Incorporation of Standard Supervised-Release Conditions and Controlled Substance Offense Clarification under the Fourth Circuit Sentencing Guidelines

Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in United States v. Zadgery Collins McNeil (4th Cir. May 6, 2025) addresses two key sentencing‐guideline issues: (1) the proper classification of prior state distribution convictions as “controlled substance offenses,” and (2) the technical requirements for orally pronouncing standard supervised-release conditions at sentencing. McNeil, a convicted felon who pleaded guilty to unlawful firearm possession and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, challenged both the enhancement of his Guideline range based on prior South Carolina distribution convictions and the district court’s handling of supervised-release conditions. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Background and Key Issues

Parties: United States (Appellee) v. Zadgery Collins McNeil (Appellant).
Offenses:
1. Possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
2. Possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D).
District Court Sentence: 150 months’ imprisonment and 4 years of supervised release.
Appellant’s Challenges:
1. Whether two prior South Carolina marijuana‐distribution convictions qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.2.
2. Whether the district court erred under United States v. Rogers (4th Cir. 2020) by failing to orally pronounce the standard supervised-release conditions and failing to explain their imposition.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence. First, it held that South Carolina distribution convictions are properly treated as “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines, reaffirming United States v. Jackson (4th Cir. 2025). Second, it rejected McNeil’s claim of Rogers error. The panel found that:

By stating it would impose the “mandatory and standard conditions” of supervised release, the district court validly incorporated the Guidelines’ standard conditions.
A minor discrepancy between the oral and written description of the reporting condition was cured by the written judgment, clarifying any ambiguity.
The reasons for imposing the standard conditions were self-evident in light of the court’s explanation of McNeil’s dangerousness and recidivism, so no further detailed justification was required.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Miller, 75 F.4th 215 (4th Cir. 2023): De novo review of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a controlled substance offense under § 4B1.2.
United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2022): Held that South Carolina’s distribution statute sweeps in attempt offenses; McNeil relied on it to argue overbreadth vis-à-vis the Guidelines definition.
United States v. Jackson, 127 F.4th 448 (4th Cir. 2025): Clarified that South Carolina’s distribution statute does not cover attempted distribution and therefore aligns with the pre-2023 Guidelines definition of controlled substance offense.
United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020): Mandates that all non-mandatory conditions of supervised release must be orally pronounced or properly incorporated by reference at sentencing.
United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021): Conditions appearing first in a written judgment without oral pronouncement are nullities.
United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185 (4th Cir. 2022): Confirmed that incorporating “standard conditions” by reference is sufficient in circuits without conflicting local orders.
United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 550 (4th Cir. 2021): Explains the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) governing discretionary conditions.

2. Legal Reasoning

a) Controlled Substance Offense Enhancement
Under pre-2023 Guidelines § 4B1.2, a “controlled substance offense” excludes inchoate or attempt crimes. McNeil argued South Carolina’s distribution statute criminalized attempts, but Jackson held that it does not. Thus, the district court correctly counted his prior convictions for distribution of marijuana, leading to a higher Guidelines range.

b) Supervised-Release Conditions and Rogers Compliance
Rogers requires either oral announcement of discretionary conditions or clear incorporation by reference. McNeil contended the court failed to announce the standard conditions. The panel observed that:

The court expressly stated it would impose the “mandatory and standard conditions . . . outlined at § 3583(d).”
No alternative “standard” condition set exists in the District of South Carolina; therefore, the reference points only to the Guidelines’ standard set.

This satisfied the oral requirement. A minor discrepancy regarding reporting—“district to which released” vs. “district where authorized to reside”—did not require remand because the written judgment resolves the ambiguity per Rogers.

c) Explanation of Discretionary Conditions
Though district courts must justify discretionary conditions under § 3583(d), that requirement is less demanding when conditions are standard and no non-frivolous objection is raised. McNeil’s dangerousness and criminal history sufficiently explained the need for supervision, rendering detailed justification of routine conditions unnecessary.

3. Potential Impact

Reaffirms that state distribution statutes that do not criminalize attempts fall squarely within the “controlled substance offense” definition for sentencing enhancements.
Provides a clear blueprint for district courts to incorporate standard supervised-release conditions by reference when no conflicting local rule exists.
Limits the scope of Rogers errors by permitting minor discrepancies corrected by the written judgment, reducing the risk of remand solely on technical draftsman errors.
Emphasizes that district courts need only a concise justification for standard conditions when the overall sentence rationale is clear and unobjected to.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Controlled Substance Offense (§ 4B1.2): A prior conviction involving the distribution or possession with intent to distribute illicit drugs. Before 2023, it excluded mere attempts. South Carolina’s distribution law, as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, does not reach mere attempts.
Rogers Error: A sentencing procedural error occurring when a court fails to orally pronounce non-mandatory supervised-release conditions or fails to properly incorporate them by reference, making them unenforceable.
Incorporation by Reference: A shorthand method where a court states it will apply a known set of conditions or rules (here, the Guidelines’ standard conditions) without reciting each one individually at the hearing.
Plain‐Error Review: An appellate standard applied when the defendant did not object below. The error must be obvious, affect substantial rights, and seriously impair the fairness or integrity of the proceeding.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. McNeil (4th Cir. 2025) reinforces two critical sentencing principles: (1) state felony distribution convictions that do not punish mere attempts qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under the Sentencing Guidelines, and (2) district courts may satisfy Rogers by incorporating the Guidelines’ standard supervised-release conditions by reference in circuits without alternate local standards. Moreover, minor discrepancies between oral and written pronouncements can be cured by the written judgment, and routine conditions need only a sentence-wide explanation if the defendant raises no objection. This ruling will guide both sentencing courts and practitioners in structuring defensible sentencing transcripts and judgments moving forward.