In re Z.S.: Termination of Parental Rights and Denial of Post-Termination Visitation for Noncompliance and Lack of Emotional Bond

I. Introduction

The memorandum decision in In re Z.S., No. 24-655 (W. Va. Nov. 4, 2025), from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, concerns the termination of a father's parental rights to his very young child and the denial of his request for post-termination visitation. The Court affirmed the Circuit Court of Monongalia County's October 16, 2024, dispositional order terminating the parental rights of Petitioner Father M.S. to his child, Z.S., and denying him any visitation after termination.

The case sits at the intersection of several recurring themes in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence:

Application of the statutory standard for terminating parental rights without resorting to less restrictive alternatives (such as guardianship or termination of only custodial rights) under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d).
The significance of a parent's participation in improvement period services, including drug treatment, multidisciplinary team (MDT) meetings, drug screening, and visitation, as evidence of the ability or inability to remedy abuse and neglect conditions.
The criteria governing post-termination visitation—especially in the context of a very young child removed in infancy—and the requirement of an emotional bond and benefit to the child under In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995).
The transition, flagged in a footnote, to new standards for post-termination visitation through provisional amendments to Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, as discussed in In re Z.D.-1, 251 W. Va. 743, 916 S.E.2d 375 (2025).

While In re Z.S. is issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21 (and thus does not announce new syllabus points), it provides a clear and instructive application of the governing standards to a familiar factual pattern: chronic substance abuse, partial initial engagement with treatment, relapse, disappearance from services, and a very young child placed with a relative willing to adopt. It also illustrates how the absence of a developed parent–child bond can operate both to support termination and to justify the denial of any ongoing contact.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Abuse and Neglect Petition

In November 2023, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that both parents abused substances while Z.S. was in their care. Z.S. was approximately one year old at the time of removal.

At the adjudicatory hearing in January 2024, Father stipulated that he abused substances in a manner that negatively affected his ability to parent Z.S. Based on this stipulation, the circuit court adjudicated him as an abusing and neglecting parent.

B. The Improvement Period and Initial Progress

Following adjudication, the circuit court granted Father a post-adjudicatory improvement period upon written motion. Under West Virginia practice, an “improvement period” is a time-limited opportunity for the parent to participate in services and demonstrate the capacity to remedy the circumstances that led to the abuse or neglect finding.

The terms of Father’s improvement period required him to:

Attend and participate in all multidisciplinary team (MDT) meetings.
Submit to random drug screenings.
Participate in parenting and adult life skills classes.
Comply with any other services recommended by DHS or the service providers.

At a review hearing in March 2024, DHS reported that:

Father had completed a twenty-eight-day detoxification program;
He was enrolled in an intensive outpatient program;
He had two clean drug screens, but missed a third screen.

On this basis, DHS recommended that Father begin supervised visitation in conjunction with adult life skills and parenting classes. At this point, there were glimmers of progress.

C. Relapse, Noncompliance, and Loss of Contact

The trajectory changed significantly thereafter:

At a review hearing in June 2024, Father failed to appear, although he was represented by counsel.
DHS advised that Father had relapsed, entered another rehabilitation facility, then left and declined readmission.
Despite this relapse and noncompliance, the circuit court granted Father a three-month extension of his improvement period.
At a final review hearing in September 2024, Father again failed to attend, though still represented by counsel.
DHS presented a report indicating that Father:
- Did not return to rehabilitation despite stating that he would;
- Did not submit to any drug screens after June 2024;
- Had not communicated with DHS or service providers since June 2024;
- Was homeless and unable to provide for himself due to his ongoing substance abuse.

Thus, by late summer 2024, Father had effectively disengaged from the case: no contact with DHS, no services, no drug screens, and no visitation.

D. Dispositional Hearing and Circuit Court’s Order

The dispositional hearing occurred in October 2024. Father did not attend in person but was represented by counsel. DHS presented evidence of:

Father’s failure to stay in contact with DHS;
His failure to attend MDT meetings;
His nonparticipation in required drug screens;
His failure to attend a substantial number of parenting and adult life skills classes; and
His absence from supervised visits with Z.S. since December 2023 and failure even to inquire about the child’s well-being.

Father, through counsel, argued that only his custodial rights should be terminated because he allegedly maintained a bond with Z.S. He sought an “alternative disposition” that would be less restrictive than full termination, presumably leaving some residual parental rights or some ability to maintain a relationship with the child.

DHS countered that:

Z.S. was only one year old at removal and two years old at termination.
Father had not visited or inquired about Z.S. for nearly an entire year.
Given this absence of contact, any assertion of a meaningful bond was unsupported.

The circuit court made the following critical findings:

There was no reasonable likelihood that Father could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future.
Termination of his parental rights, not merely custodial rights, was necessary for the welfare of the child.
Given Z.S.’s very young age (two years old) and the paternal grandmother’s willingness to adopt, permanency through adoption was in the child’s best interests.
Post-termination visitation was not appropriate and would not be in Z.S.’s best interests, particularly in light of the lack of evidence of an emotional bond and Father’s failure to visit or inquire about the child for most of the proceedings.

Mother’s parental rights were also terminated, and the permanency plan was adoption by Z.S.’s current kinship placement, the paternal grandmother. Father appealed the termination of his parental rights and the denial of post-termination visitation.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court of Appeals:

Determined that oral argument was unnecessary and proceeded via memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Applied the standard of review from Syl. Pt. 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
Affirmed the circuit court’s termination of Father’s parental rights under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), finding:
- A sufficient evidentiary basis for concluding there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, as defined in § 49-4-604(d); and
- That termination, rather than some lesser disposition, was necessary for the welfare of the child, including to secure permanency through adoption.
Affirmed the denial of post-termination visitation, applying Syl. Pt. 5 of In re Christina L., which requires that:
- Visitation must not be detrimental to the child’s well-being and must be in the child’s best interest; and
- The court should consider whether a close emotional bond exists between the parent and child.
Held that, given Father’s failure to visit, his lack of contact, and the child’s removal at age one with nearly a year of no interaction, the record lacked any evidence of an emotional bond or any benefit to the child from maintaining post-termination contact.
Noted, in a footnote, that after the entry of the circuit court’s order, the Court provisionally amended Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings to adopt broader standards for consideration of post-termination visitation, as discussed in In re Z.D.-1, but that the decision in In re Z.S. applies the standards that existed at the time of the circuit court’s order.

The ultimate outcome: The circuit court’s October 16, 2024, order was affirmed in all respects.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Standard of Review – In re Cecil T.

The Court reaffirmed the familiar standard of review for abuse and neglect appeals set forth in Syl. Pt. 1 of In re Cecil T.:

Findings of fact by the circuit court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard—meaning they will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Conclusions of law and the ultimate application of law to the facts are reviewed de novo, giving no deference to the circuit court’s legal interpretations.

This standard is significant because it sets a relatively high bar for reversing a circuit court’s factual determinations about a parent’s compliance, progress, or bond with the child—matters that are inherently fact-intensive and often grounded in credibility and observational assessments. The Court’s affirmance in In re Z.S. reflects substantial deference to the circuit court’s factual findings about Father’s noncompliance and the absence of a meaningful parent–child relationship.

B. Issue One: Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

1. Statutory Framework – West Virginia Code § 49-4-604

The primary statutory provision governing disposition in abuse and neglect cases is West Virginia Code § 49-4-604. The Court focused in particular on subsection (c)(6) and the definition in subsection (d).

Under § 49-4-604(c)(6), the circuit court may terminate parental rights:

"[u]pon a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future and, when necessary for the welfare of the child."

Subsection (d) defines the key phrase:

"'[n]o reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected' means that . . . the abusing adult . . . [has] demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on [his] own or with help."

The statutory scheme contemplates a forward-looking, predictive assessment: based on the parent’s behavior, engagement with services, and progress (or lack thereof), is there a realistic expectation that the conditions causing abuse or neglect can be substantially remedied within a time frame compatible with the child’s needs?

2. Role of Less Restrictive Alternatives – Kristin Y. and R.J.M.

Father argued that the circuit court should have chosen a less restrictive alternative to full termination—such as terminating only his custodial rights or otherwise limiting his role without fully severing the parent–child legal relationship.

The Supreme Court rejected that argument, relying on:

Syl. Pt. 5 of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011); and
Syl. Pt. 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), which Kristin Y. quotes.

Those cases establish that, when the statutory criteria are met—no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare—the circuit court may terminate parental rights without first attempting less restrictive alternatives. The Court in In re Z.S. explicitly reaffirmed that principle:

"[P]ursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), circuit courts are permitted to terminate parental rights without the use of a less restrictive alternative '[u]pon a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future and, when necessary for the welfare of the child.' See also Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y. ... (permitting termination of rights 'without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected')."

Thus, once the statutory predicates are satisfied, there is no legal entitlement to a lesser disposition; the choice of disposition is committed to the circuit court’s sound discretion, guided by the child’s best interests and the policy favoring permanency.

3. Application to Father’s Conduct

The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that Father had demonstrated an “inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on [his] own or with help,” within the meaning of § 49-4-604(d), and therefore there was “no reasonable likelihood” of correction in the near future.

Key factual findings supporting this conclusion included:

Noncompliance with improvement period requirements: Father failed to attend a substantial number of MDT meetings, drug screens, and parenting/adult life skills classes.
Relapse and refusal of treatment: After initial detox and outpatient treatment, Father relapsed, briefly entered another rehabilitation program, then left and declined readmission.
Disengagement from the case: Beginning in June 2024, Father ceased communicating with DHS and service providers altogether, failed to attend review hearings, and did not participate in any further drug screens or services.
Ongoing instability: Because of continued substance abuse, Father was homeless and unable to provide for himself, let alone care for a young child.
Failure to visit or inquire about the child: Father did not attend supervised visits with Z.S. for nearly the entire duration of the proceedings and did not inquire about the child’s well-being.

The Court also relied on its prior observation in In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996), that:

A parent's level of interest in visiting their child when outside their custody "is a significant factor in determining the parent's potential to improve sufficiently and achieve minimum standards to parent the child." Id. at 90 n.14, 479 S.E.2d at 600 n.14.

By failing almost entirely to visit or even ask about Z.S., Father not only failed to maintain a relationship with the child but also provided strong evidence of an inability or unwillingness to undertake the sustained effort required to remedy his substance abuse and parenting deficits.

4. The Child’s Age, Kinship Adoption, and Necessity for the Child’s Welfare

The second required element under § 49-4-604(c)(6) is that termination be “necessary for the welfare of the child.” The Court emphasized:

Z.S. was only one year old at removal and two years old at termination.
A child of that age requires prompt permanency and stable caregiving relationships.
The paternal grandmother was willing to adopt, offering a permanent, kin-based home.

The Court held that termination of Father’s parental rights (not merely custodial rights) was necessary for Z.S.’s welfare in light of:

Father’s complete disengagement from services and visitation;
His ongoing substance abuse and homelessness;
The child’s need for timely permanency through adoption;
The suitability of the existing kinship placement as a permanent adoptive home.

In practice, especially where a relative is prepared to adopt, West Virginia courts frequently conclude that full termination is in the child’s best interests because it clears the way for the security and finality of adoption, rather than leaving the child in a limbo of custodial arrangements subject to continuing uncertainty.

C. Issue Two: Denial of Post-Termination Visitation

1. Governing Standard – In re Christina L.

Father also challenged the denial of post-termination visitation. The Supreme Court analyzed this issue under Syl. Pt. 5 of In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995), which provides:

To receive post-termination visitation, "[t]he evidence must indicate that such visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to the child's well being and would be in the child's best interest." As part of this analysis, "the circuit court should consider whether a close emotional bond has been established between parent and child."

Several points emerge from this standard:

Post-termination visitation is not a matter of right; it is entirely discretionary and must be strictly subordinated to the child’s best interests.
The burden lies effectively on the parent and supporting parties to demonstrate that such visitation would be beneficial or at least not harmful to the child.
One key factor is the existence (or absence) of a close emotional bond between parent and child at the time of disposition.

The Court explicitly stated that it applied “the standards in place at the time of the entry of the circuit court’s order,” referring to Christina L. and its progeny.

2. Application: Lack of Emotional Bond and Lack of Contact

Applying Christina L., the Supreme Court found ample support for the circuit court’s decision to deny post-termination visitation:

Z.S. was “merely one year old” when removed from Father’s care.
By the time of termination, the child had been out of Father’s care for almost a full year without any interaction.
Father failed to participate in supervised visitation for the majority of the proceedings.
He also failed to inquire about Z.S.’s well-being.

Based on this record, the Court concluded:

"With the lack of any evidence demonstrating the existence of an emotional bond along with the petitioner's failed efforts to try to facilitate such bond, the circuit court had sufficient evidence to deny post-termination visitation."

Thus, the Court placed considerable weight on the absence of visitation and inquiries as both:

Evidence that no meaningful emotional bond existed; and
Evidence that post-termination visitation would not serve the child’s best interests and might be disruptive to the stability of the child’s new placement and emerging attachments.

The child’s extreme youth reinforces this reasoning: an infant or toddler removed at one year of age and not visited for nearly a year is unlikely to retain a significant attachment to a parent who has effectively vanished from their life. Moreover, the child’s primary bond is more likely to be with the kinship caregiver (here, the paternal grandmother and prospective adoptive parent), whose ability to provide stable, continuous care is critical.

3. Transition to New Rule 15 Standards – In re Z.D.-1

In footnote 4, the Court addressed a recent development:

"We apply the standards in place at the time of the entry of the circuit court's order denying post-termination visitation, but note that after its entry this Court provisionally amended Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and 'adopt[ed] appropriate standards for consideration of post-termination visitation outside of a fact-based context.' In re Z.D.-1, 251 W. Va. 743, -- n.21, 916 S.E.2d 375, 382 n.21 (2025)."

While the opinion does not detail the content of the amended Rule 15, two important implications follow:

Temporal application: The Court is careful to apply the law as it existed when the circuit court ruled. This preserves the integrity and predictability of the adjudicatory process.
Prospective significance: By referencing In re Z.D.-1 and the Rule 15 amendments, the Court signals an evolving, more structured framework for evaluating post-termination visitation claims going forward. However, In re Z.S. remains governed by the traditional Christina L. standard.

In this sense, In re Z.S. is a transitional case: it applies established doctrine while acknowledging that the Court has since refined or supplemented the standards for future cases via rule amendment.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Cecil T. – Standard of Review

Cecil T. solidifies the two-tier standard of review for abuse and neglect appeals, ensuring:

Deference to the circuit court’s fact-finding, especially regarding parental behavior, compliance, and credibility; and
Full appellate review of the application of statutes and precedents.

In In re Z.S., the Court repeatedly refers to “ample evidence” and “sufficient evidence,” indicating that it found no clear error in the circuit court’s factual determinations about Father’s noncompliance and the lack of an emotional bond, and that those findings fit comfortably within the statutory and precedential framework.

2. In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M. – No Requirement of Less Restrictive Alternatives

These cases underscore that, although child welfare law contemplates a range of dispositional options, including guardianship and lesser restrictions, the circuit court is not compelled to employ them if the evidence establishes:

No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future; and
Termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

In In re Z.S., this doctrine defeats Father’s attempt to secure a lesser disposition (e.g., termination of custodial but not full parental rights). The Court essentially holds that, under the facts presented, full termination was both legally permissible and practically warranted.

3. In re Katie S. – Visitation as a Proxy for Potential Improvement

The Court’s citation to Katie S. is strategic. Footnote 14 in that case recognized that a parent’s willingness and effort to visit their child, even when the child is out of custody, is a significant indicator of:

The parent’s level of commitment; and
The likelihood that the parent will improve enough to reach minimum parenting standards.

In In re Z.S., Father’s almost total lack of visitation and failure even to inquire about Z.S.’s well-being reinforced the conclusion that he was not on a trajectory toward improvement. This absence of interest:

Supports the finding that there was “no reasonable likelihood” of correcting the conditions of abuse and neglect;
Undermines any claim of a substantial emotional bond; and
Justifies denying post-termination visitation as not being in the child’s best interest.

4. In re Christina L. – Best Interest and Emotional Bond in Post-Termination Visitation

Christina L. remains the key authority governing post-termination visitation in West Virginia at the time of the circuit court’s decision:

Post-termination visitation is exceptional, not routine.
It may be granted only if shown to be in the child’s best interests and not detrimental.
A close emotional bond between parent and child is a central factor.

In In re Z.S., there was almost no evidence of such a bond at the time of disposition, especially given the child’s age and the extended period with no contact. Accordingly, the Court applied Christina L. to conclude that the circuit court did not err in refusing to order post-termination visitation.

5. In re Z.D.-1 – Emerging Standards for Post-Termination Visitation

In re Z.D.-1 is cited only in a footnote and only for the proposition that the Court has provisionally amended Rule 15 to adopt “appropriate standards for consideration of post-termination visitation outside of a fact-based context.” While In re Z.S. does not rely on those new standards, its mention demonstrates:

The Court’s awareness that post-termination visitation is an area of ongoing doctrinal and procedural development; and
An intent to provide more formal, rule-based guidance for future cases.

In short, In re Z.S. stands as a reaffirmation and application of the pre-amendment regime, while hinting at a more structured framework to come.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Improvement Period

An “improvement period” in West Virginia child abuse and neglect law (see generally W. Va. Code § 49-4-610) is a defined period during which a parent is given a structured opportunity to:

Engage in services (e.g., substance abuse treatment, parenting classes);
Demonstrate sobriety through drug screens;
Attend MDT meetings and court hearings;
Show measurable progress toward safe parenting.

Key points:

It is discretionary, not automatic. The parent must show that they are likely to fully participate.
It can be extended if the parent is making good-faith progress, as initially happened here.
Failure to comply with the conditions of an improvement period is strong evidence supporting termination.

B. Multidisciplinary Team (MDT)

MDT meetings bring together professionals and stakeholders—DHS workers, service providers, guardian ad litem, sometimes foster or kinship caregivers, and parents—to coordinate services and monitor progress. Consistent attendance:

Shows the parent’s engagement in the process; and
Allows real-time adjustments to the case plan.

Failure to attend MDTs, as in this case, both impedes planning and signals disengagement.

C. “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction

The phrase “no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future” is predictive. Courts look at:

The severity and chronicity of the underlying problems (e.g., long-standing substance abuse).
The parent’s history responsiveness to services and treatment.
Patterns of relapse and noncompliance.
The parent’s current functioning and stability (e.g., housing, employment, sobriety).
The child’s age and timeframe for achieving permanency.

For very young children, the “near future” is relatively short; they cannot wait years for a parent to stabilize without serious risk of developmental and emotional harm.

D. Termination of Parental Rights vs. Termination of Custodial Rights

In West Virginia, dispositions can range from:

Leaving the child in the parent’s home with services;
Removing the child and placing them in temporary custody of DHS or a relative while the parent retains parental rights;
Establishing legal guardianship or another permanent custodial arrangement; to
Termination of parental rights, which severs the legal parent–child relationship (subject only to narrow statutory exceptions, such as some inheritance or name issues in limited contexts).

When Father argued for termination of only his “custodial rights,” he effectively asked the court to allow the child to live permanently elsewhere (with the grandmother) while preserving some legal connection and potential contact. The courts, however, concluded that given his lack of progress and engagement, and the child’s need for permanence through adoption, full termination was necessary and appropriate.

E. Post-Termination Visitation

Post-termination visitation refers to court-ordered contact between a child and a parent even after parental rights have been terminated. In West Virginia:

It is extraordinary, not presumed.
It is permitted only if clearly in the child’s best interests and not detrimental to the child’s well-being.
Historically, one strong precondition is a demonstrable, positive emotional bond between the parent and child.

Where, as here, the parent has not visited or inquired about the child for nearly a year and the child is very young, courts are inclined to find that such a bond is absent or too attenuated to justify continued contact, particularly when it could interfere with the child’s attachment to a new permanent caregiver.

F. Memorandum Decision Under Rule 21

A memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure is a shorter, often fact-specific decision used when:

The case does not present novel legal issues;
Existing precedent clearly controls; and
Oral argument is not necessary.

Such decisions generally do not announce new syllabus points but can nonetheless be cited and provide meaningful guidance as to how the Court applies established law to specific factual scenarios.

VI. Impact and Broader Implications

A. Reinforcing the Importance of Full Engagement in Improvement Periods

In re Z.S. underscores that granting an improvement period and even extending it does not guarantee a parent an indefinite timeline or protection from termination. The Court’s reasoning makes clear that:

Partial or early engagement (e.g., initial detox and a few clean screens) is insufficient if followed by relapse and abandonment of services.
Nonattendance at MDTs, drug screens, and classes, combined with failure to appear for hearings, powerfully evidences “inadequate capacity” to remedy conditions.
Service providers and DHS must document both early progress and subsequent noncompliance; the courts will examine the entire trajectory.

Practitioners representing parents should counsel clients that improvement periods are conditional and that consistent, documented engagement is crucial. Sporadic efforts followed by disappearance will not forestall termination.

B. Emphasis on Visitation as Both Relationship and Prognostic Tool

The decision amplifies the dual role of visitation:

As a means of maintaining and strengthening the parent–child relationship: Without regular visits, bonds, particularly with very young children, quickly weaken or disappear.
As evidence of parental commitment and capacity to improve: Continued visitation efforts, even in difficult circumstances, can weigh in favor of extending improvement periods or considering lesser dispositions; conversely, non-visitation is probative of future parenting deficits.

In citing Katie S., the Court makes clear that a parent who neglects visitation during the case faces a steeper uphill battle in arguing against termination or in favor of post-termination contact.

C. Early Removal of Infants and the Challenge of Proving an Emotional Bond

The case is particularly illustrative regarding very young children:

When a child is removed at age one and does not see the parent for almost a year, the likelihood of an ongoing, substantial emotional bond is minimal, especially where the parent makes no effort to maintain contact.
This dynamic makes it especially difficult for such parents to meet the Christina L. standard for post-termination visitation, which hinges on the presence of a close bond and benefit to the child.

The practical takeaway: For parents of infants and toddlers, prompt and consistent visitation is critical not only to preserve the relationship but also to create a record that might support lesser dispositions or post-termination contact.

D. Kinship Placements and Adoption

Z.S. was placed with a paternal grandmother who wished to adopt. In re Z.S. exemplifies West Virginia’s policy of:

Favoring placement with relatives when safe and feasible; and
Promoting adoption, even by relatives, as the preferred route to permanency once the statutory grounds for termination are met.

The presence of a willing kinship adoptive placement did not militate against termination; instead, it provided a strong rationale for concluding that full termination was necessary to secure Z.S.’s welfare through a permanent, stable home.

E. Clarifying the Threshold for Post-Termination Visitation Under the Old Regime

Although the Court notes the subsequent amendment to Rule 15, this case clarifies how the pre-amendment regime functions in a straightforward scenario:

Absent a well-documented emotional bond and a history of beneficial visitation, post-termination contact is unlikely to be ordered.
Non-visitation, especially over many months, is not neutral; it actively weighs against any claim for post-termination contact.

Even as the law evolves, In re Z.S. suggests that the starting point for assessing post-termination visitation will remain: is there a demonstrable, beneficial relationship that the child stands to lose?

F. Signaling the Court’s Ongoing Refinement of Post-Termination Visitation Law

By flagging the provisional amendment to Rule 15 and citing In re Z.D.-1, the Court signals that it is moving toward a more codified and possibly more uniform approach to post-termination visitation. While the precise contours of those changes fall outside the text of In re Z.S., practitioners should recognize:

The Court is attentive to the complexities of continued contact post-termination, especially in kinship adoption and open adoption contexts.
Future cases may be decided under a more detailed rule framework rather than relying primarily on case law like Christina L..

VII. Conclusion

In re Z.S. offers a clear, fact-driven application of West Virginia’s statutory and case-law standards in a familiar but important type of abuse and neglect case. The decision underscores several critical takeaways:

Termination without less restrictive alternatives is fully permissible under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) when the evidence shows no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. The presence of a willing relative-adoptive placement can make full termination especially compelling.
Parental engagement during improvement periods—attendance at MDTs, participation in treatment, compliance with drug screens, and visitation—is central. Relapse, disappearance, and noncompliance powerfully evidence an “inadequate capacity” to solve the underlying problems.
Visitation serves dual roles: it maintains the parent–child bond and functions as a strong indicator of a parent’s commitment and potential to improve. Non-visitation is a serious negative factor.
Post-termination visitation under Christina L. requires proof that continued contact would be beneficial or at least not detrimental, with a close emotional bond as a key consideration. In the absence of such a bond—especially where a very young child has had no contact with the parent for nearly a year—denial of post-termination visitation is well supported.
Children’s need for timely permanency, particularly at very young ages, remains paramount. The law does not require children to wait indefinitely for parents to overcome chronic issues such as substance abuse.

Though issued as a memorandum decision, In re Z.S. reinforces the consistent themes in West Virginia child welfare jurisprudence: the predominance of the child’s best interests, the importance of concrete parental action over promises or assertions of bond, and the centrality of stability and permanency in the lives of young children.