Introduction

In this nonprecedential order, the Seventh Circuit rejects a habeas petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) sentence computation after an inadvertent early release. James McKinney argued that the common law rule against “punishment on the installment plan” barred the BOP from forcing him to serve a previously imposed 12‑month escape sentence after he had been mistakenly released and remained at liberty for more than twelve months. The panel—Judges Easterbrook, Ripple, and Pryor—held that the doctrine does not apply where the government’s error was inadvertent, where there was no governmental attempt to delay sentence expiration, and where the defendant’s own subsequent violations precipitated his return to custody.

The case sits at the intersection of several recurring federal sentencing and custody issues: when multiple sentences imposed at different times must be aggregated and run consecutively, whether time spent at liberty due to government error can be credited toward an undischarged term, and how equitable doctrines like the “installment punishment” rule operate in modern sentence computation challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Case Background

• In 2017, McKinney pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Iowa to heroin-related offenses and received 50 months’ imprisonment and six years’ supervised release.
• In 2019, he was placed first in a residential reentry center and then on home confinement. After violating conditions in January 2020, he removed his GPS monitor and fled, remaining a fugitive until September 13, 2021, when U.S. Marshals arrested him.
• In early 2022, he pleaded guilty to escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) and received 12 months’ imprisonment, ordered to run consecutively to the remaining term on the drug case, plus one year of supervised release concurrent with the six-year term in the drug case.
• On September 30, 2022, he completed the custodial portion of the drug case. Because BOP had not yet received the judgment in the escape case, it erroneously released him, and he began serving supervised release.
• In October 2023, his supervised release in the heroin case was revoked for violations; he was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release.
• Once McKinney returned to custody, BOP realized the escape judgment remained unexecuted and recomputed his sentences by aggregating the undischarged 12-month escape term with the 10-month revocation term, yielding 22 months of imprisonment.

McKinney filed a § 2241 petition in the Central District of Illinois challenging BOP’s execution of his sentences. He advanced three principal arguments: (1) that his supervised release in the escape case implied completion of that custodial term; (2) that “primary custody” rules started the escape sentence upon his 2021 apprehension; and (3) that the common law doctrine against “installment punishment” barred the BOP from reimposing the escape sentence after its erroneous release. The district court rejected each argument. On appeal, McKinney pressed only the “installment punishment” theory.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. It held that the equitable rule against “punishment on the installment plan”—which, in rare cases, credits time spent at liberty due to government error toward a sentence—does not apply where:

• the BOP’s error was inadvertent (it had not yet received the escape judgment);
• the government was not attempting to delay sentence expiration; and
• the error was discovered only when McKinney returned to custody as a result of his own subsequent supervised release violations.

The court distinguished older cases granting relief after erroneous release (e.g., White v. Pearlman; Green v. Christiansen), and it noted that McKinney did not develop any separate statutory challenge to BOP’s consecutive administration of his escape and revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Although McKinney was released from custody during the appeal, the court held the case was not moot because he remained on supervised release, and a favorable ruling could shorten that term.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1994): The Seventh Circuit’s key modern discussion of the doctrine against “installment punishment.” Dunne recognizes the equitable principle—drawn from earlier authority such as White v. Pearlman—that in exceptional cases a sentence should not be served piecemeal, particularly where early release was not the prisoner’s fault and it would be fundamentally unfair to recommit him. But Dunne emphasizes the doctrine’s narrowness and focuses on government intent and fairness. Here, Dunne’s framework supplied the analytic template: the court asked whether the government sought to delay sentence expiration and whether equity favored relief. It answered “no.”
• White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1930): A foundational case often cited for the proposition that a prisoner erroneously released without fault should not later be compelled to serve the sentence in installments—especially where the prisoner alerted authorities to the error. The Seventh Circuit distinguished White because McKinney’s recommitment followed his own violations and there was no government manipulation of sentence timing.
• Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1984): Another frequently cited case where an erroneous release resulted in credit toward a sentence after a substantial period at liberty. The Seventh Circuit treated Green as factually distinct because the government’s mistake—not the defendant’s later misconduct—prompted reincarceration.
• Pope v. Perdue, 889 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2018): Cited in two respects: (i) the “primary custody” doctrine, which governs which sovereign’s sentence runs when both state and federal authorities are involved; and (ii) mootness, recognizing that release from custody does not moot an appeal if supervised release remains and could be shortened by a favorable decision. The district court and Seventh Circuit leveraged Pope to show why “primary custody” was inapplicable (there was only federal custody here) and why the case was not moot.
• Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2009): Applied for the procedural point that undeveloped arguments are forfeited on appeal. The Seventh Circuit used Pole to decline any further discussion about § 3584(a) and how BOP sequenced the sentences because McKinney did not develop that challenge.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

1. The doctrine’s purpose and rarity: The court reaffirmed that the “installment punishment” doctrine is an equitable exception, rarely applied, intended to prevent the government from manipulating sentence service by releasing and re-incarcerating defendants to extend real-world punishment beyond what the judgment requires.
2. Government error and absence of manipulation: The decisive facts were that BOP did not receive the escape judgment and therefore could not include it in McKinney’s computations. There was no evidence the government strategically delayed execution of the escape sentence. The court stressed this was “not a case where the government is trying to delay the expiration of the defendant’s sentence.” That characterization places the case outside the core of White/Green.
3. Equity disfavored relief given defendant’s own conduct: The triggering event for rediscovering the unexecuted escape sentence was McKinney’s later supervised release violations, not the government’s pursuit of administrative clean-up after a long period of faultless liberty. That difference mattered. In prior cases granting relief, the prisoner often either alerted the government to the error (White) or was later apprehended solely because the government discovered its own mistake (Green). Here, by contrast, McKinney’s reimprisonment flowed from his own noncompliance, and the court found “no issues of fundamental fairness” that would justify equitable credit.

Beyond equity, the structure of federal sentence administration also supported affirmance:

• Consecutive administration under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a): Although not developed on appeal, the record reflects that the escape sentence was ordered consecutive to the remaining drug sentence, and BOP later aggregated the undischarged 12‑month escape term with the 10‑month revocation term—consistent with § 3584(a)’s default rule that terms imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders otherwise.
• Commencement of a federal sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a): A federal term “commences” when a defendant is received into custody to serve that sentence. A consecutive sentence does not begin until the prior term ends. Because BOP never executed the escape judgment before the erroneous release, that 12‑month term did not commence, and time at liberty did not run against it absent equitable relief—which the court declined to grant.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although designated nonprecedential, the decision offers clear guidance for future § 2241 sentence-execution disputes in the Seventh Circuit:

• Narrow scope of the “installment punishment” rule: Administrative mistakes—especially nonstrategic failures to timely receive a judgment—will rarely justify crediting time at liberty toward an undischarged, consecutive sentence. Practitioners should anticipate that equitable relief requires more than inadvertence; evidence of government manipulation or compelling unfairness is key.
• Defendant conduct matters: If the reclamation of custody stems from a defendant’s own new violations, courts are less likely to perceive “fundamental unfairness” in executing an undischarged sentence, even after an erroneous release of comparable length.
• Consecutive aggregation will be honored: BOP’s aggregation of undischarged terms (e.g., an earlier consecutive sentence plus a later revocation sentence) is consistent with § 3584(a). Challenges to the sequencing must be timely and fully developed or risk forfeiture on appeal.
• Primary custody is a two-sovereign problem: Arguments about “primary custody” will not gain traction where the custody at issue is exclusively federal.
• Mootness and supervised release: A defendant’s release from prison does not moot a § 2241 appeal if supervised release remains; litigants should evaluate the potential effect of sentence-execution rulings on the length or terms of supervision.

The decision thus functions as a cautionary note: the equitable “installment” doctrine is not a general-purpose cure for government missteps in sentence administration and is especially ill-suited where the defendant’s later misconduct brings him back into custody.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• § 2241 vs. § 2255: A § 2241 petition challenges the execution of a sentence (how the BOP computes and runs it). A § 2255 motion challenges the validity of the conviction or sentence itself. McKinney’s claim was about execution (BOP’s computation), hence § 2241 in the district of confinement.
• “Installment punishment” rule: An equitable doctrine from older cases that, in rare situations, credits time spent at liberty due to government error toward a sentence to prevent serving it in pieces. Courts ask whether the government manipulated timing and whether fairness demands relief.
• Consecutive vs. concurrent sentences (18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)): When multiple sentences are imposed at different times, they run consecutively by default unless a court orders concurrency. BOP aggregates consecutive terms to produce a single release computation.
• When a sentence starts (18 U.S.C. § 3585(a)): A federal sentence begins when a person is received into custody specifically to serve that sentence. A consecutive term cannot start before the prior term ends.
• Supervised release commencement (18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(a), 3624(e)): Supervised release follows imprisonment and begins when the person is released from custody. It does not run during any period of imprisonment for another conviction. Completing supervised release on one case does not prove that a different custodial term was served.
• Primary custody: A priority rule that applies when state and federal authorities both assert custody. The sovereign that first arrests typically has primary jurisdiction; the other sovereign’s sentence usually does not start until primary jurisdiction transfers. It is irrelevant when custody is purely federal.
• Mootness and supervision: Courts can still decide a case after a prisoner is released if he remains on supervised release, because a ruling could reduce or alter that supervision.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential affirmance in McKinney v. Lauritsen delineates the limits of the “installment punishment” doctrine in federal sentence-execution cases. Time at liberty resulting from an inadvertent BOP error will not automatically extinguish an undischarged consecutive sentence—particularly when the government did not manipulate sentence timing and the resumption of custody arises from the defendant’s own supervised release violations. The opinion also reinforces routine principles: § 2241 is the proper vehicle for execution challenges; primary custody arguments require competing sovereigns; sentences imposed at different times default to consecutive service under § 3584(a); and release from prison does not moot an appeal while supervised release persists.

Key takeaway: Absent evidence of government bad faith or compelling unfairness akin to the paradigmatic cases like White and Green, courts in the Seventh Circuit will not treat inadvertent administrative errors as warranting equitable credit for time at liberty against undischarged, consecutive terms.

Note: This order is designated “Nonprecedential” under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, but it remains persuasive authority and a practical guide to how the Seventh Circuit is likely to view similar arguments.