In re Petition of D.K.: Plea-and-Diversion Dismissals Are “In Exchange for a Guilty Plea” and Not Expungeable Under Former W. Va. Code § 61‑11‑25(a)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s decision in In re: Petition of D.K. for Expungement of Record, No. 23‑438 (Nov. 13, 2025), squarely addresses how the State’s general dismissal‑based expungement statute interacts with modern plea bargaining and diversionary practices.

At stake was whether a defendant whose felony drug charge was dismissed after successful completion of a negotiated pretrial diversion could obtain expungement of that dismissed count under the then‑controlling version of West Virginia Code § 61‑11‑25(a) (2012). The statute allowed expungement of dismissed charges—but expressly carved out charges dismissed “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense.”

D.K. argued that his drug charge was dismissed not because of his guilty plea to a minor traffic‑related misdemeanor (improper registration), but because he complied with a separate pretrial diversion agreement, years after the plea. The State countered that the entire package—guilty plea + diversion + dismissal of other counts—was a single “exchange”; therefore, the dismissal of the drug charge was, in statutory terms, “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense.”

The Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Ewing (with Justice Trump dissenting), sided with the State and affirmed the denial of expungement. In doing so, it reaffirmed a rigorously textual approach to statutory interpretation, clarified the standard of review for expungement decisions coming through the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”), and announced a clear rule: where a dismissal is one of the benefits negotiated as part of a plea package that includes a guilty plea to any offense, that dismissal falls within the statutory bar and cannot be expunged under former § 61‑11‑25(a).

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Background

D.K. was indicted in Randolph County in 2013 on three charges:

• Felony possession with intent to deliver marijuana (Count 1),
• Misdemeanor carrying a deadly weapon (Count 2), and
• Misdemeanor improper registration (Count 3).

In 2014, D.K. and the State reached a comprehensive plea agreement, accompanied by a pretrial diversion agreement:

• D.K. would plead guilty to:
  • Count 1 – possession with intent to deliver (felony); and
  • Count 3 – improper registration (misdemeanor).
• The State would:
  • Defer prosecution of the felony drug charge for 24 months under a pretrial diversion agreement;
  • Dismiss the deadly weapon charge (Count 2) with prejudice;
  • Recommend a suspended sentence and probation on the improper registration charge.
• If D.K. successfully completed diversion (and any alternative sentence conditions) the felony drug charge would be dismissed with prejudice.
• If he violated diversion, the State could re‑institute the drug charge by asking the court to accept his already‑entered guilty plea and proceed to sentencing; D.K. expressly waived any right to withdraw that plea in such event.

The circuit court accepted the plea, placed the drug charge on diversion, dismissed the weapon charge, and sentenced D.K. on the improper registration count (jail time and fine, both suspended; five years of supervised probation). D.K. later successfully completed probation (discharged early in 2017) and the diversionary period. In March 2022, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the drug charge with prejudice, nunc pro tunc to May 12, 2016.

B. Procedural History

1. Petition in circuit court. In April 2022, D.K. petitioned the circuit court to expunge all records relating to the dismissed felony drug charge under W. Va. Code § 61‑11‑25(a) (2012).
2. Circuit court decision. The circuit court denied the petition, finding that the dismissal of the drug charge was “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense” (the improper registration offense), which disqualified the charge from expungement under the statute.
3. ICA appeal. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, refusing to take a “piecemeal” view of the plea and diversion, and holding that the guilty plea to two counts (one being the drug count itself) was the consideration for dismissal of the third count and for the eventual dismissal of the drug charge.
4. Supreme Court appeal. D.K. appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals, raising a single assignment of error: that the lower courts misapplied § 61‑11‑25(a), both on its plain language and under principles of statutory construction (including in pari materia, the absurd‑results doctrine, and liberal construction of remedial statutes).

C. Issues Before the Court

The Court distilled the case to one central question:

Was the dismissal of D.K.’s felony drug charge “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense” within the meaning of former W. Va. Code § 61‑11‑25(a), such that he was statutorily ineligible to seek expungement of that charge?

Subsidiary issues included:

• What standard of review applies to circuit court expungement orders when appealed from the ICA?
• Is § 61‑11‑25(a) clear and unambiguous, or does it require resort to canons of construction?
• Can § 61‑11‑25(a) be read together with the conviction‑expungement statute, § 61‑11‑26, to avoid an allegedly “absurd result”?
• Does the statute’s purported remedial purpose justify a more expansive reading?

D. Holdings

The Court made the following principal holdings (captured in the Syllabus and the body of the opinion):

1. Standard of review. On appeal from the ICA, the Supreme Court continues to review a circuit court’s order granting or denying expungement of criminal records for an abuse of discretion (reaffirming In re A.N.T. and extending its standard into the ICA era).
2. Plain meaning of § 61‑11‑25(a). The expungement statute is clear and unambiguous. When charges are dismissed “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense,” expungement is categorically unavailable. Because the statute is unambiguous, courts must apply its plain language and may not invoke canons such as in pari materia.
3. Application to D.K.’s plea and diversion. The dismissal of D.K.’s drug charge was part of the same negotiated exchange in which he pled guilty to improper registration and entered into the diversionary framework. Therefore, the dismissal was “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense,” and D.K. was ineligible to seek expungement under former § 61‑11‑25(a).
4. Rejection of interpretive arguments.
   • The Court rejected D.K.’s attempt to sever the pretrial diversion agreement from the plea agreement; both were executed “contemporaneously and in conjunction with” each other and formed one integrated bargain.
   • The Court rejected the notion that the guilty plea must temporally coincide with the dismissal; the statute contains no requirement that the dismissal occur “at the time” of the plea, and courts cannot read such words into the statute.
   • The Court refused to read § 61‑11‑25(a) in pari materia with the later‑enacted conviction‑expungement statute, § 61‑11‑26, because § 61‑11‑25(a) is unambiguous.
   • The Court rejected application of the absurd‑results doctrine, holding that any perceived unfairness to D.K. did not rise to an absurdity contrary to legislative purpose.
   • Even assuming § 61‑11‑25(a) is “remedial,” the liberal‑construction canon cannot be used to contradict the statute’s explicit exclusion of dismissals obtained in exchange for guilty pleas.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the ICA, which had in turn affirmed the circuit court’s denial of D.K.’s petition for expungement.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Standard of Review and ICA Appeals

• In re A.N.T., 238 W. Va. 701, 798 S.E.2d 623 (2017)
  Before the creation of the ICA, A.N.T. established that “[t]his Court reviews a circuit court’s order granting or denying expungement of criminal records for an abuse of discretion.” That standard focuses on whether the circuit court’s decision was based on a mistaken view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts.
• Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995)
  The Court relied on Chrystal R.M. for the principle that pure questions of law, including statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo (plenary review).
• Bartles v. Hinkle, 196 W. Va. 381, 472 S.E.2d 827 (1996)
  Quoted for the abuse‑of‑discretion standard: a trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling “is based on an erroneous assessment of the evidence or the law.” This anchored the appellate framework: de novo review of the legal meaning of § 61‑11‑25(a), but deference to the circuit court’s application of that law to the plea record absent legal error.
• ICA‑era cases: In re H.A., Christopher P. v. Amanda C., Folse v. Rollyson, Moorhead v. W. Va. Army Nat’l Guard
  The Court cited these decisions for the proposition that it continues to apply existing standards of review when reviewing cases that come up through the ICA. In D.K.’s case, that means the A.N.T. abuse‑of‑discretion standard carries over unchanged.

2. Plain Meaning and Limits on Statutory Construction

A cluster of well‑established West Virginia precedents grounds the Court’s textualist approach:

• State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968)
  Syllabus point 1 (restated in Syllabus pt. 2 here) provides: “Courts always endeavor to give effect to the legislative intent, but a statute that is clear and unambiguous will be applied and not construed.” This frames the opinion: if § 61‑11‑25(a) is clear, the Court has no warrant to deploy interpretive canons or equity‑based reasoning.
• State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951)
  Syllabus point 1 (restated as Syllabus pt. 4): “The rule that statutes which relate to the same subject should be read and construed together [in pari materia] … does not apply to a statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous.” This directly rebuts D.K.’s argument that § 61‑11‑25(a) should be harmonized with § 61‑11‑26 to avoid perceived anomalies.
• Dunlap v. State Compensation Director, 149 W. Va. 266, 140 S.E.2d 448 (1965), via In re H.W., 247 W. Va. 109, 875 S.E.2d 247 (2022)
  Syllabus point 3 in D.K.: “‘Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no basis for application of rules of statutory construction; but courts must apply the statute according to the legislative intent plainly expressed therein.’” This reinforces Elder and Epperly: no canons, no in pari materia, no policy balancing if the text is clear.
• State v. Sulick, 232 W. Va. 717, 753 S.E.2d 875 (2012); Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941)
  These cases support giving statutory words their “common, ordinary and accepted meaning in the connection in which they are used.” This underpins the Court’s natural‑language reading of the phrase “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense.”
• Brooke B. v. Ray, 230 W. Va. 355, 738 S.E.2d 21 (2013), as restated in State v. Butler, 239 W. Va. 168, 799 S.E.2d 718 (2017)
  Syllabus point 6 in D.K. quotes Brooke B./Butler: “It is not for this Court arbitrarily to read into a statute that which it does not say. Just as courts are not to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were purposely included, we are obliged not to add to statutes something the Legislature purposely omitted.” This directly answers D.K.’s attempt to add a temporal limitation (“at the time of the plea”) into § 61‑11‑25(a).

3. Absurd‑Results Doctrine

• State ex rel. Frazier v. Meadows, 193 W. Va. 20, 454 S.E.2d 65 (1994)
  Frazier recognizes a narrow class of “exceptional circumstances” where courts may depart from literal statutory language, including when a literal reading would produce an “absurd or unconstitutional result.”
• Taylor‑Hurley v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 209 W. Va. 780, 551 S.E.2d 702 (2001)
  Taylor‑Hurley refines the doctrine: courts may choose a reasonable construction over a literal one only when the literal reading would produce a result “demonstrably at odds with any conceivable legislative purpose,” and may not simply rewrite statutes based on a policy view that the literal result is “undesirable.”

These cases allowed the Court to rigorously police the boundaries of the absurd‑results doctrine and conclude that whatever inequity D.K. perceived did not rise to the level of absurdity that justifies deviating from plain text.

4. Remedial Statutes and Liberal Construction

• State ex rel. City of Wheeling Retirees Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 185 W. Va. 380, 407 S.E.2d 384 (1991)
  Cited for the general rule that remedial statutes should be liberally construed to effectuate their remedial purpose.
• State v. A.D., 242 W. Va. 536, 836 S.E.2d 503 (2019)
  There, the Court described a specific drug‑offense expungement provision, W. Va. Code § 60A‑4‑407(b), as providing “remedial measures” for certain drug offenders. D.K. attempted to leverage that remedial orientation to argue for a generous reading of § 61‑11‑25(a).
• Hasson v. City of Chester, 67 W. Va. 278, 67 S.E. 731 (1910)
  Hasson provides that “[t]hat which is plainly within the spirit, meaning, and purpose of a remedial statute, though not therein expressed in terms, is as much a part of it as if it were so expressed.” The Court uses Hasson to explain the limits of “liberal construction”—it cannot be deployed to contradict unambiguous exclusions in the statutory text.

Together, these cases frame the Court’s conclusion that, even assuming § 61‑11‑25(a) is remedial, courts may not interpret it to allow expungement where the statute plainly bars it.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Statutory Text: Former W. Va. Code § 61‑11‑25(a) (2012)

At the time D.K. sought expungement, the relevant portion of § 61‑11‑25(a) provided:

Any person who has been charged with a criminal offense under the laws of this state and who has been found not guilty of the offense, or against whom charges have been dismissed, and not in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense, may file a civil petition in the circuit court in which the charges were filed to expunge all records relating to the arrest, charge or other matters arising out of the arrest or charge.

The statute thus imposes three key conditions:

1. The person was charged with a criminal offense;
2. The person was found not guilty or the charges were dismissed; and
3. The acquittal or dismissal was not “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense.”

Only if all three conditions are met may a petitioner seek expungement. D.K. satisfied the first two, but the third was contested. The dispute reduced to how “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense” should be understood.

2. Plain‑Text Reading of “In Exchange For a Guilty Plea to Another Offense”

Applying the plain‑meaning canon, the Court treated the phrase “in exchange for” in its ordinary contractual sense—as part of a bargain or quid pro quo. It asked:

Was the later dismissal of the drug charge a benefit D.K. obtained as part of the same negotiated bargain in which he agreed to plead guilty to the improper registration charge (and to the drug charge itself subject to diversion)?

The plea agreement answered that question. Paragraph 2, which the Court quoted in detail, set out a three‑part package:

1. D.K. would plead guilty to:
   • Possession with intent to deliver (Count 1); and
   • Improper registration (Count 3).
2. The State would:
   • Defer prosecution of the drug charge for 24 months via pretrial diversion, then dismiss it with prejudice if D.K. successfully completed diversion and any alternative sentence; and
   • Dismiss the deadly weapon charge (Count 2) with prejudice.

Crucially, the agreements themselves stated that the plea agreement and the pretrial diversion agreement were “executed contemporaneously and in conjunction with” one another. The Court treated them as an integrated contract, reflecting a unified exchange: D.K. gives up guilty pleas and waivers; the State provides diversion, potential dismissal of the drug charge, and actual dismissal of the weapon charge.

Against that backdrop, the Court concluded that the dismissal of the drug charge was indeed one of the things the State promised in consideration of (i.e., “in exchange for”) D.K.’s guilty plea to another offense. The fact that the dismissal was contingent on successful completion of diversion and occurred later in time did not alter its essential character as part of the bargained‑for package.

3. Integrated Treatment of Plea and Diversion Agreements

D.K. sought to treat the pretrial diversion agreement as separate from the plea agreement—arguing that:

• The diversion agreement (and his compliance with it) was the immediate cause of dismissal; and
• The guilty plea to improper registration merely opened the door to the diversion, but was not the “exchange” for the dismissal itself.

The Court rejected that segmentation as inconsistent with the “reality of the plea process” and the express language of the documents:

• Both agreements were executed contemporaneously and in conjunction with each other. This signaled that they were parts of a single, indivisible plea package.
• The plea agreement itself spelled out the diversion mechanism and the conditions under which the drug charge would be dismissed; the agreements were not independent instruments operating in isolation.
• The State conditioned its extension of the plea offer on D.K.’s waiver of the right to withdraw his guilty plea to the drug count if he violated diversion, underscoring that the guilty plea and the diversion arrangement were tightly linked elements of one bargain.

Accordingly, the Court held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in looking at the plea agreement and diversion agreement together and concluding that the dismissal of the drug charge was, in statutory terms, “in exchange for” a guilty plea to another offense.

4. No Temporal Requirement in the Statutory Bar

D.K. also argued that, even if his plea and diversion were part of a global bargain, the drug charge was not dismissed “in exchange for a guilty plea” because the dismissal did not occur “at the time” he entered the plea. In his view, the immediate “exchange” for the plea was: (1) dismissal of the gun count; and (2) access to diversion. The later dismissal of the drug charge was, he claimed, “in exchange” for successful completion of diversion, not for the earlier guilty plea.

The Court found no support for a timing limitation in the statute’s text:

• Section 61‑11‑25(a) does not say “immediately in exchange” or “at the time the plea is entered.” It focuses solely on whether the dismissal was part of a bargain that included a guilty plea to another offense.
• Under Brooke B./Butler, courts are forbidden from adding words to a statute that the Legislature did not include. Creating a contemporaneity requirement would be precisely such an impermissible addition.

Put simply, the presence of a time gap between the plea and the dismissal does not change whether the dismissal was one of the benefits of the guilty‑plea bargain. The Court held that “however later in time that dismissal came,” it remained “in exchange for a guilty plea” within the meaning of the statute.

5. Rejection of In Pari Materia With § 61‑11‑26 (Conviction Expungement)

D.K. attempted a more elaborate statutory‑construction argument: he posited that, had he violated diversion and been convicted of the drug charge, he could potentially have sought expungement of that conviction under W. Va. Code § 61‑11‑26 (2020), the general conviction‑expungement statute. Thus, he argued, it would be “absurd” to interpret § 61‑11‑25(a) as denying expungement when the charge was dismissed but potentially allowing expungement had he been convicted.

He urged the Court to read § 61‑11‑25(a) in pari materia with § 61‑11‑26 to avoid this result and harmonize the expungement framework.

The Court declined to do so, emphasizing:

• Clarity of § 61‑11‑25(a): The statute is “clear and unambiguous.” Under Epperly and Dunlap/In re H.W., when a statute is clear, the rule that related statutes should be read together does not apply. Statutory construction in pari materia is a tool for resolving ambiguity, not for defeating plain text.
• Separate schemes: Section 61‑11‑25(a) governs expungement after acquittal or dismissal (with a specific carve‑out), whereas § 61‑11‑26 provides a separate regime governing expungement of certain convictions after specified waiting periods and satisfaction of criteria. The Court refused to use the structure of one scheme to distort the unambiguous terms of the other.

Thus, any tension between the two statutes is a policy matter for the Legislature, not a license for the Court to reinterpret explicit statutory language.

6. No “Absurd Result” Justifying Departure From Plain Text

Building on the § 61‑11‑26 argument, D.K. invoked the absurd‑results doctrine recognized in Frazier and Taylor‑Hurley. He claimed it was absurd that:

• If he had failed diversion and been convicted, he might eventually qualify for conviction expungement; but
• Because he succeeded and obtained a dismissal, he is forever barred from expungement of the dismissed charge due to the plea‑based dismissal exception.

The Court rejected that characterization:

• Not “demonstrably at odds” with legislative purpose. The Court emphasized that the absurd‑results doctrine applies only when a literal reading is “demonstrably at odds with any conceivable legislative purpose,” not merely when it produces a result one party finds unfair or counterintuitive.
• Legislative design is plausible. It is entirely plausible that the Legislature intended to:
  • Encourage true dismissals and acquittals not tied to plea bargains by permitting expungement; and
  • Withhold that benefit when dismissals are the product of negotiated charge‑bargaining (to prevent defendants from erasing records of charges they bargained away in exchange for pleas to others).
• Policy objections are for the Legislature. Even if some policy anomaly exists between dismissal‑based and conviction‑based expungement regimes, the Court stressed that it is “not license … to simply ignore or rewrite statutory language on the basis that, as written, it produces an undesirable policy result.”

Thus, the Court found nothing “absurd” in the statutory scheme as applied to D.K.’s facts.

7. Limits of Liberal Construction for Remedial Statutes

Finally, D.K. argued that § 61‑11‑25(a) is remedial and should be construed liberally to advance its purpose of helping individuals clear their records. Citing City of Wheeling Retirees, A.D., and Hasson, he contended that this remedial character should tip the balance toward eligibility for dismissal‑based expungement in borderline cases.

The Court responded in two steps:

1. Unnecessary to decide whether the statute is remedial. The Court expressly stated it need not resolve whether § 61‑11‑25(a) is, in fact, “remedial,” because even if it were, D.K.’s proposed construction cannot be squared with its plain terms.
2. Liberal construction cannot contradict clear exclusions. Citing Hasson, the Court acknowledged that remedial statutes may be read broadly to include what is “plainly within the spirit, meaning, and purpose” of the statute, even if not explicitly stated. But here:
   • The statute explicitly and unambiguously excludes dismissals “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense.”
   • To permit expungement in D.K.’s scenario would not be a mere “liberal” reading; it would be “flatly contradictive” of the statute’s text.

In essence, the Court drew a line: remedial‑statute principles cannot be used as a back door to override express statutory limits.

C. Impact and Future Implications

1. Clarified Rule for Plea‑Linked Dismissals Under Former § 61‑11‑25(a)

The central doctrinal contribution of In re D.K. is a bright‑line rule for the pre‑2024 version of § 61‑11‑25(a):

Where the dismissal of a charge is part of the benefits negotiated in a plea package that includes a guilty plea to any other offense, that dismissal is “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense” within the meaning of former § 61‑11‑25(a), and therefore ineligible for expungement under that statute.

Several concrete consequences flow from this:

• It does not matter whether:
  • The dismissal occurs immediately or years later;
  • The dismissal is mediated through a diversion or deferred‑adjudication arrangement;
  • The plea is to a different, less serious offense (e.g., a misdemeanor when the dismissed charge was a felony); or
  • The dismissed count is distinct from, or related to, the count to which the defendant pled guilty.
  What matters is whether, in reality and on the record, the dismissal was part of the same bargain in which the defendant pled guilty to another offense.
• Courts are instructed to look at the global plea package “without piecemeal consideration,” as the ICA put it, and to treat contemporaneously executed plea and diversion agreements as a unified whole when determining whether a dismissal was obtained “in exchange for” a plea.

2. Strategic Considerations for Plea Bargaining and Diversion

For defense counsel and prosecutors negotiating plea dispositions (especially in the pre‑2024 statutory framework, but potentially by analogy under the amended statute), this decision has significant practical implications:

• Global plea packages carry lasting expungement consequences. Any deal in which a client pleads guilty to one charge in exchange for dismissal (immediate or conditional) of another charge will likely foreclose expungement of the dismissed count, even if the count is later dismissed after successful diversion.
• Structuring future diversions. To preserve the possibility of expungement under statutes like former § 61‑11‑25(a), defense counsel may seek:
  • Pretrial diversion or deferred adjudication without entry of a guilty plea to any other offense; or
  • Dismissals that are clearly not part of a plea exchange (e.g., dismissal due to evidentiary issues, prosecutorial discretion, or other non‑bargained reasons).
• Waiver provisions matter. Express waivers (such as D.K.’s waiver of the right to withdraw his guilty plea upon diversion violation) strengthen the argument that a dismissal following successful diversion is a pre‑agreed component of the plea exchange, rather than a separate, discretionary act by the State.

Although the 2024 amendments to § 61‑11‑25 are not addressed in this opinion, the Court’s analytical approach—tight focus on text and on the integrated reality of plea bargains—will almost certainly guide future interpretation of the amended statute.

3. Standard of Review in the ICA Era

In re D.K. is also important procedurally. It confirms:

• On appeals from the ICA, the Supreme Court continues to review expungement rulings for abuse of discretion, as it did before the ICA existed.
• At the same time, the Court independently reviews legal questions like the meaning of statutory language de novo.

This ensures consistency and signals that the creation of the ICA has not altered the substantive appellate standards governing expungement, only the routes and layers of review.

4. Reinforcement of a Textualist Methodology

The opinion also reinforces West Virginia’s commitment to textualism:

• When statutory language is clear, the Court will:
  • Refuse to employ canons like in pari materia;
  • Tightly cabin the absurd‑results doctrine to extreme cases;
  • Limit liberal construction of remedial statutes to situations not governed by explicit exclusions.
• The Court repeatedly quotes foundational textualist precedents (Elder, Epperly, Dunlap, H.W., Brooke B./Butler) to emphasize that judges may not add conditions (like a timing requirement) or carve out exceptions not found in the language.

Future litigants in expungement and other statutory cases should expect that arguments grounded in legislative purpose, fairness, or remedial policy will not override clear statutory text.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

This section explains several legal concepts that are key to understanding the opinion.

1. Expungement

“Expungement” is a court‑ordered process that removes or seals records of an arrest or criminal case so they are treated, for most legal purposes, as though they never occurred. Under West Virginia’s expungement statutes:

• Some provisions (like former § 61‑11‑25(a)) concerned dismissed charges or acquittals;
• Others (like § 61‑11‑26) concern convictions, with stricter criteria and waiting periods.

2. Plea Agreement and Global Plea Package

A plea agreement is a negotiated deal between the prosecutor and defendant. Common components include:

• The defendant agrees to plead guilty to one or more charges;
• The State agrees to:
  • Dismiss other charges;
  • Recommend a particular sentence or sentencing range; and/or
  • Permit diversion, deferred adjudication, or probation in lieu of incarceration.

A global plea package resolves multiple charges together; all parts of the deal are conditional on each other. Courts generally treat the entire package as a single “exchange.” That is crucial for determining whether a dismissal was “in exchange for” a guilty plea.

3. Pretrial Diversion and Deferred Adjudication

A pretrial diversion or deferred adjudication is an arrangement where prosecution or the final judgment is postponed on condition that the defendant:

• Comply with certain terms (e.g., treatment, community service, remaining law‑abiding, meeting with a probation officer); and
• Successfully complete a set period of supervision.

If the defendant succeeds, the charge is often dismissed; if the defendant fails, prosecutors may resume prosecution or ask the court to enter a previously deferred guilty plea and proceed to sentencing.

In D.K.’s case, the Court noted that his “pretrial diversion” arrangement was akin to what later became codified in W. Va. Code § 61‑11‑22a (deferred adjudication), although that statute did not exist at the time of his agreement.

4. Abuse of Discretion vs. De Novo Review

• Abuse of discretion means the appellate court will defer to the trial court’s decision unless it was based on a clear mistake in how the law or the facts were applied. The appellate court does not re‑try the case, but checks for serious errors of judgment.
• De novo review means the appellate court decides the issue afresh, without any deference to the lower court. Questions like “What does this statute mean?” are reviewed de novo.

In expungement appeals, the Supreme Court uses a mixed standard: de novo for legal questions (like the meaning of § 61‑11‑25(a)), and abuse of discretion for the ultimate decision to grant or deny expungement (assuming the correct law is applied).

5. In Pari Materia

Reading statutes “in pari materia” means interpreting related statutes (on the same subject matter) together so that they form a coherent whole. This is a tool used to resolve ambiguity or fill gaps. But when a statute is clear and unambiguous by itself, West Virginia law holds that in pari materia does not apply.

6. Absurd‑Results Doctrine

The absurd‑results doctrine allows a court, in rare cases, to avoid a literal reading of a statute if that reading would produce an outcome so irrational that the Legislature could not possibly have intended it. But:

• The result must be truly absurd or contrary to any rational legislative purpose, not merely harsh or unfair in the eyes of one party;
• The court’s departure from the text must be limited and aimed at preserving the statute’s core purpose, not rewriting policy wholesale.

In D.K., the Court found no such absurdity.

7. Remedial Statutes and Liberal Construction

A remedial statute is a law designed to correct some harm or injustice or to provide a benefit or remedy. Courts often say such statutes should be “liberally construed” to fulfill their purpose. But:

• Liberal construction can expand a statute to cover situations that are clearly within its spirit, even if not expressly mentioned;
• It cannot negate or override explicit exclusions or conditions written into the statute.

Thus, even if § 61‑11‑25(a) is remedial, its express exclusion of dismissals “in exchange for a guilty plea” cannot be nullified by “liberal” interpretation.

8. “Nunc Pro Tunc” Orders

“Nunc pro tunc” is Latin for “now for then.” A nunc pro tunc order is an order entered now that is deemed effective as of an earlier date. In D.K.’s case, the 2022 order dismissing the drug charge was entered nunc pro tunc to May 12, 2016, meaning the law treats the dismissal as having occurred in 2016, even though the paperwork was signed later.

9. Use of Initials in Expungement Cases

Under Rule 40(e)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, courts use initials instead of full names in expungement cases to protect privacy. That is why the case style is In re: Petition of D.K. rather than a full name.

V. Conclusion

In re: Petition of D.K. for Expungement of Record is a significant decision for West Virginia’s expungement law and plea‑bargaining practice, particularly under the pre‑2024 version of W. Va. Code § 61‑11‑25(a). It establishes that:

• Dismissals that are part of a plea‑and‑diversion package are treated as “in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense,” even when the dismissal occurs long after the plea and is conditioned on successful diversion.
• Such dismissals are categorically ineligible for expungement under former § 61‑11‑25(a).
• Courts must interpret unambiguous statutes according to their plain language, without resorting to in pari materia, expansive remedial construction, or the absurd‑results doctrine, absent truly exceptional circumstances.
• The abuse‑of‑discretion standard continues to govern appellate review of circuit‑court expungement orders, even in the ICA era, with de novo review reserved for pure legal questions.

For future cases, the opinion sends a clear signal: bargaining away charges in exchange for guilty pleas has permanent consequences for expungement eligibility. Defendants and counsel must factor that reality into plea discussions. And unless and until the Legislature alters the statutory language, courts in West Virginia will enforce such textual limits strictly, even when they cut against a petitioner who has successfully completed diversion and otherwise appears rehabilitated.