Inclusion of Pedestrian Warning Signs Within “Highways” Under RSA 231:92

Introduction

Felts v. City of Rochester, 2025 N.H. 16 (April 16, 2025), is an interlocutory appeal decided by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Raymond Felts sued the City of Rochester after his wife, using a painted crosswalk without warning signs or signals, was struck and later died. The City moved to dismiss, asserting limited municipal liability under RSA 231:92, I. The trial court held that “highway” includes the roadway and crosswalk markings but excludes pedestrian warning signs or signals. The City appealed, asking whether pedestrian warning signs and traffic controls fall within the meaning of “highway” under RSA 231:92.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative: pedestrian warning signs, crossing signals, and other traffic controls are part of the “highway” for purposes of RSA 231:92. In a de novo statutory interpretation, the Court:

Examined the plain and ordinary meaning of “highway” in dictionaries and related statutes;
Considered the statutory context, including definitions of “insufficiency” in RSA 231:90 and related provisions on warning devices (RSA 231:94–95);
Applied common‐law precedents (State v. Scott; Richard v. Pembroke School District) emphasizing that integral elements of a public way, even if physically detachable, belong to the highway;
Reviewed legislative purpose—enacted to balance municipal protection and limited recovery rights;

Concluding that warning signs are functionally inseparable from the roadway’s safe use, the Court vacated the trial court’s exclusion of signage from RSA 231:92 and remanded for further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Dolbeare v. City of Laconia (168 N.H. 52): Adopted the interlocutory‐appeal standard and record reliance.
Cloutier v. City of Berlin (154 N.H. 13): Established de novo review of statutory interpretation and the plain‐meaning rule.
Richard v. Pembroke School District (151 N.H. 455): Held that a curb abutting a sidewalk is part of the sidewalk for RSA 231:92 purposes.
State v. Scott (82 N.H. 278): Defined “highway” to include the soil and airspace above a public way.
RSA 229:1 (Supp. 2024): Legislative definition of highways as roads for motor, bicycle, or pedestrian travel.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning followed these steps:

Plain‐Language Analysis: “Highway” means any public road or way, including its right‐of‐way and structures integral to its use. Dictionaries and RSA 229:1 confirm a broad scope.
Contextual Reading: Under RSA 231:90, “highway” insufficiency is defined to include hazards related to warning signs. RSA 231:92’s limited liability applies to “construction, maintenance, or repair of public highways,” which logically encompasses related traffic controls.
Functional Integration: Drawing on Richard, the Court recognized that elements essential to safe travel—curbs, crosswalk markings, pedestrian signs—are functionally inseparable from the highway, regardless of physical detachability.
Legislative Purpose: Enacted in 1991 to maximize municipal protection yet allow recovery for actual notice of insufficiencies, Senate Bill 151-FN’s statement of intent did not signal any narrowing of “highway” to pavement alone.

Impact

This decision carries several ramifications:

Expanded Municipal Immunity Scope: Municipalities may invoke RSA 231:92’s limited liability defense in cases alleging negligence in the placement, maintenance, or design of pedestrian warning signs and signals.
Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs will need to plead and prove notice or knowledge of signage deficiencies and failure to correct under RSA 231:90–92, just as they must for roadway defects.
Design and Maintenance Practices: Cities and towns should review their crosswalk and signage inventories, inspection protocols, and corrective‐action timelines to ensure compliance and mitigate liability.
Legislative Considerations: If the legislature seeks to restore a narrower definition, it may amend RSA 231:92 to explicitly exclude warning devices or traffic controls from “highway.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

RSA 231:92 Limited Liability: Municipalities aren’t liable for highway defects unless the defect qualifies as an “insufficiency” under RSA 231:90 and the municipality had notice and failed to act.
“Insufficiency” (RSA 231:90): A defect rendering a way unsafe in normal use or a hidden hazard not reasonably avoidable, considering signs and prevailing conditions.
Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal of a non‐final order (here, the partial dismissal ruling) allowed when it involves a controlling legal question.
Viatic Use: Use of a highway as a means of travel, encompassing both pedestrians and vehicles.

Conclusion

Felts v. City of Rochester establishes that pedestrian warning signs, signals, and related traffic controls are integral components of a “highway” under RSA 231:92. By interpreting “highway” broadly—consistent with statutory text, legislative purpose, and common law—the Court ensures that signage‐related negligence claims fall within the limited liability framework. Municipalities and practitioners must now address signage in both design standards and pre‐litigation protocols, while plaintiffs must satisfy RSA 231:90’s notice and insufficiency requirements for any highway element, including warning devices. This precedent reinforces the balance between protecting municipalities and preserving legitimate recovery rights.