In re M.W.: Severe Child Trauma, Limits on Reunification Efforts, and Termination of Parental Rights Despite Parental Rehabilitation

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re M.W., No. 25-7 (Nov. 4, 2025), addresses a difficult and increasingly common problem in child welfare law: how courts should proceed when a parent has made extraordinary rehabilitative progress, yet the child, suffering from severe and longstanding trauma, adamantly rejects reunification and even the thought of contact.

The case arises from Boone County and concerns petitioner mother L.W. (“Mother”) and her fifteen-year-old child, M.W. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged abuse and neglect based primarily on Mother's longstanding substance abuse and unsafe living conditions. Mother later achieved nearly fifteen months of sobriety, successfully completed a post-adjudicatory improvement period, and was described by service providers as a “recovery rock star.” Nevertheless, the circuit court terminated her parental rights, concluding that the child’s severe emotional injury and entrenched fear made reunification untenable in the near future and that adoption was necessary to provide permanency.

On appeal, Mother raised three principal issues:

Whether DHS made “reasonable efforts” to preserve and reunify the family when it did not attempt family therapy or supervised visitation and delayed the child’s psychological evaluation.
Whether the circuit court erred by choosing the most drastic disposition—termination of parental rights—instead of a less restrictive alternative such as terminating only custodial rights and establishing a guardianship.
Whether the circuit court gave excessive weight to the child’s wish to be adopted and to have no further contact with Mother.

The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order. While the decision does not formally create new black-letter law, it meaningfully applies and refines several core principles in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence:

“Reasonable efforts” to reunify do not require DHS to provide services—such as family therapy or visitation—that mental-health professionals and the child’s reactions indicate are unsafe, futile, or likely to exacerbate self-harm.
There can be “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected even when the parent has rehabilitated, if the child’s emotional injuries and trauma-induced fear cannot be repaired in the near future.
The informed, consistent wishes of an older child, particularly one over fourteen with severe trauma, can carry substantial weight in the best-interest analysis and may support termination and adoption over guardianship, even when the parent and guardian ad litem favor a less permanent option.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Pre-petition history and CPS involvement

Before the abuse and neglect petition, M.W. had been placed in a legal guardianship in December 2022. That guardianship was disrupted in April 2023. At that point, Mother petitioned to regain custody.

However, CPS investigation uncovered significant concerns:

Mother tested positive for methamphetamine.
Her home lacked proper waste disposal.
She had illegally obtained electricity.

Concerned about these conditions and Mother’s continued drug use, the circuit court declined to return the child to Mother and ordered DHS to file an abuse and neglect petition. In June 2023, DHS petitioned, alleging Mother’s illegal substance abuse and inability to provide safe and adequate housing.

B. Adjudication and improvement period

At the August 2023 adjudicatory hearing, Mother stipulated that she abused illegal substances and that this abuse negatively affected her parenting. On that basis, the circuit court adjudicated her as an abusive and neglectful parent as to M.W.

In September 2023, the court granted Mother a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Conditions included:

Maintaining sobriety and submitting to drug screens.
Participating in outpatient substance abuse treatment.
Participating in family treatment court (if accepted).
Obtaining and maintaining appropriate housing and stable income.

Mother excelled in these services. Service providers described her as a model participant. She completed family treatment court, maintained a period approaching fifteen months of sobriety, consistently attended recovery meetings and individual therapy, and secured housing, employment, and transportation.

C. Child’s condition and refusal of contact

Despite Mother's significant progress, the situation with the child was dramatically different. By the November 2024 dispositional hearing:

M.W., then fifteen, had been diagnosed with severe post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
The child was in ongoing treatment with a psychiatrist and a counselor.
The child repeatedly, firmly, and credibly expressed a desire to have no contact with Mother and to remain in the current foster placement.

Critically, the child's trauma response to Mother’s presence—or even the suggestion of contact—manifested in self-harm:

The child self-harmed after a worker brought gifts from Mother.
The child self-harmed again after a worker merely mentioned scheduling a visit with Mother.

In light of these “severe reactions,” CPS workers concluded it was not safe to attempt family therapy and that the child's position and distress were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, regardless of the services DHS might offer.

D. Expert psychological evaluation

A forensic psychologist evaluated the child and testified as an expert:

The child feared Mother and had “a very negative opinion” of her, grounded in “various types of abuse and neglect” over the course of the child’s upbringing.
The psychologist opined that the child was capable of expressing her own wishes, even if her presentation was more juvenile than her chronological age.
Repairing the parent-child relationship would be “very, very difficult” without the child’s willing participation.
Family therapy requires both parties’ willingness to engage; without the child’s participation, it would not be effective.
Given the history of mental-health issues and self-harm, the psychologist expressed concern about reunification.

E. DHS and GAL recommendations; Mother’s request

Two CPS workers testified that DHS recommended termination of parental rights to allow the child to achieve permanency through adoption. They emphasized:

The child’s firm, persistent desire not to be returned to Mother’s care, given “her years of abuse and neglect.”
The child's strong preference for adoption in the current placement.
The child's specific anxiety that a guardianship would allow Mother to later regain custody.
Their view that the damage to the parent-child relationship could not be repaired in the near future, with or without DHS assistance.

By contrast, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) recommended a less drastic approach—terminating only Mother’s custodial rights and placing the child in a guardianship with the current caregiver, believing that arrangement would maintain the child’s safety and security.

Mother, acknowledging the depth of the child’s trauma, likewise did not seek immediate reunification. She testified that:

She had remained sober for nearly fifteen months and maintained treatment and recovery supports.
She had suitable housing, transportation, and employment.
She would rather the child remain where she was if the child was happy there.
She did not want the court to force the child into family therapy.
She requested termination of only her custodial rights and establishment of a guardianship, which she perceived to be less permanent than adoption.
She hoped to pursue visitation in the future if the child desired; she acknowledged the child's psychological suffering and conceded there was nothing more she could do to repair the relationship at that point.

F. Circuit court’s dispositional findings

The circuit court praised Mother’s efforts, finding that she had “accomplished amazing things” during her improvement period and effectively remedied her substance abuse. However, the court focused on the child’s emotional injuries and the irreparable state of their relationship in the near term:

The child had been “repeatedly and severely emotionally injured over her entire life” by Mother’s substance abuse and “may never overcome it.”
The child self-harmed merely at the thought of being around Mother.
At nearly sixteen, the child showed “no signs of budging” from her insistence on having no relationship with Mother.
The court was uncertain that “any amount of resources” could possibly heal the relationship.
The court found the child's emotional injuries could not be remedied “in the near future either with or without help.”
The court concluded the only way the child might eventually be open to repairing the relationship would be to give her a permanent, safe, stable home from which to heal.

The court found:

DHS had made reasonable efforts toward reunification, in light of the history and unique factors in the case.
Termination of parental rights was in the child's best interests and was the least restrictive dispositional alternative available.
Post-termination contact with Mother could occur in the future if the child wished it.

The circuit court terminated Mother’s parental rights. The permanency plan was adoption by the child’s current foster caregiver. Mother appealed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order in all respects. Applying a mixed standard of review—clear error for factual findings and de novo review for legal conclusions (citing Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011))—the Court held:

Reasonable efforts. DHS made reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family, even though it did not initiate family therapy or supervised visitation and even if the child’s psychological evaluation might arguably have been conducted earlier. The record supported the circuit court’s finding that these additional services were not reasonable or safe given the child’s severe PTSD, self-harm, and consistent refusal to participate.
Least restrictive alternative. The circuit court properly terminated parental rights without employing less restrictive alternatives such as guardianship, because there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect and abuse—specifically, the child’s severe emotional injury and destroyed trust—could be substantially corrected in the near future, as contemplated by W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(5). Termination was consistent with the statutory framework and the controlling best-interest standard.
Child’s wishes. The circuit court appropriately considered, but did not mechanically follow, the child’s wishes, as required by W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C) and In re J.A., 242 W. Va. 226, 833 S.E.2d 487 (2019). The child’s preference for adoption and refusal of contact were part of a broader evidentiary picture—supported by expert testimony and self-harm incidents—showing that termination and adoption were in the child’s best interests. The Supreme Court, following In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025), declined to reweigh the evidence.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the December 5, 2024 termination order.

IV. Legal Analysis

A. The governing statutory and doctrinal framework

Several interlocking legal standards frame the Court’s analysis:

Reasonable efforts requirement. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iv), any dispositional order terminating parental rights must indicate whether DHS made reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family, or explain why such efforts would have been unreasonable under the circumstances.
Dispositional alternatives and “no reasonable likelihood” standard. W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) authorizes termination of parental rights if there is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future” and when termination is necessary for the welfare of the child. Subsection (d)(5) specifies that this “no reasonable likelihood” standard includes situations where:
“[t]he abusing parent . . . [has] repeatedly or seriously injured the child . . . emotionally, . . . and the degree of family stress . . . [is] so great as to preclude the use of resources to mitigate or resolve family problems.”
Best interests of the child. The “controlling standard” for any dispositional decision remains the child’s best interests. The Court reaffirmed Syl. Pt. 4 of In re N.H., 241 W. Va. 648, 827 S.E.2d 436 (2019) (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, In re B.H., 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 734 (2014)) that the child’s best interests govern, and echoed In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 629, 408 S.E.2d 365, 381 (1991): in balancing parental rights and child welfare, the child’s welfare is paramount.
Child’s wishes (14+). W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C) requires that, in considering termination, the circuit court “give consideration to the wishes of a child [fourteen] years of age or older.” As summarized in Syl. Pt. 4 of In re J.A.:
A circuit court is not obligated to comply with the child’s wishes, but shall make the termination decision based upon a consideration of the child’s best interests.
Standard of review. On appeal, factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo (In re Cecil T.). Appellate courts will not reweigh evidence or substitute their judgment for that of the trial court (In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 233, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996); In re D.S.).

B. Reasonable efforts where the child is severely traumatized and refuses contact

1. Mother’s “reasonable efforts” argument

Mother argued that DHS did not make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family, even though she and the child received individual services. Specifically, she claimed DHS:

Failed to foster an atmosphere that would improve the parent-child relationship.
Did not attempt family therapy or supervised visitation.
Unreasonably delayed conducting the child’s psychological evaluation.

She relied on the line of cases emphasizing that an improvement period has, as one of its goals, fostering an improved relationship between parent and child, citing In re M.M., 244 W. Va. 316, 853 S.E.2d 556 (2020), which in turn relied on In re Carlita B..

2. Court’s reconciliation with M.M. and Carlita B.

The Supreme Court acknowledged the principle from M.M. and Carlita B.: a key goal of an improvement period is strengthening the parent-child relationship, not only rehabbing the parent in the abstract. However, the Court held that this goal was not realistically attainable in this case, “even with help,” due to:

The repeated and severe emotional injury Mother’s substance abuse caused the child.
The child’s inability to overcome these injuries despite ongoing counseling and psychiatric treatment.
The child’s self-harm upon receiving gifts from Mother and upon merely being told a visit might be scheduled.
The expert psychologist’s opinion that, without the child’s willing participation, repairing the relationship would be “very, very difficult,” and that family therapy would likely be ineffective.

The Court endorsed the circuit court’s finding that, under these circumstances, DHS’s decision not to initiate family therapy or supervised visitation was reasonable. Efforts that would likely trigger self-harm or escalate trauma were neither safe nor promising as reunification tools.

3. Timing of the psychological evaluation

Mother also argued that the child’s forensic psychological evaluation should have been conducted earlier, presumably to shape interventions sooner. The Supreme Court rejected this as a basis for reversal, emphasizing Mother’s failure to demonstrate prejudice:

The psychologist concluded that family therapy would only be helpful if the child was willing to participate.
The child’s steadfast refusal to engage in such services and deep opposition to contact were consistent throughout.
Mother did not explain how an earlier evaluation would have materially changed the outcome.

The Court emphasized that the termination order was “not attributable to the DHS’s lack of effort or violation of its statutory obligations.” Rather, it was driven by the child’s unremedied emotional injuries and the expert-supported conclusion that additional reunification services would be ineffective and potentially harmful.

4. Doctrinal significance

The decision clarifies that:

“Reasonable efforts” are context-dependent; they do not compel DHS to implement all theoretically available services.
Where credible evidence shows that certain services (e.g., family therapy, visitation) would likely provoke self-harm or exacerbate the child’s trauma, DHS may reasonably forgo those services.
Courts may properly find that DHS has met its efforts obligation even when some typical reunification tools are never deployed, so long as the record adequately explains why they would be unreasonable or unsafe.

This is a practical application of the statutory language that allows a finding that certain efforts would be “unreasonable due to specific circumstances.” Here, the specific circumstances were the child’s PTSD, self-harm responses, and absolute refusal of contact.

C. Termination as the least restrictive alternative despite parental rehabilitation

1. Mother’s request for a guardianship and partial termination

Mother did not seek immediate reunification. Instead, she:

Asked the court to terminate only her custodial rights.
Requested that the child’s placement be converted into a guardianship, which she viewed as less permanent than adoption.
Hoped future contact might develop if the child chose it.

The GAL similarly recommended terminating only custodial rights and using guardianship to preserve the child’s safety and stability.

2. Legal rule on less restrictive alternatives

The Court reiterated that termination may be used without resort to less restrictive alternatives when statutory criteria are met. Citing Syl. Pt. 5, in part, of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)), the Court noted:

“Termination of parental rights . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.”

Under § 49-4-604(d)(5), there is no such reasonable likelihood when:

“[t]he abusing parent . . . [has] repeatedly or seriously injured the child . . . emotionally, . . . and the degree of family stress . . . [is] so great as to preclude the use of resources to mitigate or resolve family problems.”

3. Application to Mother’s case

The Supreme Court held that this statutory standard was satisfied. The circuit court’s findings established that:

Mother’s neglect over most of the child’s life caused severe emotional injury.
The parent-child relationship was “profoundly damaged.”
The child self-harmed at the mere prospect of being in Mother’s presence.
No amount of services could remedy the situation “in the near future.”
The child’s welfare required permanency through adoption, to provide the safe, secure, stable home needed for healing.

Crucially, the “conditions of neglect or abuse” were not limited to Mother’s current conduct (substance abuse), which she had substantially corrected, but extended to the ongoing consequences of past abuse and neglect—namely, the child’s deep, trauma-based fear of Mother and the destruction of trust. These conditions could not be corrected in the near future, if at all.

Thus, even though Mother herself had rehabilitated, the statutory focus on the child’s condition and the broader family dynamic justified termination without intermediate steps such as guardianship.

4. Best interests and permanence versus guardianship

The Court reinforced that the child’s best interests remained the controlling standard (citing N.H., B.H., and Carlita B.). In this case:

The child’s firm wish for adoption and dread of guardianship (out of fear that Mother might later regain custody) weighed strongly in favor of adoption.
Adoption provided greater legal certainty and finality than guardianship, which the child perceived as precarious.
The circuit court reasonably concluded that only adoption—as opposed to guardianship—would provide the degree of permanency and psychological security needed for the child to continue healing.

This is significant because both the GAL and Mother favored a guardianship solution. The Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed termination and adoption, underscoring that:

The GAL’s recommendation, while important, is not binding on the court.
The parent’s preference for a less permanent arrangement cannot override the child’s best interests as determined by the evidence.
Guardianship is not presumptively the “least restrictive alternative” when it fails to meet a traumatized child’s need for finality and safety.

D. The role of the child’s wishes in the termination decision

1. Statutory requirement

W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C) requires a circuit court, when considering termination, to “give consideration to the wishes of a child [fourteen] years of age or older regarding the permanent termination of parental rights.”

In In re J.A., the Court clarified that:

A circuit court is not obligated to comply with the child’s wishes, but shall make the termination decision based upon a consideration of the child’s best interests.

Mother argued that the circuit court placed “too much weight” on the child’s wishes to be adopted and to sever the relationship with Mother.

2. The child’s wishes in context

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the circuit court did not treat the child’s wishes as dispositive. Instead, it:

Considered the child’s repeated, consistent, and clearly expressed desire—over time—to have no contact with Mother and to be adopted by the current caregiver.
Relied on the forensic psychologist’s opinion that the child was capable of articulating her wishes.
Tied the child’s wishes to extensive evidence of trauma, fear, and self-harm responses triggered by even indirect contact with Mother.
Balanced those wishes against Mother’s rehabilitation, the GAL’s recommendation, the DHS recommendation, and the statutory best-interest standard.

The child’s wishes thus were one factor—albeit a weighty one—within a comprehensive best-interest analysis rather than an automatic “veto” power.

3. Appellate deference

The Supreme Court, invoking In re D.S., reaffirmed that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence. Once satisfied that the circuit court considered the required statutory factors—including the child’s wishes—and grounded its decision in the evidence, the Supreme Court deferred to the lower court’s judgment about how much weight to give each factor.

The Court therefore found no error in how the circuit court weighed the child’s preference for adoption.

E. Precedents cited and their influence

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).
Cited for the basic standard of review in abuse and neglect appeals: clear-error review of factual findings and de novo review of legal conclusions. This frames the Court’s limited role: it will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the circuit court if the findings are supported by the record.
In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 233, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).
Cited (Syl. Pt. 1, in part) to emphasize that appellate courts will not disturb a trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. This supports the Court’s refusal to second-guess the circuit court’s determinations that family therapy was unsafe, the child’s injuries could not be quickly remedied, and DHS’s efforts were reasonable.
In re M.M., 244 W. Va. 316, 853 S.E.2d 556 (2020), and In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991).
These cases underline that a primary “goal” of an improvement period should be improving the parent-child relationship. The Court here acknowledges that principle but explains that, in M.W., the child’s severe emotional injuries rendered that goal unattainable in the near term, even with reasonable efforts. Thus, M.W. does not reject M.M./ Carlita B.; it defines the limits of what an improvement period can accomplish when a child is profoundly traumatized.
In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), and In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).
These decisions stand for the proposition that termination of parental rights can be ordered without first attempting less restrictive alternatives if there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected. M.W. applies this doctrine where the uncorrectable conditions are the child’s severe emotional injuries and destroyed trust, rather than the parent’s present behavior.
In re N.H., 241 W. Va. 648, 827 S.E.2d 436 (2019), and In re B.H., 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 734 (2014).
These cases reiterate that the child’s best interests are the controlling standard in dispositional decisions. M.W. uses this principle to justify choosing termination and adoption over guardianship, despite Mother's improvements and the GAL’s preference.
In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991).
Also cited to emphasize that, in the balance between parental rights and child welfare, the child’s welfare is paramount. M.W. embodies this by prioritizing the child’s need for emotional safety and permanence over Mother’s desire to maintain some residual legal status.
In re J.A., 242 W. Va. 226, 833 S.E.2d 487 (2019).
Cited for the rule that courts must consider, but are not bound by, the wishes of children aged fourteen or older regarding termination. M.W. applies this by giving substantial consideration to a fifteen-year-old’s well-founded preference for adoption, but still framing the ultimate decision as a best-interest determination.
In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025).
Cited for the appellate principle that the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence. This principle is central to the Court’s refusal to disturb the circuit court’s weighing of the child’s wishes and the conclusion that termination best served the child’s interests.

V. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

For non-specialists, several abuse-and-neglect concepts used in the opinion are worth clarifying:

Adjudicatory hearing.
The stage where the court decides whether the allegations of abuse or neglect are proven. In this case, Mother stipulated that her drug use harmed her parenting, so the court adjudicated her as an abusive and neglectful parent.
Post-adjudicatory improvement period.
A court-supervised period after adjudication during which the parent receives services to correct the problems that led to the abuse or neglect finding (e.g., treatment, parenting classes, housing assistance). Successful completion can pave the way to reunification—but does not guarantee it.
Dispositional hearing.
The stage after adjudication and any improvement periods, where the court decides the permanent plan for the child: return home, guardianship, placement with a relative, termination of parental rights and adoption, etc.
Termination of parental rights.
The most drastic disposition. It permanently severs the legal relationship between parent and child (with limited exceptions, such as court-ordered post-termination visitation in narrow circumstances), allowing the child to be adopted.
Guardianship.
A less permanent arrangement in which another adult assumes legal responsibility for the child’s care while the biological parent’s legal status is not fully terminated. It can often be modified in the future at the parent’s request, which is precisely what made the child in this case fearful.
Reasonable efforts.
The legal duty of DHS to try, through services and supports, to help families stay together or reunify if it can be done safely. What counts as “reasonable” depends on the case and does not require DHS to provide every conceivable service, especially those that would likely cause harm.
No reasonable likelihood conditions can be corrected.
A statutory phrase meaning that, in the foreseeable future, the problems that led to the abuse or neglect (including their impact on the child) are not likely to be fixed, even with services. It is a prerequisite for termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).
Best interests of the child.
The overarching principle in child welfare law that courts must prioritize the child’s safety, stability, and long-term well-being—even over the parent’s desire to maintain rights—when the two are in conflict.
Guardian ad litem (GAL).
An attorney appointed to represent the child’s best interests (not necessarily the child’s stated preferences, though those are considered). The GAL’s recommendation is influential but not binding on the court.
Memorandum decision.
A shorter appellate decision issued under W. Va. R. App. P. 21, typically without a full syllabus. It resolves the case and can be cited, but it is usually used when the Court concludes that existing law adequately resolves the issues and no new comprehensive opinion is needed.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For DHS and child welfare agencies

The decision provides practical guidance on how DHS can satisfy the “reasonable efforts” requirement when dealing with older, severely traumatized children:

DHS is not obligated to force contact (via family therapy or visitation) that professionals believe will trigger self-harm or deepen trauma.
Agencies must thoroughly document the child’s reactions, professional assessments, and the reasons certain services are not attempted, so the court can make specific findings that alternative efforts would be unreasonable or unsafe.
Mental-health services for the child, and careful attention to the child’s expressed wishes, can be just as important as services for the parent in evaluating reunification prospects.

B. For parents and their counsel

The opinion is both cautionary and instructive for parents in abuse and neglect proceedings:

Compliance with services and personal rehabilitation, while essential, may not be sufficient to prevent termination if the child has suffered deep, enduring emotional harm and strongly opposes reunification.
Parents and counsel should address the child’s trauma proactively—supporting the child’s mental-health treatment and demonstrating insight into the harm done and the child’s need for safety and autonomy.
Proposals for less restrictive alternatives (like guardianship) must be evaluated through the lens of the child’s subjective sense of safety and permanence. If the child perceives guardianship as unstable or threatening, the court may justifiably favor adoption.

C. For judges and GALs

In re M.W. underscores the importance of:

Making detailed, individualized findings about both parental progress and the child’s emotional state, including any trauma-related responses to contact.
Explaining clearly why certain services (like family therapy) were not attempted, especially in “reasonable efforts” analyses.
Weighing, but not mechanically following, the recommendations of DHS, GALs, and the expressed wishes of the child.

It also signals that courts may properly:

Reject a GAL’s preference for guardianship and a parent’s desire to retain residual rights, where evidence indicates that only adoption will meet the child’s need for finality and emotional security.
Continue to permit post-termination contact at the child’s discretion, thereby allowing for the possibility of future healing without undermining the immediate need for permanency.

D. For older youth in foster care

For adolescents, especially those over fourteen, the case affirms that:

Their informed, consistent wishes regarding permanency—especially when supported by psychological evaluations—will be taken seriously and can be decisive in highly traumatized cases.
Their fears about legal arrangements such as guardianships (e.g., that it might enable a parent to seek custody again) matter and can shape the court’s best-interest analysis.

At the same time, the case avoids granting older youth an unchecked veto; their wishes are powerful evidence but still situated within a broader best-interest framework.

VII. Conclusion

In re M.W. is a nuanced application of West Virginia’s abuse and neglect framework to a heartbreaking but increasingly familiar set of facts: a parent who has worked diligently to overcome addiction and comply with services, and a traumatized teenager who views any renewed relationship with that parent as terrifying and destabilizing.

The decision reinforces several key principles:

Reasonable efforts have limits. DHS is not required to pursue reunification services that credible evidence shows would be unsafe or futile, especially when those efforts might intensify a child’s trauma or self-harm.
Parental rehabilitation is necessary but not always sufficient. Courts may still find “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions of abuse or neglect can be corrected where the child’s emotional injuries are profound and unremedied, even if the parent has addressed her own conduct.
Permanency and best interests can outweigh less drastic legal options. When guardianship fails to provide the psychological security an older traumatized child needs, termination and adoption may be deemed the least restrictive—and most appropriate—alternative.
Older children’s voices matter. Courts must consider, and may substantially credit, the well-supported wishes of children aged fourteen and older, while still grounding decisions in the overall best-interest analysis.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s affirmance in In re M.W. underscores that in West Virginia’s child welfare system, the child’s safety, emotional well-being, and need for lasting permanence remain the lodestars, even in the face of a parent’s admirable and genuine efforts at rehabilitation.