In re W.M.: Enforcing Rule 26(a)’s Two‑Part Standard for Stipulated Adjudications in West Virginia Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re W.M., No. 24‑258 (Nov. 13, 2025), marks a significant clarification of the requirements for stipulated adjudications in child abuse and neglect cases under Rule 26(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings. While styled as a memorandum decision under Rule 21(d), the opinion solidifies and applies the Court’s earlier holding in In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621 (2023), and sends a clear message to circuit courts, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”), guardians ad litem, and defense counsel: a parent’s consent to adjudication cannot substitute for a factually adequate stipulation that satisfies statutory definitions of abuse or neglect and the textual requirements of Rule 26(a).

At the same time, sharply worded separate opinions expose deep tension within the Court over:

• How specific an abuse and neglect petition must be to charge a non-offending parent;
• How strictly courts must enforce procedural safeguards when a child’s best interests are at stake; and
• The limits on West Virginia’s ability to remove a child born in another state without complying with the UCCJEA and emergency-removal statutes.

The majority vacates the father’s adjudicatory and dispositional orders because his stipulation was legally deficient under Rule 26(a) and the governing statutes, and remands for further proceedings. Justice Trump concurs in that result but would go further, finding the petition itself fatally insufficient and the initial removal jurisdictionally suspect. Senior Status Justice Hutchison dissents, arguing that the majority has elevated procedural “technicalities” over the “polar star” of child welfare and would have affirmed both adjudication and termination.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The parties and the birth of W.M.

W.M. was born in July 2023 in Harrisonburg, Virginia. His mother, P.T., and his father, J.M. (the petitioner), resided in Randolph County, West Virginia, but the child’s birth occurred out of state.

Hospital staff in Virginia became suspicious when P.T. claimed W.M. was her first child, despite evidence of a prior Cesarean section. Investigation revealed that she had seven other children and that her parental rights to all seven had previously been involuntarily terminated in West Virginia. Those prior proceedings involved:

• “Absolutely deplorable” living conditions;
• Significant medical neglect of multiple children; and
• Lack of prenatal care for the youngest of the older siblings.

At the time of W.M.’s birth:

• P.T. refused to discuss her older children or even acknowledge their existence to the CPS worker;
• The CPS worker determined that J.M. had no knowledge of P.T.’s previous CPS history or her seven older children;
• J.M. reported he had known P.T. for about a year, was a first‑time father, had no prior CPS history, no substance abuse or criminal history, and was employed with a home in Randolph County; and
• Both mother and child were medically stable; P.T.’s hospital urinalysis was negative, and W.M. was healthy.

B. Filing of the petition and emergency removal

Under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑605(a)(3), DHS was required to file an abuse and neglect petition because P.T. had previously had her parental rights involuntarily terminated to other children. DHS removed W.M. from his parents’ custody at the Virginia hospital within a few days of birth and, on July 12, 2023, filed a petition in Randolph County.

The petition alleged:

• “Aggravated circumstances” as to P.T., based on the prior involuntary terminations and her failure to make significant changes in her circumstances;
• As to J.M., that:
  • He was “unable to accept” the information about P.T.’s prior terminations “as truth” and “remained involved” with her;
  • “Due to his lack of understanding, [Father] is unable, at this time, to be protective” of W.M.; and
  • He was not “accepting the situation with regard to [Mother’s] aggravated circumstances,” which “creat[ed] an inability of the Respondent Father to be protective.”

The petition acknowledged that J.M. had no prior CPS history and no other children. J.M. waived his right to a preliminary hearing. DHS also sought emergency custody; the details of the emergency application are not in the appendix, but DHS took custody of W.M. at the Virginia hospital and secured a West Virginia order ratifying emergency custody.

C. Adjudication: the father’s stipulation

J.M.’s adjudicatory hearing was significantly delayed by continuances and took place on February 7, 2024. In preparation, he underwent a parental fitness evaluation, which:

• Found “adequate ability in understanding appropriate parenting techniques”;
• Identified some parenting “deficiencies” that could be addressed in parenting classes; and
• Did not identify substance abuse, criminality, or mental instability.

At adjudication, J.M. did not contest that W.M. was an abused and neglected child, but instead entered into a stipulated adjudication. In substance, he:

• “Stipulate[d] that his son was abused or neglected as defined by W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201 and the laws of the State of West Virginia”;
• “Admit[ted], as generally alleged in Paragraph 6 of the Petition,” that:
  • He failed to discover that P.T. previously had her parental rights terminated to other children;
  • She was therefore subject to automatic initiation of abuse and neglect proceedings regarding W.M.; and
• “Further stipulate[d] to a failure to protect the child from exposure to a parent with aggravated circumstances”; and
• Stated that he believed the stipulation was in W.M.’s best interests.

Based solely on this stipulation, the circuit court entered an adjudicatory order on March 4, 2024, finding J.M. to be an abusing and neglecting parent.

D. Disposition: denial of improvement period and termination

J.M. then moved for a post‑adjudicatory or, in the alternative, post‑dispositional improvement period. The court delayed ruling until the disposition hearing held on April 1, 2024.

At disposition, the court heard testimony from both J.M. and P.T. Salient findings included:

• J.M. continued to question or minimize the significance of P.T.’s prior terminations;
• He testified it would be “hard” to leave P.T. and that he would do so only if the court terminated her rights;
• He said he had seen P.T. parent and believed she was “a good parent,” and that he did not view knowledge of her history as important;
• The court was not persuaded that J.M. genuinely recognized a need to protect W.M. that might require severing his relationship with P.T.; and
• The court found “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions leading to abuse and neglect can be corrected in the near future” and that it “cannot grant an improvement period” to J.M.

By order of April 8, 2024, the circuit court:

• Denied J.M.’s motion for an improvement period;
• Terminated his parental rights under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6); and
• Also terminated P.T.’s parental rights.

P.T. separately appealed; her termination was affirmed by memorandum decision on March 19, 2025. The permanency plan for W.M. is adoption in his current placement.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

On appeal, J.M. challenged:

• The sufficiency of the petition as to him;
• The validity of his adjudicatory stipulation under Rule 26(a);
• The denial of an improvement period; and
• The failure to consider less‑restrictive alternatives to termination.

The Supreme Court of Appeals held:

1. The petition was legally sufficient under State v. Scritchfield because, although brief, it adequately notified J.M. of the basis for DHS’s involvement and afforded him a reasonable opportunity to respond.
2. J.M.’s stipulation was legally deficient under Rule 26(a) because:
   • It failed to set forth agreed factual allegations connecting his conduct or omissions to abuse or neglect as defined in W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201; and
   • It omitted any statement of his “problems or deficiencies to be addressed at the final disposition,” as Rule 26(a) explicitly requires.
3. Because there was neither a compliant stipulation nor a full contested adjudication, there was no valid adjudication of J.M. as an abusing or neglecting parent, and the circuit court therefore lacked authority to proceed to disposition against him.
4. Accordingly, the Court vacated the March 4, 2024 adjudicatory order and the April 8, 2024 dispositional order as to J.M. only, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the proper Chapter 49 process.
5. Given this dispositive procedural defect, the Court declined to address J.M.’s remaining assignments of error (improvement period and less‑restrictive alternatives).

The termination of P.T.’s parental rights, previously affirmed in a separate appeal, remains undisturbed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the abuse and neglect petition

1. Majority’s application of Scritchfield

West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑601(b) requires that an abuse and neglect petition “allege specific conduct including time and place, to bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court.” The Court has long interpreted this requirement through the notice-focused lens of State v. Scritchfield, 167 W. Va. 683, 280 S.E.2d 315 (1981), which held:

“If the allegations of fact in a child neglect petition are sufficiently specific to inform the custodian of the infants of the basis upon which the petition is brought, and thus afford a reasonable opportunity to prepare a rebuttal, the child neglect petition is legally sufficient.” Syl. pt. 1, Scritchfield.

The majority recognizes that the petition against J.M. was not extensive, but concludes it was “legally sufficient from a notice standpoint” because:

• It put J.M. on notice that DHS was proceeding under § 49‑4‑605(a)(3) (mandatory petition upon a new birth after prior involuntary terminations); and
• It specifically alleged that:
  • J.M. remained in a relationship with P.T. despite learning of her “aggravated circumstances”; and
  • His failure to accept or understand her prior history allegedly rendered him unable “at this time” to be protective.

The majority also notes Rule 19 of the Abuse and Neglect Rules, which allows liberal amendment of petitions before the final adjudicatory hearing, and cites In re Randy H., 220 W. Va. 122, 640 S.E.2d 185 (2006), recognizing the circuit court’s authority to compel an amended petition if it believes additional abuse or neglect not encompassed in the original petition has occurred or is imminent.

On this view, the petition passes muster because it described, albeit briefly, the factual scenario DHS believed justified court involvement: an unknowing, then disbelieving, father who refused to acknowledge the significance of his fiancée’s aggravated circumstances and therefore was, in DHS’s view, not yet protective.

2. Justice Trump’s contrary view: petition as “fatally flawed”

Justice Trump’s concurring and dissenting opinion squarely rejects the majority’s conclusion that the petition was sufficient. He emphasizes:

• J.M. was a first‑time father with no CPS or criminal history, no substance abuse, no history of violence, and a stable job and home;
• DHS’s own petition conceded that J.M. had no knowledge of P.T.’s prior CPS history until after W.M.’s birth; and
• The petition did not allege that J.M. had harmed or threatened W.M., failed to provide for him, or exposed him to any concrete danger.

Citing West Virginia Code § 49‑1‑201’s definitions of “abused child” and “neglected child”— and the Court’s analysis in In re A.L.C.M., 239 W. Va. 382, 801 S.E.2d 260 (2017)—Trump stresses that neglect requires a “refusal, failure or inability” to meet the child’s basic needs, and abuse or neglect must be grounded in conduct that harms or threatens the child’s welfare.

On that statutory foundation, he invokes Scritchfield and its antecedent, In re Simmons Children, 154 W. Va. 491, 177 S.E.2d 19 (1970):

“[An abuse and neglect] petition which states no facts respecting the improper care or supervision of the parents and contains only conclusory statements is defective.” Scritchfield, 167 W. Va. at 689, 280 S.E.2d at 319.

Justice Trump characterizes the allegations against J.M.—that he was “unaware,” did “not appear to acknowledge the situation,” and “remained involved” with P.T.—as pure conclusions, not descriptions of abuse, neglect, or failure to protect. In his view:

• The petition failed to allege any conduct that would bring W.M. within § 49‑1‑201 as to J.M.;
• It therefore could not lawfully support an adjudicatory hearing, let alone termination; and
• The proceedings against J.M. were “defective from inception” and should be dismissed on remand.

This disagreement displays a significant fault line: whether the statutory requirement of “particularity” in § 49‑4‑601(b) is satisfied by notice-level pleading of DHS’s concerns, or whether it demands allegations that, if true, expressly map onto all statutory elements of abuse or neglect.

B. Rule 26(a) and stipulated adjudications

1. The structure and purposes of Rule 26(a)

Rule 26 governs stipulated adjudications in abuse and neglect proceedings. Rule 26(a) requires that any stipulated adjudication include two categories of information:

1. Agreed upon facts supporting court involvement regarding the respondent’s problems, conduct, or condition; and
2. A statement of respondent’s problems or deficiencies to be addressed at the final disposition.

Rule 26(b) further requires that any stipulation “meet the purposes of these rules and controlling statute,” meaning it must legitimately support the threshold determination that a child is abused or neglected and set the stage for meaningful dispositional planning. The rule is designed to:

• Ensure that a parent’s consent is informed, voluntary, and factually grounded;
• Prevent “rubber‑stamp” adjudications based on conclusory admissions; and
• Preserve the integrity of the two‑stage process—adjudication and disposition—set out in Chapter 49.

2. In re Z.S.-1: the Court’s 2023 clarification

In 2023, the Court in In re Z.S.-1 confronted a stipulated adjudication where a mother:

• Admitted that her infant child had unexplained injuries while in her sole care;
• But claimed she did not know how the injuries occurred.

The Court held in syllabus point 3:

“Rule 26(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings requires a stipulated adjudication to include both ‘(1) [a]greed upon facts supporting court involvement regarding the respondent['s] problems, conduct, or condition’ and ‘(2) [a] statement of respondent's problems or deficiencies to be addressed at the final disposition.’”

The Court found the stipulation deficient because:

• Although it acknowledged injury to the child, it did not explain how the injuries related to the mother’s conduct or condition as a respondent;
• It contained no statement of the mother’s “problems or deficiencies” to guide dispositional planning; and
• Without such content, it could not support an adjudication or the termination that followed.

Z.S.-1 thus firmly established that:

• Inclusion of all required information under Rule 26(a) “is not optional”;
• Stipulations must be more than bare admissions of status (“I was neglectful”); they must contain concrete factual bases; and
• The absence of a valid adjudication deprives the circuit court of authority to proceed to disposition as to that child and parent.

3. Application to J.M.’s stipulation in In re W.M.

The Court treats J.M.’s stipulation as closely analogous to the defective stipulation in Z.S.-1 and applies the same two‑part analysis.

a. Failure to allege “agreed upon facts supporting court involvement”

The Court identifies two central deficiencies:

• No factual nexus between J.M.’s conduct and abuse or neglect. The stipulation:
  • Conceded J.M. did not know about P.T.’s prior terminations until informed by DHS;
  • Admitted he “failed to discover” that history sooner; and
  • Recited that W.M. “was abused or neglected as defined by W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201.”
  But it did not explain how J.M.’s prior lack of knowledge or subsequent disbelief constituted abuse or neglect, nor how his conduct “harmed or threatened” W.M.’s welfare under § 49‑1‑201.
• Unsupported admission of “failure to protect.” The stipulation baldly stated that J.M. failed to protect W.M. from “exposure to a parent with aggravated circumstances,” but:
  • Contained no agreed facts establishing that J.M. knew, or reasonably should have known, that P.T. posed a present risk of abuse or neglect to W.M.;
  • Did not allege that P.T. had mistreated W.M. or any child in J.M.’s presence; and
  • Did not describe any action or omission by J.M. that allowed abuse or neglect actually to occur or become imminent.

The Court situates this analysis within preexisting “failure to protect” jurisprudence:

• Doris S., 197 W. Va. 489, 475 S.E.2d 865 (1996) (Syl. pt. 7): “The term ‘knowingly’ as used in West Virginia Code § 49‑1‑201 does not require that a parent actually be present at the time the abuse occurs, but rather that the parent was presented with sufficient facts from which he/she could have and should have recognized that abuse has occurred.”
• In re Betty J.W., 179 W. Va. 605, 371 S.E.2d 326 (1988) (Syl. pt. 3): An abused child includes one “whose parent knowingly allows another person to commit the abuse,” and termination is generally upheld only when the parent takes no action despite that knowledge or actively shields the abuser.

Applying those standards, the majority concludes that nothing in the stipulation establishes that J.M. was “presented with sufficient facts” from which he “could have and should have recognized” that P.T. posed a current risk of abuse or neglect to W.M., nor that he knowingly allowed abuse to occur. Bare “exposure” to a parent with past terminations is not, without more, abuse or neglect by the other parent.

b. Omission of “problems or deficiencies to be addressed”

The stipulation also failed the second prong of Rule 26(a): it contained no explicit statement of J.M.’s “problems or deficiencies” to be addressed at disposition. In Z.S.-1, the Court stressed that this requirement is not pro forma; it ensures that:

• All parties share a common understanding of what specifically must change; and
• The circuit court can fashion a meaningful case plan and evaluate progress.

Here, the majority declines to infer such a statement merely from surrounding context (e.g., that J.M. needed to separate from P.T. or develop insight into her history). Absent an explicit articulation in the stipulation itself, Rule 26(a) was not satisfied.

4. Consent does not cure a facially deficient stipulation

DHS and the guardian ad litem urged the Court to treat any deficiencies as “invited error,” arguing that J.M. had:

• Voluntarily chosen to stipulate;
• Never challenged the sufficiency of the petition or stipulation below; and
• Affirmatively urged the circuit court to accept his stipulation.

The Court firmly rejects this argument. Citing In re I.M.K., 240 W. Va. 679, 815 S.E.2d 490 (2018), and echoing In re T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983), it reiterates that:

“It is apparent that the state's right to intervene is predicated upon its initial showing that there has been child abuse or neglect, which constitutes unfitness on the part of the parents to continue, either temporarily or permanently, in their custodial role. . . . [Thus] the parties cannot circumvent the threshold question, which is the issue of abuse or neglect.”

Because Rule 26(b) mandates that stipulations “meet the purposes” of the rules and statutes, a parent cannot, by consent, authorize a court to find abuse or neglect without a legally adequate factual basis. Due process and the structure of Chapter 49 impose a non‑waivable threshold:

• The State must establish a factual foundation for abuse or neglect (by proof or valid stipulation); and
• Only then may the court exercise dispositional powers, including termination.

C. Jurisdictional consequences of a defective adjudication

Relying on Z.S.-1, In re A.P.-1, 241 W. Va. 688, 827 S.E.2d 830 (2019), and In re T.C., the Court underscores the centrality of adjudication in the statutory scheme:

• W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601(i) requires an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the child is abused or neglected;
• W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604 permits dispositional orders (including termination) only after such a finding;
• T.C., Syl. pt. 1: “Such a finding is a prerequisite to further continuation of the case.”

Accordingly, the Court holds:

“Absent [a] stipulated adjudication[] that complied with the requirements of Rule 26(a) or a full adjudication on the merits, there was no proper adjudication of [the child] as an abused and/or neglected child and [the parent] as . . . a[n] abusive and/or neglectful parent[], and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to a disposition as to [the child].”

This is not a subject‑matter jurisdiction ruling in the narrow sense; rather, it is a recognition that the court’s authority to impose permanent dispositional consequences is conditioned upon a procedurally valid adjudication. When “the process established by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes … has been substantially disregarded or frustrated,” the resulting order must be vacated. Syl. pt. 5, In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001).

Here, because J.M.’s adjudication rests solely on a defective stipulation, both the adjudicatory and dispositional orders against him must be vacated and the case remanded for proceedings that:

• Address only actions or omissions occurring before the filing of the operative petition (as § 49‑4‑601(i) requires); and
• Fully comply with the two‑stage structure and Rule 26(a)’s requirements if resolved by stipulation.

D. Justice Trump’s additional concerns: UCCJEA and emergency removal

Justice Trump’s opinion, while concurring in vacatur, goes beyond the majority’s analysis and flags foundational issues about the legitimacy of the State’s initial interventions.

1. Questioning DHS authority to remove W.M. from a Virginia hospital

W.M. was born, and remained at the time of removal, in a hospital in Harrisonburg, Virginia. Justice Trump notes:

• The record contains no indication that DHS obtained an order from a Virginia court before taking custody;
• The West Virginia emergency custody statutes, such as W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑303 (pre‑petition emergency custody) and § 48‑20‑204(a) (UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction), by their terms require the child to be “present in this State” or in the county where custody is taken; and
• Because W.M. was in Virginia, West Virginia’s emergency jurisdiction provisions did not apply.

He points to Virginia’s nearly identical UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction statute, Va. Code § 20‑146.15, and its registration and enforcement provisions (Va. Code §§ 20‑146.26, 20‑146.27), and concludes that:

• Virginia, not West Virginia, had temporary emergency jurisdiction to authorize removal if an emergency existed;
• DHS should have sought relief from a Virginia court or registered any West Virginia order in Virginia in accordance with the UCCJEA; and
• Absent such compliance, DHS “exceeded the bounds of its lawful authority” by executing a West Virginia order in a foreign jurisdiction.

He characterizes this as “a troubling exercise of governmental power untethered from our law and indifferent to jurisdictional limits,” warning that:

“When the government proceeds upon pleadings that do not allege imminent danger or abuse or neglect with sufficient specificity, the process is defective from inception.”

2. Misuse of emergency removal provisions

Justice Trump also contends that DHS improperly invoked emergency custody under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑303 and, even if read with § 49‑4‑602(a)(1), failed to allege or demonstrate:

• “Imminent danger to the physical well‑being of the child,” as specifically defined in § 49‑1‑201; or
• The absence of reasonably available alternatives to removal.

He highlights:

• DHS’s own observation that W.M. was healthy, born full‑term, with a normal birth weight;
• Mother’s negative drug screen and receipt of prenatal care;
• The lack of any allegation that either parent had abused or neglected W.M. or that he was in immediate danger; and
• DHS’s failure—even months later—to inspect J.M.’s home, despite physical conditions of the home being central to P.T.’s prior case.

In his view, “the law does not sanction such speculative, preemptive intrusions into a family” and “applications for emergency custody must rest on facts specifically alleged, and the State may not substitute suspicion for evidence or association for neglect.”

Although these jurisdictional and procedural concerns do not command a majority, they will likely be cited in future litigation involving:

• Interstate births and removals; and
• The threshold showing required for “imminent danger” and emergency intervention.

E. Justice Hutchison’s dissent: re‑centering the “polar star” of child welfare

Senior Status Justice Hutchison dissents from the majority’s decision to vacate. He believes:

• The petition and stipulation, read in context, were sufficiently compliant with Rule 26(a);
• The record amply supported both adjudication and termination; and
• The majority improperly subordinates the child’s best interests to “technical legal rights” of the parent.

Quoting a long line of West Virginia cases—Green v. Campbell (1891), Conner v. Harris (1925), Kessel v. Leavitt (1998), and Brook B. v. Ray (2013)—he reiterates the “polar star” doctrine:

“[T]he best interests of the child trump all other considerations. It is the polar star that steers all discretion.”

From this vantage, he emphasizes:

• Mother’s recent and egregious prior neglect of seven other children, including severe home filth and serious medical neglect;
• Her refusal in the current case even to acknowledge the existence of those children or discuss the prior proceedings;
• J.M.’s stubborn refusal for more than six months to believe DHS’s account of P.T.’s history or to see it as relevant to W.M.’s safety;
• His insistence that P.T. was “a good parent” and that he saw no need to know why her rights had been terminated; and
• His repeated refusal to end the relationship with P.T., pledging to do so only if the court forced his hand by terminating her rights.

Justice Hutchison views these facts as more than adequate to establish that:

• There was a concrete, ongoing risk to W.M. if left in J.M.’s custody while he remained aligned with P.T.; and
• J.M. had a clear “problem” or “deficiency”—his unwillingness to prioritize W.M.’s safety over his relationship—that all parties fully understood, even if it was not expressly summarized in the stipulation’s text.

He therefore would:

• Affirm J.M.’s adjudication as an abusing and neglecting parent; and
• Affirm termination, emphasizing:
  • Parents must acknowledge and address problems for improvement periods to have value (In re Charity H., quoting Doris S.);
  • The circuit court, as fact‑finder, reasonably found J.M.’s late‑breaking promise to leave P.T. not credible; and
  • There was “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions could be remedied soon.

In short, the dissent warns against allowing strict procedural enforcement to perpetuate a child’s lack of permanency—W.M. is over two years old and still not in a permanent placement—and urges that Rule 26(a) not be interpreted in a way that “erodes” the child‑centered standard.

V. Precedents and Doctrinal Context

The opinion is densely cross‑referenced to prior West Virginia child welfare and due process cases. Key authorities and their roles include:

• State v. Scritchfield, 167 W. Va. 683, 280 S.E.2d 315 (1981)
  – Established notice‑based standard for petition sufficiency (Syl. pt. 1).
  – Majority uses it to uphold the petition’s sufficiency as to J.M.
• In re Simmons Children, 154 W. Va. 491, 177 S.E.2d 19 (1970)
  – Earlier precedent requiring factual, not conclusory, allegations; cited by Justice Trump via Scritchfield.
• In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
  – Standard of review: factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo.
• In re I.M.K., 240 W. Va. 679, 815 S.E.2d 490 (2018)
  – Emphasized that the State’s right to intervene rests on an initial showing of abuse/neglect; parties cannot “circumvent the threshold question.”
• In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621 (2023)
  – Clarified that Rule 26(a) requires both:
  • Agreed facts supporting court involvement; and
  • A statement of the parent’s problems or deficiencies.
  
  – Held that omission of either renders a stipulation invalid and deprives the court of authority to proceed to disposition.
  – Forms the backbone of In re W.M.’s analysis.
• W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res. ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 197 W. Va. 489, 475 S.E.2d 865 (1996)
  – Interpreted “knowingly” in the failure‑to‑protect context; cited to show the absence of facts establishing that J.M. knew or should have known of abuse or neglect by P.T.
• In re Betty J.W., 179 W. Va. 605, 371 S.E.2d 326 (1988)
  – Addressed when a parent “knowingly allows another person to commit the abuse.”
  – Majority uses it to show that termination on a failure‑to‑protect theory requires proof the parent had knowledge and failed to act.
• In re Randy H., 220 W. Va. 122, 640 S.E.2d 185 (2006)
  – Recognized circuit court’s authority to compel DHS to amend a petition when additional abuse or neglect is suspected.
• In re A.P.-1, 241 W. Va. 688, 827 S.E.2d 830 (2019)
  – Held that parental rights cannot be terminated at disposition without a prior finding of abuse or neglect at adjudication.
• In re T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983)
  – Reaffirmed that an adjudicatory finding of abuse or neglect is a prerequisite to any dispositional alternatives.
• In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001)
  – Provided the remedy rule: when the abuse and neglect process has been substantially disregarded or frustrated, dispositional orders must be vacated and the case remanded for compliance.
• In re A.L.C.M., 239 W. Va. 382, 801 S.E.2d 260 (2017)
  – Explained that neglect under § 49‑1‑201 requires conduct that harms or threatens a child’s welfare through refusal, failure, or inability to meet the child’s needs.
  – Justice Trump draws on this to argue the petition against J.M. alleged no such conduct.
• In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004) (quoting Doris S.)
  – Stands for the proposition that failure to acknowledge a problem makes it essentially untreatable and renders an improvement period futile.
  – Cited in Justice Hutchison’s dissent to justify denial of an improvement period.
• Constitutional and liberty‑interest cases:
  • In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973) – natural parent’s custody rights as a fundamental liberty interest;
  • Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) – U.S. Supreme Court recognition of parental liberty interest in child‑rearing.
  These are invoked by Justice Trump to emphasize the need for strict statutory compliance.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

For clarity, several central concepts in the opinion can be briefly explained:

1. Adjudication vs. Disposition

• Adjudication (W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601):
  The stage where the court determines whether a child is an “abused child” or “neglected child” under § 49‑1‑201 and whether the respondent is an abusing or neglecting parent. It is about what happened and whether the State’s intervention is justified.
• Disposition (W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604):
  The stage after adjudication, where the court decides what to do: return the child home, grant an improvement period, place the child with relatives, terminate parental rights, etc. It is about remediation and permanency planning.

The law insists that disposition cannot occur without a valid adjudication. In re W.M. enforces that sequence by vacating dispositions based on an invalid adjudication.

2. Stipulated adjudication

Instead of contesting the State’s allegations at a full evidentiary hearing, a parent may “stipulate” to adjudication—essentially admitting that their conduct meets the statutory definition of abuse or neglect. This can:

• Spare the child and parties a contentious trial;
• Demonstrate the parent’s acceptance of responsibility; and
• Potentially support granting an improvement period.

Rule 26(a) requires that such a stipulation not be a mere conclusion (“I am neglectful”) but include specific agreed facts and a description of the parent’s problems or deficiencies to be addressed.

3. “Known or should have known” in failure‑to‑protect cases

West Virginia law holds a parent responsible not only for direct abuse or neglect, but also for knowingly allowing another person to abuse the child. This requires:

• That the parent had actual knowledge of abuse or compelling facts from which a reasonable person would recognize abuse or grave risk; and
• That the parent failed to take reasonable action to protect the child.

Mere association with someone who has a problematic past is not, by itself, sufficient. In re W.M. stresses that a stipulation must contain facts showing this knowledge element, not just conclusory references to “failure to protect.”

4. “Aggravated circumstances” and mandatory petitions

Under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑605(a)(3), DHS must file a petition when a parent has previously had parental rights involuntarily terminated to another child. These are called “aggravated circumstances.” As to that parent, the law assumes a heightened risk and often allows the court to forego reasonable efforts toward reunification.

However, as In re W.M. illustrates, the mere presence of aggravated circumstances as to one parent does not automatically establish abuse or neglect by another parent. Separate statutory and procedural thresholds must still be met as to each respondent.

5. “Improvement period”

An improvement period is a statutorily authorized timeframe during which:

• The parent follows a case plan (e.g., services, classes, counseling); and
• The court evaluates whether the parent can safely remediate the conditions of abuse or neglect.

Courts have broad discretion whether to grant an improvement period, and one precondition is that the parent acknowledge and begin to address the underlying problems. Where a parent denies any problem, an improvement period may be deemed futile.

6. UCCJEA and interstate emergency jurisdiction

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), adopted by both West Virginia and Virginia, governs which state’s courts have the authority to make and enforce child custody determinations, especially when more than one state is involved.

A key provision allows temporary emergency jurisdiction when:

• The child is physically present in the state; and
• The child has been abandoned or needs protection because of mistreatment or abuse.

Justice Trump’s concurrence highlights that:

• Because W.M. was physically in Virginia, only Virginia could exercise emergency jurisdiction over him under the UCCJEA;
• West Virginia courts could not unilaterally authorize removal from a Virginia hospital without following UCCJEA procedures (e.g., registration of a West Virginia order in Virginia and seeking enforcement there); and
• Strict adherence to these jurisdictional rules is a core component of due process and federalism.

VII. Practical Implications and Future Impact

1. Drafting and accepting stipulations: a higher bar

In re W.M., building on Z.S.-1, sends a clear directive:

• For DHS and guardians ad litem:
  • Do not present, and do not rely on, boilerplate stipulations that merely track the statutory definitions (“I admit my child is neglected under § 49‑1‑201”).
  • Ensure that stipulations recite concrete agreed facts that, if proven, would satisfy each element of abuse or neglect.
  • Include a succinct but explicit statement of the parent’s problems or deficiencies—e.g., “Father’s problem is refusal to accept Mother’s documented pattern of severe neglect and to protect the child from unsupervised contact with her.”
• For parents’ counsel:
  • Advise clients that they cannot simply “plead guilty” to abuse or neglect in the abstract; the stipulation will spell out specific facts that will guide the case.
  • Insist that the stipulation accurately reflect your client’s actual conduct and understanding, and that it not overstate culpability.
  • Recognize that an inadequate stipulation may be vacated later, exposing the client to renewed litigation and uncertainty.
• For circuit judges:
  • Scrutinize every stipulated adjudication for strict compliance with both prongs of Rule 26(a).
  • If the stipulation is conclusory, require counsel to supplement it with agreed specific facts and a list of problems/deficiencies, or proceed to a contested adjudication.
  • Do not assume that silence in the stipulation can be cured by inferences from the record; Rule 26(a) demands that the stipulation itself contain the required information.

2. Reinforcing the adjudication–disposition firewall

By vacating the disposition due to defects at adjudication, the Court reinforces a structural safeguard:

• Evidence and concerns that arise after the petition is filed (e.g., a parent’s conduct during the case) are relevant to disposition, but cannot retroactively cure a failure to allege or prove abuse or neglect at adjudication.
• This temporal boundary:
  • Protects parents from adjudications based on post‑petition behavior not alleged in the petition;
  • Requires DHS to amend the petition under Rule 19 if new abuse or neglect arises; and
  • Prevents dispositional findings from “backfilling” an insufficient adjudication.

3. The live debate over petition specificity and non‑offending parents

The stark disagreement between the majority and Justice Trump about the sufficiency of the petition signals an unresolved doctrinal tension:

• Majority’s practical/notice approach: If the petition gives a parent fair notice of DHS’s theory (here, inability to protect because of denial and continued relationship with a parent with aggravated circumstances), it passes § 49‑4‑601(b).
• Justice Trump’s element‑focused approach: The petition must allege conduct that, if true, satisfies each element of the statutory definition of abuse or neglect; mere suspicion or relational proximity is not enough.

Future litigants representing “non‑offending” or peripheral parents (new partners, grandparents, etc.) will likely invoke Justice Trump’s reasoning to demand more robust factual allegations before an adjudication can proceed against them.

4. Interstate births and the reach of West Virginia’s child welfare system

Though not adopted by the majority, Justice Trump’s UCCJEA analysis is a cautionary note for DHS and the bench:

• When a child is born in another state—even to West Virginia residents—West Virginia agencies and courts must:
  • Respect the other state’s primary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA; and
  • Use registration and enforcement mechanisms, not unilateral action, to secure custody.
• Failure to follow UCCJEA procedures risks:
  • Jurisdictional challenges;
  • Suppression or invalidation of subsequent orders; and
  • Interstate comity concerns.

Counsel in future cases involving cross‑border births will undoubtedly cite In re W.M.’s concurring opinion to challenge emergency removals undertaken without demonstrable UCCJEA compliance.

5. Balancing due process and the child’s best interests

Finally, the split between the majority and Justice Hutchison spotlights a recurring tension:

• On one hand, strict adherence to procedures and statutory thresholds protects parents’ fundamental rights and ensures the State does not overreach.
• On the other, children need timely permanency, and excessive procedural rigidity can prolong instability.

The majority emphasizes due process and structural integrity of the Chapter 49 process. The dissent warns that this approach may, in effect, privilege “technical legal rights” over the child’s welfare, especially where the factual risk is plain and undisputed.

Practitioners should be prepared to argue both sides of this balance:

• Invoking In re W.M. to ensure that parents are not adjudicated or terminated without a robust factual foundation and a Rule 26(a) compliant stipulation; and
• Citing the dissent and cases like Brook B. v. Ray to argue against remands or reversals where procedural missteps are minor and the child’s best interests clearly favor finality.

VIII. Conclusion

In re W.M. is best understood as a strong enforcement of a principle crystallized in In re Z.S.-1: stipulated adjudications in abuse and neglect cases must be both factually and formally sufficient. A parent’s consent cannot convert a conclusory or incomplete stipulation into a lawful basis for an adjudication of abuse or neglect and the drastic remedy of termination.

Key takeaways include:

• Rule 26(a) is mandatory and two‑part. Every stipulated adjudication must:
  • Recite specific agreed facts connecting the parent’s conduct or condition to abuse or neglect; and
  • Explicitly identify the parent’s problems or deficiencies to be addressed at disposition.
• No valid disposition without a valid adjudication. Where adjudication is based solely on a defective stipulation, dispositional orders—including termination—must be vacated.
• Minimal petitions may be upheld, but the Court is divided. The majority accepts a notice‑based standard, while Justice Trump insists on element‑level particularity, especially for non‑offending or peripheral parents.
• Interstate removals and emergency custody raise serious jurisdictional issues. Though not decided by the majority, Justice Trump’s analysis signals that DHS should meticulously follow UCCJEA and emergency‑removal procedures when acting across state lines.
• The best‑interests “polar star” remains central—but not absolute. Justice Hutchison’s dissent underscores that child welfare is the ultimate goal, but the majority’s enforcement of procedural safeguards demonstrates that best interests must be pursued within the confines of statute and due process.

On remand, the circuit court must now either:

• Conduct a full contested adjudication as to J.M. based on pre‑petition conduct; or
• Obtain a new, fully compliant Rule 26(a) stipulation.

Either path must then lead, if abuse or neglect is found, to a disposition that honors both W.M.’s need for timely permanency and J.M.’s constitutional and statutory rights. In this way, In re W.M. reinforces that the protection of children and the protection of due process are not mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing pillars of West Virginia’s child welfare system.