In re L.M.: Balancing Grandparent and Sibling Placement Preferences Under West Virginia Law—The Primacy of the Child’s Best Interests

Introduction

In In re L.M., No. 24-426 (W. Va. June 26 2025), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia confronted the perennial tension between statutory placement preferences and the overarching mandate to protect a child’s best interests in abuse-and-neglect proceedings. The petitioners—paternal grandmother S.M. and step-grandfather G.M.—sought permanent placement of their twenty-two-month-old grandchild, L.M., after both parents’ rights were terminated. Although an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) home study approved their Ohio residence, the circuit court refused to displace L.M. from the foster home where he had lived for sixteen months with his three older maternal half-siblings. This commentary unpacks the Court’s affirmation of that refusal, emphasizing the methodological framework for weighing the “grandparent preference” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-114(a)(3)) against the “sibling preference” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-111(e)(1) & § 49-2-126(a)(6))—all through the lens of the child’s holistic welfare.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s July 1 2024 order denying the grandparents’ motion for permanent placement.
2. Applying a “clear-error” standard to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions (In re Cecil T.), the Court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s best-interest analysis.
3. The Court reiterated that both grandparent and sibling statutory preferences are rebuttable; the child’s best interests remain the “paramount concern.”
4. Evidence supporting the foster placement included (a) a strong sibling bond, (b) demonstrated trauma when separated, (c) the grandparents’ questionable credibility regarding the father’s presence and abuse, and (d) minimal child–grandparent bonding.
5. Ancillary claims—e.g., denial of contact and grandparent visitation—failed for procedural default or lack of record support under W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89 (2011) – Established the bifurcated standard of review (clear error vs. de novo).
In re K.E., 240 W. Va. 220 (2018) – Clarified that the grandparent preference is non-absolute and subordinate to the best interests of the child.
Napoleon S. v. Walker, 217 W. Va. 254 (2005) – Syllabus point 4 often quoted for the same principle.
In re R.S., 244 W. Va. 564 (2021) – Directed courts to conduct a best-interest analysis when applying the sibling preference.
In re G.G., 249 W. Va. 496 (2023) – Reaffirmed the broad discretion of trial courts in custody matters.
In re D.S., 914 S.E.2d 701 (W. Va. 2025) – Warned appellate courts against reweighing evidence or assessing credibility de novo.
In re A.F., 2025 WL 1603901 (W. Va. 2025) – Reiterated that reasons for overcoming the grandparent preference must appear expressly in findings of fact and conclusions of law.

These authorities collectively framed the doctrinal path: statutory preferences guide but do not dictate; best interest is the polestar.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in four logical steps:

Standard of Review & Deference
Citing Cecil T. and G.G., the Court reminded parties that factual determinations—credibility, bonding, risk of parental intrusion—are uniquely within the circuit court’s ken. Re-litigating those under the guise of appellate argument was impermissible.
Competing Preferences
Though the legislature articulates both grandparent and sibling preferences, neither is labeled “stronger.” The Court reaffirmed its jurisprudence that each may yield when outweighed by individual best-interest factors (safety, continuity, emotional stability, trauma history).
Application to Facts
a) The sibling group had endured collective trauma and demonstrated protective bonding.
b) Foster placement was stable for sixteen months; professionals attested the children were “thriving.”
c) The grandparents’ insight into the father’s dangers was minimal; conflicting testimony suggested the father resided (or at least frequented) their home.
d) The child-grandparent bond was weak; supervised visitation displayed distress.
e) The petitioners never moved to take all four siblings—thus could not satisfy both statutory preferences simultaneously.
Procedural Integrity
Rule 10(c)(7) deficiencies doomed the visitation-rights assignment of error. The Court’s insistence on pinpoint citations reflects an ongoing campaign to curb sloppy appellate briefing.

Impact of the Decision

While In re L.M. does not radically shift West Virginia child-welfare doctrine, it crystallizes several practical teachings:

Codified preferences are presumptions, not entitlements. Practitioners must marshal best-interest evidence instead of relying solely on familial status.
Sibling cohesion can outweigh grandparent preference. Expect MDTs and caseworkers to pivot quickly toward sibling-focused permanency plans when bonds are strong.
Credibility matters. Minimizing a parent’s abuse or equivocating about their residency will undercut kinship placement efforts.
Appellate briefing discipline. The Court continues to enforce Rule 10(c)(7), hinting at future dismissals for non-compliance.
Adoption trajectory clarity. Once the foster family signals intent to adopt, grandparent visitation petitions become precarious; any order is vacated upon nonrelative adoption (see W. Va. Code § 48-10-501).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC): A uniform statutory agreement among states ensuring that out-of-state placements meet safety standards in both sending and receiving states.
Multidisciplinary Team (MDT): A statutorily required body—including DHS, guardian ad litem, service providers, and sometimes foster parents—tasked with developing and reviewing placement and service plans.
Grandparent Preference (W. Va. Code § 49-4-114(a)(3)): The Department “shall first consider” willing and suitable grandparents for adoption placements—but only as a first look, not a mandate.
Sibling Preference (W. Va. Code §§ 49-4-111(e), 49-2-126(a)(6)): A policy encouraging siblings to live together when safe and feasible, yet still subject to best-interest analysis.
Best-Interest Analysis: A holistic inquiry into a child’s physical safety, emotional needs, bonding, continuity, and developmental welfare—trumping all statutory presumptions.
Standard of Review: “Clear error” for facts means the appellate court will overturn only if the findings are plainly wrong; “de novo” for legal questions means no deference to the lower court’s legal conclusions.

Conclusion

In re L.M. reinforces West Virginia’s unwavering commitment to child-centric decision-making in abuse-and-neglect proceedings. The ruling illustrates that even when grandparents pass ICPC scrutiny and express willingness, the court may prefer a non-kin foster placement if substantial evidence demonstrates that separating siblings or exposing a child to residual danger would be detrimental. For counsel, the case underscores the necessity of building a best-interest narrative rather than invoking statutory preferences in isolation. For trial courts, it provides a template for crafting detailed findings that withstand appellate scrutiny. Ultimately, In re L.M. stands for a deceptively simple yet potent principle: the best interests of the child eclipse all statutory shortcuts, familial entitlements, and procedural conveniences.