagreed: although it stated that resolution of SWAPA’s claims would “require interpretation of the CBA,” it held the RLA does not support complete preemption in the same way as, for example, ERISA or some provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). It therefore remanded the case to state court.

C. Plea to the Jurisdiction, Assignments, and Dual Suits

Back in state court, Boeing filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting:

  1. Ordinary (defensive) RLA preemption barred SWAPA’s state-law claims because they “required interpretation” of the 2006 and 2016 CBAs; and
  2. SWAPA lacked associational standing to assert its members’ damages claims.

In response, 8,794 SWAPA members executed assignments transferring their individual claims against Boeing to SWAPA. These assignments:

  • Transferred “all rights, title, and interest” in the pilots’ claims against Boeing related to the “MAX Crisis,”
  • Authorized SWAPA to “prosecute, settle, and/or compromise” those claims and to collect and distribute any recoveries, and
  • Explicitly waived the pilots’ right to pursue those claims individually.

SWAPA filed the assignments in this case. Boeing amended its plea, contending that the assignments were void as against public policy because they were allegedly designed to circumvent the Legislature’s limits on associational standing in Texas Business Organizations Code § 252.007(b) and the procedural safeguards in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 (class actions).

The trial court granted Boeing’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed SWAPA’s claims with prejudice, without explanation.

SWAPA then:

  • Moved to modify the judgment to dismiss the claims on behalf of pilots “without prejudice,” so they could proceed in a separate suit as assignee; the trial court denied this motion, and
  • Filed a separate suit, in the same court, asserting the pilots’ assigned claims as assignee.

The trial court dismissed the second suit on res judicata grounds. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed that dismissal, concluding SWAPA’s petition in the second suit did not establish the prerequisites for res judicata. Boeing petitioned for review in that separate case; the Texas Supreme Court denied review the same day it decided the present case.

D. Court of Appeals Decision and Supreme Court Review

In the case now under discussion, the Dallas Court of Appeals held:

  • The RLA does not preempt SWAPA’s state-law claims against Boeing.
  • SWAPA does not meet the requirements for associational standing under Texas law to assert its members’ damages claims.
  • SWAPA does have standing to pursue its own (non-assigned) damages.
  • The pilot assignments are not void as against public policy, but they do not retroactively cure SWAPA’s lack of associational standing in the original suit.

Accordingly, it:

  • Affirmed the dismissal of SWAPA’s representative claims on behalf of pilots, but modified that part of the judgment to be without prejudice; and
  • Reversed the dismissal of SWAPA’s own claims and remanded those claims for further proceedings.

Boeing sought review in the Texas Supreme Court solely on:

  1. RLA preemption; and
  2. Validity of the assignments/public policy and the “without prejudice” modification.

SWAPA did not file a cross-petition to challenge the court of appeals’ associational-standing ruling. The Texas Supreme Court therefore treats the associational-standing issue as waived and confines its review to:

  • Whether the RLA preempts SWAPA’s claims; and
  • Whether the assignments are void as against public policy.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

A. Railway Labor Act and Federal Preemption

The RLA, enacted in 1926 and later extended to airlines, is designed to:

  • Avoid interruptions to commerce by preventing strikes and work stoppages;
  • Protect employees’ rights to organize and bargain collectively; and
  • Provide a structured framework for resolving “major” and “minor” labor disputes.

Key distinctions:

  • Major disputes: Concern the formation of CBAs or efforts to secure them—i.e., the creation of new contractual rights.
  • Minor disputes: Involve interpretation or application of existing CBAs—i.e., enforcement of existing contractual rights.

Minor disputes must be resolved through mandatory arbitration before an adjustment board rather than through ordinary litigation. This mandatory arbitration regime underlies the RLA’s preemptive effect: if a claim is in substance a “minor dispute” (i.e., requires interpretation or application of a CBA), it is subject to the RLA’s mandatory dispute-resolution mechanisms and preempted insofar as state-law courts cannot adjudicate it independently.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s leading decisions on RLA/LMRA preemption include:

  • Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994). The Court held that the RLA preempts only those state-law claims whose resolution “depends on an interpretation” of a CBA. State-law claims that can be resolved without interpreting the CBA—because they arise from independent state-law duties—are not preempted, even if the CBA is part of the factual background.

  • Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). Construing the LMRA but expressly analogized in Norris, the Court held that a state-law retaliatory-discharge claim was not preempted because its elements—retaliatory intent and resulting harm—could be decided without interpreting the CBA, even though the discharge might also be a CBA violation.

  • Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The Court emphasized the need for uniform interpretation of CBAs under federal law, to avoid inconsistent state rules altering collectively bargained terms.

  • Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989). Clarified major/minor dispute distinctions under the RLA and underscored the required resort to arbitration for minor disputes touching CBA interpretation.

The Texas Supreme Court in this case adopts the Norris/Lingle “substantially dependent on CBA interpretation” standard for RLA preemption, emphasizing:

  • A claim is not preempted if it can be resolved “independent of any negotiated labor agreement,” such that the CBA is not the “only source” of the right asserted.
  • Preemption applies only when resolution of the claim is “substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of” the CBA.

The Court also notes—but does not decide—a contested issue in federal courts: whether the RLA preempts state-law claims that require CBA interpretation when the dispute does not directly involve a carrier-employee relationship (e.g., claims against third parties like Boeing). Many federal circuits have treated such claims as preempted if CBA interpretation is necessary, even where the RLA’s arbitration mechanisms would not offer a remedy, raising potential “remedial gap” concerns. The Texas Court expressly sidesteps this question because it finds no CBA-interpretation requirement in SWAPA’s claims.

B. Texas Law on Assignment of Claims and Public Policy Limits

Under Texas law, causes of action are generally assignable unless barred by statute or public policy. The Court relies on a line of cases including:

  • State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996). Gandy invalidated certain “Mary Carter”-type settlement/assignment arrangements between plaintiffs and one defendant, holding they violated public policy by distorting the adversarial process, misleading juries, and creating unfair pressure on non-settling defendants. It emphasized that assignments that “tend to increase and distort litigation” are void.

  • Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1992). Criticized settlement arrangements that realign parties’ incentives in ways that mislead juries and undermine the truth-seeking function.

  • Henry S. Miller Commercial Co. v. Newsom, Terry & Newsom, L.L.P., 709 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2024). Reaffirmed that assignments are generally valid; an assignee “owns [the claim], controls its prosecution, and is entitled to any recovery.”

  • Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2010). Upheld assignments to a third party that was not a “stranger/entrepreneur,” emphasizing that the assignee’s connection to the underlying transactions and claims matters in public-policy analysis.

  • PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. Partnership, 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004). Held certain Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) claims were non-assignable, reflecting the rule that highly personal, punitive, or statutorily individualized claims are generally not assignable.

  • Texas Medical Resource, LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc., 659 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. 2023). Found unfair-settlement claims unassignable, again reflecting the personal/punitive vs. property/remedial distinction.

The Court distinguishes assignments of “property-based and remedial” claims (typically assignable) from assignments of “personal and punitive” claims (typically non-assignable). Lost income and economic damages from fraud or tortious interference fall into the former category.

The Court also cites the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008), which recognized the long-standing acceptability of “pass-through” assignments in which assignees sue in their own names even though they agree to remit proceeds to the assignors. Such arrangements, by themselves, do not offend public policy or Article III standing.

C. Associational Standing, Class Actions, and Assignment-Based Standing

Texas has codified associational standing principles derived from Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), in Texas Business Organizations Code § 252.007(b). Under that provision, a nonprofit association may sue on behalf of its members only if:

  1. Its members would otherwise have standing in their own right;
  2. The interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and
  3. Neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members in the lawsuit.

The third requirement is crucial. Where liability and damages turn on individualized facts—such as each member’s reliance on a particular misrepresentation and individualized wage-loss calculations—associational standing is typically unavailable.

Class actions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 (mirroring many aspects of Federal Rule 23) provide another mechanism for aggregate litigation, but Texas law does not require plaintiffs to proceed by Rule 42 if another lawful vehicle exists. As the Court notes, nothing “mandates that a plaintiff pursue a remedy through the procedures of Rule 42.” (Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 450 (Tex. 2007).)

Assignment-based standing is a third, distinct route: the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor and may assert the assignor’s claim in its own name. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized these mechanisms as “fundamentally different” yet co-existing modes of standing. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975).

The key takeaway in this case is that the Court treats associational standing, class-action procedures, and assignment-based standing as alternative mechanisms. The existence of stricter requirements for one does not, by itself, invalidate the permissible use of another.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. RLA Preemption: Independent State-Law Duties and “Substantially Dependent” Analysis

1. Boeing’s preemption theory

Boeing argued that SWAPA’s tort and interference claims are preempted because their resolution requires determining:

  • Whether the 2006 CBA already obligated SWAPA pilots to fly the MAX, and
  • How the 2016 CBA changed those obligations.

On Boeing’s view, SWAPA could not show causation or damages—core elements of fraud and tortious interference—without first establishing the scope of the pilots’ pre-existing CBA duties. If the 2006 CBA already required them to fly the MAX, Boeing contended, then Boeing’s alleged misrepresentations about the MAX’s similarity and training requirements could not have caused any additional injury.

2. The Court’s focus on claim elements, not background contracts

The Court applies the Lingle/Norris method: analyze the elements of each state-law claim and ask whether those elements can be proven without interpreting the CBA.

For fraudulent misrepresentation, the elements include:

  1. A material misrepresentation;
  2. Made with knowledge of falsity or recklessness;
  3. Intended to be acted upon;
  4. Actually and justifiably relied upon; and
  5. Causing injury.

Negligent misrepresentation is similar but turns on a false statement made without reasonable care in a business setting, relied upon to the plaintiff’s detriment. Tortious interference with a prospective business relationship requires:

  1. A reasonable probability of entering into a business relationship (here, a new CBA);
  2. Intentional and wrongful interference by the defendant (via independently tortious conduct);
  3. Proximate causation; and
  4. Actual damage or loss.

SWAPA’s core theory is:

  • Boeing made misrepresentations about the safety, characteristics, and training requirements of the 737 MAX in order to induce SWAPA (and pilots) to agree—in the 2016 CBA—to fly the MAX.
  • SWAPA and pilots relied on those misrepresentations in agreeing to the 2016 CBA requirement to fly the MAX.
  • They suffered economic injury when the MAX was grounded and they lost work and wages.

Crucially, SWAPA does not claim that Boeing’s misrepresentations changed what the 2006 CBA already required; instead, it claims that, regardless of whether the 2006 CBA covered the MAX, SWAPA had bargaining leverage when that CBA became amendable in 2012 and would not have agreed to the 2016 CBA’s MAX obligations but for Boeing’s misrepresentations.

3. The 2006 CBA and the “amendable” period

The Court places significant weight on the “amendable” nature of the 2006 CBA beginning in 2012. Once the CBA became amendable:

  • SWAPA was legally entitled under the RLA to bargain for different terms in a successor CBA.
  • SWAPA was not compelled to carry forward any specific term—such as MAX flying—into the new 2016 CBA.

Even assuming for argument’s sake that the 2006 CBA could be interpreted to require pilots to fly the MAX, SWAPA’s allegation is that, in 2016, it would not have agreed to a renewed or explicit MAX-flying obligation but for Boeing’s misrepresentations. Thus:

“[E]ven if the 2006 CBA required the pilots to fly the MAX, SWAPA had no obligation to agree to fly it in the 2016 CBA, and SWAPA asserts that it would not have agreed to fly the MAX in the 2016 CBA but for Boeing's alleged misrepresentations.”

Because the alleged injury flows from the decision to enter into the 2016 CBA influenced by fraudulent inducement (a state-law duty independent of any CBA), the 2006 CBA is not the “only source” of the rights asserted.

4. Factual disputes vs. contract-interpretation disputes

The Court emphasizes the difference between:

  • Purely factual questions—such as what representations were made, whether they were false, whether SWAPA and individual pilots actually relied on them, and whether that reliance caused economic loss; and
  • Legal questions of contract interpretation—such as the scope of pilots’ duties under a specific CBA term.

The Court explicitly leaves factual issues for later proceedings, holding only that those disputes do not require judicial interpretation of CBA terms. The claims are “independent” in the sense that their elements can be adjudicated solely by reference to:

  • State tort standards, and
  • Non-CBA evidence (communications, negotiations, conduct, economic impact).

As Lingle teaches, even if the same facts could also be relevant to a contractual grievance under the CBA, that overlap is not enough to trigger preemption so long as the state-law cause of action does not turn on what the CBA means.

5. Rejection of the federal district court’s CBA-interpretation remark

Boeing pointed to the federal district court’s earlier observation that resolving SWAPA’s claims “will require interpretation of the CBA.” The Texas Supreme Court responds:

  • It is not bound by that statement.
  • The federal court’s remark was, in any event, irrelevant to its holding that the RLA does not support complete preemption, because both parties conceded that CBA-interpretation issues were immaterial to complete-preemption analysis.

Thus, that statement does not control the ordinary preemption question presented here.

6. Conclusion on preemption

Applying the Norris/Lingle standard, the Court concludes:

“Because the resolution of SWAPA's claims against Boeing is not ‘substantially dependent’ upon an interpretation of either of the parties' CBAs, we conclude that the Railway Labor Act does not preempt SWAPA's claims.”

The decision reinforces a narrow, interpretation-focused view of RLA preemption, preserving state-law tort remedies where claims arise from duties and misrepresentations independent of the CBA’s meaning.

B. Validity of the Pilots’ Assignments to SWAPA

1. Boeing’s public-policy challenge

Boeing argued that the pilots’ assignments are void because:

  • Their “sole purpose” is to circumvent the Texas Legislature’s constraints on associational standing in § 252.007(b); and
  • They effectively bypass the safeguards built into class-action procedures.

Boeing labeled them “pass-through” assignments, suggesting that SWAPA was merely a collection device for pilots’ claims and recoveries.

2. The Court’s distinction from Gandy-type distortive assignments

The Court reaffirms Gandy’s rule that assignments that “tend to increase and distort litigation” are void because they:

  • Mislead juries;
  • Promote collusion among ostensible adversaries; and
  • Risk unfairly shifting liability to less culpable defendants.

However, it finds none of these concerns implicated here:

  • There is no adverse alignment issue: SWAPA and pilots are not shifting blame among multiple tortfeasors or realigning adversaries.
  • The alternative to assignment could be up to 10,000 separate pilot suits—potentially more burdensome and complex than a centralized assignee action.
  • SWAPA is not a “stranger/entrepreneur” but the union that negotiated the CBA and allegedly relied on Boeing’s misrepresentations, placing it at the center of the factual narrative.

Thus, the assignments do not inherently “make the litigation more protracted and complex” in the Gandy sense.

3. Property-based and remedial nature of the claims

The Court characterizes the pilots’ claims—fraud, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference, and related economic damages—as “property-based and remedial,” not “personal and punitive.” This characterization:

  • Distances the case from non-assignable claims like certain DTPA or unfair-settlement claims that serve punitive or strictly personal regulatory roles; and
  • Supports the general rule that economic-tort claims are assignable absent a specific prohibition.

4. Statutory silence on assignments vs. associational-standing limits

Texas Business Organizations Code § 252.007(b) limits associational standing where claims or remedies require individual member participation. The Court notes:

  • The Legislature plainly knew how to restrict a nonprofit association’s representative litigation authority.
  • It did not adopt any parallel limitation on members’ ability to assign their claims to their association.

Given that:

“The Legislature has directed that SWAPA cannot have associational standing to sue on behalf of its members if the claim or relief requires the individual members' participation in the suit … but it has not imposed the same prohibition against a member's assignment of his claim to an association, although it certainly could have done so.”

The Court is unwilling to infer a broad public-policy prohibition against assignments simply from the existence of associational-standing limits. To do so would effectively rewrite the statute.

5. “Circumvention” vs. alternative standing mechanisms

Responding to the suggestion (and the dissent’s concern) that assignments “circumvent” associational standing or class-action rules, the Court states:

“Associational standing, class-action standing, and standing based on an assignment provide alternative means for obtaining standing, and, because of their distinct requirements, neither circumvents the other.”

This is a key doctrinal statement. It affirms that:

  • Plaintiffs may choose among lawful procedural vehicles.
  • Stricter requirements under one mechanism (e.g., associational standing) do not disqualify the use of another (assignment), unless the Legislature or binding precedent expressly forbids it.

6. The assignee’s burden: proving each individual claim

The Court underscores that while assignments confer standing and control, they do not change what must be proven:

  • The assignee “steps into the shoes” of the assignor and acquires no greater rights.
  • SWAPA must prove, for each assigned claim:
    • Liability of Boeing to the individual pilot (including the pilot’s reliance, causation, and injury), and
    • The amount of damages that individual pilot suffered.

Assignments do not convert individual reliance and damage questions into a single, association-wide issue. As the Court puts it:

“To recover damages on a pilot's claim for tortious interference or misrepresentations, for example, SWAPA must establish that each individual pilot relied on alleged misrepresentations and suffered a particular amount of damages as a result.”

This ensures that assignments cannot be used to circumvent the individualized-participation concerns that bar associational standing; they simply relocate control of the claims, not their substance.

C. Procedural Management: Joinder, Consolidation, Severance, and Separate Trials

Recognizing the complexity of litigating thousands of individual claims held by a single assignee, the Court stresses that:

  • It is not deciding how the second lawsuit (with assigned claims) should be structured or tried.
  • Trial courts have broad discretion under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 39, 40, 41, and 174 to:
    • Join or separate parties and claims,
    • Consolidate actions, and
    • Order separate trials “to avoid prejudice, do justice, and increase convenience.”

Key procedural principles:

  • Severance and consolidation are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • The trial court must exercise “sound and legal discretion” within the limits of the particular case.
  • SWAPA must litigate as an assignee, not as a de facto representative association or class representative without satisfying those separate requirements.

The Court’s message to trial courts is twofold:

  1. Assignments to an association are valid and can support standing.
  2. Yet, courts must still protect defendants’ rights to contest each claim and must manage the litigation to prevent assignments from becoming an end-run around individualized proof requirements or Rule 42 safeguards.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Labor and Employment Litigation under the RLA

The decision has significant implications for labor-related litigation involving:

  • Unions and employees seeking to assert state-law claims; and
  • Third-party manufacturers, consultants, or service providers (like Boeing) whose conduct influences CBA negotiations or working conditions.

Key impacts:

  • Clarified limits on RLA preemption in Texas courts. State-law fraud and interference claims will not be preempted merely because they arise in a CBA bargaining context or because the CBA forms part of the background. Preemption turns on whether the court must interpret CBA terms, not whether the CBA is relevant.
  • Preservation of state remedies against third parties. Unions and employees can pursue tort claims against non-carrier entities when those entities independently misrepresent material facts or interfere with contract negotiations, so long as liability does not hinge on what the CBA means.
  • Narrowing the “remedial gap” concern. Some federal authority had suggested that certain third-party tort claims might be preempted under the RLA without any available arbitral or federal statutory remedy. By strictly cabining preemption to cases of necessary CBA interpretation, this decision helps avoid that gap in many scenarios.

B. Mass Assignments as an Alternative to Class Actions and Associational Standing

The Court’s validation of mass assignments to a union will likely influence how large groups of similarly affected individuals structure litigation:

  • For unions and trade associations: Mass assignment becomes a viable strategy when:
    • Associational standing fails because claims require individualized proof of reliance, causation, and damages; and
    • Class certification is uncertain, slow, or strategically undesirable.
  • For plaintiffs’ counsel: Assignments can offer centralized control and avoid some procedural hurdles of class actions (such as typicality, commonality, and adequacy), but they do not obviate the need for individualized proof.
  • For defendants: The risk profile shifts: a single organizational plaintiff may wield thousands of claims, increasing potential exposure and negotiation leverage, but defendants retain the right to demand individualized proof.

At the same time, the Court’s insistence that assignments do not collapse individualized issues into aggregate ones acts as an important check against de facto class actions without Rule 42 compliance.

C. Manufacturer and Third-Party Exposure in Labor Settings

Manufacturers and other third parties involved in labor negotiations or operational changes—particularly in safety-sensitive industries—should take note:

  • Communications to unions and employees may generate tort exposure. Misrepresentations about safety, training, or operational features that influence CBA negotiations can support state-law fraud and interference claims.
  • RLA preemption will not provide a blanket shield. Where claims can be framed around independent duties to avoid misrepresentation, RLA-based preemption defenses will be weaker.
  • Risk management and documentation become critical. Clear disclaimers, robust due diligence, and accurate technical disclosures are essential in negotiations touching on equipment, procedures, or safety.

D. Procedural Doctrine in Texas: Standing and Case Management

The case also refines Texas procedural doctrine:

  • Standing is time-specific. Standing is determined at the time suit is filed. Later-obtained assignments cannot retroactively cure an initial absence of standing, which is why SWAPA’s assigned claims must proceed in a separate lawsuit.
  • Assignments vs. associational standing. The Legislature’s associational-standing limits do not implicitly prohibit mass assignments; courts will not infer such a ban where the statute is silent.
  • Enhanced role for trial courts in managing aggregated assignee claims. Judges will need to use joinder, consolidation, severance, and separate-trial mechanisms creatively and carefully to balance:
    • Efficiency and convenience;
    • Avoidance of prejudice to either side; and
    • Preservation of each party’s right to a fair trial.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. RLA Preemption vs. “Complete Preemption”

There are two different concepts:

  • Complete preemption (jurisdictional). A rare doctrine under which a federal statute is so powerful that it converts any related state-law claim into a federal claim, allowing removal to federal court. The RLA does not have this effect for tort claims like SWAPA’s.
  • Ordinary preemption (defense on the merits). Even in state court, a defendant can argue that a federal statute (here, the RLA) displaces or bars certain state-law claims. That is the kind of preemption at issue in this case.

The Texas Supreme Court is dealing only with ordinary preemption—whether, as a defense, the RLA bars SWAPA’s claims because they really are minor disputes about CBA interpretation. It answers that question “no.”

B. Major vs. Minor Disputes under the RLA

  • Major disputes: About forming or changing CBAs—such as negotiating a new agreement or modifying existing terms (like adding MAX flying duties in a new CBA).
  • Minor disputes: About interpreting or applying existing CBAs—such as whether, under the current CBA’s language, pilots are required to fly a particular aircraft.

Minor disputes must go to arbitration under the RLA, not to court. Preemption analysis focuses on whether the claim, in substance, is such a minor dispute (i.e., requires interpreting CBA language). Here, the Court characterizes SWAPA’s claims as independent torts, not minor disputes.

C. Associational Standing vs. Assignment

Associational standing lets an organization sue in its own name for injuries to its members, but only under strict conditions, including that individual members do not need to participate heavily in the case.

Assignment is different: a person transfers his or her legal claim to another party, who then owns it and sues in its own name. The assignee must prove everything the original holder would have had to prove, including individualized facts like reliance and damages.

In this case:

  • SWAPA could not meet the requirements for associational standing because resolving pilots’ individual lost-wage claims requires their individual participation (for reliance, causation, damages).
  • But the pilots could assign their claims to SWAPA, allowing SWAPA to litigate as an assignee—subject to individualized proof requirements.

D. “Injury in Fact” and Standing

Injury in fact is the idea that to sue, a party must show a concrete, particularized harm, not just a general grievance. In assignment:

  • The assignee is deemed to have suffered the same injury as the assignor, because it steps into the assignor’s shoes.
  • But the assignee must still prove that injury existed and was caused by the defendant’s conduct.

E. Joinder, Consolidation, Severance, and Separate Trials

Texas procedural rules give trial courts flexible tools:

  • Joinder (Rules 39, 40): Bringing multiple parties or claims into the same lawsuit when they are related.
  • Consolidation (Rule 41, 174): Combining related suits or claims for efficiency.
  • Severance (Rule 41): Splitting off claims into separate suits when issues are distinct or combining them would be prejudicial or unwieldy.
  • Separate trials (Rule 174): Trying different issues or parties separately within the same lawsuit to avoid confusion or prejudice.

The Court signals that all these tools are on the table for managing SWAPA’s thousands of assigned claims in the separate lawsuit.

VIII. Conclusion

The Boeing Company v. SWAPA establishes two important principles in Texas law:

  1. Railway Labor Act preemption is narrowly confined to claims requiring CBA interpretation. State-law tort and interference claims arising from independent duties—such as a third party’s obligation not to misrepresent material facts—are not preempted simply because they occur in the context of CBA negotiations or because the CBA provides factual background.
  2. Mass assignments of members’ claims to their association are valid and do not violate public policy. So long as the assigned claims are property-based and remedial, and the assignee proves each individual claim’s elements (liability, reliance, damages), such assignments are a legitimate alternative to associational standing and class actions. They cannot be deemed invalid solely because they are chosen to avoid the procedural constraints of those other mechanisms.

At the same time, the Court carefully polices the limits:

  • Assignments do not excuse SWAPA from proving each pilot’s individualized reliance and damages.
  • Trial courts retain broad discretion to structure proceedings to avoid prejudice and to preserve defendants’ rights to contest each claim.
  • SWAPA’s role as assignee must not be converted into de facto associational representation in disregard of statutory requirements.

In the broader legal landscape, the decision reaffirms the autonomy of state tort law alongside federal labor policy, clarifies the interplay between preemption and independent state duties, and endorses assignment-based standing as a robust, though demanding, tool for aggregate litigation. For unions, employers, manufacturers, and courts, it provides a detailed roadmap for navigating complex, high-stakes disputes at the junction of federal labor statutes, state tort law, and modern procedural practice.

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