3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Preservation of error; plain-error posture

• Jeremias u. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018): Used to set the review framework where an objection is not renewed and the ruling is not final—triggering plain error review.
• Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 924, 932, 59 P.3d 1249, 1254 (2002): Cited for the principle that a motion in limine can preserve an evidentiary issue without renewed objection only when the district court issues a “definitive ruling” after full briefing/hearing. The court distinguished this case because the exclusion of Dr. Davis was preliminary and expressly revisitable.

B. Expert admissibility; reliable methodology; fit to facts

• Halmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 500-01, 189 P.3d 646, 651-52 (2008): Supplies Nevada’s core expert-admissibility inquiry: expert testimony must be relevant and the product of reliable methodology, grounded in particularized facts rather than conjecture or generalization.
• Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 147-48, 576 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978): Supports excluding an expert who would testify only about general principles (there, eyewitness unreliability) without a viable foundation tied to the evidence presented in the case.
• Lickey v. State, 108 Nev. 191, 196, 827 P.2d 824, 827 (1992) and Perez v. State, 129 Nev. 850, 861, 313 P.3d 862, 870 (2013): Establish and reinforce the prohibition against experts (or any witnesses) commenting on another witness’s veracity or “vouching” for truthfulness—protecting the jury’s exclusive role in credibility determinations.
• Flowers v. State, 136 Nev. 1, 9, 456 P.3d 1037, 1046 (2020): Limits expert testimony that would functionally introduce un-cross-examined testimonial hearsay under the guise of an expert opinion.

C. Relevance of inconclusive DNA; “thoroughness” and “complete story”

• Chaparro uv. State, 137 Nev. 665, 672-73, 497 P.3d 1187, 1194-95 (2021): The central authority validating admission of inconclusive DNA evidence when it helps show investigative thoroughness and/or allows the State to present a complete story about a particular piece of evidence, even if the DNA has “minimal probative value” to guilt or innocence.

D. Closing argument boundaries; prosecutorial misconduct

• Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008): Provides plain-error review where no objection was made to closing argument.
• Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 984, 36 P.3d 424, 433 (2001): Confirms the State may comment on testimony, argue what the evidence shows, and request reasonable inferences.
• Valentine uv. State, 135 Nev. 463, 472-73, 454 P.3d 709, 718-19 (2019): Contrasts permissible inference with impermissible argument. In Valentine, the prosecutor improperly compared an inconclusive male DNA profile to the defendant’s profile despite expert testimony that no such conclusion could be drawn. The court here treated Valentine as a cautionary boundary line.

E. Hearsay; excited utterance

• Crowley uv. State, 120 Nev. 30, 34, 83 P.3d 282, 286 (2004): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of evidentiary rulings.
• Medina v, State, 122 Nev. 346, 351-52, 143 P.3d 471, 474-75 (2006): Defines and operationalizes the excited utterance exception—time elapsed is relevant, but the key is whether the declarant remains under the stress of excitement.

F. Sufficiency of evidence; circumstantial proof of intent

• Gordon v. State, 121 Nev. 504, 508, 117 P.3d 214, 217 (2005) (quoting Domingues uv. State, 112 Nev. 683, 693, 917 P.2d 1364, 1371 (1996)): Supplies the familiar sufficiency standard—whether any rational juror could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State.
• Grant v. State, 117 Nev. 427, 435, 24 P.3d 761, 766 (2001): Confirms criminal intent can be inferred from conduct and circumstantial evidence, not only direct proof.

G. Cumulative error

• Morgan v. State, 134 Nev. 200, 201 n.1, 416 P.8d 212, 217 n.1 (2018): Reinforces that cumulative error does not apply where no individual errors are identified.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Exclusion of Dr. Deborah Davis: “general principles” plus nonrenewal equals no relief

The court combined two ideas: (1) under Halmark v. Eldridge, expert methodology must “fit” the case through particularized facts, and (2) under Jeremias u. State and Richmond v. State, a defendant must preserve an issue unless the trial court issues a definitive ruling. Here, the district court preliminarily excluded Dr. Davis because the defense planned to keep her testimony “general in nature,” i.e., disconnected from trial evidence, invoking the Porter v. State concern that generalized reliability critiques are not automatically admissible.

Critically, the district court expressly invited Vazquez to re-raise the expert issue as the evidentiary record developed. Because Vazquez did not do so, the Supreme Court found no plain error and no showing of prejudice to substantial rights.

B. Limiting Dr. O’Donohue: the court polices credibility and hearsay through expert boundaries

The district court permitted broad testimony about suggestibility and inconsistencies in forensic interviews but prevented case-specific commentary that would (a) implicitly adjudicate P.V.M.’s credibility (barred by Lickey v. State and Perez v. State), or (b) serve as a vehicle to place untested, testimonial hearsay before the jury (guarded against by Flowers v. State). The Supreme Court framed this as protecting “the province of the jury” and applying established Nevada limits on experts: experts may educate the jury about general phenomena but may not tell the jury whether a specific witness is truthful or smuggle in inadmissible interview content.

C. Admission of inconclusive male DNA: relevance includes narrative completeness and investigative context

The opinion’s most concrete doctrinal application is its reliance on Chaparro uv. State. The DNA evidence could not identify Vazquez, but it was still admitted as relevant because it (1) demonstrated investigative thoroughness and (2) “completed the story” of the evidentiary chain about what was tested and what was found. The court also emphasized “fit” to the testimonial narrative: Josephina said she saw hand-to-genital contact through leggings; P.V.M. described abuse “in exactly that way.” Thus, the DNA results—though inconclusive—were treated as contextually supportive of the State’s overall story rather than as definitive identification evidence.

D. Closing argument: permissible inference distinguished from Valentine-type overreach

Applying Valdez v. State (plain error) and Randolph v. State (reasonable inference), the court rejected the misconduct claim. It distinguished Valentine uv. State, where the prosecutor made a direct comparison forbidden by the expert’s own limitations. Here, the prosecutor argued it was “unlikely” the male DNA originated from another male in the household. The court deemed that argument an inference not contradicted by the record and therefore within Randolph’s advocacy boundary.

E. Excited utterance: stress-of-event, not stopwatch timing

Relying on Medina v, State and NRS 51.095, the court upheld admission of P.V.M.’s statements to her mother as excited utterances. The key factual anchor was Josephina’s description of P.V.M. after the event as “a turtle like in her shell,” supporting continued stress. The court treated the interval (“sometime after” but before leaving with law enforcement) as not dispositive so long as stress persisted.

F. Alternative factual theory and sufficiency: the State need not “lose” if one route is proved

The appellant framed the case as requiring proof of both alleged touch locations (vagina and upper leg). The court instead assessed whether evidence permitted a rational juror to find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt under Gordon v. State/Domingues uv. State. With Josephina’s eyewitness account, P.V.M.’s testimony that Vazquez rubbed her leg and vagina, and Vazquez’s own statements that he touched P.V.M., the court held that a rational juror could find lewd touching of “either P.V.M.’s vagina, leg, or both.” It further relied on Grant v. State to infer lewd intent from conduct and circumstances, even if the jury credited only the “leg” portion.

G. Cumulative error: no error, no aggregation

Citing Morgan v. State, the court concluded that absent any identified error, there can be no cumulative error warranting relief.

3.3. Impact

• Inconclusive DNA remains admissible for narrative and investigative purposes: The decision reinforces Chaparro uv. State as a practical tool for the State to admit inconclusive biological evidence to show investigative diligence and “complete the story,” especially in child-sex cases where other physical corroboration may be limited.
• Closing-argument constraints are framed by evidentiary contradiction: The court’s distinction from Valentine uv. State signals that misconduct risk rises sharply when the prosecutor’s inference is affirmatively contradicted by the State’s own expert limitations, not merely when evidence is weak or non-identifying.
• Expert defense strategies must be tethered to case facts and preserved: Generalized testimony about interviewing dynamics may be allowed, but applying it to the specific witness’s truthfulness or replaying interview contents can be curtailed. Equally important, when a district court invites renewed proffer after evidence develops, failure to re-raise can effectively forfeit the claim on appeal.
• Excited utterance remains flexible in child-trauma contexts: The emphasis on continuing stress rather than strict timing supports admission where a child’s demeanor indicates lingering trauma, even if the statement is not instantaneous.
• Sufficiency review remains deferential where intent can be inferred: The court’s reliance on circumstantial inference of lewd intent (even from “leg touching”) suggests appellate courts will defer heavily to juries when testimonial accounts describe sexualized context and defendant admissions exist.