Independent Certification Discipline Beyond Tenure Arbitration: Commentary on In the Matter of the Certificates of Nicholas Cilento (N.J. 2025)

Independent Certification Discipline Beyond Tenure Arbitration:
Commentary on In the Matter of the Certificates of Nicholas Cilento, Supreme Court of New Jersey (Dec. 9, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s per curiam decision in In the Matter of the Certificates of Nicholas Cilento, State Board of Examiners, New Jersey Department of Education solidifies an important structural principle in New Jersey education law: disciplinary actions imposed through teacher tenure arbitration do not preclude the State Board of Examiners and the Commissioner of Education from separately imposing licensing sanctions on a teacher’s certificate based on the same underlying conduct.

At its core, the case addresses whether a tenured educator who has already been disciplined through the tenure arbitration system can be subjected to additional, and potentially more severe, discipline in the form of certificate suspension or revocation by a separate administrative body operating under a distinct statutory scheme. The Court unanimously concludes that they can.

The decision expressly endorses and effectively elevates to statewide, binding precedent the Appellate Division’s reasoning in Morison v. Willingboro Board of Education, 478 N.J. Super. 229 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 258 N.J. 143 (2024), and makes clear that:

  • The teacher tenure discipline scheme (N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1) and the certificate discipline scheme (N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38 to -39) are distinct, complementary, and non-exclusive.
  • The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar the State Board of Examiners from acting on a teacher’s certificate after a tenure arbitration award.
  • The absence of “privity” between the local board of education and the State Board of Examiners is central: each is a different party pursuing different legal interests.
  • Due process—both procedural and substantive—is not violated so long as the educator receives notice and an opportunity to be heard in the certification proceeding and the dual-scheme system is rational and not fundamentally unfair.

This commentary examines the factual background, procedural history, and legal reasoning, and assesses the decision’s broader impact on New Jersey education law, particularly on the relationship between employment discipline and professional licensure.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Incident and Tenure Charges

Petitioner Nicholas Cilento was a tenured special education teacher employed by the Woodbridge Township School District. On May 21, 2019, he was relieved of his responsibilities on the ground that he had consumed alcohol on school premises. The Woodbridge Township Board of Education (the “Woodbridge BOE”) brought tenure charges in October 2019, alleging:

  • Unbecoming conduct on May 20 and 21, 2019, in violation of standards of professional behavior, state and municipal law, and district policy; and
  • An additional tenure charge alleging a pattern or course of unbecoming conduct over time.

At the tenure arbitration hearing, held under the TEACHNJ Act framework (N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑10 to -18.1, particularly N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑17.1), Cilento admitted to struggling with alcoholism and to consuming alcohol on school grounds. The arbitrator found the charges (other than the “pattern over time” allegation) proven and concluded that the conduct constituted just cause for discipline, but not for dismissal.

The arbitrator imposed:

  • A three-month unpaid suspension; and
  • Reinstatement on a “Last Chance Basis” – essentially a final warning that any further serious misconduct could result in termination.

B. Initiation of Separate Certificate Discipline

Notwithstanding the arbitrator’s penalty, the New Jersey State Board of Examiners (the “Board of Examiners” or the “Board”) initiated a separate proceeding regarding Cilento’s teaching certificates. On March 3, 2021, the Board issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) under N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑38 to -39, directing Cilento to explain why his certificates should not be suspended or revoked. The OSC relied on the same underlying factual conduct—consumption of alcohol on school premises—that had been the basis for the tenure charges.

Cilento argued that the arbitrator’s decision:

  • Should be considered a final agency decision of the Department of Education; and
  • Therefore precluded the Board from imposing any additional discipline, under principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, comity, privity, and due process.

The Board, however, concluded that Cilento’s conduct was unbecoming of a teacher in the broader, statewide sense and imposed a two-year suspension of his teaching certificate(s). The Board emphasized that it is an independent administrative body with authority to decide whether conduct proven in other proceedings warrants certificate discipline.

C. Commissioner and Appellate Division Decisions

Cilento appealed the Board’s decision to the Commissioner of Education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑38.4. The Commissioner upheld the Board’s determination, reasoning that:

  • The Board of Examiners was not a party to the tenure arbitration and is not bound by the arbitrator’s penalty determination.
  • The tenure arbitration and the certification discipline arise under distinct statutory schemes—one concerning employment in a particular district, the other concerning licensure to teach anywhere in the state.
  • The two decisions were the product of separate proceedings conducted for different purposes.

Cilento then appealed to the Appellate Division. While his appeal was pending, the Appellate Division issued its decision in Morison v. Willingboro Board of Education, a case raising the “exact issue” presented here: whether a tenure arbitrator’s disciplinary determination precludes the State Board of Examiners from imposing certificate discipline on the same record.

Relying heavily on Morison, the Appellate Division rejected Cilento’s challenge and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.

D. Grant of Certification and Supreme Court Review

The Supreme Court granted certification, 259 N.J. 503 (2025), to address the recurring and structurally important question of the relationship between tenure arbitration and certification discipline. Amicus briefs were submitted by:

  • The New Jersey Principals and Supervisors Association; and
  • The New Jersey Education Association (NJEA), the statewide teachers’ union.

On December 9, 2025, the Court issued a unanimous per curiam opinion affirming the Appellate Division and expressly endorsing the reasoning in Morison.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court’s opinion is brief but consequential. It does not re-litigate every argument; instead, it explicitly adopts the Appellate Division’s Morison analysis as controlling authority for the issues raised. The key points are:

  1. Two distinct statutory schemes with different purposes and stakes.
    The Court emphasizes, as did Morison, that:
    • One scheme governs tenure discipline for a specific employment relationship (N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑10 to -18.1, including tenure arbitration under N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑17.1).
    • The other governs statewide licensure—the power to suspend or revoke a teaching certificate under N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑38 to -39.
    The “stakes” of the two proceedings differ: the tenure proceeding concerns employment status in one district; certification discipline concerns the teacher’s ability to work in any public school in the state.
  2. No privity, no identity of parties, and therefore no res judicata or collateral estoppel.
    Because the Board of Examiners was not a party to the tenure arbitration, and the local school board is not a party to the certification proceeding, there is no identity of parties or privity. Thus, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar the Board from proceeding.
  3. Due process is satisfied; no fundamental unfairness.
    Following Morison, the Court agrees that the educator’s procedural due process rights are met so long as he receives notice and an opportunity to be heard in the certificate proceeding. The dual-track system does not amount to “egregious governmental abuse,” does not “shock the conscience,” and does not offend “judicial notions of fairness.” The coexistence of licensing and tenure disciplines is rational and complementary.
  4. Anticipatory vs. retrospective challenge is immaterial.
    Cilento sought to distinguish Morison because that case involved an anticipatory challenge (to prevent a certificate action before it happened), while his challenge was retrospective (to overturn an already-imposed certificate suspension). The Supreme Court expressly rejects this distinction, stating that it “does not affect the analysis of the action’s permissibility.”
  5. Outcome: Affirmed.
    The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Board’s two-year suspension of Cilento’s teaching certificates stands, in addition to the three-month unpaid suspension and Last Chance reinstatement previously ordered by the arbitrator.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Statutory and Institutional Framework

1. The Tenure Discipline Scheme: N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑10 to -18.1

New Jersey’s tenure system, significantly restructured by the TEACHNJ Act (2012), provides for:

  • Tenure protections for qualifying educators;
  • Grounds for tenure charges (dismissal or reduction in compensation) under N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑10; and
  • A mandatory, expedited arbitration process for resolving such charges, under N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑17.1.

Key features, as highlighted through Morison and noted by the Court, include:

  • Parties: The dispute is between the tenured educator and the local board of education (here, the Woodbridge BOE).
  • Subject matter: Whether the teacher may be dismissed or otherwise disciplined from his employment in that particular district.
  • Decision maker: An independent arbitrator, selected under procedures set forth in the statute, issues a binding decision.
  • Relief: Remedies such as termination, suspension, reprimand, or other employment-related sanctions.

In Cilento’s case, the arbitrator found that his conduct warranted discipline but not dismissal and imposed a three-month unpaid suspension with reinstatement on a “Last Chance Basis.” From the employment law standpoint, this concluded the tenure dispute with the Woodbridge BOE.

2. The Certification Discipline Scheme: N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑38 to -39

Separate from tenure, New Jersey also regulates who may hold a teaching certificate authorizing them to teach in public schools statewide. N.J.S.A. 18A:6‑38 to -39 empower the State Board of Examiners to:

  • Issue, revoke, or suspend teaching certificates;
  • Initiate proceedings by Order to Show Cause when an educator’s conduct may be “unbecoming of a teacher” or otherwise incompatible with holding a certificate; and
  • Impose sanctions ranging from reprimand to full revocation of the certificate.

Key features include:

  • Parties: The proceeding is between the licensed educator and the State Board of Examiners (often with the Commissioner’s oversight at the appellate stage).
  • Subject matter: Whether the teacher should be allowed to hold a teaching certificate and thus be eligible to teach anywhere in the New Jersey public school system.
  • Decision makers: The Board of Examiners and ultimately the Commissioner of Education, not the tenure arbitrator.
  • Relief: Suspension, revocation, or restoration of certification, which can affect employment opportunities beyond a single district.

The Supreme Court, following Morison, characterizes these two schemes—tenure discipline and certification discipline—as “distinct and dissimilar”. They serve different regulatory objectives and operate through different institutional actors.

3. Morison v. Willingboro Board of Education as Controlling Precedent

Morison is the linchpin of the Court’s analysis. Although the Supreme Court does not restate the entire Morison opinion, it highlights its central conclusions:

  • The two statutory schemes (tenure and certification) are distinct in purpose, procedure, and stakes.
  • There is no privity between the local board and the Board of Examiners; they are separate entities pursuing different interests.
  • Consequently, res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar certification discipline after tenure arbitration.
  • Due process and fundamental fairness are not violated by this dual-track system.

Morison itself involved a teacher who attempted an anticipatory challenge—seeking to enjoin the Board of Examiners from even initiating certificate proceedings after a tenure arbitration outcome. In Cilento’s case, the challenge is retrospective—seeking to set aside a certificate suspension already imposed. The Supreme Court explicitly holds that this timing distinction does not change the core legal analysis.

By endorsing Morison without qualification, the Supreme Court effectively elevates it from persuasive Appellate Division authority to statewide, binding construction of the relationship between the two statutory schemes.

B. Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Privity

1. Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion)

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, generally bars parties (or their privies) from relitigating claims that:

  • Involve the same cause of action;
  • Were between the same parties or those in privity with them; and
  • Have been resolved by a final judgment on the merits.

Cilento’s res judicata argument was essentially:

  • The tenure arbitration decision was a final resolution by an arm of the Department of Education; and
  • The Department (through the Board of Examiners) should not be allowed to impose a different or additional penalty for the same conduct.

The Supreme Court, adopting Morison, rejects this because the parties and claims are not the same:

  • The tenure arbitration was between Cilento and the Woodbridge BOE, about his employment in that district.
  • The certificate proceeding was between Cilento and the Board of Examiners, about his licensure to teach statewide.

Although the underlying factual conduct (alcohol consumption on school grounds) overlaps, the “cause of action” is not identical: employment discipline vs. professional licensure. This alone is a strong reason for rejecting claim preclusion.

2. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion)

Collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of specific factual or legal issues that:

  • Were actually litigated and determined in a prior proceeding;
  • Were essential to the judgment; and
  • Are being raised against a party (or privy) who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.

Here, even if one assumes that certain factual findings (e.g., that Cilento consumed alcohol on school grounds) were fully litigated before the arbitrator, collateral estoppel does not prevent the Board of Examiners from:

  • Adopting those factual findings; and
  • Reaching an independent judgment on the appropriate licensing sanction.

More fundamentally, the Supreme Court—through Morison—emphasizes that:

  • The Board of Examiners is not in privity with the local school board; and
  • The local board’s role and the Board of Examiners’ role are institutionally distinct.

Without privity, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel can bind the Board to the arbitrator’s choice of penalty. The Board is free to act on the same underlying facts to protect statewide licensing interests.

3. Privity and Institutional Independence

“Privity” describes a sufficiently close relationship between separate entities such that one is legally bound by judgments involving the other. Here, the Court (following Morison) holds that:

  • The local board of education is an employer acting in a localized employment capacity.
  • The Board of Examiners is a state licensing authority acting to protect the integrity of the teaching profession statewide.

These roles are conceptually and functionally distinct; they are not “privies” in any meaningful sense for preclusion purposes. Thus, the Board of Examiners is not “bound” by the arbitrator’s calibration of the employment penalty.

The decision underscores that an arbitrator’s ruling does not exhaust all state regulatory authority over the educator; it merely settles the tenure dispute with that district.

C. Comity Between Decisionmakers

Cilento also raised principles of “comity” – the idea that one tribunal should, as a matter of respect and coherence, defer to the decisions of another, especially within the same overall governmental system.

While the Supreme Court does not explicitly elaborate on “comity” separately from preclusion and due process, its endorsement of Morison makes clear:

  • There is no legal requirement that the Board of Examiners defer to an arbitrator’s choice of discipline, even if both operate within the education regulatory sphere.
  • Each body performs a different function: one resolves an employer–employee tenure dispute; the other regulates professional licensing.
  • Comity considerations do not override the Board’s independent statutory duty to assess fitness for licensure.

The Court’s approach treats overlapping regulatory authority as complementary rather than conflicting, a theme explicitly articulated in Morison.

D. Due Process and Fundamental Fairness

1. Procedural Due Process

Procedural due process, under both the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions, requires that before the state deprives a person of a protected interest (such as a property interest in a professional license), it must provide:

  • Notice of the proposed action; and
  • An opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

The Supreme Court, adopting Morison, holds that there was no procedural due process violation because:

  • Cilento received an Order to Show Cause that clearly notified him of the proposed certificate discipline and its factual basis.
  • He had an opportunity to respond and to contest the proposed sanction in the certificate proceeding.
  • He then had the right to appeal the Board’s decision to the Commissioner and further to the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court.

The fact that the tenure arbitration already afforded notice and a hearing on the underlying misconduct does not replace the need for procedural safeguards in the licensing process—but it also does not add additional constitutional requirements beyond those basic guarantees. The certificate proceeding itself satisfies due process requirements.

2. Substantive Due Process and Fundamental Fairness

Substantive due process and New Jersey’s “fundamental fairness” doctrine protect individuals against:

  • Governmental actions that are arbitrary or irrational; and
  • “Egregious governmental abuse” that “shocks the conscience” or offends “judicial notions of fairness.”

The Supreme Court quotes Morison in concluding that the separate action of the Board of Examiners:

  • Does not rise to the level of an “egregious governmental abuse.”
  • Does not “shock the conscience.”
  • Does not offend basic fairness.

Instead, the Court views the dual system as having a rational foundation:

  • Tenure laws protect teachers against arbitrary or politically motivated employment decisions, while allowing for discipline or removal in appropriate cases.
  • Licensing laws protect students, parents, and the integrity of the education system by ensuring that only fit and competent individuals hold teaching certificates.
  • The coexistence of these systems allows for both localized employment decisions and centralized regulation of the profession.

From this perspective, imposing a two-year certificate suspension after a three-month employment suspension is not inherently unfair. The teacher’s continued statewide eligibility to teach is a separate, legitimate subject of regulation even after his dispute with the employing district has been resolved.

E. Anticipatory vs. Retrospective Challenges

A notable feature of the Supreme Court’s opinion is its explicit rejection of the attempted distinction between:

  • An anticipatory challenge, as in Morison, where a teacher sought to prevent the Board from initiating certificate proceedings; and
  • A retrospective challenge, as in Cilento, where the teacher sought to overturn a certificate suspension already imposed.

The Court states that this procedural posture difference “does not affect the analysis of the action’s permissibility.” This is significant for two reasons:

  1. It confirms that Morison was not limited to injunction contexts or to preliminary disputes about the Board’s jurisdiction. Rather, its core reasoning applies equally to fully developed disciplinary actions and appeals.
  2. It forecloses a two-track judicial review strategy where litigants might argue that, even if the Board has power to start a certificate case, it somehow lacks power to complete it once a tenure award has been issued.

By closing this loophole, the Court solidifies a uniform rule: the existence of a tenure arbitration decision, at any stage, does not disable or legally constrain the Board of Examiners’ independent licensing authority.

F. Policy Considerations and Systemic Impact

1. Separation of Employment Status and Professional Licensure

At a conceptual level, Cilento embraces a common structure seen in many professions:

  • Employers decide whether to retain or discipline an employee; and
  • Separate licensing bodies decide whether the individual is fit to practice that profession more broadly.

In education, this means:

  • A teacher may keep a job in one district yet still face licensing scrutiny that could affect their ability to work elsewhere.
  • Conversely, losing a job in one district does not automatically mandate certificate revocation; the Board of Examiners may choose a lesser sanction or none at all.

The Court’s decision reinforces that these two spheres are intentionally distinct. The arbitrator’s decision calibrates the employment consequences for that district; the Board’s decision calibrates the licensing consequences for the profession statewide.

2. “Double Punishment” Concerns

From an educator’s perspective, the prospect of facing both tenure discipline and certificate discipline based on the same incident may appear as “double punishment.” The Court implicitly acknowledges this concern but finds no constitutional violation because:

  • The sanctions serve different governmental interests (employer discipline vs. public protection via licensure); and
  • Each proceeding affords its own due process protections.

In legal terms, this is not “double jeopardy” (which does not apply to administrative sanctions of this nature) nor impermissible multiple punishment, but rather a permissible layering of employment and regulatory consequences.

3. Practical Consequences for Teachers, Unions, and School Districts

The decision has several practical implications:

  • For teachers: Even a favorable or moderate outcome in tenure arbitration (such as reinstatement on a Last Chance Basis) does not guarantee immunity from licensing review. Teachers must understand that serious misconduct—even if not resulting in dismissal—can trigger separate certificate proceedings.
  • For unions (e.g., NJEA): Representation strategies may need to account for potential certificate consequences from the outset of a case. Unions may seek to address, where possible, licensing implications in settlement negotiations or in advocacy before the Board of Examiners.
  • For school districts: Local boards cannot, through arbitration or settlement, “bargain away” the State’s independent licensing authority. However, their factual development and litigation strategy in tenure cases can have collateral effects, as the Board may rely on established facts from those proceedings.
  • For the Board of Examiners and Commissioner: The decision affirms their discretion to:
    • Initiate certificate proceedings based on tenure case outcomes; and
    • Impose independent sanctions reflecting the broader public interest in teacher fitness statewide.

4. Systemic Coherence and Child Protection

From a systemic standpoint, the decision supports a model in which:

  • A teacher who commits serious misconduct in one district cannot necessarily insulate himself from statewide licensing scrutiny by securing a favorable or lenient tenure arbitration outcome.
  • The State retains the capacity to remove from the profession (via certificate suspension or revocation) individuals whose conduct makes them unfit to teach anywhere, even if one district is willing to retain them under strict conditions.

The Court accepts Morison’s view that this dual system is “complementary, not deleterious” to the education law framework. It fosters both local flexibility and statewide protection of students and public trust.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

For non-specialists, several legal concepts in this opinion merit brief clarification.

1. Res Judicata

Res judicata (claim preclusion) means: you generally get only one full chance to litigate a claim against a particular opponent. Once there is a final decision on that dispute, you cannot bring the same claim again against the same party (or someone legally equivalent to that party).

In Cilento, this doctrine does not apply because:

  • The tenure arbitration and certificate proceedings involve different parties; and
  • They involve different types of claims (employment vs. licensing), even if the factual basis overlaps.

2. Collateral Estoppel

Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) means: if a specific issue—like whether a person did a particular act—was fully and fairly decided in one case, that issue cannot be relitigated in another case between the same parties (or their privies).

Even where prior factual findings are accepted, collateral estoppel does not prevent a different tribunal (with different legal authority and goals) from imposing its own, distinct consequences based on those facts. That is the situation here with the Board of Examiners.

3. Privity

Privity refers to a legal relationship close enough that two different entities are treated as if they are the same party for preclusion purposes.

In this case:

  • The local school board is an employer.
  • The State Board of Examiners is a licensing authority.

They are not “privies,” so a decision binding one does not automatically bind the other.

4. Procedural vs. Substantive Due Process

  • Procedural due process is about how the government acts: Did it give fair notice and a chance to be heard before imposing a deprivation?
  • Substantive due process is about what the government does: Is the government’s action so arbitrary, irrational, or outrageous that it violates basic constitutional norms, even if all procedures were followed?

The Court holds that the certificate proceeding gave Cilento adequate procedural protections and that the dual discipline system is substantively rational and not fundamentally unfair.

5. Fundamental Fairness

New Jersey’s “fundamental fairness” doctrine supplements due process in some contexts. It asks, broadly: even if something is technically lawful, is it so inconsistent with basic fairness that the courts should stop it?

In Cilento, the Court concludes that allowing separate certificate discipline does not offend fundamental fairness. The system is structured, comprehensible, and serves legitimate public goals.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of Cilento in the Broader Legal Context

In the Matter of the Certificates of Nicholas Cilento is concise, but it carries substantial doctrinal and practical weight. Its principal significance lies in three interrelated points:

  1. Formal adoption of Morison as controlling law.
    The Supreme Court not only agrees with the Appellate Division’s judgment in Cilento but explicitly embraces Judge Sabatino’s “comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion” in Morison. This cements the principle that tenure arbitration outcomes do not preclude separate certification discipline.
  2. Clear separation of employment discipline and licensure discipline.
    The Court underscores that:
    • Tenure laws govern the teacher’s status with a particular employer.
    • Licensing laws govern the teacher’s fitness to practice the profession statewide.
    These regimes can operate concurrently and cumulatively without violating preclusion doctrines or due process.
  3. Rejection of procedural posture distinctions.
    By holding that anticipatory vs. retrospective challenges make no difference to the analysis, the Court ensures that educators cannot defeat the Board of Examiners’ authority based on timing or litigation strategy. The Board’s authority to act is stable and independent.

In practical terms, Cilento sends a clear message:

  • Tenure arbitration is not the final word on a teacher’s professional fate in New Jersey.
  • The State retains robust power, through the Board of Examiners and Commissioner, to reassess and sanction a teacher’s license based on serious misconduct, even after local employment disputes are resolved.

For the education community—teachers, unions, administrators, and regulators—this decision provides much-needed clarity. It confirms that New Jersey’s education law is built on a dual but complementary foundation: local employment protections and discipline on one side, and centralized professional licensure oversight on the other.

That dual structure, the Court concludes, is not only lawful but rational and fair, serving both the rights of educators and the broader public interest in maintaining a safe, competent, and trustworthy teaching profession.

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