Inclusive Revival of Child Sexual Abuse Torts Under the SAFE Child Act

Introduction

In Cohane v. Home Missioners of America, the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed whether the “revival provision” of the SAFE Child Act—enacted in 2019 to protect survivors of child sexual abuse—reopens time-barred claims not only against direct abusers but also against institutions and supervisors who enabled the abuse. Plaintiff Gregory Cohane filed suit in July 2021, invoking the two-year window (January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2021) during which any civil action “for child sexual abuse” previously barred by the three-year statute of limitations (N.C.G.S. § 1-52) could be revived. Defendants Glenmary Home Missioners and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte moved to dismiss, arguing that the revival provision applied only to direct perpetrators, not to enablers or institutional defendants. The trial court agreed, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to resolve this pivotal statutory-interpretation question.

Summary of the Judgment

• The court held unanimously that section 4.2(b) of the SAFE Child Act revives “any civil action for child sexual abuse otherwise time-barred” under N.C.G.S. § 1-52, without limiting which defendants may be sued.
• By its plain language, the modifier “any” and the reference to the broad scope of tort claims under § 1-52 encompass both direct abusers and those who “specially contributed” to the harm (e.g., negligent supervision, ratification).
• The trial court’s narrow reading—limiting revival to direct perpetrators—was reversed, and the Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed.
• No constitutional avoidance was necessary because the statutory text was clear and unambiguous.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• McKinney v. Goins (N.C. Jan. 31, 2024) – Held that the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act comports with the state constitution.
• Misenheimer v. Burris, 360 N.C. 620 (2006) – Clarified that common­law negligence actions fall under the three-year limitations statute, N.C.G.S. § 1-52.
• Custom Molders, Inc. v. American Yard Products, Inc., 342 N.C. 133 (1995) – Session law language controls over codified statutes in case of conflict.
• State ex rel. Stein v. Kinston Charter Academy, 379 N.C. 560 (2021) – Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standards and deference to complaint allegations.
• Various decisions on statutory interpretation (e.g., Fearrington v. City of Greenville, Spruill v. Lake Phelps Volunteer Fire Dep’t) – Emphasized plain-meaning rules and legislative intent.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in three steps:

1. Plain language and context: The revival provision covers “any civil action” for child sexual abuse previously barred by N.C.G.S. § 1-52. The word “any” signals a broad sweep, and referring to § 1-52 incorporates all common law torts (assault, battery, negligence, emotional distress) under that limitations umbrella.
2. No textual basis to distinguish defendants: Nothing in the statutory text limits the word “any” to actions against individual abusers. On the contrary, tort law principles allow recovery from direct wrongdoers and from persons or institutions who negligently hired, supervised, or ratified the abuse (e.g., vicarious liability). The court presumed the legislature legislated against the backdrop of those established tort doctrines.
3. Presumption of consistent usage and express qualifications: When the General Assembly intended to carve out categories of defendants or to limit liability, it did so explicitly (for example, in other parts of the SAFE Child Act or in N.C.G.S. § 1-52(6), (13)). The absence of such limiting language in § 4.2(b) confirms that it applies to all potential tortfeasors.

Impact

This decision has several important consequences:

• It affirms that survivors of childhood sexual abuse have a revived cause of action against both individual perpetrators and the organizations or supervisors who enabled the harm.
• Institutions face renewed exposure to legacy claims, creating incentives for stronger reporting, supervision, and compliance policies.
• It clarifies the scope of the SAFE Child Act’s revival window, ensuring broad access to civil remedies for survivors whose claims were time-barred before December 31, 2021.
• Future courts will look to this precedent when interpreting revival statutes or extensions of limitations, both in North Carolina and potentially in other jurisdictions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Revival Provision: A temporary rule that “resurrects” lawsuits that were too late (time-barred) under the normal limitations period.
• Statute of Limitations (N.C.G.S. § 1-52): A law setting a deadline—usually three years—for filing personal injury claims.
• Tolling: Pausing the limitations clock (e.g., while a plaintiff is a minor).
• Vicarious Liability: Holding an employer or supervisor legally responsible for the wrongful acts of an employee or subordinate.
• Respondeat Superior: A specific form of vicarious liability where an employer is liable for torts committed by employees during the scope of their employment.

Conclusion

Cohane v. Home Missioners of America establishes that North Carolina’s SAFE Child Act revival provision is textually and contextually broad enough to revive any civil action for child sexual abuse that was time-barred, regardless of whether the defendant is a direct abuser or an institutional enabler. By applying traditional tort principles and respecting the plain language of the statute, the court reaffirmed survivors’ rights to seek redress and underscored the legislature’s intent to extend civil remedies to all contributors to child sexual abuse. This ruling marks a significant development in North Carolina law, strengthening accountability and providing a clear path to justice for victims.