Inclusion of Common Law within “Law” under Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Michigan’s decision in James Stefanski v. Saginaw County 911 Communications Center Authority, decided April 14, 2025 (Docket No. 166663). Stefanski, a 911 dispatcher, alleged that his employer retaliated against him in violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq., when he reported a supervisor’s gross negligence in coding a 911 call that resulted in a victim’s death. The key issues before the Court were:

• Whether the term “law” in MCL 15.362 includes violations of the common law, including gross negligence;
• Whether Stefanski’s discussion of, or actual report of, the supervisor’s conduct satisfied the WPA’s requirement of “reporting” a violation; and
• Whether summary disposition was proper on the ground that Stefanski did not engage in protected activity.

The parties were:

• Plaintiff‐Appellant: James Stefanski, former full‐time 911 dispatcher for Saginaw County.
• Defendant‐Appellee: Saginaw County 911 Communications Center Authority, Stefanski’s employer.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Michigan Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Clement (joined by Justices Bernstein, Cavanagh, Welch, Bolden, and Thomas), reversed the Court of Appeals and held—as a matter of first impression—that:

1. The plain term “law” in MCL 15.362 encompasses the common law as well as statutes, regulations, and rules promulgated pursuant to law.
2. Because MCL 15.362 uses the phrase “a violation of a law,” a plaintiff must identify a discrete law allegedly violated—here, whether gross negligence itself constitutes “a law” must be decided.
3. To trigger WPA protection, an employee must actually report a violation or show by clear and convincing evidence an imminent report; mere discussion does not suffice.

The Court reversed the lower courts’ grant of summary disposition on the basis that “law” excludes common law, and remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine:

• Whether gross negligence is “a law” whose violation can be reported under the WPA;
• Whether Stefanski’s communications to his director constituted an actual report (or clear and convincing evidence of an imminent report) under MCL 15.362.

Justice Zahra dissented, applying the surplusage and associated‐words canons to conclude that “law” in the WPA refers only to positive, written law (statutes, regulations, ordinances, acts of Congress), and not judge‐made common law.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

• Landin v. Healthsource Saginaw, Inc. (305 Mich App 519, 2014): Held that reporting medical malpractice—a common‐law tort—did not fall under the WPA’s protections.
• Chandler v. Dowell Schlumberger Inc. (456 Mich 395, 1998): Established that WPA provisions must be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose; defined “protected activity.”
• Dolan v. Continental Airlines (454 Mich 373, 1997): Explained the WPA’s public‐protection purpose and the requirement that WPA claims be construed broadly.
• Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine (537 US 51, 2002): Interpreted the phrase “a law or regulation” in a federal statute to exclude common‐law claims, relying on the article “a” and the noscitur a sociis canon.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in three major steps:

1. Inclusion of Common Law as “Law.”

   The WPA does not define “law.” The Court consulted general and legal dictionaries (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary) to show that “law,” in both lay and technical senses, encompasses judge‐made common law. Because MCL 15.362 uses the bare term “a law” without limitation, excluding the common law would impose a statutory barrier not found in the text. This interpretation aligns with the WPA’s remedial purpose “to protect employees who report violations of state, local, or federal law.”

2. Requirement to Identify “a” Law.

   The indefinite article “a” in “a violation of a law” implies a discrete law. While common law is now included within the umbrella definition of “law,” a whistleblower must still identify a specific law (statute, rule, regulation, or a particular common‐law principle) that has allegedly been violated. The Court remanded to decide whether gross negligence, as opposed to a broader category of “negligence,” qualifies as a discrete common‐law rule serving as “a law.”

3. Proof of an Actual or Imminent Report.

   Under Chandler and MCL 15.363(4), WPA protection requires either an actual report of a violation to a public body or clear and convincing evidence that the employee was about to make such a report. Merely discussing potential wrongdoing internally, without an intention or steps taken to report to a public body, falls short of protected whistleblowing. The remand thus also covers whether Stefanski’s conversations with the director fulfilled this element.

3.3. Impact and Future Implications

This decision establishes new binding law in Michigan:

• It clarifies that common‐law violations (e.g., gross negligence, malpractice) can be “laws” under the WPA, broadening the scope of protected whistle‐ reporting.
• It reinforces that whistleblowers must still identify a discrete law or rule—statutory or judge‐made—violated by the employer.
• Employers will need to consider potential WPA exposure when addressing internal reports of negligence or other common‐law violations.
• Lower courts must apply the decision and remanded questions in pending cases alleging retaliation for reports of gross negligence or malpractice.

By interpreting “law” to include judge‐made rules, the Court may encourage more employees in public‐safety, medical, and other fields to report perceived negligence without fear of retaliation—but also raises litigation over what common‐law principle was allegedly violated.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Common Law: Judge‐made rules developed over time by courts, as opposed to statutes or regulations. Example: the tort of gross negligence is part of the common law.
• Prima Facie Case under MCL 15.362: To establish a protected claim, a plaintiff must show (1) protected activity (actual or imminent report), (2) adverse employment action, and (3) causal link between them.
• Summary Disposition (MCR 2.116): A party’s request for a judgment without a full trial, akin to a “summary judgment” in federal practice.
• Remand: Sending the case back to the lower court (Court of Appeals) for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling.
• Noscitur a Sociis: A canon of statutory construction meaning “a word is known by the company it keeps,” used to interpret terms in context.

5. Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Stefanski v. Saginaw County 911 marks a significant expansion in the interpretation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. By holding that “law” includes the common law, the Court has opened WPA protection to employees who report judge‐made violations such as gross negligence and malpractice. At the same time, it preserves guardrails by requiring the identification of a discrete law and proof of an actual or imminent report. The remand will determine whether Stefanski’s report of gross negligence meets these standards. Going forward, both employers and employees in Michigan must account for this principle when handling internal reports of wrongdoing under the WPA.